On the 23d day of January, 1909, the plaintiff  commenced an action against the defendants  in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication.   The complaint was in the following language:

"COMPLAINT.

"I.

  "That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

"II.

"That for a long time before  the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants,  Martin  Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A.  Reyes, Faustino  Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose", Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of  a certain daily  newspaper known as 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling Pagsilang' which newspaper during all the time  mentioned in this complaint was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages  in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the  Philippine Islands.

"III.

"That for a long time the defendants have  been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October, 1908,  with the malicious intention of injuring the  plaintiff, who on said date was, and  still is a  member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and  Secretary of  the Interior in the Government of  the Philippines, they attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as  an official  of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt,  and ridicule of the public,  printed, wrote (redactaron), and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of  the 30th of October,  1908, a malicious defamation and false libel which was injurious (injurioso) to the plaintiff, said  libel reading as  follows:

"'EDITORIAL.

" 'BIRDS OF PREY.

" 'On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be  eaten and  devoured.

" 'Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of things which makes them  the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former.  At times they have  been  fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and  devourers,  but in the majority of cases they  did not obtain  anything  but a change  of name  or plumage.

" 'The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation between the ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it  at the fellow-creatures' expense.

" 'Amongst men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon.  And for some  psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the eagle, or the serpent.  Some have done so by a  secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature  of simulation,  of  infatuated  vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor ever can be.

" 'The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most adepts.   And men, collectively and individually, have  desired to copy  and  imitate the most rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.

" 'There are men  who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the vampire.

  " 'Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure  the skulls of the Igorots and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight, with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the  large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amidst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always  for his own benefit.

" 'Authorizing, despite  laws  and  ordinances, an  illegal slaughtering of diseased  cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat  which he himself  was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position.

" 'Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects  and importing fish eggs, as if the fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and less savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species coming from  other climes.

" 'Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindoro, in Mindanao, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the  object is to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of others.

" 'Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of worthless land  at fabulous prices which  the city  fathers dare not refuse,  from fear  of displeasing  the one who is behind the motion,  and which they do not refuse for their own good.

" 'Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the prospects of enormous profits, at the expense of  the blood of the people.

"'Such are the characteristics of the man who is at  the same time  an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who  gorges himself on  the dead and putrid meats, an owl who  affects a. petulent omniscience  and  a vampire who silently  sucks the blood of the  victim  until he leaves it bloodless.

" 'It is these birds of prey who triumph.  Their flight and their aim are never thwarted.

" 'Who will detain them?

" 'Some share in  the booty and the plunder.  Others are too weak to raise a voice of protest.  And others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.

" 'And then  there appears,  terrifying, the immortal legend:

" 'MANE, TECEL, PHARES'

"IV.

"That the plaintiff was, on  the  date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine  Islands, and  to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public in general, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior, and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms and language used in said defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in effect they were understood, by the public officials of the  Government and the in- habitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff in compliance with his duties in his position as such  member of the Civil Commission of the  Philippines and  as such  Secretary  of the  Interior of the  Philippine Islands, ascended on a previous occasion  the mountains of the Province  of Benguet to  study  the  native tribe known as Igorot, residing in said region; by reason of the publicly known fact that in the said mountains of Benguet there exist large  deposits of gold, and for the reason that,  as member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines, which te the legislative body of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiff takes part in  the enactment and repealing of laws in said Islands; by reason furthermore of the fact, publicly known, that the  plaintiff, as such  Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has had under his direction and control the enforcement of the laws; of  the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by reason furthermore of the fact,  publicly known that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had under his direction and control the Bureau of Science of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and he is generally known as a man devoted to the study of science; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary, of the Interior  of the Philippine  Islands, at  a previous time, caused the importation into the Philippine Islands of fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the mountain streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-hatcheries; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact  that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has journeyed to and explored the Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao,  and other regions of  the Philippine Archipelago; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said  plaintiff,  as  such Secretary of the Interior of  the Philippine  Islands,  at one time investigated and prepared a report for the Civil Commission of the Philippines  in regard to a certain proposition for the  purchase of a parcel of land for the city of Manila; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as member of said Civil Commission of  the  Philippines  together with the other members of said legislative body, once opened negotiations with a certain  firm engaged in the hotel business in regard to the  location of a  prospective  hotel  on one of the filled-in lands of the city of Manila.

"That said defendants charged said  plaintiff  with  the prostitution of his office  as member of the  Civil  Commission of the Philippines  and as Secretary of the  Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the  purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws  of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with  taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object of gain for himself and for  others; and lastly with being 'a bird of prey;' and that said defamation should be understood,  as in effect it was understood, by the public officials of the  Government and the people  of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all  of which allegations relating to  the  character  and conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatsoever. "That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading  in large and showy type, and every effort made by said defendants to see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the  same.

"V.

"Besides assailing  the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing the said libel, did so with  the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff  was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and  for this  reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormdus difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and  to make him so unpopular  that he  would  have to resign his  office as member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.

"In fact said defendants,  by means of said libel and other false statements  in said mentioned newspaper, have  been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence  of the public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in  his way in thp performance of his official duties,  in consequence  of which the plaintiff has  met  with  a  great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in  every one of the Departments.

"VI.

"And for all these  reasons the plaintiff  alleges:  That he has been damaged  and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional  work  to which  he has been put, by the  said defendants, in the compliance of his duties, both in the past and the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum of fifty thousand  pesos (P50,000) Philippine  currency, and besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional  sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000)  Philippine currency, in the way of punitive  damages, as a warning to the defendants.

"Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:

" (1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.

"(2) That judgment  be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated, and the costs of the action."

On the 23d of February, 1909,  the defendants presented the following demurrer to the said  complaint:

"DEMURRER.

"Now come the defendants, through their  undersigned attorney, and demur to the complaint filed herein, upon the following grounds:

"First.  That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.

"Second. That the  facts alleged in the complaint do  not constitute a cause or  right of action.

"Third. That there is  another  action pending between the plaintiff  and  several of the  defendants for the  same cause; and

"Fourth. That some of the defendants have been  erroneously included therein.

"Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss  the complaint, with  costs  against the plaintiff."

On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled said demurrer in the following decision, to which the defendants  duly excepted:

"ORDER.

"The defendants demur upon, several grounds:

"(1)  The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible and this is directed principally to paragraph 2, in which it is alleged that the defendants were 'duenos, directores, redactores,' etc., but it is not alleged that they were such simultaneously.  If this were the sole averment of the defendants' connection  with the alleged libel, the objection might be well taken, but  paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendants 'imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron,' etc., the article complained of.  Under section 2 of Act 277 'every person' who 'publishes or procures to be published any libel'  is made  responsible.   (Cf. U S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 752.)  We think, therefore, that the connection of the defendants with the publication complained of is sufficiently charged.

"(2) It is also claimed  that  the facts alleged are  not sufficient to state a cause of action and it is urged in support of  this that  the article  complained of and which is copied in the. complaint, fails to mention the plaintiff or to show on its face that it refers to him.  It is, however, specifically alleged in paragraph  4 that the article was intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so understood by the public, and this allegation is admitted by the demurrer. Under the rule announced in Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words complained of do refer to  the plaintiff 'an action for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name.'

"(3) It is  further  urged that there is  another  action pending between the  parties for the  same cause.   This, it is true, is made a ground for  demurrer by the Code of Civil Procedure, sec.  91 (3),  but like all grounds therein mentioned, it must 'appear upon the face' of the pleading objected to, and where it does not so appear 'the objection can only be  taken by answer.   (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There  is no averment in the complaint which indicates that there is another action pending.

"The fourth ground of the demurrer is  not one  recognised by law (Code C. P., sec. 91) nor do we find anything in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) Which  would necessitate any change in the  views already expressed.

"The demurrer is,  therefore, overruled and defendants are given the usual five days to answer."

