The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appella smoking opium in violation of the provisions of Act No. 1761; and further that he is a  recidivist, in that on a former  occasion he was convicted similar violation of the Opium Law.

The trial  judge found him guilty as  charged  in the information, and ordered his deportation from the Philippine Islands under the provisions section 32 of Act No. 1761, as amended by section 4 of Act No. 1910, which is as follows:

"On and  after March first, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be unlawful for any person in the Philippine Islands to inhale, smoke, chew,  swallow or otherwise use or permit to be used in or on his body any opium, except for medicinal purposes,  and  then only upon  prescription of a duly licensed and practicing physician. 

"Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be pun by a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos nor less than  three hundred pesos, or by  imprisonment for not exceeding five years, nor less than t months, or by  both  such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion the court: Provided, however, That in the case of the commission  of a second offense under  the provisions of this section, any person  so convicted, if other than a citizen of the  United States or a citizen  o Philippine. Islands, may, by order of the court, be deported."

The Solicitor-General, in his brief, invites  the attention of the court fact that the evidence discloses that the appellant has a native wife an child living in the Province of Iloilo, with whom he was living at the t his arrest, and  suggests  that under all the  circumstances of this case penalty of deportation would appear to  be  excessive. In this we agree with the  Solicitor-General.

An exceptionally  wide range  of discretion is  conferred upon the court the imposition of the penalties prescribed for  violations of the penalized provisions  of the Opium Law.  But this  discretion should not be exercise arbitrarily, and in imposing the prescribed penalties the courts should have  in mind the purpose and  object of the statute as a whole.  We this that a review of the legislation  having  for  its object the regulation use and sale  of opium, its  derivatives  and compounds,  as  such legislation has been adopted in this as well as in many foreign  jurisdictions,  just the conclusion  that  the primary  object of the statute now in force in these Islands is the protection of the body politic from the evils which believed to be incident to the widespread use of this habit forming drug other than as a  medicine  or for scientific  purposes. With this  object view all  unauthorized use  of or traffic in  the drug is  penalized, the prescribed penalties  to be imposed by  the  courts  in their discretion very wide limits.

The exceptionally wide extent  of discretion conferred upon the  courts the statute clearly indicates the intention of the legislator that in applying these penalties the courts should have in  mind, at all times, the primaary object of the law, that is to say the suppression of the vice, as a widespread  evil threatening the public welfare; and further, the particular circumstances of each case, and the degree of criminality  involved in t particular violation of the statute of which the accused person has been convicted.

Accordingly we have heretofore held that - 

"Upon a  person  who  is convicted only of the crime of smoking opium, of having in his possession such a small quantity of the drug  as to  ju the inference that  it was intended merely for his own personal  use, the court has always readily affirmed the imposition of the minimum penalty; "but upon those who  attempt  to 'exploit the vice' and  violate  the provisions of  the Opium Law for gain,  it is deemed proper that, within discretionary limits  prescribed by law,  a higher and more severe  penalty should be imposed."   (U.  S. vs. Castaneda,  18  Phil. Rep.,  5

In accord with the views thus set forth we have affirmed a large number sentences imposing heavy fines and prison sentences upon persons convict of violation of the Opium Law, in cases wherein it appeared  from the evidence  that such persons had been engaged in its illegal  importation sale, or in the keeping of opium dens or the unlawful handling of the drug for profit, in any  form.  Indeed  we have adopted  the practice  in such cases  of adding  a  prison sentence  where the  court below has imposed a fine without imprisonment.   Mere  fines, however large,  do  not seem serve as a sufficient deterrent to offenders of this class, doubtless be the  illicit gains from the traffic  in the drug are so great, while the of  detection  and punishment  are in most instances so few, as a result the comparatively small bulk of the contraband article.

The following cases illustrate quite  clearly our  practice in this rega also our uniform practice of sustaining the courts below in cases wherein have held that the unexplained illegal  possession of the  drug,  in  quantities considerably in excess of an amount which would appear to be reasonably sufficient for the personal use of a victim of the opium habit, justified inference that the possessor is engaged in handling the drug for profit.

In the  case of U.  S. vs. Chia-Tua  (12 Phil. Rep., 605), a fine and two months' imprisonment was imposed on conviction of sale of opium without a license.

In the case of U. S. vs. Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil. Rep., 86), a pen two years' imprisonment and a fine of P3,000  was imposed  upon conviction  of an  attempt to smuggle seventy tins of opium into the Isl

In the case of U. S. vs. Viliano  (18  Phil. Rep., 359), a senten year and two months' imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P2,500, upon conviction of an attempt to smuggle a hundred tins of opium into th Islands,  was affirmed.

In the case of U. S. vs. Look Chaw (19 Phil.  Rep., 343), sentence of si months' imprisonment and a fine of Pl,000 was imposed for a violation of section 15 of the Opium Law.

