The object of this appeal is to set aside a judgment for P4,483.90, with interest  from July 11, 1911, rendered in the Court of First Instance of favor of the city of Manila and against the Manila  Electric Railroad an Light Company, for services rendered, in inspecting and listing, prior t installation, electric meters  belonging to the company to the number of The fee, which it is claimed is fixed by a city ordinance, in  force at when the tests were  made, was P2 for each meter tested.  The difference between the total fees for testing the 2,712 meters and the amount of the judgment  arose from a credit  of P1,085.10 in favor  of the company for the electric current furnished the city laboratory in making the tests.

The defenses urged to the action are: (1) That the city was not authorize to make any charge for testing the company's meters;  (2) that if it has such  authority, a charge of P2 for each meter tested is excessive  and illegal;  and   (3)  that under the terms of ordinance No. 68, relied up the city, no such charge is  authorized or prescribed for the testing of as is sought to be imposed and collected in this action.

In regard to the question of the authority of the city to enact an ordinance providing for the official inspection and test of the electric meters an a reasonable charge for. this  service we think there can be no question unless it appears that there is  something in  the  defendant company's franchise which relieves it from liability to charges for such services. under its charter and  in the exercise of its police powers, is  vested authority to provide for the official inspection and test of all electric meters before their installation,  and this authority carries with it the right reasonable charges for the making of such inspections and tests.  As stated by counsel for the appellant,  "it has frequently  been  held that the granted  to a  municipality to  license and regulate an occupation carries with it, by necessary implication  if not by express grant,  the right t and to impose reasonable charges for inspection and supervision."

Subsection  (ii)  of section 17 of the Charter of Manila provides Municipal Board shall have authority "To regulate, control, and prevent discrimination in the sale and supply of gas, electricity, and telephone street railway service,  and fix and regulate  rates and charges therefor where the same has not  been fixed by Act of Congress or the Philippine Commission; and to provide for the inspection of all gas, electric, telephone and street-railway  wires, conduits, meters, and other apparatus, and the condemnation and correction or removal of the same, when dangerous or defective."

By virtue of the power thus conferred upon the city we hold that it is c authorized to enact appropriate ordinances providing for such reasonable inspection and tests of electric meters used in the city of Manila as it deem proper or necessary, and to fix reasonable fees for the making of such tests.  As is pointed out in the opinion of the trial judge, the me silence of the Charter on the question of charges does not prevent their imposition.  (Welch vs. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn., 140; 12 Am. Rep., 38 St. Paul vs. Dow, 37 Minn. 20; Am, St. Rep., Vol. 5, 811; Griggs vs. 103 Ga., 602; 68 Am. St.  Rep., 134; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. vs  Baltimore, 79 Md., 502; 24 L. R. A., 161, 163; Saginaw vs. Swift Co., 113 Mich., 660; 72 N.W., 6.)

Counsel for appellant points to the fact that in some cases wherein the Charter of Manila grants powers of inspection and regulation, express authority is granted to charge reasonable fees therefor, and he contends that the expression of the authority in those cases is an implied denial such authority in all other cases.   We  cannot  agree/with this content The argument might have some force if an express grant of authority to f such fees were made in regard to certain  inspections  and tests made un the section of the Charter by authority of which the ordinance in question was enacted, and were silent as to the others.  But it would be straining canon of  construction  on which  counsel relies beyond all limits to ho the express grant of a power in one portion of a charter,  which might have been inferred from  the  general  terms of  the Charter without have been expressly granted, forbids the application of the ordinary rules of construction to all the remaining provisions of the Charter, and justifies the  inference that no powers were intended to be granted thereunder which are not expressly conferred.   In the absence of an express prohibition, or language amounting by necessary implication to a prohibition, we think t the grant to the city of the power and the duty to inspect and to test carries with it the power to impose a reasonable fee thereunder.

In regard to the  contention that  the recovery of the fee for testing i meters impairs the obligations of the defendant's franchise, it should b sufficient to say, in the language of the trial judge,  that "Until it is shown that the amount collected from this charge is enough more than the reasonable and proper cost to provide the city with a  substantial surplus, the charge is not a revenue regulation and therefore not a tax."  The claim of the defendant company is based on the  fact that its franchise provide that the percentage  of gross earnings which it is required to pay the c for the  privileges granted by its franchise "shall be in lieu of all ta assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon  the privileges, earnings, income, franchise, etc., of the grantor, from which and assessments the  grantee   is hereby  expressly exempted." But  it i clear that  so  long  as the  fee charged for making the tests of the company's  meters is merely a  reasonable charge for the services actual involved, the charge is not in the nature of a tax or an assessment.

In regard to the contention that the fee of 92 for each meter  tested is unreasonable and excessive charge we accept the conclusions of the trial judge that the evidence of record does not sustain an affirmative finding that it is so clearly unreasonable or excessive as to justify us in hold illegal and the ordinance invalid.  We are not called upon in this action a reasonable charge for the services  rendered.   Appellant  seeks to av liability on the ground that the charge is so unreasonable that as a mat of law the ordinance fixing it is, to that extent, illegal and invalid. "judicial authority to declare an ordinance unreasonable is a power to b cautiously exercised," and we are not  prepared to disturb  the conclusion the  trial judge in  this regard on the not wholly satisfactory evidence introduced by the appellant at the trial in the court below. The third contention of appellant is that the ordinance by its terms does not author or prescribe a fee for" the testing of the meters on account of which the action is brought. Counsel  insist that section 23 of ordinance No. 68 o city of Manila, which provides fees for the official tests of meters has reference only to tests made under the provisions of  the next preceding section (22), which relates to tests made when there is a new installation electric lights, and not to tests made under authority of section 5,  which relates  to tests  made of meters disconnected for repairs. The fees for which this action was brought were for tests of this  latter class.

We think it is very clear, however, that the scale of fees set out  in s 23 was clearly intended to apply  to  all cases wherein tests of meters made under authority of the ordinance.  The section provides that "The f for each inspection and test herein provided shall  be as follows." We t that the words "inspection  and test herein provided" clearly refer to a inspections and tests provided in the ordinance.   The mere fact that section 23 immediately succeeds section 22, and that the scale of fees provided section  23 was undoubtedly intended to have application to cases arising under section 22 by no means justifies the conclusion  that this  scale has no reference to tests authorized under any other section of the ordinance.   If the scale of fees set forth  in section 23 applied  only cases arising  under section 22, it would seem that instead of using gen language,  which is applicable to  all tests made  by authority of the ordinance, it would have limited the  collection of fees  to cases arising section 22 by specifically referring to tests  provided "in section 22" next preceding section."   Indeed, if the scale of fees were intended  to apply only to section 22, its logical place  in the ordinance would be w the body of that  section  itself. Moreover, looking at the purpose and object sought to  be attained by establishing a scale  of fees for the testing of meters,  it would seem not less reasonable and proper that fees should  be charged  for tests made in cases where re-installations are be made of old and defective meters removed for the purpose of making repairs, than that they should be charged in  cases where new meters are tested.

The judgment of the  court below should be and is hereby affirmed.

Arellano,  C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent, JJ., concur.