On the 15th day of November,  1909, the defendants presented their amended answer, which was as follows:

"ANSWER;

"The defendants in  the  above-entitled cause, through their undersigned  attorney, by their answer to the complaint,state:

"That the defendants deny generally the allegations of the complaint.

"As a special defense, the defendants allege:

"First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint and which the defendants hereby deny.

"Second.  That the facts  set out as constituting a cause of action in the complaint, are insufficient to constitute such cause of action in favor of the plaintiff  and against the defendants.

"Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason that  there is now  pending in the Court of First Instance of this city a criminal cause, No. 4295, for the crime  of libel against  the defendants herein, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel  A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and civil, being based upon the same facts which the plaintiff herein, who is  also a party to the said criminal action, now alleges as the  basis of his action.

"Fourth.  That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been extinguished for the reason that plaintiff did not expressly reserve his right to enforce the same in the aforesaid cause 4295, for  the crime of libel, after the said criminal  cause had been finally disposed of.

"Fifth. That the defendants, Lope  K.  Santos,  Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G.  Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gre- gorio M. Cansipit, were erroneously included  in the complaint, for the simple reason  that the first two were acquitted in said  criminal cause No.  4295,  for libel, the third was used as a witness for the prosecution in the said criminal cause, and the others have  no interest, either directly or indirectly, in the newspaper 'El Renacimiento* in which it is alleged by the plaintiff the editorial, which is the basis of the complaint, and which it is claimed to  be libelous, was published.

"Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff."

After hearing the evidence adduced during  the trial of the cause, the arguments of the respective attorneys, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January, 1910, rendered the following decision:

"DECISION.

"This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000 for an alleged  libel  of the plaintiff by the defendants.

"The  plaintiff is the  Honorable Dean C.  Worcester,  a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government. The defendants are twelve persons designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores), and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling PagsilaNG' which defendants, as well  as the plaintiff,  are  residents of the  city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

"It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said daily newspaper,  and that said newspaper, during all the time mentioned  in, the complaint, was  published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.

"It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious intention  of injuring the plaintiff, who then was and still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only  as  a private citizen, but also as an official of the Government  of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in said newspaper in its  ordinary number of the said 30th of October, 1908,  a malicious defamation and false libel, which was injurious to the plaintiff,  said libel, as translated from the Spanish, reading as follows:

" 'EDITORIAL.

" 'BIRDS OF PREY.

" 'On the surface of the globe some  were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten and devoured.

" 'Now and  then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against an order of things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former.  At times they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and devourers, but in a majority of cases they do not obtain anything but a change  of  name or plumage.

"'The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation; the relation between the ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow- creature's expense.

"'Among men  it is easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon.  And for some psychological reason the nations who  believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and most harmful creatures  as emblems; it is either the  lion, or the eagle, or the serpent.  Some have done so by a  secret impulse of affinity and  others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor ever will be.

" 'The eagle,  symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found  the most adepts.  And men, collectively and individually, have desired  to  copy and  imitate the most rapacious bird  in order to triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.

"'There are men who,  besides being eagles, have  the characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the vampire.

"'Ascending  the  mountains of Benguet to  classify and measure the skulls of  the  Igorots and study and civilize them, and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of     prey, where are the large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his  own benefit:

" 'Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle  in  order to derive  benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position.

" 'Presenting himself on all occasions  with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is confined  to  dissecting insects and  importing fish eggs, as if the fish  eggs of this  country were less  nourishing and savory, so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species coming from other climes.

" 'Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao, in Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object is to possess all the data and the key to the national  wealth for his  essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties registered under the names of others.

" 'Promoting through   secret  agents and  partners, the sale to the city of worthless  land at fabulous prices which the city  fathers dare not refuse from fear  of  displeasing the one who is behind the motion,  and which they  do not refuse for their own good.

" 'Patronizing concessions  for hotels on filled-in lands, with the prospects  of enormous profits,  at the  expense  of the blood of the people.

" 'Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises  and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects  a  petulant  omniscience  and a  vampire who silently sucks the blood   of the victim until he leaves  it bloodless.

" 'It is these birds  of prey who triumph.   Their flight and aim are never thwarted.

" 'Who will detain them?

" 'Some share in the booty and plunder.  Others are too weak to raise a voice of protest.  And others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.

" 'And then  there  appears,  terrifying,  the immortal legend: "

'MANE, TECEL,  PHARES.'

"It  is alleged, among  other things, in  paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff  was on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the Philippine  Islands, and to the inhabitants of the  Philippine Islands, and to the public generally, personally as well as  a member of the Civil  Commission of the Philippines  and  as Secretary of the Interior; and the defamation  and libel, and the words, terms, and language used  in  said defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with  the intention of indicating  the said plaintiff, and that they should, be understood, as  in fact they were understood, by the  public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of  the Philippine Islands  in general,  as  referring to the plaintiff."  (Here follow the reasons for saying the editorial  referred  to plaintiff and why the public understood it as referring to him.)

"The said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil  Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for personal ends;  with  wasting public funds for the purpose  of promoting his  personal welfare; with the violation of  the laws  of the Philippine  Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of  robbing the people, with the object of gain for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey; and that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood by the public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, as  charging the said plaintiff with the   conduct, actions and things  above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatever.  That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy type, and every effort was made by said defendants to see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.

"In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation  of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a  corrupt person, unworthy of the position which ne held, and for this reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of  the Interior, and in this way they endeavored  to create enormous  difficulties for him in the  performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission  of the Philippines and Secretary of  the Interior.  In fact, said defendants, by means of said libel  and other false statements in said mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence  of the  public in the plaintiff, and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way  in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.

"And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all these reasons he has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the  additional work to which he has been put by the said  defendants in the compliance with his  duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as for the injuries to  his reputation and feelings, in the sum of ^50,000, and that besides this said amount he  is entitled to collect from the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.

"The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated  and the costs of the action; and is dated and signed, Manila, P. I., January 23, 1909,  Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid  and Hurd,  attorneys for plaintiff.

"A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defend- ants,  through their  attorney, Sr.  Felipe Agoncillo,  which demurrer was heretofore heard and overruled by the court, ami the defendants required to answer. Accordingly, the defendants within the prescribed time, filed their answer; and on November 16, 1909, through  their attorney, filed an amended answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):

" 'The defendants in the above-entitled  action, through their undersigned attorney, answering the complaint, state: That they make a general denial of the allegations in the complaint, and as a special defense allege:

" '(1)  That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the complaint in question, as evidently appears from the allegations in the same, and which the defendants.

" '(2)  That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are insufficient to constitute a cause of action m favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;

" '(3)  That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to Ikw, criminal case No. 4295, for libel, against the defendants Martin  Oeampo,  Teodoro  M.  Kalaw, and  Fidel  A. Reyes, in the Court of First  Instance of  this city, being still pending, inasmuch as both  causes, criminal and civil, we based upon the same facts which the plaintiff,  who is also interested in said criminal cause, considers a cause of action;

" '(4)  That the civil action in the above-entitled cause fare been destroyed as  a consequence of the fact that the plaintiff  did  not  expressly reserve his right to the same in the said mentioned cause No. 4295 for libel, in order to exercise it after the termination of said criminal cause;

" '(5) That  the defendants Lope K.  Santos,  Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit  have been erroneously included in the complaint, for the simple reason that the first two  were acquitted in the said cause No. 4295 for libel, the third was used  as  a witness  by the prosecution in the  same cause, and the  latter ones have no interest,  directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El Renacimiento" in which, the plaintiff presumes, was published the editorial which forms the basis of the complaint, and which is said to be libelous; and concluding with a prayer to the  court to dismiss the case, with costs against the plaintiff.'

"The second paragraph of this 'special defense' is nothing other than a general demurrer to the complaint, which has been overruled, as already stated.

"The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as meaning a simple denial  that the plaintiff is the person  referred to  in the  alleged libelous article 'Birds of Prey'  which issue is  sufficiently raised by the general denial of the allegations in the complaint.

