The portion of the judgment rendered  in this case in first instance which affects this decision is as follows:

"FINDINGS.

"From the complaint, reply  and facts  agreed upon, th6 court finds to be well  established:

"(a) That the plaintiff is a resident of the municipality of Cebu;

"(b) That the defendant is a municipal corporation  duly organized  under the provisions  of law  in  force in these Islands and governed in all its acts by the provisions of the Municipal  Code;

"(c)  That on  or about January 24, 1910, the plaintiff leased from the Insular Government, under the provisions of Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission, lots 3 and 4 of block 2 of the official plan of Cebu water front reclamation No.  2; since which date he has held  said lots as such lessee;

"(d)  That on or about  March  26, 1910, the plaintiff secured the approval of the architect of the Insular Government of the plan for a building to be erected on said lots, such proposed building to be of  re-enforced concrete with galvanized iron roof, one  story,  height to the ceiling of 5 meters and 20 centimeters and to the ridge of the roof 8 meters, said building being intended for a storeroom and warehouse;

"(e) That on April  18, 1910, the plaintiff submitted, in writing to  the municipality of  Cebu  an  application for a permit to erect said building;

" (f) That said municipality and the officers thereof have refused and still refuse to issue such permit, and have notified the plaintiff that the erection of said building is prohibited, and have threatened the plaintiff with prohibition and perpetual suspension of such construction ;

"(g) That on May 15, 1901, the defendant municipality of Cebu approved and published ordinance No. 3, a copy of which is attached to  the defendant's reply as Exhibit 1; and that said  ordinance  has never been repealed or suspended;

"(h) That on April 23, 1910, said municipality of Cebu approved and published ordinance No. 100, a copy of which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit A; that on April 28, 1910, the provincial board of Cebu suspended the operation of said ordinance No. 100, which suspension is in force on this date;

"(i)  That the lots leased by  the plaintiff are located on streets  of the first class, according to  the classification in ordinance No. 3, and are situated on  the water front of the municipality of Cebu, where all the  steamers in said port load and discharge;

"(j)  That the defendant is a municipal corporation of the first class; and

"(k)  That the plaintiff has purchased and already has in his possession a large quantity of  materials for the construction  of the  proposed building and has entered into a contract for the construction  work and has begun such construction work.

"CONCLUSIONS.

"From the foregoing findings, the  court concludes:

"(a)  That the building projected by the plaintiff fulfills all the  conditions reasonably necessary for safeguarding the public health, as well as for protection against fire and other dangers and calamities, said building to be of fireproof materials with good ventilating  facilities;

"(b)  That ordinance No. 100,  being suspended by the provincial board, is not in force and  therefore no legal reason or motive exists for the refusal on the part of the municipality of Cebu to issue the permit requested by .the plaintiff, and,  moreover, if it were not suspended by said board, said ordinance No. 100 would be invalid; because it would be illegal, unreasonable  and beyond  the  authority of the municipal council to prohibit  the construction of
  buildings less than two stories in height;

"(c) That ordinance No. 3 furnishes no legal reason or motive for the refusal on the part of the municipality to issue the permit requested by the plaintiff  or to prohibit the construction of the building projected  by the plaintiff, because the provisions of said ordinance, especially paragraph 15, which is violated by the building in question, are  unreasonable, illegal and entirely beyond the authority  conferred by the Municipal Code upon  municipal councils. Since the proposed building, like the rest of the locations included in the classification of streets of the first class, is situated on the water front of the municipality of Cebu, where all the steamers load and discharge and where warehouses and storerooms are very necessary to facilitate Cebu's commerce, the attempted prohibition of this kind of building in said district on the part of the municipal council is not only unreasonable but also indefensible;

"(d) Even  though the  municipal council  of Cebu  had authority to regulate the style and exact size of buildings, which authority it does not have, still such authority confers no right to require the ornamentation and decoration of such buildings exactly like others, as is attempted  in paragraph 13 of ordinance No. 3, nor to require buildings of two, three or other number of stories, because such regulations constitute an illegal  and vexatious interference with property rights, the general rule being that laws and ordinances of municipalities regulating buildings will interfere with property rights and the free exercise thereof only to the extent necessary for  guarding the  'public welfare.'   If a municipality has the right to require or to exact buildings of three stories, why not of ten or of twenty?

