Clemente Pena at the time of his death was the owner of some  real  estate,  cattle, and other  personal  property. Among his heirs he left a son named Pedro Pena.  When the estate of Clemente Pena was divided, Pedro Pena had already died and his daughter, named Francisca Pena, received his portion of the inheritance.   She was  then a minor  and a guardian, Ramon Ortiz, was appointed, and the latter  took over and administered the property that had come to Francisca Pena, through her father, from the estate of the aforesaid Clemente Pena.  Francisca Pena married Eulogio  Tria and died March 2, 1902.

After the death of Francisca Pena, her surviving husband, Eulogio Tria, made application,  on January 13, 1903, for the appointment of a judicial administrator  for the intestate estate of his late wife,  and was himself  appointed.   He presented an inventory of the  property of the deceased, which inventory  included seven parcels of  land.  But commissioners of appraisal  were  appointed  and  appraised thirty-four parcels, and there the proceedings of that administration terminated.

On January 18, 1907, Gavina Fernandez also made special application for the appointment of an administration for the property which Pedro Pefia had left at his decease, by a will executed and  probated under the late sovereignty. and the petitioner herself, Gavina Fernandez, widow of the said Pedro Pena, was appointed.  In the same instrument she asked for the partition of the estate of Pedro Pena, and there the proceedings terminated.

Later, on July 23, 1908, Gavina Fernandez, as such judicial administratrix, instituted the present suit praying for judgment in her favor and  against the defendant for the ownership and possession  of the property set forth in the complaint, for P2,000 damages and the costs.

The material facts of the complaint are: the third, wherein it  is averred that the hereditary succession of the deceased Pedro Pena is the owner and is entitled to ownership and possession of the property which is then described, to wit,  according to the fourth fact, seven parcels of rural land,  and five horses, the condition of the  latter being a matter of surmise (B. of e., 2 and 3);  and  the fifth, in which it is averred  that  the defendant Eulogio Tria,  as judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Francisca Pena (second fact) illegally retains, in his possession the property described in the complaint and claims to have rights therein adverse to those of the plaintiff.

In his reply the defendant confines himself to a generaldenial.

From the evidence adduced, the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines, which tried the case, decided it "in favor of the plaintiff  in her capacity as administratrix for the deceased Pedro Pena, declaring that  she  was entitled  to possession during the probate proceedings with reference to the real property described in the complaint and ordering the defendant to deliver it to her."   (B. of e., 8 and 9).

The defendant prepared a bill of exceptions and appealed to this court, submitting the following assignments of error:    

1. In  having declared  the  plaintiff-administratrix owner of the land sought.
   
2.    
3.  In  denying the  request for a new trial on the ground that the judgment is not  sustained by the evidence.         

With reference  to  the  first assignment, the trial court made no declaration  of ownership.  It merely stated the conclusion that the plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pena, was entitled  to possession of the property described in the complaint so that she might act as administratrix during the probate proceedings  of  the  estate of Pedro Pena, and that  when the debts had been paid, if any existed, and said proceedings  were terminated, the property remaining should be divided among the heirs; and judgment was rendered to this effect.

With reference to the second, no error was incurred in denying the request for a new trial, for the evidence adduced sufficiently sustains the conclusions in the judgment.

The trial court held the following facts to be proven:

1. That Pedro Pena was the son of Clemente Pena,  and that the latter died before the former.  A fact admitted by the defendant.
   
2.  
3. That the land described in  the complaint belonged to Clemente Pena and, according to his will, said land belonged to Pedro Pena as heir, and for this reason it was  delivered first to Ramon Ortiz  as guardian of Francisca  Pena  and later to her, aided  by her husband Eulogio Tria,  in whose possession it now is as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Francisca Pena.  A fact not refuted by the defendant.
   
4.  
5. That, according to the will of the deceased Pedro Pena, his  widow  Gavina  Fernandez and his legitimate  daughter Francisca Pena are his heirs

The clause in the will of Pedro Pena wherein this testamentary disposition of his is made reads thus:  "Item. - I affirm that  I have been married three times: The first time to Dona Maria Ramirez, by whom I had six children, all now dead; the second  time to Dona  Petrona  Fernandez, also dead,  from  which marriage  we  have a minor  daughter named Francisca; and the third time to Dona Gavina Fernandez, by  whom I have another  son, named  Ambrosio, to whom I leave, as heirs by force of law, one-half of all my property to my daughter Francisca, and the other half to my wife Gavina Fernandez and son Ambrosio."
   