"The third paragraph is not a valid defense  in law, for the simple reason that section 11 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission, under which this suit  is brought, especially provides for  a separate civil action for damages,  as Well as for a criminal prosecution.  (See Mr. Justice Johnson's  recent decision.)  This third paragraph is therefore without  merit; and the same may be said of  the fourth paragraph thereof.  As to paragraph five, it contains no material averment  which could not have been set up and insisted upon under the general issue.

"One part of this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer already adjudicated, another part is covered by the general issue, and the residue is without merit  as a legal  defense,  and might have  been stricken out.  The defense is therefore tantamount to the general issue only, there being no special plea that these charges are true, nor any plea of justification.

"The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and  ended December 10, 1909,  and the  proceedings and evidence introduced  are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic  notes taken by  the court's  official  reporter. At the trial Judge Kincaid and  Major Hartigan  appeared for the  plaintiff and Senores  Agoncillo,  Cruz Herrera, and Ferrer for the  defendants.

"After hearing the testimony  and arguments of counsel and  a due consideration of the case, the court  finds  the following facts  established by the admissions and  a decided preponderance of the evidence:

"That the  defendants Martin Ocampo,  Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,  Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven  in number, are the proprietors and owners  of the said daify newspaper known as 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling Pagsilang' and that 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling Pagsilang' are one and the same newspaper, owned, managed, printed, and  published by the same persons; that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos were the editors in chief or directors of this paper on the 30th of October, 1908, and that said nine defendants named were the owners, editors, proprietors, managers,  and publishers of said  newspaper on  said 30th of October,  1908, for a long time prior thereto, and during all the time mentioned in the  complaint.

"As to the  defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from the evidence to have been editors of said paper, but in a subordinate position to the chief editors or directors, Kalaw and Santos,  and to have acted  under the direction  of the latter two defendants.

"The  court further finds that every essential or material allegation of  the complaint is true substantially as therein stated, with the exception noted as to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar,  and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as may be herein- after indicated.  The case is therefore dismissed as to these three defendants.

"The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial 'Birds of Prey' does not refer to a determinate person; and (2) that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of the defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous article or the damage to the plaintiff resulting. therefrom.

"In the  opinion  of the court this article so indubitably refers to the plaintiff, and was so easily and well understood by the readers of said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it would be an act of superrogation to elaborately discuss the evidence adduced in support of or against the proposition. It is as clear to the court from  the evidence adduced as the noonday  sun, that the plaintiff  is the identical and only person meant and referred to in said article 'Birds of Prey;'  and it requires  no argument to prove that it does  mean  and refer to him and was so intended by  the writer, and therefore by said  nine defendants,  and could not have been otherwise understood  by any intelligent  reader or subscriber of said paper, in view of the reasons assigned in the complaint, which reasons are clearly disclosed and fully established by the evidence.  And it may be added that  much  valuable time was needlessly consumed by the defense at  the trial in an effort to establish the contrary.

"It seems to the court  a reflection  upon the intelligence of the subscribers and readers of  'El Renacimiento' to contend that this editorial was not well understood by them as referring to  the plaintiff,  and as fully as  if his name had been mentioned in every paragraph thereof.  And assuredly the omission of his name from the editorial has made the libel none the less hurtful and disastrous in its results to the reputation and feelings of the plaintiff.

"Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show  that  none  of the twelve defendants were the owners of 'El Renacimiento' and  'Muling Pagsilang' but that six of them had originally contributed their money as a patriotic donation to the  Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the paper as trustees for this people, and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends, but had not done so.

"This proposition in the light of the evidence is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration.  To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common sense.  That those seyen defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper  in 1901 for their own personal benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably established.   It is equally well established that Martin Oeampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof,  and  were such on  said  30th  of October, 1908.

"Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven founders, and that Lichauco  contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco promised to contribute an amount which he (the witness) did not  remember but that Lichauco did not keep his promise.  (See pp. 107, 108, and 231 of the evidence.)

"The  other evidence and circumstances strongly  corroborate  Arcadio Arellano, and the  court  is constrained  to believe that Arellano told the truth and Oeampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a copy of 'El Renacimiento' containing the article 'Infamy Among Comrades' page 87 of  the evidence, in which there was published that these seven persons named are the shareholders  of the paper.

"Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as  to enlighten the court as  to  which witness, Arellano or Oeampo, told the truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his authority to publish in said  paper, as he  did on November 22, 1907, that he, Galo Lichauco,  was  one  of  the shareholders.  The presumptions are therefore against Galo  Lichauco.   See S. S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36 C.C.A., 136 and l53).

"It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor or director of the Spanish section of said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was the chief  editor or director of the Tagalog section on said 30th of October, 1908, and that the Spanish and Tagalog sections  are, and then were, one  and the same newspaper, but printed and published in different languages.

"It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, and  was published and circulated cjaily in the Spanish and  Tagalog languages in the city of Manila.  Not only are these  allegations  true, but it is also true that said newspaper has a daily circulation and subscribers in other parts of the world, notably in the United States and Spain; and  it has subscribers numbering in toto not less than 5,200,  and a  daily  issue of 6,000 copies.

"It is also true as alleged, and  the court so finds that since the year 1906  to  said 30th  of October, 1908, these nine defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in their said newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of  October, 1908 with the malicious intention of injuring the  plaintiff, who on said date was and still is a member of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the Inferior in the Government of the  Philippine Islands; and with the  object  of exposing him to  the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary, number of said 30th of October, 1908, the malicious defamation and  false libel, of and concerning the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded to as the editorial 'Birds of Prey' which libel was And is highly injurious to the plaintiff and from which the plaintiff has sustained serious damage.

"This  editorial,  when properly  interpreted  and  read between  the lines, means, besides  other things,  and was intended by the writer to mean and be understood by the readers thereof as meaning substantially the following:

"That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the  globe to  eat and devour, like a bird of prey, and that others, born  to be  eaten  and devoured, are the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the  plaintiff; that the plaintiff has a  desire to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird, the eagle, in order to triumph in plundering his fellowman; that the plaintiff besides being an eagle, has the characteristics of the vulture, the owl, and the vampire.

"That the  plaintiff ascended the  mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots, and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey the large deposits  of gold - the prey concealed amidst  the  lonely mountains - and to  appropriate them to himself afterwards, and that to this end the plaintiff had  the legal facilities, made and unmade at his own will, and that this is always done  for his own benefit.

"That the plaintiff authorized, in  spite of laws and ordinances, the illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged  to condemn by virtue of his official position; that  while the plaintiff presents himself on all occasions with  the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, his whole  scientific labor is confined to  dissecting insects and importing fish eggs.

"That although the plaintiff gave an  admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao and Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the  Archipelago, with  the money of the people, under the pretext of the public good, as a  strict matter  of truth his object was to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth for  his essentially personal benefit, and that this  is shown by his acquisition of immense properties registered  under  the names , of others.

"That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of Manila of worthless land at fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared not refuse from fear of displeasing the plaintiff, who was behind the project, and which they did  not refuse for their own good; that the plaintiff favored concessions for hotels in Manila on filled-in land; with the prospect of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of  the people.

"That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same time an eagle that surprises and  devours, a vulture  that gorges himself on  dead and rotten meats, an owl that aifects a petulant omniscience, and a  vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous article concludes with the asseveration in substance that the plaintiff has been 'weighed in the balance and found wanting' - 'Mane, Tecel, Phares.'

"That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying.  Almost every line thereof teems with malevolence, ill  will, and  wanton  and reckless  disregard of the rights and feelings of  the  plaintiff; and from the very nature and number of the  charges therein contained the editorial is necessarily very damaging to the plaintiff.

"That this editorial,  published  as it was by the nine defendants, tends to impeach  the  honesty and reputation of the plaintiff and publishes his alleged defects, and thereby exposes him to public hatred,  contempt, and!  ridicule, is clearly seen by a bare reading of the editorial.