" (e) That the officials of the municipality of Cebu should issue the permit or license requested by the plaintiff for the construction of the  building projected in accordance  with the plans approved by the Government architect;

"(f)  That neither  said  municipality nor  any officer thereof has any right to interfere with or  in any manner hinder the construction of  said building.

"JUDGMENT.

"In consequence of the findings and  conclusions set forth above, the court  declares ordinance No. 100,  as well  as paragraphs 13 and 15 of ordinance No. 3, illegal, null and void; and  directs the  municipal  council of Cebu to immediately issue the permit requested  by the  plaintiff  on April 18, 1910, for  the construction of the building projected in the plan approved by the Government architect, oft lots 3 and 4 of block 2 of the Cebu water-front reclamation No. 2,  the temporary injunction  issued by this  court on April 29, 1910, becoming permanent, that is, perpetually forbidding the municipality of Cebu and all of  its officers, representatives, agents, employees, attorneys and other persons in its  service to prohibit or  attempt  to  prohibit,  to suspend or attempt  to suspend, to hinder or to attempt to hinder, directly or indirectly, by means of force or threats, complaint or charge against the plaintiff, his  agents, employees, attorneys or contractors,  in any manner, the construction work on the building projected upon lots 3 and 4 of block 2 of the official plan of Cebu water-front reclamation No. 2, as long as the plaintiff continues such construction in accordance with the plan approved  by the Insular Architect on March  26,  1910, or any other  plan that  does not violate  ordinances  or reasonable  regulations  for the health and public security of the municipality of Cebu;  with all the costs of this judgment against said municipality." Defendant appealed from this judgment,  alleging as the ground thereof that  the court  erred in annulling ordinance No. 100 and  sections 13 and 15 of ordinance No. 3 enacted and published by the municipal council of Cebu.

Ordinance No. 100 must be immediately dismissed from consideration, because, as the trial judge well says, since it was suspended by the provincial board and therefore not in force it can not be invoked as the ground for refusing the permit requested by  the  plaintiff.   Aside from this, what is said in the foregoing decision  regarding sections 13 and  15 of ordinance No. 3 may be considered applicable. These sections read as follows:

"13.  Every building  erected in 'McClernand' street and its parallels  toward the sea shall be of three stories: the first four meters  in  height, the second three meters and twenty  centimeters, and the last four meters and fifty centimeters.  Its  front shall be in harmony with  the ornamentation  adopted by the municipality for  this street and  no permit  shall  be issued that does not fulfill the foregoing conditions.  In the remaining streets of the same class as the preceding,  houses of two stories may be erected, the first five meters in height and the second five, duly ornamented  in the style of the government building of this city.

"15. All houses erected on  streets  of the second  class must be of two stories,  the first four meters in height, and the second four meters and twenty centimeters.  The houses numbered 7  and 12  in  'La Infanta' street are taken  as models  of the  ornamentation for this  class.  Buildings known  as warehouses, stores or shops, even  when they have  outwardly the  appearance  of dwelling-houses, are strictly  prohibited in  streets of the first and second class." It is  agreed by the parties that the land  whereon the plaintiff desires to  build is located in Calle Morga, which is regarded as  a street of the  first class, according to the classification  adopted  in  ordinance No.  3;  and  that the building said plaintiff proposes to erect will  be of strong materials, that is, of cement walls reenforced with  steel rods and will have a galvanized-iron roof; it  will be  8 1/2 meters in height to the highest point of the roof and will be of one story with a height of 5 meters and 20 centimeters to the ceiling, and will be a strong, fireproof structure.  We have not before us the plan of this building, but it is stated in the judgment appealed from, without any objection on the appellant's part, "that it fulfills all the conditions reasonably necessary for safeguarding the public health, as  well as for protection against fire and other dangers and calamities, said building to be of fireproof materials  with  good ventilating facilities;" and it is  also  stated in the same judgment that the land  whereon  the plaintiff proposes to erect it "is situated on the water front of the municipality of Cebu,  where all the  steamers of said port load  and discharge."

