This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt from  criminal liability  but was  obligated to  indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of Pl,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane  until further  order of the court.

About the 4th of October, 1909,  several  persons were assembled  in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra,  Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian  Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan  with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he likewise inflicted  various wounds on  the women  named  Calbayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan.

For  this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos  Sur,  dated February 15, charging the non-Christian  Baggay, jr.,  with murder, because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan.  This cause  was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109,  for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the  defendant's  counsel appealed  to this  court.

By another writing of June 27,  the same counsel asked for immediate  suspension  of execution of the judgment, because it  had been appealed and had not become final. He also requested annulment of  the sale at public auction of the property attached by the sheriff or his deputy under order of the court, for making indemnification with  the defendant's property in accordance with said judgment, as the attachment had been executed upon the property of the non-Christian woman named Dioalan and of other persons, and not upon that of the defendant.

In opposition thereto, the  provincial fiscal on the 30th of the same month requested in writing that the appeal from this judgment filed by the counsel for the defense be  not admitted or  carried forward, representing that it was  out of order as having been submitted beyond the time limit; for on the very day said judgment was rendered, April 28, 1910, the accused's counsel,  Sotero  Serrano, was  verbally notified thereof, and it is therefore untrue that he was notified  only on  June 17  of  said  year, on which date he read and  examined  the case  and without the clerk's knowledge signed the same, making it appear that he was notified on that date, June 17, when he had known since April 28 of the judgment,  of  which the judge had verbally informed him, although the latter did not then have him sign it.

In reply to this motion of the provincial fiscal, the defense requested that the appeal filed be  admitted and carried forward, representing that, when the court verbally announced his decision to defendant's counsel; the judgment had not yet been entered, and therefore neither the defendant nor his counsel could be notified thereof in legal form until said date, June 17.

Passing upon this motion on August 2, 1910, the court declared said appeal out of order and dismissed it;  and, furthermore, denied the petition for suspension of judgment, as said  judgment had become final.

Thereupon,  counsel for the defendant  resorted  to this court with a petition praying that a writ be issued directing said judge, Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same time  annulling  all  action taken  for execution  of the judgments rendered in the causes for murder and for lesiones.   After consideration thereof, the Attorney-General, on behalf of said judge and of the provincial fiscal, requested that this remedy be declared out of order, as the issuance of such a writ against the judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and much more against the provincial fiscal, was not in  accordance with law; but this court by order of November 15 saw fit to declare said remedy of  mandamus to be in order and issued a  written order directing the judge of the Court of First Instance to immediately  admit the appeal filed  in  these two causes  and to forward all the records to this higher court.  At the same time he was instructed to refrain absolutely from executing said judgments or causing them  to be  executed while said appeals were  pending, a prohibition  that was  extended to the provincial sheriff, his agents  and representatives, until further order from this  court.  Upon notification  of  the foregoing and in compliance therewith, the judge by order of November 22 admitted the appeal filed by counsel for the defense both in the cause for murder and in that for lesiones.

The question raised on the appeal filed in this case by counsel  for the  insane  defendant, Baggay, jr.,  is solely whether he, notwithstanding that he was held exempt from criminal liability, has  nevertheless incurred  civil liability, with  obligation to indemnify the  heirs of the  murdered woman  and to pay the costs.

Article  17 of the Penal Code states: 

"Every person criminally liable for  a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable."

Article  18 of the same code  says; 

"The  exemption from criminal  liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3,  7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following:

"(1)  In cases 1, 2,  and 3, the persons who are  civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under  their  authority,  legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was  no blame or negligence on their part. 

"Should there be no person having  them under  his authority, legal guardianship, or power, or if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles,  or minors shall answer with their own  property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in  accordance with the civil law."

True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal "liability,  because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is  also liable for reparation of  damage  and for  indemnification  of the harm  done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for  the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for the  reason  that  his fellows ought not to suffer from the disastrous results of his harmful  acts more than is  necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition.  Law and society are  under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his  property for reparation and  indemnification, he is  still entitled to the benefit of  what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune  to suffer the consequences of his acts.

According to the law, the persons in the first place liable. are those  who have the insane party under their care or guardianship, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part; but if the demented person or imbecile lack a guardian or some  person charged  with his care, or if the  latter be insolvent, then his own property must meet the civil  liability of indemnifying or repairing the damage  done, and for this reason judges and courts in rendering judgment in a criminal cause prosecuted against an insane or demented  person,  even when  they hold  the accused exempt from criminal liability,  must  fix the civil liability of  the persons  charged  with watching over and caring for him or the liability of the demented person himself with his property for reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm done, unless the offended party or the heirs of the  person  murdered expressly  renounce such reparation or indemnification.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Moretand, JJ., concur.