"It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in support  of these  malicious,   defamatory, and injurious  charges against the plaintiff; and there was at the trial no pretense whatever by the defendants that any of them are true, nor the slightest evidence introduced to show the truth of a solitary charge; nor is there any plea of justification or  that t{ie charges are  true, much less evidence to sustain such a plea.

"In the  opinion of the court 'Birds of  Prey,' when read and  considered in its relation to  and connection with the other articles libelous and defamatory in nature, published of and concerning the plaintiff by these nine defendants anterior  and subsequent to the publication of this article, and having reference to the same subject matter as shown by the evidence, is one of the worst libels of record.   It is safe to say that in all the  court reports of the Philippine Islands,  or of Spain, of England,  or the  United States, there is not to be found a libel case in which there is a more striking  exemplification of the spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil motive,  mischievous intent, actual malice, nefarious purpose,  base malignity, or gross malevolence.

"It is proper to observe' also that since the beginning of this attack on  the  plaintiff in the year  1906 down almost to the present  time, so far from there being any apology, retraction, or effort to repair the injury already done  as far as lay in the power of the defendants, the persecution, wrong, and tortious injury to the plaintiff have been steadily kept up and persisted in, without the slightest abatement of the malevolent spirit.

"There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation ; per contra, the libel has been repeated, reiterated, and accentuated, and  widely and extensively  propagated by these nine defendants through  the  columns of  their said paper and otherwise; and it appears  from the evidence that especial effort has been made by these same defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the libeloiis and defamatory words used of and concerning the plaintiff in said editorial.

"Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and reasserting its  truth, this diabolical libel has been spread broadcast over the Philippine Islands and to  other parts of the world.  In said criminal case No. 4295 some of these nine defendants pleaded the truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q is to  be found this language: 'The defense  will  adduce its evidence demonstrating the  truth of every one of the facts published.

"In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909,  there is published this statement:

" 'The  brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of  pur counsel, to gather evidence which we are to adduce  in our  effort to  demonstrate the truth of           the accusations that we have formulated in the article which is the subject  of the agitation against us, having expired, the trial of the case against our director has been resumed.' (See pp. 63  and 67 of the evidence.)

"And about the same time they also declared ia their said paper thai 'there is more graft than fish in the rivers of Benguet'  And this  in the year of our Lord 1909! the persecution  having begun  in 1905;  thus indicating that there is to be no 'let-up' or cessation of the hostile attitude toward the  plaintiff or the  vilification of  his  name and assaults upon his character, much less a  retraction or an apology, unless drastic means and measures are made use of to the end  that there may be  no further propagation of the libel, or asseveration,  or reiteration of its truth.

"This article 'Birds of Prey' charges the plaintiff with malfeasance  in office and criminal acts, and is  therefore lifoelous per se.  It in substance charges the plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of  the Civil Commission of  the Philippine  Islands and Secretary of the Interior of said Islands for personal ends.   It'is charged also substantially that plaintiff in his official capacity wasted the public funds for the purpose of promoting his own personal welfare, and that he violated the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila.

"In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing  the people with the object of gain  for himself and for others; with being a bird of prey, a vulture (buzzard), an owl,  and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim (meaning the people) until he leaves it bloodless; that is to say, robs the people, until he leaves them wretched and poverty-stricken, deprived of all worldly possessions; and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like Belshazzar, has been weighed in the balance and found wanting as a high Government functionary; all of which charges are false and malicious and without any foundation whatever in fact, as the evidence fully demonstrates.

"It is alsa a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation was written and published that it might be understood, and it was understood, by the public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, and  wherever  else said newspaper may have circulated and been read, as charging the plaintiff with the tortious and  criminal  acts and conduct charged  in  said editorial as hereinbefore specified and interpreted.

"The court finds it also  true that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the  plaintiff,  said nine defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was despotic and corrupt and  unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose his  administration of the office in  his charge as  Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous  difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as  a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and  Secretary of the Interior.

"It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel, and other  like false statements in their  said newspaper, have been  deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of  the public in the plaintiff  and to incite the people to  place obstacles in his way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the plaintiff has met with many  difficulties which  have  greatly  increased his labors as a public official.

"It further  appears from the evidence  that not only has. an effort been made by these nine defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the charges, but in order that said defamation should attract the attention of the public, they published the  same under  a  heading in  large, bold and  showy type,  so that it might be easily seen  and read by all the subscribers and readers of said paper.

"In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every essential allegation  of the complaint is true substantially as therein claimed, and that the whole of the said editorial relating to the misconduct and bad character     of the plaintiff is false and without the slightest foundation in fact.   Not a scintilla of evidence was introduced in support  of any  injurious  charge made therein  against the plaintiff, to. say nothing, of the plaintiff's evidence that each and every charge of malfeasance therein contained is false, and without reference to whether  a failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the charge.

"The  evidence shows no  'special' or 'actual  pecuniary damage and none is alleged in the complaint.  Two other kinds  of damages, however,  are claimed, to wit, general damages for injuries to the feelings and reputation of the plaintiff and additional work to which he  has  been put by the conduct of the defendants,  which are laid in the sum of P50,000, and  'punitive,' exemplary,  or vindictive damages, 'as a warning to the defendants,' or as expressed in Act 277  of the  Philippine Commission,  'as a just punishment to the libelers and an example to others,' which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.

"The  nine  defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the  next  question to be decided  is what amount of damages should  be awarded the plaintiff  for the injury to his  reputation and feelings and this being a proper ease for punitive damages, the further  question is, what  sum shall be awarded as a just punishment to these nine libelers and as an example to others.   In neither of these cases is there any precise measure of damages.

"In  determining  the  amount to be awarded in the  first instance it  is proper to consider the previous character, influence, reputation, standing, official position,  hope of advancement,  prospect of promotion, and  social status of the plaintiff and his family, and all  the circumstances  connected with the  case.

"The plaintiff is a man in the  prime of  life, holding, as he has held for the last ten years  an important, responsible, lucrative, high and exalted position of trust and honor in the service  of the  Government  of the United States, in the Philippine Islands, without a blotch  on his family escutcheon, so far as the evidence shows, and with an untarnished reputation as a man, as a citizen, and as a Government official.

"He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position ; a man of learning, famous as a scientist, and scientific achievements  and scholarly attainments, a man of industrious habits, genuine  worth,  and intellectual force.   He has  read, studied, traveled, and  learned much, and is an author of merit and distinction.  He was for a long while a  professor in one of the largest and  most renowned institutions of learning in  the world; he is  a man  of  vast experience, broad  and liberal views,  and an  extensive acquaintanceship, not only in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States and other countries of the world.   He was well  and  favorably received by the people  wherever he journeyed previous to this atrocious libel upon his integrity and reputation.

"He has discharged the  duties of his lofty official position in a manner that reflects credit upon himself as well as the Government which he represents, and apparently with entire satisfaction to all of  his superiors in office and the people generally;  and  but for this  pernicious, outrageous,  and highly reprehensible assault upon his good name, fame and reputation, there were prospects of promotion to higher honors.   And so far as his personal and private record is concerned  it was without a blemish anterior to the time when these unfounded and dastardly aspersions were  cast upon it  by these nine defendants.

"Indeed, it is  only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense itself to ascertain that the plaintiff is an honorable man,  and without a stain upon his character, officially or otherwise.  It  would be interesting to note here in parallel columns and compare the charges made in 'Birds of Prey' and the testimony of one of the witnesses  for the defendants.

"Felipe Buencamino,  an intelligent witness for the de- feftse, in his  testimony  (p. 240) when asked the question, Do you know Mr. Worcester?'  he  answers, 'Yes,  sir; I know him as an honorable man.  I also know him as an honest,  honorable public  official.'  In answer to another question he says, 'As I have said,  I  know Mr. Worcester as a private citizen and as a public  official, and my opinion of him is that of an honorable man  and an upright official.' And no other witness testified anything to the contrary. ". 'A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving favor rather than silver  or gold.'

