The defendant and  appellant in this  case was charged with the crime of estafa upon an  information which reads as follows: 

"That on or about  December 10, 1910,  in  the municipality  of  Cavite, Province of  Cavite,  P.  L,  the above-named  accused entered the bicycle renting establishment, named  'Ligaya,' located  in Plaza Soledad of said municipality, pretended  that his name  was Jose de los Santos and  that lived at No. Ill  Calle Paseo,  and rented from the proprietor of said establishment,  named Leoncio Pangilinan, an Iver Johnson bicycle, No. 16 with the private marks No. 10 and the initials L. P., agreeing to the sum centavos an hour, and to return it after one hour;  but having  taken away said bicycle he did not return  it at the  time agreed or  pay the  rental thereof, but he did willfully, illegally, and maliciously and against the owner take possession of  it for himself and for the sake of gain, keeping in his possession until January 29, 1911, when the  said bicycle was found possession  of the said  accused in the town  of Imus, Province of Cavite I."

Accepting, as  we  do, the findings of  the trial  court as to the  credit and the lack of credibility of the different witnesses for the prosecution for the defense, the evidence  of record conclusively  establishes the gu the defendant  and appellant of the  crime of  estafa charged in t information,  and defined  and penalized in section 5 of article 535  of Penal Code,  read together  with section 1 of article 534.

Counsel for the appellant contends that since the information fails  expressly to allege that the bicycle in question had a specific definite value, and forth just what that value  was, a judgment of conviction upon this information should  not  be sustained.  But  while  it is true that a con of the crime of estafa cannot  be sustained in the absence  of proof that the  subject matter of the fraud perpetrated  by the accused had some value,  and while in good practice a complaint or information charging the commission of the crime of estafa  should specifically allege the value of the subject matter of the fraud where that is possible, we hold the mere  omission of an allegation of the specific value of the bicycle mentioned in the information did not render it fatally defective, because facts alleged in the complaint, when proven, establish beyond any  reason doubt  that the  bicycle  had some value.  The  information  alleges that the bicycle was  the property of  one  Leoncio  Pangilinan; that  it was use, at  the time when the  crime was committed, in  his bicycle renting establishment; and that  the  defendant rented it from the  owner and agreed  to  pay him 50  cents per hour for its use.  We think  that these allegations are sufficient, when proven, to sustain and justify a finding bicycle in question had some value, and that it was the personal property the complaining witness; and it appearing  that this bicycle  had  been converted or misappropriated by the defendant, in violation of  the provision of  subsection 5  of article 535, the finding that the bicycle was person property of some  value is sufficient to sustain a  conviction Under the provisions of  subsection 1 of article 534, which prescribes the penalty imposed where the value of the subject matter of the  fraud is not shown be  in excess of  250 pesetas.  In the case of the U.  S. vs. De (12 Phil. Rep., 87), wherein defendant was  convicted  of  the  crime of robbery  of  a watch, the specific Value  of which was not  set out expressly in the complaint,  we said that: "Since the crime of robbery is complete when all the other requisites set out in the definition of the c concur, if the property taken has even the smallest value, we think we would be justified in holding that the watch taken had sufficient value to sustain conviction of robbery,  unless it affirmatively appeared that it was absolutely worthless, for without testimony to the contrary a watch, which the owner valued enough to carry, may fairly be presumed to have some value, however insignificant that value may be."

We agree, however, with counsel for the appellant that the trial court er convicting the defendant of the misappropriation or conversion of property the value of more than  250 and less than 6,000 pesetas.  It  is true that one of the witnesses  testified that  the bicycle  in question was worth P75, and  that, if this testimony could be taken into  consideration for purpose of classifying the estafa  committed by the defendant  with those penalized under the provisions of subsection 2 of article 534, the judgment conviction should not be disturbed.  But the information does not charge the value of the property taken was more than 250 and less than 6,000 pesetas, and while we hold that its allegations amount to a charge that a bicycle of some value was taken, we would not be justified in declaring t these allegations amount to a charge that the bicycle had a value of more than 250 pesetas.   Under the code provisions the misappropriation or conversion of property valued at more than  250 pesetas is a higher offend than the misappropriation or conversion of property valued at less than 2 pesetas,  and an entirely different and distinct penalty is prescribed for two offenses.  We have frequently held that in no case can a conviction b sustained for a higher offense than that charged in the information, nor different offense, unless it is necessarily included in the offense charge manifest therefore that the conviction  in this  case  for the higher  of must be reversed.

Counsel for the prosecution contends that the failure of the information allege specifically that the  bicycle  had a value of 250 pesetas was cur by  the undisputed evidence of  record showing that its  was  in fact worth P75, or 375 pesetas.  Suit  this contention  can not be maintained; in  the place, because it  is in direct conflict with the general rule whereby we uniformly declined to sustain convictions for higher offenses than those charged in the information, which has its foundation in the Constitutional of  the  accused to  be advised at  the  outset of the proceedings as to the precise  nature of the charge against him; and, in the second place, because timely objection was made to the introduction of the evidence as the specific value of  the  bicycle,  and under elementary rules of evidedence the testimony in this  connection  should have  been excluded, at least i far as it was offered for the purpose of establishing  a higher or a diff offense  from that charged  in the complaint.

Of course we are not to be understood as holding that in every  case of t kind the admission of such evidence would necessarily be erroneous.   Case may arise  wherein testimony of this character would be properly admitted the purpose of aiding in the identification of the property, or  for the purpose of corroborating the testimony  of  a particular witness  or the But in such cases its use as evidence must be strictly limited to the leg object for which it might properly be admitted, and it can never be taken into  consideration for the purpose of maintaining a conviction for an of higher than that charged in the information.

The  judgment of the court below convicting and  sentencing the defendant should be and is  hereby reversed. The defendant  and  appellant is, nevertheless, adjudged guilty of  the  offense charged in the information is to say, of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized in sect of article 535 of the Penal Code,  read  together with section 1 of article and there being no evidence as to the  existence  of aggravating  or extenuating  circumstances, we  sentence  him to the prescribed penalty in its medium degree, that is to say, to two months and one day of arresto mayor, and to pay the costs in both instances. The bicycle having bee recovered by its  owner, there is no need for a specific order for its restoration.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson,  and  Trent,  JJ., concur.