This son Ambrosio died after his father,  and his rights of inheritance passed by operation of law  to  his mother Gavina Fernandez, a fact that does not appear to be contradicted by the oral evidence adduced.
 
That  the  property described in the  complaint is  the same which  appears in the  inventory,  presented by  the appellant as  remaining at the death of his wife Francisca Peiia,  when  he asked for the judicial  administration of her intestate estate (Exhibit  A of the plaintiff), the same which,  together  with other property, was enumerated in the  inventory made by  the  commissioners of appraisal in said  proceedings  in the intestate  succession of Francisca Pena (Exhibit B  of  the plaintiff), and  finally  the same which, together with other property, appears to have been turned over by the guardian of  Francisca Peiia,  Ramon Ortiz, to the attorney  in fact  of the married couple, Eulogio  Tria  and  Francisca Pena  (Exhibit   C  of  the plaintiff).
 
Therefore  there  is no  justification for the request  for a  new trial on the ground  that the judgment  is not sustained  by the evidence.
 
It is. clearly  established  that Francisca  Pena,  instead of her father Pedro Pena,  received all  the  property that the latter's father had left  him, and that  this property did not all belong  to Francisca Pena, but only a  half of it, according  to  the express  disposition  of Pedro Pena. The other half belonged to Gavina Fernandez, and in order to secure  it,  she instituted special proceedings wherein she was  appointed  judicial administratrix  of  the estate of her  deceased husband, Pedro  Pena,  with  the object and for  the  purpose the law  fixes, in order to transmit the inheritance  from the hands of him  who leaves  it at his death to those who, according to his wish or according to the  provisions of law,.are  entitled to  receive it.

The  law provides  that, when a  will  has been  proved and  allowed,  the court shall  issue  letters testamentary thereon to the person  named  as executor therein,  if he accepts the trust and gives the bond required by law.  The term "executor"  in this Act shall include  an administrator with the will annexed.   (Code of Civ. Proc, sec. 641.)
   
If no executor  is named'in the will, or if a person dies intestate, the  administration shall first be  granted to the surviving husband or wife.  (Ibid., 642.)
 
In appointing  as administratrix for the estate of the deceased, Pedro  Pefia  his  widow Gavina  Fernandez the court acted in conformity  with these legal provisions.
 
  The law further provides that "every executor or administrator, unless he is residuary  legatee and has given the bond prescribed  for the residuary  legatee, shall, within three months  after his appointment, return  to the  court a true inventory  of the real  estate and  all the  gootls, chattels, rights and  credits of  the  deceased which  come into his possession or knowledge.  (Ibid.,  668.)

"An  executor  or administrator may commence,  prosecute, or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions which survive to such executor or administrator,  and are necessary  for the  recovery  and protection of  the property or rights of the  deceased, and may prosecute or defend such actions or suits commenced in the lifetime of the deceased. (Ibid., 702.)
   
"Actions to recover the title or possession of real estate, buildings, or any  interest therein, actions to recover  damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, and actions to recover  the  possession of specific articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or administrator."   (Ibid.,  703.)

  In  conformity with  these provisions and in accordance with  general principles  of  law,  the plaintiff Gavina Fernandez, as  administratrix  of  the estate  of Pedro Pena has  been  able to say  justly in  her complaint that the hereditary succession of this deceased is the owner and is         entitled to ownership and possession of the property, which is withheld by the defendant, Eulogio Tria, in his capacity  as administrator of the intestate estate of  Francisca Pena, property the identity of which, according to the copy of the inventories made of said intestate estate, is set forth by the trial judge,  against which statement and finding this Supreme Court finds no error to have been committed, and property which, as  was properly asked in the  complaint and  as  ordered in  the  judgment  appealed from, should be in the possession and under the administration of the plaintiff.
 
