This defendant  was  charged  with the crime of libel, alleged to have be committed as follows:

"I. On or about  the  month of December,  1907, in the municipality of Santa Maria,  Province of Bulacan, P. I., the said  accused, Jose S. Serapio, did and criminally, with the  intention of attacking, reviling, and expose in public hatred and scorn the good name,  virtue, and reputation of  Bonifacio Morales, write, publish, and send by mail,  addressed  to the Executive Secretary,  an anonymous communication,  the pertinent  portion whereof is as follows:

" '11.  Bonifacio Morales is the murderer of 12 peaceful and  honest  men are: Mariano  Ramirez,  municipal president of Bocaue; the teacher of the primary school of Marilao, Emigdio Perez, Candido del Rosario, Juan de Ve Manuel Valderrama, a boy 13 years  old  of the  barrio of Alangalang, one Budio, musician, Mariano Mendoza, all of Santa Maria, an old man of the barrio of Sapang-palay of San  Jose and two brothers, sons of Francisco Pascual of Norzagaray.   He has committed various assaults and robberies, which are: The robbery of Captain Ciano Caluloua of Meycauayan, the robbery of Simeona of Angat, whereby a girl 12 or 13 years old was killed the robbery of P420 from Juana  Reyes of Bocaue, all in the year 1899.'

"II.  On the same date or time, to wit, December, 1907, in the  municipal Santa Maria, Province of Bulacan, P. I., the said accused, Jose S.  Serapio willfully  and criminally, with the intention of attacking,  reviling,  a to public hatred and scorn the good name, virtue, and  reputation of Bonifacio Morales,  write, publish,  and send by mail, addressed  to the Executive Secretary,  an anonymous communication,  the  pertinent portion whereof is as follows:

" '12. Bonifacio Morales is known in the  Secret Service Department of Ma a  criminal,  whose  crimes  the detective  Manuel  Arbona discovered in year 1903 *  *   *'

"III. At the same time, to  wit, December, 1907, in the same place and pr the said accused, Jose S. Serapio, did willfully and criminally, with the of attacking, reviling, and exposing to public  hatred and scorn the good name,  virtue,  and reputation  of Bonifacio Morales,  write, publish, an by mail, addressed to the Executive Secretary, an anonymous communication the pertinent portion whereof is as follows:

"'15. Bonifacio Morales is an inveterate gambler find to get money he  us diabolical methods, as in the case of the General Santa Ana in 1903, who surrendered voluntarily in order to get within the pale of the law, but M tried to demonstrate to the Government that he was caught by him in order to secure the reward offered by the Government.

"'All the foregoing is little, if the provincial government would get int discovering many crimes committed in the province by Morales and his people.'

"IV. All  the facts above specified were written,  published, and address the  Executive Secretary of the Islands by the said accused, maliciously, willfully, and at the time the slandered Bonifacio. Morales was discharging duties of the office of justice of the peace of the municipality of Santa Maria, Province of Bulacan, P. I., and all the acts above specified were committed in violation of the law."

Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned. Upon  arraignment the defendant, by his attorneys,  presented the following  demurrer:

"I. The facts alleged in the complaint  do not constitute a crime.

"II. It appears from the allegation in  the complaint that if there were it has prescribed."

The fiscal of the Province of Bulacan and the attorney for the defendant, each  presented written and oral arguments against and  in  support of  s demurrer.  The attorney for the defendant  (p.  82 of Expediente)  seems have  waived  his contention that the facts stated in the complaint were insufficient to constitute a cause of action.

After hearing the  arguments of  the  respective parties, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, in a very interesting opinion, decided that the ground of  said demurrer was not well founded,  but sustained the  second and  ordered the prosecuting attorney of the province to present a  new complaint.

With reference  to  the second ground of the demurrer. Judge Barretto in decision said:

"With reference to the  second ground for exception, counsel for the defe maintains that the crime has  prescribed under  the provisions of the law force in the Islands and supports  such conclusion  by asserting that absence of a definite provision in Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission which fixes the time during which the  penal action  arising from the crime of libel  may be exercised, the time which article 131 of the Penal Code fix the prescription of the crimes of calumny and insists is strictly applicable.

"Against this contention  of the defense, the  Attorney-General and the private prosecutor maintain  that the prescription of a general nature contained in said article 131 is not applicable,  for two reasons:

"First, because the crime of libel is entirely distinct and independent f calumny and insults; and

"Second, because that provision of the code  in the matter of prescriptio crimes is not applicable to the crimes created and  punished by special l promulgated by the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature.