" 'Who steals my purse steals trash;

*      *     *      *

But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.'

"The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property.   It is one of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.

" 'The respect and esteem of  his fellows are among the highest rewards of a well-spent life vouchsafed to man in this existence.  The hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their possession the solace of later years.  A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen and  known of his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a great character and an unblemished  reputation,  has secured a  possession more useful, and  more valuable than  lands, or houses,  or  silver, or gold  *  *   *

." 'The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly strives to give redress for its injury.  It imposes iipon him who  attacks it by slanderous words, or libelous publication, a liability to make full compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame and  obloquy, and for the injury to the feelings of the owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander or the libel.

" 'It goes  further.  If the words are spoken, or the publication is made, with  the intent  to injure the victim, or with criminal indifference to  civil obligation, it imposes such damages as a jury (in this case the judge), in view of all the circumstances of the particular case adjudge tiiat the wrongdoer ought to pay  as an example to the public, to deter others from  committing  like offenses, and as a punishment for the infliction of the injury.

" 'In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil intent, or hatred, while its  legal signification is defined to be "a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification.'   (36 C. C.A., 475.)

"Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious  act done intentionally and without the semblance of justification or excuse, or proof that the libelous charges against the plaintiff were 'published with good motives and for justifiable ends.'

"But the Legislature and the  highest  judicial authority of these Islands  have  spoken in no uncertain words with regard to the rights of the plaintiff in this case; and  we need not necessarily turn to the law of libel elsewhere, or the decisions of the courts in other jurisdictions to ascertain or determine his rights.

"In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine Commission) is to be found the law of these Islands especially applicable to this  case.  Section 1 thereof defines  libel.  Section  2 provides  that every  person who willfully and  with a  malicious  intent to  injure  another publishes, or procures to be  published, any libel  shall be punished as therein provided.  Section 3 provides that an injurious publication is  presumed  to have been malicious if no  justifiable motive for making it is shown.  Section 4 provides, among other things, that in all criminal  prosecutions the truth may be given in  evidence; but to establish this defense, not only must the truth of the matter charged as libelous  be proven,  but also that it was published with good motives  and for justifiable ends; and the presumptions, rules of evidence, arid special defenses are equally applicable in civil and criminal actions, according to section 11 of said Act.

"Section 6 is as follows:

" 'Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is  chargeable with  the  publication of any words contained in any part of such book or number of each newspaper or serial  as fully as if he were the author of the. same.'

"And section 11 provides as follows:

" 'In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth shall have a right to a civil  action against the person libeling him for  damages sustained by reason of such libel, and the  person  so libeled shall be entitled to recover  in such civil  action not only the  actual pecuniary  damages sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his  feelings  and reputation, and in  addition such punitive damages as the  court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler  and an example  to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of  the parties.  The  presumptions, rules 01 evidence and special defenses provided i;or in this chapter for criminal prosecutions  shall be  equally applicable in civil actions  under this section.'

"'The proprietor of a printing plant is  responsible for publishing a libel.  According  to the  legal doctrines  and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a  publication containing  libelous  matter is liable for the same.' (Mr.  Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 757.) But said section 6 plainly  fixes  the liability of editors  and proprietors of newspapers,  and  is clear enough for all the purposes of this case.

"Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep.,  155^[1]),  speaking for our Supreme Court, says:

" 'When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory words used refer  to the  plaintiff,  and it is proven that the words do in fact refer to him and are capable of bearing  such special  application, an action  for libel may be maintained even though the defamatory publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name,'

"And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 428⁽¹⁾), for the same high authority, says:

" 'In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and  reputation  may be recovered though no actual  pecuniary damages are  proven.

" 'Punitive damages can not be recovered unless the tort is aggravated by evil motive,  actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression.'

"That is to say, if there is  evil motive, or actual malice, or deliberate violence, or oppression then punitive damages, or 'smart money,' may be recovered.

"And Justice Carson (U. S. V8. Sedano, 14  Phil.  Rep,, 838), also says:

" 'Actual  or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be  inferred from the style  and tone of the publication.

" 'The  publication  of falsehood  and  calumny  against public officers or candidates for public office is specially reprehensible and is an offense most  dangerous to the people and to the public welfare.

" 'The interests of society require that immunity should be granted to the discussion of public affairs, and that all acts and matters of a public nature may be freely published with fitting comments and strictures; but they do not require that the right to criticise public officers shall embrace the right to base such criticism upon false statements of fact, or to attack the private character  of the officer,  or to falsely impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office.'

"And there are  almost numberless English and American authorities in perfect harmony with these decisions of our Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be cited here; and it is not necessary.

"Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, ia that of Scott vs. Donald (165 U. S., 58)  and cases therein cited.  In this case the  court says: 'Damages have been defined to be the compensation which law will allow for an injury done, and are said to be exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual loss  when  the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate  violence or oppression,' which  is in entire harmony with  Justice Wil- lard's  decision hereinbefore cited.

"And quoting from the decision  in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the same high court says:

" 'In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and  malicious, or gross or outrageous, courts permit juries  (here the court) to add to the measured compensation of the  plaintiff which he would have  been entitled to recover,  had the injury been inflicted without design or intention, something further  by way of punishment or example, which  has sometimes  been called  "smart money." '

"It thus  clearly appears that  the facts established in the case  at  bar are more than sufficient to bring it within the rule of law  here laid down by the highest  judicial authority.

"Section  11 of the Libel Law  expressly allows general damages; and Mr. Justice Willard, in Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Company,^{1} says:

" 'The general  damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not for mental suffering alone, but they are allowed for injury to the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the common law of England and America presumed that such  damages existed  without proof thereof from the mere fact of publication of the libel.'

"In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized  the power of a jury in certain  actions in tort to assess against the tort  feasor punitive damages. Where the  injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely, or indignity, the judge or jury, as  the case may be, is  not limited to the ascertainment of  a simple compensation  for the wrong committed against the aggrieved  person.

" 'The public  position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government, and the evil  example of libels, are considerations with the jury (here the judge) for increasing damages.'  (Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3 Johns, 56.)

" 'The character, condition, and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on the matter of the extent of damages.'   (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac, 345; 13 Abb. Prac, 41, 811.)

" 'Where a publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was made  with malice - technical, legal malice, but not malice in fact - and the amount of damages depends in a large degree upon the motives which actuated the defendants in its publication; and in such cases the law leaves it to the jury (here the judge) to find and return such  damages as they think right and just, by a sound, temperate, deliberate and  reasonable  exercise of their functions  as jurymen.' (Erber vs. Dun,  (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)

" 'Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary damages, and the law of principal and agent; are controlled by the same rules as are other actions of tort.  The right of a plaintiff  to recover exemplary damages exists wherever a tortious injury has been inflicted recklessly or wantonly, and it is not limited to cases where the injury resulted from personal malice or recklessness of the defendant.   It follows that the owner of a newspaper is as responsible for all the acts  of omission and  commission of those he employs to edit it. and manage its affairs, as he would be if personally  managing the same.'   (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.)  15 Fed., 371.)

" 'The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any  attempt to ascertain its correctness is  sufficient to  justify  a finding that defendant committed libel with a wanton indifference, and with  actual malice  sufficient to sustain exemplary damages.'  (Van Ingen vs. Star Co.,  1 App. Div., 429, 37 K Y., 114.)

" 'The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an action for libel, where it appears that plaintiff was  persistently persecuted in the columns of defend-           ant's newspaper, and that he and his  family were  held up to public contempt and ridicule, and defendants withdraw from the case after failing to establish a  plea of justification.'   (Smith vs.  Times  Co., (Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)

" 'In  considering the amount which the defendant shall pay, on this account (exemplary damages)  the turpitude of his conduct and his financial ability are only considered; and  such consideration is not in view of the injury or dis- tress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of the  public; the wrongful act  is regarded as an indication of the actor's vicious mind - an overt deed of vindictive or wanton  wrong, offensive  and  dangerous  to the  public good.  This is the view of those damages which generally  prevails.'  (Sutherland on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092, title Exemplary Damages.)