Once in possession, there should be applied the principle which this  Supreme Court  has laid down in interpreting the  law:

'By section 641, when a  will is  proved it is obligatory upon the court to appoint  an executor  or administrator. By  virtue of  other  provisions of the code this  executor or administrator has, under the direction of the court, the full  administration and control of the deceased's property, real and personal,  until  a final decree is made in accordance with section  753.  During the period  of  administration  the heirs, devisees, and legatees have no  right to interfere with  the administrator or executor  in the.discharge of his duties.   They have  no right,  without his consent, to  the possession of any part of the  estate, real or personal.  The  theory of the present  system  is that the  property  is all in the  hands of the court, and must stay there until the affairs  of the  deceased are  adjusted and  liquidated, and  then the  net balance  is turned  over to the persons by law  entitled to it.   *  *  *   After the estate is fully settled,  and all the debts and  expenses of administration are paid, the law contemplates that there shall be  a hearing  or trial in this proceeding in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of determining  who the parties are that are entitled to the  estate in the  hands of the executor or administrator for distribution, and after such hearing or trial it is made the duty of the  court to enter a decree or final judgment, in which decree, according to section 753, the court 'shall assign the  residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,  and in its order the court shall  name  the  persons  and proportions or parts to  which each  is entitled/ "  (Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 439, 440.)
   
  Until this  time comes, therefore, it can not be determined which is the property or, which is the part thereof that belongs to the intestate estate of Francisca Pena, and until such time there is no property belonging to Francisca Pena or to Gavina Fernandez, but only  property belonging to the intestate estate of Pedro Pena.
 
To assert  rights of  ownership and  possession in favor of Francisca Pena, before determining what the property is which may fall to her from the estate of Pedro Pena, seems to be a plain absurdity that does not require demonstration,  just as there is no  need for demonstrating that an effect can not precede its cause.  Francisca  Pena and Gavina Fernandez are the  successors  in interest  of the estate of Pedro Pena, their predecessor in interest, and Francisca Pena can hardly have private property derived from Pedro  Pena's estate before  such estate  has been divided and  before Francisca Pena  and Gavina Fernandez have been legally assigned their respective portions.

So the  judgment  appealed from  could  not  be  more in accordance with law,  with strict justice  and  with the dictates of reason, and it is therefore hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.
   
 

---

DISSENTING:

MORELAND, J.,
   
This  is an action of ejectment begun by Gavina  Fernandez, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pena, deceased,  against Eulogio Tria,  as  administrator of the estate of  Francisca Pena, deceased.

The land in suit is owned,  according to the undisputed facts in  this case, and as found  by the decision of this court, as, follows:
   
Gavina  Fernandez,  personally, an undivided  one-half interest.
 
Eulogio Tria,  personally,  and his  only child,  Buenaventura, a minor, together own the other undivided  one-half part, as heirs of Francisca  Pefia, deceased, who,  prior to her death, owned said undivided  one-half part as tenant in  common with said Gavina Fernandez.
 
So that Gavina Fernandez, representing a half  interest, and Eulogio Tria and his child, together representing the other half, are concededly owners and tenants in  common of the land in suit in this  case.

The land  in question  was  originally  owned  by Pedro Pena, who concededly died in November, 1890.  He left a will divising an undivided  one-half  of  said  land to his widow,  Gavina Fernandez, and the  other undivided  one-half to his  daughter,  Francisca Pena.  Francisca Pena, immediately  on the death of her father,  Pedro Pena,  took possession of all  of said  lands and retained them till her death, which occurred on the 2d day  of March,  1902. She left, her surviving, as her only heirs at law, her husband, Eulogio  Tria,  and an only child, a son, Buenaventura, born on the 14th day of July, 1899.  These two  heirs  took possession  of the property left  by the wife and. mother and continue in the same at  present.

During all the years from 1890 no one has ever questioned or challenged the ownership or the possession of  Francisca or her successors in interest.

It will be noticed that  the only apparent parties to this action are administrators.  Not one of the conceded owners of the land is a party.   Neither Gavina Fernandez,  Eulogio Tria nor his  minor son is a party.
   
It will also be noticed that,  although the  complaint alleges that  the  defendant administrator is in possession of the lands, that allegation  is denied by the answer, and there is no legal proof in the evidence showing the possession alleged.   The only witness who testified for the plaintiff on  that subject was Emilio  Fuentebella who said  that he supposed or concluded that the  possession was by  Eulogio as adminstrator simply because  he was administrator.  On the contrary, all  the  facts  and circumstances show that Eulogio  Tria and his  minor son  are  in  possession of the lands in question as heirs and owners and have been since the death of the wife and  mother in 1902.  In fact, this court finds as a fact that the administration of the estate of Francisca by her husband,  Eulogio,  as  administrator, terminated in 1903.  The court says:

"After the death of Francisca Pena, her widower Eulogio Tria made application, on  January  13, 1903, for the appointment of a judicial administrator for the  intestate estate of his late wife, and  was himself appointed.  He presented an inventory of  the  property of the deceased, which inventory  included  seven  parcels  of land.  But commissioners of  appraisal were  appointed  and appraised thirty-four parcels, and there the proceedings of that administration  terminated."

