This is an action  of  quo warranto, begun in this court. It appears that the  plaintiff  was duly  elected president  of the  municipality  of Lingayen, Province  of  Pangasinan. After his election the defendant protested that election upon two grounds:

First.  That the plaintiff  was ineligible to  hold the office of municipal president  upon  the ground that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Second. That  ballots had been  counted  in  favor of the plaintiff  which,  as a matter of fact,  should not  have been counted  for  him and which  were sufficient  to  reduce the number   of  votes which he  actually  received below that received by  the  defendant.

The court heard the protest and decided in favor of the defendant upon the ground last mentioned, declining the consideration of the eligibility of the plaintiff to such office.

This action was begun upon the sole theory and founded upon the single ground that the decision of the court in the protest mentioned was  null  and void for the reason that not all of the candidates voted for for that office had been notified of the  protest as required  by law and that, therefore, the court  was without jurisdiction or power to enter the judgment which it did enter in favor of the defendant. It is the contention that  the court being entirely without jurisdiction  and, therefore, its judgment in  favor  of the defendant being null and void, the defendant is usurping the office and unlawfully excluding the plaintiff therefrom.

While this is an action of quo warranto, we have so far treated it in the nature of a  certiorari as to require the elevation to this court of the record made in the court below relative to said protest.  From that record it appears that the very question of the notice to all of the candidates voted for at said  election for the office, of municipal president was raised before the court below and fully considered and decided by it.  After the entry of the judgment in favor of the defendant, a motion  was made by the plaintiff to vacate and  set aside  said  judgment and to  dismiss the whole  proceeding upon  the ground  that not all  of said candidates had been notified of the protest as required  by law.  The motion was heard.  The question was litigated. The evidence  was discussed and  considered.  The  arguments  of  counsel were  presented.  The court found from the evidence that all of the candidates had  been  notified of the protest  and that the notice was  in the form and served in  the manner and within the time required by the statute.  That question having been raised before the court below and passed upon there, we are unable to see  at this moment how an action of quo warranto can be maintained, based upon the theory that such notice was lacking.  That question having been determined  in  the  court below, and the decision  never  having  been  questioned  in the  only manner in which such a decision  can be, we must hold it conclusive in this action, quo warranto not being a method by  which that decision can be reviewed.  We are,  therefore, of the opinion that the action must be dismissed.

The complaint is hereby dismissed.  So ordered.

Arellano,  C.  J.,  Torres,  Mapa,  Johnson, Carson,  and Trent, JJ., concur.

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  ON REHEARING

JANUARY  22, 1913.

MORELAND, J.:

A motion for permission  to proceed with the action of quo warranto and to take testimony relative to the question whether all the candidates voted for at the election referred to in these proceedings had been regularly notified of the initiation of the protest.

We have to say, in  amplification of our former opinion on this question, that the general rule is that, where the jurisdiction  of the court depends  upon  the existence of facts, and the court  judicially considers and  adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the facts exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and  cannot be  controverted in a collateral  proceeding.   (Phelps  vs.  The  Mutual  Reserve Fund, 112 Fed., 453;  S. C, 61 L.  R. A., 717; Johnson vs. The Brewers Insurance Company, 51 Wis., 570; Wyatt vs. Steele, 26 Ala., 639; Wilkins vs.  McCorkle, 112  Tenn., 688; Milner vs. Neel, 114 Ga., 118; Brockenborough vs. Melton, 55 Tex., 493; Merritt  vs.  Home,  5 Ohio St., 307; 67 Am. Dec, 298; Lancaster vs. Snow, 184 111., 534; Swift vs.  Yanaway, 153 Ill, 197; Fairchild  vs.  Fairchild, 53 N. J.  Eq., 678; Hotchkiss vs. Cutting, 14 Minn., 537; Bruce vs. Osgood, 154 Ind., 375; Ketchum vs. White, 72 Iowa, 193; Axman vs. Dueker, 45 Kan., 179; Hiatt vs. Darlington, 152 Ind., 570; Goodell vs. Starr, 127  Ind., 198; Davis vs. Dresback, 81 Ill., 393; Cincinnati Railroad Co. vs. Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St., 273; Sipe vs. Copwell, 59  Fed., 970; Rogers vs. Milner, 13 Wash., 82; Rotch vs. Humboldt College, 89 Iowa, 480; State Insurance Co. vs. Waterhouse, 78 Iowa, 674; Flannery vs. Baldwin Fertilizer Co., 94 Ga., 696; Delphi vs. Startzman, 104 Ind., 343; Bumstead vs. Read, 31  Barb., 661; Evers vs. Watson, 156 U. S., 527;  Dowell vs. Applegate,  152 U. S., 327; Laccasane  vs. Chapuis,  144 U. S., 119; Kent vs. Lake Superior Co., 144 U. S., 75.)

There being in the record evidence to support the finding of the court below relative to its own jurisdiction over the subject matter  and over  the persons. involved,  this  court will not, in  this proceeding,  review the finding.

The motion to be permitted to go forward is  denied.

Arellano,  C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Trent, JJ.,concur.