" 'Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff, but solely to punish the  defendant.  This legal motive would suffer defeat if punitive damages could not be  given for a malicious attack  on a reputation too well established to  receive  substantial  injury at the hands of a libeler.'   (Judge Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub.  Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)

"It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is  too well established to be  seriously affected by the defamatory words used  of and concerning him in 'Birds of Prey' but it  would  not be proper  to  gravely consider this suggestion.

"The  conditions  in  these  Islands  are  peculiar.   The minds,  thoughts, and opinions of the  people  are easily molded, and the public is credulous and perhaps frequently too ready to believe anything that may be said in  derogation  of  an  American official, especially so when it is published and  vouched for by  the editorial and  business management and proprietors of a newspaper of the prominence, pretensions, circulation, and influence of  'El Renacimiento' which  paper is everlastingly proclaiming in its columns that it is being conducted and published solely in the interests of the Filipino  people - pro  bono publico.  There is stronger disposition  to give  credence to what is  said in a newspaper here in  the Islands than elsewhere, and when abuse, vilification,  and defamation are persistently practiced for a period of  several years, without modification or retraction, but with renewed emphasis, the people naturally come to believe in its verity  and  authenticity.

"It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution  of the plaintiff by 'E1 Renacimiento' and the libel published  in its columns, the minds of the major part of the Filipino people have been poisoned and prejudiced against the plaintiff to such an extent that he is regarded by these  people as  odious,   dishonest,  unscrupulous and tyrannical.

"It may be that his reputation  has  not  suffered so severely with those of his own race, but when it is considered that his  vocation has tenfold more to  do with the Filipinos than with his own people, that his official duties place him in constant contact with them, and that his success in his chosen career is largely dependent upon their good will and support, it is manifest that the damage to his reputation has been  very  great and that a large sum of money should be  awarded to indemnify  him,  as far as  money can indemnify,  for the loss  of his good name with  the Filipino people.

"The plaintiff came  to  the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of hope and  ambition.  Since his arrival he has devoted himself incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of the inhabitants of the  Archipelago and to  the faithful performance, as far as he was able, of the pledges and promises of the Government  to the Filipino  people. The duties of his particular office were such as brought him in more immediate and constant  contact with the  people than any other official of the same category in these Islands.

"It is clearly  shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform, and did  efficiently perform, all of these duties, doing everything that  he could in ah unselfish and disinterested manner for the welfare and development of the  country and its people, knowing full  well  that his career, as well as his advancement, depended largely upon the good will of these people, and, that by incurring their censure or displeasure he would have little hope of success in his chosen work.

"Imagine, therefore,  the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental suffering, and distress,  and perturbation of spirit that  would necessarily be occasioned him when he  discovered  that  through the nefarious,  studied, and practiced persecution of the paper in question, these high hopes were blasted, and that, instead of having gained the respect and gratitude of the people for the assiduous labors devoted to their uplifting, they had been made to believe that, instead of being a benefactor, he was a vampire that was sucking their life blood, a corrupt politician who was squandering the money wrung from the people by means of taxation, in schemes for his own personal aggrandizement and  enrichment.

"That instead of developing the mineral wealth  of  the Islands he was taking up all  the rich veins and appropriating them in the names of subservient tools, to  his  own personal use, benefit and  profit.  That instead of protecting the people from  disease, he was, by means of infected meat and for his own personal gain, spreading contagion among them.

"That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and the vampire; that, in  short, he was a 'bird of prey,' with all that is implied in that term in its worst acceptation; that he was a corrupt tyrant, who never lost an opportunity to do the people hurt; that instead of wishing them well and  seeking their advancement, he was their enemy, who never lost an opportunity to degrade and humiliate them; that  instead of preferring them for office and  positions of official trust, he treated them with all sorts  of contempt and indifference.

"It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its contemplation of a result so disastrous, so unjust, and so unmerited.

"It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands a young scientist he had already won fame in his own country; that he is  a fellow of the important scientific associations of the world.  His election as a fellow  or member of these  scientific bodies shows that his labors in the Philippines  were the object  of solicitude by the prominent scientific and learned  men  not  only of his own race,  but in many  other  civilized countries  of the world.  Important results were  evidently expected  of him by them, and it can not be doubted that they  expected of him  a life  honestly devoted to the conscientious discharge of his duties as a trusted  public functionary of the American Government in the Philippine Islands.

"And yet he is falsely denounced in the  columns of said newspaper to his fellows  of these societies as  a man who is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish and avaricious that he has not  considered for  a moment the duties incumbent  upon him;  that he has been oblivious to every obligation of trust and confidence, and that he is unworthy of the respect of honest men.

"One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of  the city of Boston.  It is furthermore shown that copies of this paper  went to Spain, England,  and to different parts of the United States;  and  inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man of  prominence in the  scientific world, it is to be inferred that his fellows became more or less aware of these heinous charges.

"Thus we find that the  plaintiff is here  confronted with disappointed ambition  and frustrated hopes, and placed in the humiliating attitude of having to explain to his fellows that the charges are untrue, of  adducing evidence to clear himself, perhaps never with complete success, of the stain that has been cast upon his reputation by  the libelous and defamatory declarations contained in 'Birds of Prey.'

"In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the case and the law applicable thereto,

"It is  the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff has  sustained damages  on account of wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of thirty-five thousand (P35,000)  pesos, and that he is entitled to recover  this sum of the nine defendants named, as being responsible for having written, printed, and published said libel; and  that the plaintiff is  entitled to  recover of them the further  sum of twenty-five thousand (P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages, which the court thinks will be a just punishment to these  nine libelers and an example to others.

"Wherefore,  it is ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean  C. Worcester, have and  recover  of the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro Ml Kalaw, Lope K. Santos,  Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and  Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, the sum  of sixty  thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit, for which execution may  issue.

"It  is ordered.   At Manila, P. L, this 14th day of January,  1910."

From  said decision  the defendants appealed and made the following  assignments of  error in this court:

"I.

The court erred in overruling our motions for  suspension of this case, in its present state, until final judgment should be rendered in criminal  cause No. 4295 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, pending  appeal in the  Honorable Supreme  Court, for  libel  based  also on the editorial, 'Birds  of Prey.'

"II.

"The court erred in admitting as evidence mere  opinion adduced  by counsel for the plaintiff with the intention of demonstrating  to whom the editorial, alleged to be libelous, refers.

"III.

"The  court  erred  in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of the witnesses for the plaintiff than to the expert testimony of the  defense.

"IV.

"The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is based to be libelous per se and to refer necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.

"V.

"The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco  to be owners of 'El Renacimiento.'

"VI.

"The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel for the defendants.

"VII.

"The court erred in rendering  judgment  against the defendants.

"VIII.

"The court erred in  sentencing the defendants jointly 'and severally' to pay to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, the sum of  P60,000.

"IX.

"The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment be confined to the business known as 'El Renacimiento' and to the defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw, without extending to property of the alleged owners of said newspaper which was not invested therein by them at its establishment.

"X.

"The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment rendered against the defendants.

"XI.

"The court,  finally, erred in granting  to the plaintiff punitive damages against the alleged owners of 'El Renacimiento,' admitting  the hyphothesis that  said editorial id libelous per se and refers  to  the Honorable Dean  C. Worcester."