In view  of this  positive  declaration  I do not  stop  to discuss the character and effect of certain  accounts introduced in evidence by the plaintiff.

The result is that, if the  decision of this court  amounts to anything in the end,  it will  terminate in the exclusion of Eulogio Tria and his son,  Buenaventura, from the possession  of the land in dispute.  Moreover,  if  the defendant administrator is the representative of the  heirs,  then his expulsion from possession is equivalent, legally, to the expulsion of the heirsthemselves.   I therefore treat the matter from the point of view of the heirs themselves,

Therefore, I dissent from this decision: 

1.   Because it recognizes  and  approves the wisdom and policy as well  as  the  validity of the  appointment of an administrator with the  will annexed seventeen years after the death of  the person for  whose estate  the administrator was appointed (Pedro Pena having died in 1890), when, at the time  of the appointment, there were  no  claims for or against the  estate,  when there  was no  personal property left by the deceased in  existence,  and when the real property left by the decedent had been continuously in the undisputed and unchallenged possession of his only child and devisee and her heirs for seventeen years.
   
2.  
3.   Because it sanctions and approves such appointment when, in my humble judgment, there was no legal or practical reason  justifying such appointment.
   
4.  
5.   Because it sanctions such appointment upon a  theory which, in my opinion,  misconstrues the object and purpose of administration under the law of the Islands  the  theory of the court  being that, when heirs or devisees differ over their respective rights in real estate, such real estate should. by means of  the appointment of an administrator, be taken away from all.  This ignores the rights of owners of lands to settle their disputes' between themselves or by appealing to the court  in person.  It is the forcible appointment of a guardian for every  person who happens to be an heir and does not agree with his coheirs.
   
6.  
7.   Because 4 it lays  down  the proposition, and lays  it down as the policy of the law of administration in this country, that one can  do  by indirection what he cannot do by direction.  Gavina Fernandez  being  the  owner of an undivided half of the real estate in question, and that is all she claims, and Eulogio and Buenaventura being the owners of the other undivided  half, it is a principle unquestioned anywhere that Gavina could not dispossess them by any action or proceeding known to the law.  One tenant in common cannot legally  dispossess his  fellow  tenant in common.  Their rights are equal, and equal rights cannot in law or justice produce unequal results.   Both are entitled to possession, but not one alone.  Not being able,  then, to dispossess the defendants by direct attack, Gavina astutely takes the path of indirection.  She procures the appointment of an administrator; and lo,  a miracle is wrought, a right which  never  existed before  was  born, namely  the  right to drive from possession those whose rights in the premises from which they are expelled are  inferior  to those  of no man.   Prior  to speaking the mysterious  and portentous words which created the administration, all the powers of the estate  could  not have  dispossessed them.  There were no rights greater than theirs.  There was no justice that they did not share.  There was no one who could drive them from their home.  In spite of all this, the administratrix passes her  magic wand over this legal vacuum, this  receptacle, this space in which there is nothing,  and behold, it  is peopled with powers.  Where there was  nothing before, there is something now.   Where, before, there was nothing which could expel a person from land which he owned (and had  possessed for seventeen years  without  challenge), now there is a strange creature of the law which, without ownership, dispossesses the owner,  without right overcomes the rightful, and with nothing takes all.  By the utterance of a single word, "appointed," the king becomes the beggar. Where direction  is unsuccessful, the devious ways of indirection meet success.
   