In the case of U. S. vs.  Lee See (20 Phil. Rep., 398), penalty months' imprisonment and P1,000 fine for an attempt to smuggle twenty- eight tins  of  opium  into the Philippines was affirmed.

See also U. S. vs. Petallio (15 Phil; Rep., 642), wherein a penal year and one  day was imposed; U. S. vs.  Ana (15 Phil Rep.,  648 wherein a penalty of six months' imprisonment and  P300 fine was imposed U. S. vs. Lim-Tioco (15 Phil. Rep., 650), wherein imprisonment an P500 was imposed; U. S. vs. Tan-Quimyung (15 Phil, Rep.,  678), imprisonment for one year and a fine of P2,000 was imposed;  U. S. vs Lee (20 Phil. Rep., 596), wherein one year's imprisonment was imposed; a number of others of like tenor and effect.

On the other hand, the following cases illustrate the practice of this c affirming sentences imposing lighter penalties in cases where the convict for a first offense, and  the  violation of the law consisted of  smoking opium, or the illegal possession of  small quantities of the drug or of utensils, under circumstances  which would not justify the inference that convict was engaged in "exploiting the vice" for gain.  (U. S. vs.vs. Que-Latt,  15  Phil. Rep., 680; U. Hong Kong, 16 Phil. Rep., 678;  U. S. vs. Go Chin, 16 Phil. Rep., vs. Lim Chu, 16 Phil. Rep., 681; U. S.  vs. Farinas  Go Ju Rep., 684;  U. S. vs. Vy Tico, 16 Phil. Rep., 685; U. S. vs.vs.  Yu Chang Co,  17 Phil. Rep., 60 vs.  Ng  Se, 17 Phil. Rep., 607; U.S. vs. Phee, 17 Phil. Rep. vs. Go-Dingco,  17 Phil. Rep., 611; U. S.  vs. Yap  Chinci Rep., 617;  U, S. vs. Radami 17 Phil. Rep.,  626;  U. S. vsvs. Lim Tan Co, 17 Phil. Rep., 637; U. S. Lu, 17 Phil. Rep.,  637; U. S. vs. Ang Kan, 17 Phil. Rep.,  638; Yuen Chue,  17 Phil. Rep., 638; U. S.  vs. Sy  Yh Co,  17 Phil, R S. vs. Tan Nga Hui,  17 Phil Rep., 640; U. S.  vs. Lim Chi Rep.,  645;  U. S.  vs.  Bautista, 17 Phil. Rep.,  646; U. S.  17 Phil.  Rep., 646; U, S. vs. Chua Co, 17 Phil. Rep., 647; U. S. Vijunco, 17 Phil. Rep.,  658; U. S. vs. Ing Tong,  18 Phil. Rep., vs. Tan Chuco and Hao Chat Quiat,  18 Phil. Rep., 597; U. S. vsvs. Tan Pang, 18 Phil. Rep., 6 Co Su, 18 Phil. Rep., 615; U. S.  vs. Yap, 18 Phil. Rep.,  617; U.  S.  Baiiares  and Go-Paya,  18 Phil. Rep., 619; U. S. vs. Chua  Hun H Rep., 620; U. S. vs.  Go  Siong Huy, 18 Phil.  Rep., 620; U. S. < Hong Ki, 18 Phil.  Rep., 621; U. S. vs.  Wui  Co, 18 Phil. Rep., vs. Guillen Co Cuebo, 18 Phil. Rep., 622; U. S. vs. Chua Ting Rep., 630;  U.S. vs. Hu Bu,  18  Phil. Rep., 631; U.  S. vs. Zapa Marquez, 18 Phil. Rep., 633; U.  S. vs. Go Lean, 20 PhiJ. Rep., 593; U. Bertran, 20  Phil.  Rep., 594;  U.  S. vs. Co Ba, 20 Phil. Rep.,  595; U vs. Yap Tiongco,  20 Phil. Rep., 602;  U. S.  vs.  Poh Chi, 2 Rep., 607; U. S. vs. Ah  Chang and Ah Tong, 20 Phil. Rep., 609; U vs. Ly Juat Co, 20 Phil.  Rep., 625; U. S. vs. Teves, 20 Phil

