This defendant was charged with a violation of the Opium Law.   The complaint alleged:

"That  on or about the eighth  day of October, 1911, in the city of Mani Philippine Islands,  the said Ching Po was,  willfully,  illegally, and the owner of,  and had in  his power  and possession and under his control, 18 grams of opium,  a prohibited drug, without being lawfully authorized to do."

After hearing  the evidence,  the Honorable A.  S. Crossfield,  judge, found the defendant guilty of the crime  charged in the complaint,  and sentenced him to  pay a fine of and the costs.

From  that sentence  the defendant  appealed.  In  this court the appellant makes the following assignments  of error:

First.  That the trial court erred in  not sustaining the defendant's plea of former jeopardy.

Second. That  the trial court erred in  receiving as evidence against the defendant the testimony given by him upon his trial in a certain other cause in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, No. 7949, entitled City of Manila vs. Ching Po et al.," over the objection  of the defendant.

From  an examination of the record it  appears that the following statement of  facts made  by the appellant in his brief is substantially correct:

It appears  by the record that the defendant in this cause was  tried an convicted before the municipal court  of the city  of Manila in  a certain cause  entitled  "The City  of Manila vs. Ching Po et al.,"  wherein Ching Po was charged, together with  others, "with visiting  and being house where opium was kept and used upon the person," in violation of Ordinance No. 152 of the said city of Manila ; that said defendant, toge with  his  co-defendants appealed said cause to  the  Court of First Inst of the city  of Manila; that upon  the trial of  said  appeal  in the Court of First Instance  on November 3,1911, the defendant herein testify a certain amount of opium (18 grams) and an opium pipe found by the police at No. 26 Qalle Chica, Manila, where said defendant lived, belong him and was in his possession and under his, control; that upon the said cause No. 7949  in the Court of  First Instance said Ching  Po was acquitted; that immediately succeeding said trial and acquittal in said No. 7949, the complaint in the present cause was presented and the defendant re-arrested and charged "with having in  his possession and wader,  his control the  same opium and pipe" referred  to and testi to by him in the former trial; that at the time of arraignment, a plea former jeopardy was  presented by the  defendant and  overruled  and due exception taken and  that thereafter the prosecution was  permitted the trial court, in spite of the objection of said defendant, to introduced evidence in  this cause the testimony of the defendant upon his trial in former cause to the effect, as above stated, that he was the owner and i possession of said opium and pipe.

Bearing these facts in mind,  with reference to the first assignment of will be noted that the crime of which the defendant had been acquitted i said cause No. 7949 was a criminal action for a  violation  of  ordinance No.  152, which ordinance provided for the punishment of those who "visited houses where opium was kept and used upon the person;" whereas, in the present case, the defendant  was accused of the crime of "being the owner and having in his possession and under  his control 18 grams of opium in violation of the  Opium Law."  It will be  seen, therefore, that the crime which the defendant was accused and acquitted in cause No. 7949 was a different and distinct offense from that  with which he is charged in the present case.  Being, therefore, a distinct and different offense, it is imagine how the plea of former jeopardy could effectively be interposed.

The Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1,  1902) in section 5, among things provides, that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law; and no person, for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment, nor  shall he  be comp in a criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Under these provisions it will be noted that the prohibition  against be twice placed  in jeopardy only relates to being placed in jeopardy twice the same  offense.  If the offenses are not the  same, certainly provisions of the Act  of  Congress can not be  invoked for the. purpose of securing the acquittal of the  defendant under  the second complaint. Unless it clearly appears that the first  and second offenses are the said the accused can not claim the benefit of autre fois  acquit or autre convict  In the present case, under the statement of facts of the appellant, it clearly appears that the offenses  are not the same.  The was a violation of a city ordinance, prohibiting persons from "visiting where opium was kept and used upon the person, etc."  The second offense the one under which the defendant is here accused, is that of the violate of a law of the Commission, known as the Opium Law.