8.  
9.   Because, while giving miraculous  virtues to the appointment  of an administrator in one case, it gives none whatever to such appointment in another.  If the appointment of Gavina Fernandez as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pena produces such miraculous results, why does not the appointment of  Eulogio Tria  as administrator  of the estate of Francisca Pena produce results equally miraculous ? It is certain that Francisca Pena was just as much the owner of her real estate as Pedro Pena was of his; and therefore if the administrator  of Pedro Pena can take his real estate away from everybody regardless of owners' rights, of law, equity, justice and everything else, why cannot the administrator of Francisca Pena do the same  thing with the real estate which she left?  If the administratrix of Pedro is an irresistible force as to the  real  property of Pedro, why is not the administrator of Francisca an irresistible force as to the real estate of Francisca?   This court, as well as the court below,  found the ownership of Francisca with the same force and effect as it found the ownership  of Pedro. Why, then, should the administrator  of Francisca give way to the  administratrix of Pedro?  If one can claim miraculous attributes, why cannot the other, and for  the same reason?  If one can succeed  with  nothing, why  cannot the other?  When two irresistible  forces come together     in opposition, the result is necessarily nil.  If the administratrix of Pedro claims that she  must take the real estate which  he owned to  administer  it, the administrator  of Francisca makes the same claim  relative to the real estate which  Francisca  owned.  If the administratrix of Pedro asserts that she must hold the real estate of Pedro during administration, so asserts the administrator of Francisca. Simply because Pedro Pena died first and Francisca's property came from him does not under the facts of this case give his administratrix superior powers over the administrator of Francisca.  In reality there never was, in effect, an estate of Pedro  Pena.  The appointment seventeen years after  his death was abortive.   The estate, if one ever came into existence, ceased to exist  on the distribution of the  property. (Sections 596, 597, Code of Civil Procedure; McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil. Rep., 211.)   The appointment in 1907 could not give life to something which,  if it was ever born, died in 1890; nor can it destroy a status created by the division of the estate and a delivery of the property in 1890, which status obtained in 1907 when the futile  appointment of plaintiff was made.
   
10.  
11. Because it deprives the owners of their rights of property without any  beneficial result whatever.   What is the administratrix to do with this property?  What can she do with it?  Absolutely nothing.  If  it  be said that the administratrix took it to divide between  the devisees  (a power attributed to an administrator which I deny, particularly relative to tenants in common, such proceedings being properly of partition under section 181 of  the Code  of  Civil Procedure), I reply that we do not knoxu  that the devisees want to divide  it.  There  is not a particle  of  evidence in  the record showing such a desire. Indeed, the devisees are not even parties.  Surely the court will not divide real property among owners without their consent!  If it be urged that the administratrix took it to ascertain who the owners are, I reply that the administratrix admits the ownership of Eulogio and Buenaventura.  But, even  if it be conceded that the administratrix took the property,  and properly so, for the purposes mentioned,  that does not in any sense or to any degree justify the dispossession of the owners.   Both of those ends could be attained just as well by leaving them in possession while the questions were being determined.  And being the unquestioned owners of an undivided one-half interest  and having been in unchallenged possession for more than seventeen years, are they not entitled, under every principle of justice and  equity,  to remain in possession until superior rights are shown?   I again put the question, Why should  the administratrix take this property?  The only possible answer is, "Just to give it back again after she has fattened her fees at the expense of  rights which should never have been disturbed."  It is the old refrain of marching up the hill and marching  down again.
    
12.  
13. Because so far as this  action is concerned, it destroys the owners' rights in the property in question depriving them  of legal  virtue and effect and making them go for nought.   Their admitted  ownership of an undivided half, their undisturbed possession for seventeen years, are given no effect, are accorded no legal virtue and go for nothing. In spite of these conceded rights, this decision strips them as naked as the veriest squatter.  While such deprivation of rights may be limited in time, it is nevertheless a deprivation.
    
14.  
15. Because the only evidence  presented in the case by the plaintiff to show the right  which she asserts is the  order appointing her administratrix.   There is no other evidence in the  case  on  that subject.   The only proof which the administratrix offers to sustain her alleged rights is her naked appointment.
    
16.  
17. Because it lays down the doctrine, which I regard as a most unfortunate one, that the right of an administrator to the  possession of the real estate of a decedent is general and absolute and not special and relative; and this  court by this decision now and for the future drives absolute and conceded owners from the possession  of their lands on the mere proof of  the appointment of an administrator, without showing the  existence of the special conditions  upon which, in my judgment, the  rights of an administrator in      real estate depend.  This doctrine, enunciated so generally in this case, and,no other interpretation can be given to the decision, is not founded in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure  and is  not  supported, so far as I can ascertain,  by a single Anglo-Saxon authority.
    
18.  
19. Because it makes the administrator the representative of one heir as against another, thereby seriously misapprehending the  nature  and  purpose of administration and  the functions of  an  administrator.
    
