This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga, the Hon. Julio Llorente presiding,  convicting the accused of  a violation  of section 57 of Act No. 1189 and sentencing him to one year in prison, to the payment of the costs of the action, and confiscating in favor of the Insular Government the cigarettes sold in violation of the Internal Revenue Law, the factory, the land upon which  it stands, the machinery, fixtures, and all other property located therein, and ordering the disposition of the goods and the rendition of an account of the proceeds of the same in the manner provided by law.

It  is alleged in this  case that between the 29th of December, 1908, and the 11th of July, 1909, Calixto Surla, the defendant in this case, being engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes, and being duly licensed thereto by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Insular Government, took from said factory and sold for domestic consumption in the locality where the  factory was situated 42,000 cigarettes which were properly subject  to the tax imposed by section 101 of the Internal Revenue Law [1189] aforesaid without paying  the revenue tax thereon.  It is also charged in the information that this was the second offense which the accused had committed, he having been fined for a  similar act on the 20th  of March, 1908.

The  shortage  of 42,000 cigarettes is not denied.  The difference between the prosecution and the defense relates simply to  the reason for such shortage, the prosecution alleging that the shortage was due, as above stated, to the secret and unlawful  removal of said  cigarettes from the factory by the accused for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the tax thereon, the accused asserting that the shortage  was  due,  first,  to the consumption  of a  large number of cigarettes  by the operatives in the factory, upon which there is no tax, and, second, to the mistakes made by Eulogio Manalang, the bookkeeper, in entering on the books the  number  of  cigarettes  daily manufactured  and the number taken from the warehouse and sold. We  are convinced that the following findings  by the learned trial court are fully sustained by the evidence: 

"That the accused  is a manufacturer of cigarettes and is the owner of the factory A-5-255, situated in the pueblo of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, P. I., the license having been issued in the name of said Calixto Surla; that on the 9th day of July, 1909, Roullven and  Moran,  internal-revenue agents, visited the said factory for the purpose of inspecting it;  that it appeared, according to the statement of Eulogio Manalang, Surla's superintendent, that Surla had possession of the key to the storehouse, and he being absent, the revenue agents were not able at that time to inspect the warehouse. They were under the necessity of  waiting until they  could obtain the key,  Eulogio Manalang went to get the key but soon returned stating that Surla was sleeping and that he did not dare awaken him. By reason, however, of the insistence of the  agents that they would enter the storehouse even though  they did so by force,  Manalang called Calixto Surla,  who finally appeared  and   opened the storehouse. In the presence of the accused the  agents proceeded to take an inventory of the cigarettes found therein and also of the books  of  the factory.  They  found a shortage of 42,000 cigarettes.  Surla admitted such shortage but stated that he did not know to what to attribute the shortage because ever since his first conviction he had always carried the key to the storehouse himself.  He further stated that the shortage must be due to the mistakes of his superintendent,  Eulogio Manalang.   The agents then  immediately visited the different stores in Angeles and found ten packages of cigarettes  from the factory of Calixto Surla  upon  which the package number had been duplicated.  Nine of these  packages were present in evidence.   On the 12th of July,  1909, the said internal-revenue agents, accompanied  by Mr.  Armstrong, another agent, returned to the factory  and made an inventory of the materials there, finding there also a shortage of 693 kilos and 740 grams.  On this occasion Eulogio Manalang stated to the agent Armstrong that he had made a mistake in the  official books of the daily production of the factory and exhibited to said agent a private book which contained as  he stated correct notes of the number of cigarettes  produced daily by the factory. On comparing the entries in the private book with those in the official registry, great differences were found between them.  They aggregate, according to the testimony of the agent, 52,500 cigarettes.  If the differences in the entries on the two books had been made to appear in the official book, instead of a deficit of 42,000 cigarettes there would have been an excess of 10,500 cigarettes.  On  this occasion the  accused again stated to agent Moran that from the day he had been convicted before he had never confided the key of the storehouse to anybody else.  Agents  Roullven and Moran who visited the factory frequently during working hours  always found the doors of the storehouse locked  with  a  padlock, and stated that Calixto Surla  was always the one  who opened the door for them."

After a further discussion of the testimony presented by the accused the  court said:

"In view of all the facts presented in this case the court has arrived at the conclusion that the accused Calixto Surla maliciously and  criminally transferred or consented to the transfer  from  his  factory of the 42,000  cigarettes  in question  without  paying  the  tax  imposed  by law on  or before the moment of such transfer, and it appearing that the accused, according to  Exhibit  A, was convicted on the 20th of March,  1908, for a similar infraction of the law, he must by virtue of section 56 of the Internal Revenue Law be punished as a second offender."

A careful consideration of the record in the cause leads us to agree with the conclusion reached by the learned trial court.  The explanation of the shortage made by Eulogio Manalang varied with the time when it  was made.  The explanations of the accused himself in relation to the same matter are  equally unsatisfactory  and  unreliable.  The evidence  of the prosecution is clear and definite.  It leaves substantially nothing to inference.  It appears from the whole case that  the court neglected to take into consideration nothing  which would  benefit the accused.  No  important or influential  fact or  circumstance was  left untouched, each being given the weight and significance which it legally deserved.

The trial court also found that the accused had theretofore been found guilty of a violation of section 56 of Act No. 1189.  This finding is clearly sustained by the proofs and the facts upon which it is based are not denied by the defendant.

We are, therefore, in accord with the finding of the trial court upon the facts.

The accused asserts that the Act, in  declaring forfeited the factory and all of its contents and the ground upon which it stands, is unconstitutional.  He  also contends that  the judgment of the trial court is fatally defective in that it fails to state how the property forfeited shall be disposed of and  its proceeds accounted for.

Over the question  involving the constitutionality of  the aforesaid provision, little needs to be said.   That the Act is constitutional is not open to question.   (U. S. vs. Stowell, 133 U.  S., 1.)

As to  the form of the judgment of confiscation,  it is sufficient  to say that it is entirely immaterial to the defendant, legally speaking, how  the property confiscated is disposed of and where its proceeds go.  The property, having been forfeited, belongs absolutely to the Government,  and the proceeds arising from the disposal thereof also belong to the Government.   (U. S. vs. Stowell, 133 U. S., 1, above.) Section 42 [1189] invoked  by the accused for the purpose of demonstrating how the forfeited property should be disposed of,  and its proceeds divided, he asserting that under the terms thereof he is entitled to have the balance returned to him  after the liquidation  of the  unpaid taxes  and expenses of sale, is entirely inapplicable to forfeited property. It relates solely to the sale of property distrained to  pay taxes of  delinquents and the  disposition  of the proceeds thereof.   The title to such  property remains in the delinquent until the sale.  It is  never forfeited and is never in the government unless it becomes a purchaser at the sale.

The property being his he is entitled to whatever surplus there may be after the payment of the taxes and  all the expenses of the distraint and sale.  In case of a forfeiture of property  for crime, however, the title  and ownership of the  convict  are absolutely divested and pass  to the Government.  He ceases to have any interest therein.  As a result he can have no interest in its proceeds.  Section 50 [1189] prescribes the disposition of the property in such cases.

We do not here decide just when  the title and ownership pass from the convict to the Government in case of forfeiture - whether at the time the criminal act is committed, or when the government takes possession  under the forfeiture, or when the judgment of  confiscation is entered. It is unnecessary to a decision of this case.

The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,  with costs against the appellant.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.