The theory of the  defendants, under the first assignment of error, is that the civil action  could not proceed until the termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions of the Penal Code in support of such theory. This court, however, has decided in the  case of Ocampo et. al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for libel, under the provisions of Act 277  of the Civil Commission, constitutes  no bar  or estoppel in a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason  most often given for  this doctrine  is that the two  proceedings are not between the same parties.   Different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the weight of evidence necessary  to  the findings in the two proceedings always exist.  As between  civil and criminal actions under said Act  (No. 277)  a judgment in one  is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other.  A judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act, can not be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action.   (Stone vs. U. S., 167 U. S.,  178; Boyd vs. U. S., 116 U. S., 616, 634; Lee vs.  U. S., 150 U. S., 476, 480; U. S. vs. Jaedicke, 73  Fed.  Rep., 100; U. S. vs. Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87 Fed. Rep., 420; Steel vs.  Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.), 318,  13 American  Decisions, 288;  Betts  vs.  New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)

In a criminal action for libel the State  must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant, beyond a reasonable  doubt, while in a civil action it  is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by a prepon- derance of evidence only.   (Ocampo vs. Jenkins  (supra) ; Reilly  vs. Norton,  65 Iowa,  306; Sloane vs. Gilbert,  27 American Decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore on Evidence,  sees.  2497, 2498.)

With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we find that this court has already decided the question raised thereby, in the case of U. S. vs, Ocampo  et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1).

During the trial of the cause the  plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of  showing that the  statements made  in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to apply  to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester,  Secretary of the Interior.  The  defendants duly objected to these  questions and excepted to  the ruling of the court admitting them.

In the case of Russell vs. Kelley  (44 Cal. 641, 642) the same question was raised and  the  court, in its decision, said:

"The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the slanderous words to the plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by the testimony of  witnesses who knew the parties and circumstances  and who can state their judgment and opinion upon the application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant;  It is said that where  the words are ambiguous on the face of  the libel, to whom it was intended  to be  applied, the judgment and opinion of wit- nesses, who from their knowledge of the parties and circumstances are able to  form a conclusion as to the defendant's intention and application of the libel is evidence for the information of the  jury."

Mr.  Odgers, in his work on Libel  and Slander (p. 567), says:

"The plaintiff may also call at the trial his  friends or others acquainted with the circumstances, to state that, in reading the  libel, they at once concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff.  It is  not necessary that all the world should understand the libel.  It is sufficient  if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant."   (See  also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)

The correctness of this rule is  not  only established by the  weight of authority but  is supported by every  consideration of justice and sound policy.  The lower court committed no  error in admitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the cause.  One's reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions spontaneously made by him from time to time, and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances.   The effect of a libelous publication upon the understanding of such  persons, involving necessarily the identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of the wrong.  The issue in a libel case concerns not only the  sense of the publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a reader acquainted with the person referred to.  The correctness  of the opinion of the  witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in the libelous publication may always be tested by cross-examination.   (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs. Miles, 15 Vt, 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6 Gushing (Mass.), 71.)

It is  true  that some  of the courts  have established  a different rule.  We think, however, that a large  preponderance of the decisions of the supreme  courts of the  different States is  in favor of  the doctrine which we have announced here.

We are of the  opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may  fairly be  considered together, the question being whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause in the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the evidence,  that the said  editorial was libelous in its character.  Here again we find that this  question has been passed upon by this court in the case of  U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18  Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it  unnecessary to discuss this question1 again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause was practically the same, or at least to the  same effect, as the evidence  adduced in  the cause of U. S. vs.  Ocampo et al. It is sufficient here to swy that the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause shows, by a large preponderance  of the evidence, that said editorial was one of  the  most  pernicious  and malicious libels upon  a just, upright and honorable official, which the  courts have  ever been called upon to consider. There  is not a scintilla of evidence,  in the entire record, notwithstanding the fact that  the defendants from time to time attempted to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the statements made  in said editorial, which in any way reflects upon the character and high ideals  of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the administration of his department of the Government.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio  Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M, Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of  "El Renacimiento," the lower court said:

"Much time was  consumed also in  adducing evidence to show  that none of the twelve  defendants were the owners of 'El Renacimiento'  and 'Muling  Pagsilang'  but that six of them had originally contributed their money as  a patriotic donation to the  Filipino  people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the  paper as trustee  for this  people, and that  the paper was  being devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends,  and that Galo Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not done so.

"This proposition," said the lower court,  "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous as, to entitle it to  little, if any, serious consideration.  To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common sense.  That those seven defendants  named  contributed their respective sums of money, as  shown by  the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their  own personal  benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably  established.  It is equally  well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he  has been and  is  still  the administrator or  business manager of said newspaper, and  that the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th of October, 1908."

Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime before the commencement of the present action and before any question was raised with reference to who were the owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case of United states vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil.  Rep., 338), testified upon that question as follows:

Q. "Who are the proprietors of 'El Renacimiento'?" - A. "I,  Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barreto, and Galo Lichauco."

Q. "Who else?" - A.  "No one else."

Q. "And Rafael  Palma - is it not so?" - A. "No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma."

During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in the other cause were true.

It also appears from the record  (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long before the commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento" in reply to an article which was published in "El Comercio," published the following statement:

"They (it) say(s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El Renacimiento") "is sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal personages. We declare that this,  besides being false, is calumnious. The shareholders of this company are persons well known by the public, and never at any moment of their lives have they acted with masks on - those masks for which 'El Comercio' seems to have so great an affection.  They are, as the public knows: Senores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit."

Arcadio  Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed  P760 to the establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of F500; that Mariano  Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each; that Galo  Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and  that Manuel Palma contributed P3,000.

During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified as witnesses, relating to the ownership of the  newspaper called  "El Renacimiento."  They testified  that whatever money they gave for the purpose of establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation,  and that they were neither the owners nor coflwners  of  said  periodical.  The defendants,  Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as witnesses during  the  trial of the cause  in the lower court.  No reason is  given for their failure to appear and give testimony in their  own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the declarations of Arcadio  Arellano, in the  case of U. S. vs.  Sedano (14 Phil.  Rep., 338) at the time they were made, were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo  Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit,  as well  as  the reply to "El Comercio," above noted.  Proof of said declarations and publication  was adduced  during the trial  of the  cause in the present  case,  and  the  attorney of  these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, if not disputed;  but, notwithstanding the fact  that said declarations and publication were presented in  evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the defendants knew of the purpose of such proof, the defendants,  Palma, Lichauco,  Barretto,  and Cansipit,  were not called as witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule  of evidence, that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in  his power to  offer evidence  of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and  he fails to offer  such prooft the natural conclusion is  that  the  proof,  if produced, instead of rebutting would swpport the inferences against him, and the  court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway Company vs. Ellis,  C. C. A. Reports, vol.  4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5  Cush.  (Mass.),  295; People vs. McWhorter 4 Barb. .(N.Y.), 438.)

Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:

"It is  certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed  according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have contradicted."

Mr. Starkey, in his valuable  work on evidence  (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:

"The conduct of a party in omitting to.produce evidence in elucidation of the subject matter in dispute, which is within his power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently offers  occasion for presumptions against him, since it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would operate to his prejudice." (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)

At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the time of the said publication in reply to "El Comercio,"  there was no reason for stating anything except the truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for publishing the fact that the defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true.

At that time there  seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors  and public benefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the fact that  they were, the owners.  The editors, publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El  Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to  announce to the public who its  owners were.  It ("El  Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged  to no one; that it had  been born into the community without parentage ;.that it had been created a terrible machine for the purpose of destroying the good character and reputation of men  without  having any one to respond for its malicious damage occasioned to honorable men; that it was a castsoff, without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and buffetted about and persecuted and destroyed without any one to protect it; that its former friends  and creators had scattered hither and thither and had disappeared like feathers before  a cyclone, declaring,  under oath, that they  did not know their offspring and were not willing to recognize it in public.  It seems to have been a Moses found in  the bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among the Filipino people, in teaching them to respect the rights of persons  and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in the State, to enter the private abode of lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor and reputation, which neither it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does not make the robber richer and leaves the person  robbed poor indeed.

The appellants tried to make  it appear that the money which the gave for the establishment of "El Renacimiento" was a pure donation.  They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino  people.  They do not  state, however,  or attempt to  show what particular persons  were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the donation was made.   A donation must be made to definite persons or associations.  A donation to an indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law, and we do not believe, in view of all  of the facts, that it was in fact made.  A donation must be made to some definite person or association and the donee must be some  ascertained or ascertainable person or association.