20.  
21. Because the decision holds that before anyone has any title or right to property whatever  under the law of these Islands it must go to the administrator and be administered by him, and then passed through the court in the proceedings for division; that  before property belongs to an heir or devisee and before he has any right to it whatever, it must go through the weary and expensive length of administration; that, although his ownership is admitted by  everybody, and  although  there  are no claims  for  or against the estate and no reason exists  why an administrator should be appointed, yet the property is, nevertheless, taken  from him, he is dispossessed of the use and occupation thereof, it  is placed in a useless administration, and it is  returned to him,  after  perhaps years, reduced  by useless expense and the fees of the administrator.  During all this time the administrator is promoting litigation.  If the heir in possession believes that, in justice, he  ought not to be driven out except  by  superior rights, and accordingly refuses to vacate, there must be a suit to put him out. Then there must be another to determine whether he is the son of his father or not and whether his father and mother were  married.  There  must  be still  another  hearing  to ascertain what his share in the property  is.   And all this, although every one of these facts thus determined may  be and generally is admitted by everybody.   In this very case no one questions the rights of  Eulogio and his son.  Yet out they go.   The court says:
       
      "Until this time comes (until an administrator has been appointed,  the property taken away from the real owners, placed in court, the  heirs and their shares determined, and final order made for distribution), therefore, it cannot be determined which is the property or which the part thereof that belongs to the intestate estate of Francisca Pena, and until such time there is no property belonging to Francisca Pena or to Gavina Fernandez, but only property belonging to the intestate estate of Pedro Pena.

"To assert rights of ownership and possession in favor of Francisca Pena before determining what the property, is which may fall to her from the estate  of Pedro  Pena seems to be a plain absurdity that does not require demonstration, just as there is no need for demonstrating that an effect cannot precede its  cause.  Francisca  Pena  and Gavina Fernandez  are  the successors in interest of the estate of Pedro Pena, their predecessor  in interest,  and Francisca Pena can hardly have private  property derived  from Pedro  Pena's  estate before such estate has been divided and before Francisca Pena and Gavina Fernandez have been legally assigned their respective portions."

The  opinion also  says:

"In conformity  with these provisions  and in accordance with general principles of law, the plaintiff, Gavina  Fernandez, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro Pena, has been able to say justly in her complaint that the hereditary succession of this deceased is the owner and is entitled to ownership and possession  of the property,  which  is withheld by the defendant, Eulogio  Tria.  *  * *."

I regard the  doctrine laid  down  in these quotations to be  contrary to  the  proposition as already established  by this court in several decisions.   I am of the opinion also that it is  contrary to the  provisions of the  Civil Code and the decisions of  the  supreme court of Spain.  Articles 657, 658 and 661 of  the  Civil  Code read as follows:

"The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the  moment of his  death.

"Succession is granted  either by the will of the man as expressed in a will or, in  its absence,  by provision of law.

"The first is called testamentary the second legal succession.
   
 "It may also be bestowed partly by will of man and partly by provision of  law.

"Heirs succeed the deceased in all  his rights, and obligations  by the mere fact of his death."
   
  In a decision of the supreme court of Spain dated November 23, 1903, the court said:
 
"As has  been  repeatedly decided by this supreme court, the heir, as the  successor of the deceased in  all his rights and,obligations, has  the  power  and  the.right  to  demand what  pertains to his interest, without reference to his co-heirs, whenever it is not to their prejudice and  provided that he conforms to the laws regulating community of property."

In another decision dated December 11 of the same year the court said:

"It is an ancient rule of our law, confirmed by article 661 of the Civil Code, that the heirs succeed by the mere fact of the death of  their predecessor in  interest."

In  the case of Pascual vs.  Angeles (4 Phil.  Rep., 604) the court said:

"If the juridical personality of the deceased  testatrix is transmitted to the heir and the latter  is considered as identified with his devisor, to whose rights, actions,  and obligations,  not  extinguished by  her death,  he succeeded,  then there is no doubt that the plaintiff, as testamentary successor of his deceased sister Ciriaca, as  appears  from the will on page 17 of the  bill of exceptions, had a right to.oust the defendant,  Angeles,  for failure to pay the stipulated rent. (Art. 659 of the Civil Code; judgments of the supreme court of Spain of February 10, 1879; September 13, 1882; and January 28, 1892.)"

