Appellant in this case duly excepted to the judgment in the court  below and moved for  a new trial on  the ground that the judgment entered therein is contrary to the weight of the evidence.  This motion having been overruled, he filed his bill of exceptions, wherein he prayed that the evidence submitted at the trial be taken as a part thereof.  This bill of exceptions was approved  and duly certified by the trial judge.

It now appears that the record thus certified is defective, in that it contains only the documentary evidence submitted at the trial  and does not  contain the certified transcript of the stenographer's notes  of the oral evidence taken at the trial in the court  below.

Appellant has thus far failed to  perfect the record,  although his attention has  been called thereto,  and indeed it would appear from his assignment of errors that he has abandoned his contention in the court below based  upon his allegation that the evidence of record does not sustain the judgment to which he excepted.

The rule of practice adopted in this court in a case wherein a motion  has been filed in  the court below on the ground that the evidence  taken therein is not sufficient  to sustain the judgment, and wherein it appears that all of the material  evidence  has not  been brought here  on appeal  is: First,  to grant a new trial on the motion of the appellant if it appears that the defect in the record is due to circumstances over which the appellant had  no control, and that he has exercised due diligence in an effort to cure the defect: second, to decline to grant a new trial where it appears that the appellant (whose duty it is to bring the perfected record here on  appeal), has willfully or negligently failed to include in the  record all or any part of the evidence submitted at the trial; and to proceed  to review the record brought here on appeal,  wholly disregarding the evidence taken in the court below, precisely as we would in an appeal  in a case wherein no motion for a new trial is  submitted in the court below.  In such cases  this court examines only the assignments of error of law, and limits itself to an examination of the pleadings and the findings of fact by the  trial court, seeking to determine whether the judgment rendered by the trial  court is or  is not in accord with  the  facts proven at the trial.

In the case at bar, therefore, appellant  having failed to bring all the evidence here with his bill of exceptions, and his failure so to do appearing to be intentional, he  is not entitled  to a new trial, and,  under the rules, the appellee is entitled to have the proceedings on appeal go forward to judgment without delay, as indicated above.

Counsel for  appellee, however, suggests that while the evidence taken at the trial fully sustains  the judgment of the court below, it is possible that the formal findings of fact by  the trial judge are so  deficient or so imperfectly stated that the judgment can not be sustained on them alone. He fears, therefore, that if the court proceeds to judgment on appeal without having  all the  evidence before it, the judgment of the lower court may be reversed and  the case sent back for a new trial merely because of defects  in the findings  of fact by the trial judge, although the judgment was, in fact, fully  sustained by the evidence taken at the trial.   He insists that no such result would be possible had defendant brought the  evidence here  in  accordance with his announced intention in  the court below, and in accordance with the  express terms of the bill of exceptions as certified  and approved by the trial court.  In support of his contention, counsel correctly says, that had appellant perfected his bill  of exceptions  by including therein all the evidence, then  it would be the duty of this  court, in the event that it found that the findings  of  the court  below were  insufficient or incorrect, to examine the evidence of record,  and to  decline to  reverse the judgment  on that ground,  if the  evidence itself discloses facts sufficient to sustain  the judgment.

It seems clear that under the circumstances of this case the appellee should not be forced to risk a  reversal and the delays and expense incident to a new trial, upon the mere question  of the  formal sufficiency of the findings of fact by the trial judge.   In the  court below appellee was  satisfied with the judgment rendered in his favor.   The appellant, by undertaking to make the evidence a part of the bill of exceptions, lulled him  into  a sense of false security as to the possibility of a reversal on the  mere ground  that the findings of fact by the trial court were defective or insufficient.   Appellant  having announced his intention to bring the evidence here  on appeal, appellee knew that this court, if the evidence were in fact before it, would not reverse on that ground if the evidence itself disclosed facts sufficient to sustain the judgment.  It is  now too late  for  appellee to  secure any amendments or  corrections of  errors  or omissions in the formal  findings of  fact by the trial court unless this court will make such corrections, and this court can not make such corrections unless the evidence is brought here for review.