"After carefully considering the case,  the court finds that while the crime of  libel differs from that of calumny, defined and penalized in article 452, not so with respect to the crimes of insults provided for and penalized i articles  456 et seq. of the Penal Code.   Under said articles and paragraph of article 277, the court does not understand  to  exist the  same essential  difference  between the crime  of  insults in writing and that In both the object of the perpetrator of  the crime  is to attack  the honesty, virtue,  or the reputation of a person, exposing him to public scorn, or ridicule, characteristic elements that are likewise  found in t insults in writing, defined and penalized in article 456 of the Penal Cod connection with 458 thereof.   It is certain that Act No. 277 has not way fixed the prescription for the penal action in  the crimes of libel. There is no  provision in said Act that fixes the time within which the a arising from a libelous imputation may prescribe, but it is  not less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal act is  not prescriptible unless law  expressly fixes  such prescription, the crime of libel and other prosecuted at any time, which would naturally make the provisions of  the Act absurd, for a case might arise where a  penal  action might  be exercised even after the person concerned  in  the crime or responsible t had died.

"In support of his contention, the Attorney-General cites the precedent established by the court in the cases of U. S. vs.  Lao Lock Hing Rep., 86) and U. S. vs. Calaguas  (14 Phil. Rep.,  739).   What Supreme Court has established in these cases is  that the rules of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the penalty to be imposed in the crimes punished by  a special Act,  but only the characteristic  and special American principles of discretion in the punishment. In said cases the Supreme Court has down no principle applicable to the case at bar, that is, to prescription the crime.

"The court believes that the provisions of the Penal Code with reference extinction of penal responsibility are applicable to the case, like those general character included in Book  I of  the Penal Code,  which refer to essential requisites common to all  crimes.   No special law fixes these defines crime,  but starting from the definition previously laid  down  b common penal legislation it defines and establishes the requisites peculiar special crime it is sought to correct; but still, the court thinks that n deny that before classifying an act as a special crime it becomes necessary see whether  or not the essential  requisites  common  to  every  crime present.   If such principles are of undoubted application, even without provision of the special law, the court thinks that those of  the general legislation fixing the  period within which the penal responsibility is e are likewise, for both are essential to make the law consistent and reason Under these considerations,  the court holds  that the ground for exception indicated should be sustained, and he therefore sustains the second ground demurrer or exception,  and understanding that  said objection  can be corrected, orders the presentation of  a new complaint."

From that decision an appeal was taken to this court by Mr.  Imperial, a for the Government, who made the following assignments of error:

"The trial  court incurred a legal error in  sustaining the second ground demurrer, and in declaring that the crime alleged in the complaint has prescribed in accordance with the third paragraph of article 131 of the Code of the Philippines."

Under this assignment of error the only question presented by the appellant is, whether the prescription fixed by article 131 of the Penal Code for offense of calumny and insults (arts. 452-457) is applicable to the crime of  libel as defined and  punished  under an Act  (No.  277)  of the Philippine Commission.

Calumny, as defined by the Penal Code, is: "The false imputation of a crime upon which a prosecution might  be instituted by the Government on its own motion."   (Art. 452.)  This false  imputation  of crime may be expressed publicly  in writing  (art.  453)  or orally (art. 454).  The punishment provided, when the calumny is expressed publicly in writing, prision correccional in its minimum and medium  degrees" (imprisonment six months and one day to four years and two months) "and  a fine of not more than 12,500 pesetas" (P2,500)  (art. 453).  If the calumny expressed orally simply, the punishment is "arresto mayor in its degree (imprisonment from one month and one day to two months) and a fine of not less than 625 and not more than 6,250 pesetas" (P125 Pl,250)  (art. 454).

It will be noted by reading said articles 453 and 454, that the punishment calumny depends not only upon whether it was expressed publicly, in writ or orally, but also whether  the  crime imputed was "a grave felony,"  o less grave felony'   When a felony is  grave or less  grave is defined the Penal Code.   (Art. 6.)

In the case of the crime of "insults," it may be either a statement act. In case it is a statement, it may also be either in writing or The penalty fixed for insults also depends on whether the offense is "gr "less grave," or "trifling."   The punishment for the  offense of "insult or "less grave" is banishment,  in its minimum and maximum degrees  (for period of two years four months and one day, to six  years) "and a fine of not less than 325 and not more than 6,250 pesetas" (P65 to P1, (Art. 458.)  If the insult is "trifling" the punishment is "arresto mayor minimum degree" (imprisonment for a period of one month and one day to two months) "and a fine of not less than 325 and not, more  than 3,250 pesetas" (P65 to P650).