Appellant  contends that the municipality  of Cebu has authority to require that the building in question  be of more than one  story and fulfill the conditions prescribed in the afore-cited  sections of ordinance No. 3, by virtue of section 39 of the Municipal Code,  which provides the following :

"The municipal council  shall:

*    *    *    *    *    *     *

"(f)  Establish fire limits, prescribe the kind of buildings that may be constructed within said limits and issue permits for the erection of the  same,  but  without  charging  fees for said permits."

Appellant contends that the expression kind of buildings, employed in  the legal provision just quoted, includes not only the material of which they are to be composed but also the style; that is  (so he concludes), that it empowers the municipalities to prescribe by means  of an ordinance the material that may be used in  a building constructed within the fire  limits, and the style, whether it shall be & warehouse  or a dwelling house, and if the latter, whether it shall have one,  two,  or three  stories,  as  all this  may enter into  the expression kind of  buildings, employed in subsection (f) of section 39 of the Municipal Code.

Without trying  to settle  the question  in  the concrete manner in which appellant's counsel asserts it, in the belief that it is unnecessary for the purposes of this decision, and admitting for the  sake of argument that the  legal provision cited really has the scope and meaning said counsel attributes to it, it is  certain that such provision does not authorize the municipal council in a special and specific manner to direct that the buildings necessarily have more than one story or a special and prescribed style of architecture or ornamentation.   If such authority really exists, it would be merely from the inference that it  is included by implication  in the general authority granted to  the councils by the  law for fixing the kind  of buildings that should or may be permitted within their respective jurisdictions.   Therefore,  it  is not  so  clearly and evidently beyond all argument that the law does not confer upon municipal councils the specific and definite power mooted in this case.   What does appear to be unquestionable, and this is our point of view,  is that the law does  not in any way  prescribe the form  in  which such  power should  be exercised, supposing it to exist, for the terms are so general and abstract  that they contain  no detailed provision regarding the manner of exercising the alleged power  in question.  This  being so, the exercise of this power must be subjected  to  the  requirements  of  reason  and  public expediency, requirements that,  in  the  absence  of definite provisions  of law,  must  serve as  a guide.  It would  be absurd to  suppose that the  municipalities may exercise such power in all ways without  any restriction.  Without regulations controlling its exercise, the most vexatious arbitrariness would  be easily attained.   In the absence of definite legal provisions, these regulations can not be other than those  dictated by reason and public expediency.

In the present case, which deals with a  building intended for warehouses and storerooms in a  place especially  given over to loading  and discharging the steamers that call at the port of  Cebu, we do not regard it at all reasonable to require that such building have more than one  story  or display a special and prescribed style of  ornamentation. Moreover, the commercial interests or purposes which should unquestionably prevail in the location mentioned do not, in our opinion, require such a thing, nor would they  probably secure greater benefit therefrom.   Keeping in mind also that the building mentioned fulfills the conditions reasonably necessary  for security, healthfulness, and  hygiene, as stated in the judgment appealed from, we  believe that the municipal council of Cebu,  in the case before us, for it is not our intention to lay down a general  rule for all cases, has no right to oppose or to prohibit the construction of said building, and therefore the judgment appealed from must on this definite ground be affirmed in its principal part.

As the defendant must, in accordance with this judgment, issue the permit requested by the plaintiff,  the permanent injunction therein ordered ceases thereby to have any justification, and should be eliminated therefrom.   The temporary  injunction issued  by  the court  on April 30, 1910, is also dissolved.

With  this modification the judgment appealed  from  is affirmed in  so far as it orders the municipal council of the municipality of Cebu to  issue the permit requested by the plaintiff, which  gave rise to this  suit; with the  costs of this instance against the  appellant   So ordered.

Arellano, C.  J.,  Johnson, Carson, and  Moreland,  JJ., concur.