Manifestly,  the appellant should  not be permitted  to profit by a surprise sprung  on the appellee in this  fashion. If his failure to bring the evidence here in accordance with his announced intention is the result  of negligence,  he should  not  be permitted to profit  unfairly thereby, and much less should he profit unfairly by a deliberate and willful  change of his announced intention to bring the evidence here on appeal.  Of course, if the appellant desires so to do, he should be permitted to waive his contention  in the court below that the evidence of record does not sustain the judgment, and in that  event,  so far as he is concerned, it would be a wholly  useless procedure to  go to the expense of bringing the evidence to this  court.  But appellant's  change of ground of his appeal for his own convenience  and to save himself the expense and trouble involved in  making the evidence a part of the record, should not be permitted to have the effect of forcing the appellee to go to judgment on appeal  without having  the evidence taken  at the  trial brought before this court, in a case where the evidence would sustain the judgment of  the court below although the findings of fact by the trial judge are so defective or erroneous that it could not be sustained on  them alone.  This, because in such a case, appellee may fairly claim,  that but for the appellant's misleading conduct in undertaking originally to bring the evidence here as a  part of the record to be submitted  on appeal, he, the appellee, would himself have moved the court below to so amend its findings of fact  as to make them conform with the evidence, and to render them sufficient in form and substance to sustain the judgment.

It may, perhaps, be suggested, that appellee can always protect himself from danger of reversals on the ground that the findings of fact by the trial judge do not sustain  the judgment, by always insisting on a full and correct statement of such findings, and in the event that the judge fails or declines to make such corrections as  may be necessary, forthwith entering an appeal  on that ground.  But in  the vast majority of  judgments  entered in the  court  below, such a practice would place a  useless and vexatious burden on successful litigants in the courts below.  It is, in general, a  matter  of no importance to  a successful litigant whether the reasons on which a judgment is based are sound or not, provided  the judgment itself  is in  his favor and satisfactorily disposes of the issues involved.  If no appeal is taken, or if an appeal is taken and the appellant makes the evidence a  part of the record, there can rarely be any  purpose in a vexatious proceeding by a successful litigant to compel the trial judge who has rendered  judgment in his favor to modify  or change the reasons on which he based his decision.  Practically, the only cases  where it can become a matter of importance to the successful litigant in the court below to secure the amendment or correction of an imperfect finding of facts by the trial judge, are those wherein the unsuccessful litigant appeals from the judgment, and without bringing the evidence to this court,  seeks a reversal on the ground that the facts thus found do not sustain the judgment.  If the appellant, while  the case is still in the court below, rests his appeal on this ground, the appellee can there and  then,  if  he  so  desires, move the trial court to amend its defective and  insufficient findings; and  if  he fails so to do he must take the consequences.   But if while the case is still pending in the  court below, the appellant announces his intention to bring the  evidence here on  appeal, and  after wards willfully or negligently  declines  to do so, thus misleading the appellee and inducing him  to refrain from any effort to have defective  and insufficient findings amended until it is too late to do so in the court below, we think that the appellee should be given an  opportunity to have such amendments made in this court.

We are of opinion, however, that in such cases, the appellant having  expressly  or impliedly  waived his  right  to have the evidence reviewed by this court, it then becomes the duty of the appellee to bring the  evidence  here, if he desires to have it reviewed for his benefit;  that is to say, to prevent a reversal  on the  ground  that the findings  of fact by the trial judge are defective or insufficient, when a review of the evidence itself would develop facts sufficient to sustain the judgment.

It will be seen that the practice thus indicated in no wise affects the general rule of procedure where appellant fails or declines to bring to this court all of the evidence taken in the court below, except only  to  this  extent, that in such cases, if the appellee brings the evidence here,  we will not reverse the  judgment  entered in the  court  below on the sole ground of the deficiency of the findings of fact by the trial judge,  if the evidence itself discloses  facts sufficient to sustain the judgment.

Pursuant  to the rule of practice herein indicated, the following order will  be entered herein:

Appellant having failed to include all the  evidence  taken in the court below in the record brought here on appeal, and not having offered any excuse for his  failure so to do,  the proceedings on his appeal will go forward to judgment as though no motion for a new trial, on  the ground that the weight of the evidence does not support the judgment, had been filed in the court below; unless  within twenty days the appellee  perfects the record by including  therein  the missing testimony, in which  event, the judgment of  the trial court will not be  reversed on the mere ground of the insufficiency or incorrectness of the findings of fact by the trial judge,  if the evidence thus perfected  discloses facts. sufficient to sustain it.   It is so ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.