A critical examination of these cases will disclose  that in the  earlier while we favored the imposition of lighter penalties, we were at first inclined to leave  undisturbed  sentences of the lower courts imposing fines some in excess of three hundred pesos, and even  prison sentences,  when such penalties were not much in  excess of the  minimum  penalties prescribed law,  that is  to say a fine of P300 or three months' imprisonment.  But will appear from the later cases, a  wider  experience in the  review of originating in the various  courts throughout the Islands,  and more ext opportunities for the observation of the practical working of the law ha convinced us that, as a rule in such cases, in the absence of some sufficient reason, made to appear of  record in a particular case, all prison sentences and fines in excess of P300 should be modified by the  substitution therefor of a fine of P300.  We have been brought to this conclusion not merely b the marked inequality in the application  of penalties in such cases in different courts in the Islands, arid  even  in  the  same court on diff occasions; but also because of the vicious  consequences flowing from the uncertainty as to the severity of the penalties to be imposed upon convicts such cases.   The provisions  of the law touching awards for informers c with them a very real  danger  of abuses even under the most careful  an painstaking administration  of justice.  With the fact that the danger such  abuses  is a  necessary incident  of the law,  the  courts  have nothing  to  do.   That  is  a question for  the Legislature,  and  it duty  and prerogative of  the legislator  to  determine whether the advantages derived  from  these provisions outweigh the danger of the abuses  incident  to them.   But it is the duty of the  courts  to  guard against such  abuses to  the  full extent of their power, and to administrative the law so as  to reduce them to the minimum.  In our opinion the imposition of  unequal and at times  arbitrarily severe penalties, on  persons convicted of  smoking  opium or  of having small  quantities of the drug in their possession, is  calculated  to increase enormously  the danger  of such abuses, by greatly increasing the facility with which evilly disposed pe enabled to blackmail both  the guilty and the innocent with threats of prosecution  for violations of the law of this nature.  The fear that the courts may impose a long prison sentence,  or even an extremely heavy fine on conviction upon a charge of smoking opium, places one who is conscious of guilt practically at the mercy of an informer who demands large sums the price of silence; and the  peculiar difficulties confronting an accused person in an attempt to overcome a well laid conspiracy to secure his conviction on such a charge,  combined with the fear of  such  severe penalties  may,  and we are convinced not infrequently do  induce innocent persons, especially those of  the Chinese race, to  pay tribute to blackmailers, who prey upon their  ignorance or their fears.

Our remarks in this connection should not be construed as  an  attempt t limit or prescribe the  discretion of the courts below to  impose more s penalties upon opium smokers than that just indicated, where the evidence discloses  strong or compelling reasons therefor.  Indeed, in a case very recently decided, we affirmed a prison sentence (reduced to three  month imposed upon one  convicted of  smoking opium, where the  evidence disclosed  that at the time when he was found making use of the drug, others were smoking in his house at his invitation, or at least with his permission, though we gathered from all the surrounding circumstances th the permission to make use of his house for that purpose was not granted for profit or in an attempt to exploit the vice for gain.  And in cases it affirmatively appears that the convict, because of inability  to pay of P300, would suffer subsidiary imprisonment of more than three months for his failure so to do, we can  see no objection to the imposition of months'  imprisonment  rather than the fine.

In this connection it is proper to add that  if provision were made  by for the detention and hospital treatment of  persons  convicted of opium smoking or the use of the drug in any form, with a view to  their permanent reform rather than as  a  punishment for the offense committed, it might and doubtless would be our duty to adopt  a different practice in an attempt to give effect to the intent of  the legislator.   The practice actually adopted is based on  conditions as they actually exist,  under law as it now stands on the statute book. From what has been said, we think it must be very clear that  the penalty  of banishment  upon a domiciled alien upon a  second  conviction of smoking opium,  should  no be  sustained, in the absence of exceptionally strong and compelling reason for the imposition of so extraordinarily severe a penalty.   of course, facts disclosed a  bold and contumacious  defiance of the law of the  la by a foreigner who is permitted to reside in the Islands, or if it appeal that an  alien,  himself a  confirmed victim  of the habit, was engaged fomenting the vice and encouraging or inducing others to smoke, his deportation would be clearly justified under the law.  But the mere fact a domiciled alien, a  habitual user of the drug, has been twice convicted its use, does not, in our opinion, necessitate the imposition of a penal would utterly ruin his business,  separate him  from  his  wife  and  ch a case such as that at bar, and expose him to loss and suffering far  in excess of those entailed  by the  sentence which would be imposed upon citizen for a like offense. We do not believe that the legislator intend anticipated that the discretion vested in the courts in cases of  this c would be exercised so as to produce such unjust and inequitable consequences.   (U. S. vs. Yu  Quico, 17 Phil. Rep., 625;  U.  S. Chit, 17 Phil. Rep.,  647.)

We think that this being the second offense, the penalty to be imposed should be somewhat more severe than that which should  be imposed upon a first  offender; and that, in this case, the convict  should be sentences a  prison sentence in addition to a fine.

The judgment of conviction of the lower court is affirmed, but the  sent of deportation  is reversed, and in  lieu thereof  the  convict is hereby sentenced to three months' imprisonment and to the payment of a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment according to  law in the event of insolvency and nonpayment of the fine, and to the payment of the costs i both instances.  So ordered.

Arellano, C. J.,  Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.