The crime of libel is defined by the law  (Act No. 277)  of the Philippine Commission as "a malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing or by  signs or pictures, or  the like, or  public theatrical exhibitions, blacken/the memory of one who  is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue,  or  reputation, or to publish the alleged  or natural defects o who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."

Under this law (Act No. 277)  it will be noted that the crime of libel c never be committed by oral expressions; it must always be express either in writing, printing,  or by signs  or pictures or the like, or p theatrical exhibitions.  The punishment provided under said Act (No. 277 always within the sound discretion of the court.  The court, in fixing t penalty, is not limited by any of the rules of the Penal Code in  relations the grades of punishment therein prescribed.

It is contended by the appellee, that inasmuch as the Act (No. 277) of t Philippine Commission covers a part of the offenses of calumny and insul that it is not a special law, as that phrase is used in article  7 of the Code, and that the  provisions of article 131 (of the Penal Code) relation calumny and insults apply to the crime of libel  as defined by said Act 277).   This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as phrase  is used in article 7  of the Penal Code.   Does this phrase " especiales" as used in the Penal  Code (article 7) have the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally  used?  B under the  common  law and the civil law, one of the general classificat of laws is that of (a) general and (6) special.   The first, or general defined as a law which applies  to all of  the  people of the sta to all of a particular class of persons in the state, with  equal and obligation.  A special  law,  as the phrase is  generally used, is a which applies to  particular individuals in the state or to a particular or portion of the state only. The phrase "general law" is sometimes subs by the phrase "public law" in  contradistinction to special  or  private Mr. Black,  in his very valuable law  dictionary, defines a general law, contra-distinguished from  one that is special or local, as a law that em a class  of  subjects or places, and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. (Van Riper  et al. vs. Parsons Law,  1.)   It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especi as used  in the Penal Code (article 1) is not used with  this general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a special  law a defined, but to a general law.  A careful  reading of said article 7 indicates, that the phrase "leyes especiales"  was not used  to s "special laws" in  the general signification of that phrase.   The artic be noted, Simply says,  in effect,  that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it  (the crime)  is not subjec the  provisions of said code.  We are confirmed in this opinion by an examination of the Spanish jurisprudence upon the same subject. Viada (1 Viada, 84),  in his valuable commentaries  on the provisions of the Pena Code, in discussing article 7, practically limits himself to an examinate leyes especiales" to which the provisions of the Penal Code are not applicable. In answering the question:  "Cuales son las leyes especia penan delitos," he simply enumerates such laws as follows, to wit: 

1. Ordenanza Militar;  
    
2. Ley de Organizacion y Atribuciones de los Tribunales de Guerra: 
3.  
4. Codigo Penal del Ejercito; 
5.  
6. Ley de Enjuiciamiento Militar;
    
7. Delitos de Contrabando y Defraudacion;
   
8.  
9. Delitos Electorates;
      
   
10. Ordenanzas  de Montes;
       
    
11. Ley Municipal;
          
12. Ley de Reclutamiento y reemplazo del Ejercito;
          
    
13. Ley sobre policia;
       
    
14. Ley sobre conservacion de los Ferrocarriles;
          
15. Ley de Caza;
       
    
16. Ley sobre Usurpation;
       
    
17. Ley sobre la Falsification de Patentes de Invencion;
       
    
18. Ley sobre Proteccidn a los Menores; and others which might be mentioned.

An examination  of these  laws  denominated  "leyes  especiales," that phrase is used in the Penal Code, shows that, in fact, most of them general laws in the sense that they apply to all the persons in  the state to all of a particular class.  The rule which we now adopt,  to wit: That when a crime is made punishable by a law other than by the provisions of the Penal Code, the provisions  of said code do not apply, as has been heretofore announced  by this court.   (U. S. vs. Lao Lock Hing, Rep., 86; U. S. vs. Calaguas, 14 Phil. Rep., 739).  In the case o vs. Lao  Lock Hing, supra, the defendant was charged  with a violation of the Opium Law.   (Sec.  31, Act No. 1761.)  In deciding the the court,  speaking through Mr.  Justice Torres, said: 

"The crime under consideration consists of the violation of a special la referred to in article 7 of the Penal Code, and consequently the provision said code and the classification of the crimes comprised therein are  no applicable in the present case.  The crime must be punished under the provisions of  the Act  (No. 1761) which the sovereign power,  by virtue its authority, saw fit to enact for the good of the country and its inhabitants.  Wherefore, inasmuch as it is an act which  the lawmaker ha declared to be invested with the attributes of a crime, the overruling o demurrer and the prosecution of the case are in accordance with the law.