In the case of Ilustre, as administrator, vs. Frondosa (17 Phil.  Rep., 321), this court said:

"Under the provisions of the Civil  Code (arts. 657-661), the rights  to the succession of  a person are transmitted from  the moment of his  death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor.   The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed  and delivered to them a deed for the same before his  death.  In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the  administration of the said property immediately.  If they desire to administer it jointly,  they  may do  so.  If they desire  to partition  it among themselves  and can do this  by mutual  agreement, they also have that privilege.  The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions  provides how  an estate may  be  divided  by a petition for  partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.   When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among  the heirs.  When  the  heirs are all  of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should  be burdened with the costs and expenses of an  administrator.  The  property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no  right  to intervene in any way whatever  in the division of the  estate among the  heirs. *  *  *   If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received  their participation,  they have  their remedy  by petition for partition of  the said estate."

In the case  of Malahacan, as administrator, vs.  Ignacio and others (19  Phil. Rep., 434), this  court  cited with approval the case just quoted from and said:

"The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased,  against the  defendants, the  only  heirs  at law of the said  deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died  seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years  before the  commencement of this action.

"Under the  provisions of the Civil Code the  ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly on his death.  Guillerma  Martinez, having died seized of  the lands  involved  in this suit,  leaving the  defendants  as her  only heirs at law, it follows that said  heirs instantly became the  owners  and were entitled to  the  immediate possession thereof.  It is not alleged  in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death.   The only ground upon which an administrator  can demand of the heirs  at law possession of the real  estate of which his  intestate  died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased."

To the same effect is the case of  Irlanda vs. Pitargue (22 Phil. Rep., 383).

In the case of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng  (21 Phil. Rep., 211), this  court held:

"It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the  principle of private  ownership of property that he who owns property shall  not be deprived  of its  immediate possession and use except for urgent and imperative  reasons; and then only so long and to such extent as is necessary to make the  opposing rights  which  underlie those reasons effective.  This being so, said sections, which have for their object the prompt possession and use of property by the  persons who  really own it, should  be given liberal construction.   They  should  not  be  unreasonably straitened or narrowed in  their extent, but, rather, should be given that wideness and fullness of application without which they cannot produce their most beneficial effects."

In relation to sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court  held in  said case:

"The purpose of these sections being, also, to avoid the trouble, loss of time,  expense, and other undesirable  concomitants of administration,  such construction  should  be given as will  best conserve this purpose."

12.   Because  the'  administrator  against   whom it  is rendered was not in possession of the land in dispute when the judgment was rendered and  has never been  in possession.  On the contrary it is the inevitable conclusion from the whole case that Eulogio Tria and his minor son are in possession as heirs of Francisca Pena and have been without dispute  or challenge since 1902.
    
13.  
14.   Because the court found as a fact in another part of the same decision that the  administration proceedings  on the estate of Francisca Pena, wife of Eulogio, terminated in 1903.   This being so, the administrator of that estate could  not have  been  in  possession when  this action was commenced, and cannot be now.   Therefore the basic allegation in ejectment, viz, the  possession of the  defendant, is unproved in this case.
    
15.  
16.   Because the actual owners of the land in suit, two of whom were also in actual  possession when this action was commenced and are now in possession, are not parties in  this action.  Not  one of the actual  owners is a party to  this suit although  two of them  and  their  predecessors in interest have been continuously in possession since 1890.
    
17.  
18.   Because no steps were taken by  the court below  or by this court to  protect the interests of a  minor in actual possession of the real estate in litigation in this suit.   If the  judgment  rendered  by this  court  in this case  is not fruitless,  it will  dispossess  Eulogio and his minor  son by excluding Eulogio as administrator,  the court having found that he is in partial possession as  such.  It is undoubted that the court below will, on the judgment of this court,  at once order the plaintiff put in possession to the exclusion  of everybody else.  This will dispossess  the minor  son with his father, when it is indisputable  that  they  together are the real possessors and not the administrator.  Under such conditions the  court should  take measures to. protect the minor.
    
19.  
20. Because  the evidence  produced  by the plaintiff  is legally worthless for any  purpose except to strengthen the defendants' case  and the decision has,  therefore, nothing to sustain it.  The possession of the father and son  is not illegal  or  unlawful.  It is not subordinate  to  anyone else. Their rights are not inferior  to those of any other person, especially the  plaintiff.  No  one in  the world,  so  far  as this  record  shows, has higher or more perfect legal  rights than they.