This  is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment of conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge.

In view  of certain proceedings in the justice of the peace court of Mala and  the appeal  by  the defendant from the judgment therein rendered, whereby he was sentenced to the payment of  a fine of P50, to subsidiary imprisonment and  the costs, the provincial fiscal  of Rizal on June 24,1 an information in the Court of First Instance, charging Isidoro Espiritus a violation  of municipal ordinance No.  1, series of 1910, enacted by the municipal council of  Malabon, Rizal, inasmuch as  the accused, on  November 16, 1910,  was  in that  pueblo  found  to be engaged, willfully, unlawfull and criminally,  in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as jueteng, the tickets necessary  for conducting the same having been seized in his possession.

Therefore this cause was instituted, and after due consideration  of the evidence adduced judgment was rendered, on September 25, 1911, sentencing the  defendant, for a violation of the said ordinance, to the payment of fine previously imposed upon him by the justice of the peace and, in case insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. Defendant's counsel appealed from this judgment on the ground that said ordinance was unconstitutional.

The ordinance  in question,  exhibited on  page  9 of the record, was pas by the municipal council of Malabon on January  5, 1910,  and amended at the sessions of the 27th of March and the 14th of June of the  same year. It strictly prohibits  the game of jueteng within the limits of the said and prescribes the penalties to be imposed for its violation;  and  it further provides that any person who shall collect  money for wagers on  the said game, or who shall keep, make, or prepare any list  of numbers, or representative signs thereof, for use  in such game, shall be deemed to b collector of jueteng, and bankers, those who directly conduct the receive from the collectors the tickets or other contrivances, and are for possession of the tambiolos or other articles used for the purpose of conducting  the said game; and that, finally, those who keep or maintain jueteng  games shall be  deemed  to be keepers or maintainers of gambling houses, in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of Act No.  1757.

After this judgment had been rendered,  defendant's attorney presented  a motion requesting that  it be set aside on the grounds that the court lac jurisdiction  to try the case and  sentence the defendant,  for the  reason that the ordinance under which he was tried  and convicted was unconstitutional and invalid, but  the court held in its judgment that it defect  in an ordinance or municipal regulation to  fail  to express its in  its title.  This motion was overruled.

Assuming the defendant's guilt, since he was engaged in collecting wagers the  game of  jueteng, a game prohibited by law as one of chance, and since the judgment of conviction, rendered by the justice of the peace of pueblo of Malabon, was affirmed by  the Court of First Instance,  we shall only treat in this decision of the argument advanced by the defense in maintaining this second appeal, to wit,  that the Court  of First Instance jurisdiction over the subject matter of  the suit,  for the reason that t aforementioned ordinance passed  by the municipal council of the pueblo Malabon, under which the appellant was prosecuted and convicted, is unconstitutional.

Defendant's attorney  argues that the ordinance  is contrary to the municipal code because the council exceeded the powers conferred  upon it by the code which,  in subsection (u) of section 39, only  authorizes it provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly ho of whatsoever sort,"  while the first paragraph of the  said ordinance prescribes that it is  strictly prohibited to play jueteng within limits of Malabon, and provides the penalties  for  its violation.

From  a perusal of the text of the ordinance referred to, it is unquestion that it is  in accord with the provisions of Act No.  1757, inasmuch as t latter  strictly prohibits the playing of monte, jueteng or any ot lottery, banking  or percentage games; and the said Municipal Code, by providing in  section 39 that the municipal council  shall provide against evils of gambling, granted it the authority to prohibit gambling games su those specified in the said ordinance;  therefore, the municipal council acted within the powers  conferred  upon it by the Municipal Code  and in accordance with the provisions of the said Act No. 1757, since  the game jueteng, as one of chance absolutely prohibited by the latter, is not sus of regulation, but must be prosecuted and completely suppressed in order avoid repetitions  of the great and far reaching social and  moral evils been producing in the towns of these  Islands.

Hence it is undeniable that the said municipal  council, in passing the s ordinance, did not exceed its authority and  kept strictly within the pow conferred  upon  it by  its organic law  and the  general laws  that deal with gambling.

With regard to the allegation that the said  ordinance is in conflict wit provisions of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, it must considered that an ordinance has not the character of and is not a genera law, but is merely a regulation of a local nature, and one perfectly valid effective, provided  it is  in  harmony with the general laws in force in Islands.  Therefore, it is not  indispensable that  its  subject  should in the title,  for  the provisions of the said  Act of Congress  refer to general laws that govern in a State and to  those enacted in these Island which, indeed, must not embrace more than one subject  and that subject must be expressed in the title.  This constitutional  provision has no ap to municipal ordinances, as these do not partake of the nature of laws, b are  mere rules provided for the fulfillment of the laws.   This principle down in the Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure.   (Vol. 28, p. 378, and vol. 36, p.  1021.)

For the foregoing reasons we deem it proper  to affirm and do hereby affirm the judgment appealed from, with the costs  against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Carson  JJ., dissent.