In the case of U. S. vs. Calaguas, supra,  the defendant w charged with having, by means of a wrench, removed several screws and fishplates from the line of the railroad, in the municipality of Santa R Province of Nueva Ecija, It was  alleged that he thereby damaged the lin and that a derailment of the train would  have occurred, had it not been discovered in time.  The court decided that the "Ley de Ferrocarriles was a ley especial, under said article 7, and  that the general provi the Penal  Code did not apply.  This court, speaking through its chief justice  Mr. Arellano, said:

"Crimes which are punished by special laws are not subject to the provision of this article (article 7 of the. Penal Code).   The act  of wrenching screws and fishplates from the rails of a railroad line is punished by a law,  that which governs the policing and preservation of railroads, came by the law of November 23, 1877, made applicable to the Philippine by royal decree of August 6, 1875.  In reality this provision relates to th November 14,  1855, one almost  identical to that of 1877, article 16 of reads: 'He who shall voluntarily destroy or damage a  railway  line * * * shall be  punished with the penalty of prision correctional'"

In the more recent case of U. S. vs. Fuster (10 Off. Gaz., 1048) very brief opinion,  when the  question  was squarely presented whether provisions  of the Penal "Code relating to the prescription or limitatio action for calumny and insults were applicable, this court refused to the rule of prescription  or limitation of the Penal Code to the  crime as defined  by the law of  the United States Commission.   (Act No. 277.)

This court has refused in many cases to apply some of the general provis of the Penal Code to the laws of the United  States  Commission,  or to special decrees of  the Kingdom of Spain  applicable to the Philippine I thereby holding,  in effect, that such laws, when  they  provided a penal for their violation, were "leyes especiales," as that phrase is u Penal Code.

See U. S. vs. Hutchinson  (5 Phil. Rep., 343, November 21, 1905), court refused to apply the provisions      as to subsidiary  imprisonment the nonpayment of a fine  under Acts Nos.  610  and 652 of the United States Commission;

U. S. vs. Glefonea (5 Phil. Rep., 570, January 24,  1906), where refused to apply the rule with reference to subsidiary imprisonment to a of Act No. 619 of the United States Commission;

U. S. vs. Lineses  (5 Phil. Rep., 631, February 17,  1906), where refused to apply the provisions as to subsidiary imprisonment of the Pen Code, to Act No.  292 of the United States Commission;

U. S. vs. Carvajal et al. (4 Off. Gaz,, 705, April 16,1906), wher refused again to apply the rules as to subsidiary imprisonment of the Penal Code to  section 8 of Act No. 292 of the United States  Commission; in t case, the court, speaking through Mr.  Justice Torres, said: 

"The provisions of the Penal Code which authorize the imposition of subsi imprisonment for the nonpayment of a fine imposed are not applicable to those guilty of  crimes punished under said Act  (No. 292) and other Acts of the Commission, the Penal Code being based upon an entirely different system of  legislation."

U.  S. vs. Ang  Kan  Ko (6 Phil. Rep., 376, August 22, 1906), whe court again refused  to allow the application  of the rules of the Pen Code to the laws  of  the United States Commission  (Acts Nos. 355, 653 and 864);

U.  S. vs. Cortes  et al. (7 Phil. Rep., 149, December 7, 1906). the  court  again  refused to  allow the provisions of the Penal Code to applied to the laws of the United States  Commission, or to the Law of Brigandage (Act No.  518);

U. S. vs. Lopez Basa (8 Phil. Rep,, 89, March 19,  1907). In this court refused to apply article 3 of the Penal Code relating to attempts commit crimes, to the  crimes defined and punished  by the laws of the United  States Commission (Act No. 82);

U. S. vs. Macasaet (11 Phil. Rep., 447, October 15, 1908). In thi court refused to apply the rules relating to subsidiary  imprisonment of Penal Code to sections  66 and 68 of Act No. 1189 of the United States Commission;

U. S. vs. Servillas (12 Phil. Rep., 12, November 11,1908), where again refused to allow the provisions  of the Penal Code to be applied t Act No. 1461 of the United States Commission;

Ocampo vs.  Jenkins  (14  Phil. Rep., 681, 683,  December 24, 190 where the court  said it had, in numerous cases, decided that the  provi of the Penal  Code were not applicable to crimes created  by the laws of the United States Commission;

Cruz vs.  The Director of Prisons (17  Phil. Rep.,  269, November where  this court again said, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent,  "Prio enactment of Act No. 1732,  the  Courts of First Instance had  no author to impose subsidiary imprisonment for a failure to pay fines in  cases o conviction for violation  of Acts of the United States Commission;"

U. S. vs. Kennedy (18 Phil. Rep., 122, December 29,1910), where t again refused  to apply the provisions of the Penal Code to the Acts  of the  United States Commission.