A conviction or acquittal upon one complaint is  no  bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another complaint, unless the evidence required to support the conviction upon one  of such complaints would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other.   The test as to form jeopardy is  riot whether the defendant  has  already been tried for  the same act, but whether he has been  put in jeopardy for the same offense.   (Morey vs. Commonwealth, 108 Mass., 433; U. S. Chan-Cun-Chay, 5 Phil. Rep., 385; U. S. vs. Flemister, 5 Phil.  R same case, 207 U. S., 372; U. S. vs. Gavieres, 10 Phil. Rep., 694 case,  220 U. S., 338; U. S. vs. Vallejo, 11 Phil.  Rep., 193; Ca McClaughry, 183 U. S., 365, 395; People vs. Hanrahan, 75 Mich., The  State vs. Botkin, 71 Iowa,  87; 60 American State Rep 32 N.  W. Reporter, 785; Ex Parte Hong  Shen, 98 Cal., 681; City Louis vs.  Scheer, 235 Mo., 721; In re George Hoffman, 155 Cal., of Louisiana vs. Labatut, 39 La. Ann., 513.)

We find no reason for modifying the sentence of the lower court under the first assignment of error.

With reference to the second assignment of error, to  wit, that the trial erred in receiving the testimony of the defendant, given in a former ca evidence against  him in this cause and basing his conviction thereon, i be said, again adopting the statement of facts of the  appellant in his brief, that "it appears from the record herein (evidence,  pp, 20  and 2 that the undersigned attorney (the attorney for the defendant in both ca advised the defendant, prior to the trial of cause No. 7949, that he show testify in  said cause that he was the lessee  of the house No. 26  Call Chica, and  that he lived there,  and that  the opium  found on the upper floor of said house belonged to him  and was in his possession and custody that  such  evidence, so far from prejudicing him, should have the effect freeing him from the charge therein made against him.  We have, therefor the express admission of the defendant in  cause  No. 7949, given in ope court,  that he was the owner of the opium with which he is charged  of having in  his possession  in the present case.  The fact that this admission was made by the defendant was clearly  proved during the  trial  of the present case by witnesses who heard it.   No attempt was made to  show that the fact was not exactly as confessed by the defendant.

With reference to the admissibility of the admissions and declarations o defendant charged with a crime, the rule seems to be that the declaration made by a defendant or by a third party, by  his authority, if relevant, admissible against him.  If the defendant has made statements  constitute an admission of the facts charged in the complaint, or relevant to the charges in the complaint they are  admissible against him.   (Commonweal vs. Sanborn, 116 Mass., 61; People  vs.  Bosworth, 64 Hun People vs. Cassidy, 133 N. Y., 612; State vs. Behrman, 114 N. C., 797.)

The foregoing rule is based upon the  presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were  true. acts,  conduct, and declarations, wherever made, provided  they  be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason  that  it  is fair presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault  if the not.   (Truby vs. Seybert, 12 Pa. St., 101, 104.)

The procedure in criminal cases in the Philippine Islands provides that defendant in a criminal proceeding may be a witness in his own behalf. When he avails himself  of this right, he is subject to a rigid cross-examination and is bound by his admissions,  voluntarily given, in such examination. His admissions are presumed to be given voluntarily and when thus  given  on a previous trial, they may be used against him in a subsequent cause.   (State vs.  Glass, 50 Wis.,  218; People v 47 Cal, 125; People vs. Gibbons,  43 Cal., 557.)

The rule  is well established that  a voluntary, unsworn statement of a charged with a crime, may be proved against him as a confession.  If his voluntary extrajudicial admissions are admissible against him, there see no good reason why his admissions made in open court, under oath, should not be accepted against him.

In the case of People vs. Kelley  (47 Cal.,  125) the court said: 

"If his voluntary,  unsworn statements may be proved against him as a confession, his voluntary testimony, under oath, given in a proceeding i he elects and is authorized to  testify, ought  to stand upon at least a favorable a footing."

The justice of the foregoing rule seems to be fairly well illustrated in following example: Suppose the defendant in the present action, after ma the confession  referred to above, upon some ground or other had secured on appeal, a new trial,  and on that new trial should give testimony materially different from that which he gave on the first trial.   Could be any  doubt that in that case his testimony on the first trial might b given in evidence on the second,  for the purpose of affecting his credit and for the purpose of influencing the court with reference to his guilt have been unable to find any authority in jurisdictions where a defendant may  declare in his own behalf jurisprudence supporting the contention o appellant.

Our conclusions are that the lower court committed  no error  in the trial the cause and  in imposing the penalty in the present case.  The  sentence of  the  lower court  is, therefore, hereby affirmed  with costs.

Arellano,  C. J., Torres,  Mapa, Carson,  and  Trent, JJ.,concur.