This court has  uniformly, through a long  line of decisions, as above indicated, refused to apply some of the provisions of the Penal Code t leyes especiales, as that phrase is used in article 7; or, in oth court has refused to apply some provisions of the Penal Code to any general law of the Philippine Commission, which,  within  itself, define punishment of a crime.

The Horiorable  Alberto Barretto,  judge,  in his decision in the court very correctly says, among other things: 

"But it is no less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal  ac prescriptible  unless the law  expressly fixes such prescription."  In o this is the correct rule.   (Dover vs.  Maestaer, 5 Esp,  92 Eng Common Law Reports; Hyde vs. Partridge, 3 Salk, 223, 228 (E; C. L Reg. vs. Hull, 2 Fast & F., 16 (E. C. L.).)  The doctrine of pres the limitation of time within  which an action may be brought, is of pur statutory origin.  Both under the common and the'civil law a right of ac never died by mere lapse of time.   (Mackeldrey's Roman Law, sec. 213; G 4, sec. 128.)  The court, in the absence of express law, has no authorit fix a period of prescription or limitation.   (Missouri vs. Illin 496; Reist vs. Heilbrennan, 11 Serg, & R. (Pa.), 131; Battle vs. Ga.,  405; Buchannan vs. Rowland, 5 N. J.  Law, 721; Gray vs. Hartford  Ins. Co.,  6 Fed.  Cases, No. 3375;  1 Blatchford (U. S.),  28 Williams vs. Jones, 13 East, 439; The People vs. Gilbert, 18 John 227; Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Peters (U. S.), 351.)

Under the common  law the word "prescription" is generally  used with reference to the acquisition of  a right by the lapse of time.   It  is example,  under the common law, that one may acquire a right to real property or to an easement by  prescription.

The word "limitation," as applied to actions  under the common law,  has reference to the  time within  which an action must be brought after the right of action has accrued. Under the Civil Code the word "prescription used to cover both of these ideas.   (See Civil Code, arts. 1930-1975; 4 Escriche's Diccionario de Legislation y Jurisprudencia, 643-649.)

Under the Penal  Code the word  "prescription" is used with reference to time within which the action must be brought.   (See Penal Code, art. 13 paragraphs 6 and 7.)

By  prescription or  limitation of actions, the right of action is not extinguished, neither under the common nor under  the civil law.  Both Civil and the Penal  Codes provide  when the action is extinguished and when it is prescribed simply.   These statutes (of prescription or limit not destroy the right.  They simply provided, in effect,  that after the of the  time prescribed by law, the defendant might  object, if he desire to being sued.  If the defendant failed, in some proper way, to object, in other words, interpose the statutory defense, the action could be maintained.  The  statute provided a  special defense simply.  If the de of prescription or limitation is not expressly raised, it is waived and available. , It can not be raised by demurrer.   It must be expressly pl (Aldeguer et al. vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500; Domingo vs. Osori Rep., 405;  Maxilom vs. Tabotabo, 9 Phil. Rep., 390; Harty vs. 13 Phil. Rep., 31; Sunico vs. Ramirez, 14 Phil. Rep., 500.)

Our  conclusions,  then,  following the  rule  heretofore adopted by thi court, are:

First. That by reason of article 7 of the Penal Code, some of the genera provisions of said code do not apply to the penal laws of the United Sta Commission, unless, by express provision of law, they are made applicable

Second. That there is no general or special provision of law making any the provisions of the Penal Code applicable to the Libel Law of  the  Un States Commission (Act No. 277), except the  provision as to subsidiary imprisonment when a fine is imposed.   (Act No. 1732.)

Third. That the period  of  prescription  fixed by article 131 of the Pe Code for calumny and  insults, does  not apply to the crime of libel  as defined and punished under Act No. 277 of the United States Commission.

Fourth. That unless a period of prescription or limitation is fixed by l particular offense or crime, the action for such offense or crime is  no barred by lapse of time.

Fifth.  That  the law defining and punishing  the crime of libel (Act No has not fixed a period of prescription or limitation within  which  an a for  such crime  shall be instituted.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court, sustain the  second ground  of demurrer, is hereby reversed, and it is hereby ordered  that the cause be remanded to the lower court from which it cam with direction that the defendant Jose S.  Serapio be ordered to appear plead to the complaint presented in this cause. It is so ordered, without finding as to  costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ. concurr.