A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in  the  very nature of things, to  some definite person or association.  A donation made to  no person or association could not be regarded as a donation in law.  It could not be more  than an  abandonment  of     property.  Of course where a donation is in fact  made, without reservation  to a particular person or association, the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated nor responsible, in any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation was made, was legal.  A person does not become an  owner or part owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he has made a donation; neither is  he responsible for the use to which said edifice may be applied.   No one disputes the fact that donations may be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite persons or associations,  to be  administered in accordance with  the purpose of the gift.

We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at the time they presented the defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable  hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner alleged, would be believed by the court.

After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into consideration the failure of the other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a preponderance of such evidence shows that the defendants, Martin  Ocampo,  Manuel Palma,  Arcadio Arellano,  Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the codwners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time of the publication of the said alleged libel.

With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit: That  the lower court committed an error in not admitting in evidence the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope K. Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we are of the opinion that the refusal to admit said evidence in the civil cause was not error.  The fact that the evidence in the criminal cause was insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty of the crime charged, in no way barred the right of the person injured by said alleged libel to maintain the present civil action against  him.  (Ocampo  vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.)   The criminal action had to be sustained by evidence showing the culpability of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is sufficient to  show that  the defendants injured the plaintiff by the alleged libelous  publication, by  a preponderance of the evidence only.   (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306;  Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec, 708.)

  In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin,  La., 318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the supreme court of Louisiana said:

 

"A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution cannot be given  in evidence in a civil action."

In  the case of Betts  et al. vs. New Hartford (25  Conn., 180)  Mr. Justice Ellsworth said  (in a  case where a judgment in a criminal case was offered in  evidence):

"A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which judgment was rendered, when those facts come up in a civil  case, for this evidence would not be material; and so the law is perfectly well  settled.  (1 Greenleaf on Evidence,  sees. 536, 524;  1 Phillips  on Evidence, 231; Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. St.,. 42;  Beausoleil w. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543; McDonald vs. Stark, 176 III., 456, 468.)"

  While we believe that the  lower  court committed no error in refusing to admit the sentence acquitting Lope K.  Santos in the criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination  of the record brought to this court, that it is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was  responsible, in any way,  for the publication  of the alleged  libel, and without discussing the question whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of  "El  Renacimiento" and  "El Renacimiento" constituted one and the same newspaper, we find that the evidence is insufficient to show that Lope  K. Santos is responsible in damages, in  any way,  for the publication of the said alleged libel.

The appellants discussed  the eighth  and ninth assignments of  error  together, and claim that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment  jointly and severally against the defendants and in allowing an execution against  the individual property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in support of their  contention.   The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort.  They fail  to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint  tort feasor is not  only individually liable for the  tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors.  The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort.  They might have been sued jointly and severally, as they were.   (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S.  (English Common Law Reports), 588.)   If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured,  has  his election to  sue all or  some of the  parties jointly,  or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate act of  each  individual.   (1  Chiddey,  Common  Law Pleadings, 86.)  It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for,  to give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by  various persons,  under the common law all are principals.   So also is the person who counsels,  aids or assists  in any way  the,  commission of  a wrong.   Under  the  common  law,  he who  aided or assisted  or  counseled, in  any way, the commission of  a crime, was as much  a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.  (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)

It may be stated as  a general rule, that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,  instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in,  aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.  They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in  the same  manner as if they  had performed the wrongful act themselves.   (Cooley on Torts. 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 III., 313  (63 Am. Dec, 312  and note); Berry vs.  Flefah, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N.  Y.), 612; Shep- ard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis  vs.  Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.  The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less  than all.  Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage.   It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the  tort was insignificant as compared  with  that of  the others.   (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell  (English Reports),  343;  Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East,  171; Booth vs. Hodgson,  6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant,  15  Mass.,  505; Acheson  vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller,  15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo.,  313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata.   The damages can not be apportioned among them, except  among themselves.  They can not insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.   They are jointly and  severally liable for the full  amount.  (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 111. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy,  52 Am, Bee, 258.)

A payment in  full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the others.   There  can  be but  one  satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to  discharge all.   (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N. Y.), 290; Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis.,  149.)

Of course the  courts during  the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable.   The courts may release  some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And  this is true even though they are charged jointly  and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382; Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166;  Owens  vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)

This same principle is recognized  by Act  277 of the Philippine Commission.  Section 6 provides that:

"Every author, editor or proprietor  *  *  *  is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part  *  *  * or number of each newspaper,  as fully as  if he were the author of the same."

  In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants and allowing an  execution  against their individual property.   The  provisions  of  the Civil  and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and  appellants have no application  whatever to the question presented  in the present case.

The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the amount of damages suffered on account of wounded feelings, mental suffering and injury to the good name and reputation of Mr. Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous publication.  The lower court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester amounted to P35,000.  This assignment of error presents a most difficult  question.  The amount of  damages resulting from a libelous publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of ascertainment.  It is not difficult to  realize that the damage thus done is great  and  almost immeasurable.  The  specific amount of damages to be  awarded must depend upon  the facts in each case  and the sound discretion of  the  court. No fixed or precise rules can be laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult to include all of the facts and  conditions which enter into the measure of such damages.  A  man's good name and reputation  are  worth more to him than all the wealth which he can accumulate during a lifetime of industrious labor.  To have them destroyed may be eminently of more damage to him personally than the destruction of  his physical wealth.  The loss is immeasurable.  No amount of money can compensate him for his loss.  Notwithstanding the great loss which he, from his standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some tangible  basis upon which to estimate such damages.

In discussing the element of damages in a case of libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, who tried the present case in the court below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one of  those rights  necessary to human society, that underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.  The  respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a  wellspent life vouchsafed to man in this existence.   The hope of it is the inspiration of youth and its possession  is a solace in later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen and known by his f ellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has developed a great  character and an unblemished reputation, has  secured a possession more useful and more valuable than lands or houses or silver or gold.  The law recognizes the value of such a reputation and constantly  strives to give redress for  its injury.   It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words  or libelous publications,  the  liability to make full compensation  for the damage to  the reputation, for the shame, obloquy and for  the injury  to the feelings  of  its owner, which are caused by the publication of the slander or libel.   The law goes further.  If the words are spoken or the publication is made with the intent  to injure the victim  or with criminal  indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury, in view  of all the circumstances of the particular case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter others from doing likewise, and for punishment  for the infliction of the injury."

As was said above, the  damages suffered  by Mr.  Worcester to  his good name  and  reputation  are most difficult of ascertainment.  The attorney for the appellants, in his brief, lends the court  but little assistance in reaching a   conclusion upon  this question.   The appellants  leave  the whole question to the discretion  of the court, without any argument whatever.

After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that that part  of the judgment of the lower court relating to the damages  suffered by the  Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be  modified, and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Mr, Dean C, Worcester and against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the  sum of P15,000, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909.

With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to  wit:  That the court erred in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a careful examination of the evidence, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances and the malice connected with the publication of said editorial and the subsequent publications with relation to said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission,  was justified in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants.

Section  11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in  an action for libel,  to render a judgment for  punitive  damages, in an amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others.

Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendant or defendants are actuated by malice.  In the present case there was not the slightest effort on the part of  the defendants to show the existence of probable cause or foundation whatever for the facts contained in said editorial.  Malice, hatred, and ill will against the  plaintiff are seen throughout the  record. The said editorial not only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but upon  every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.

Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the damages which should be imposed upon the defendants for the purpose of punishment.  Upon this question the courts must be governed in each case by the evidence, the circumstances and their sound discretion.  Taking into consideration the fact that some of the defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have  been sentenced, and considering that fact as a part of the punitive damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment  of the lower court should be Modified, and that a judgment should be rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of January, 1909.

Therefore, after a full consideration of all of the facts contained  in the  record  and the errors assigned by the appellants in this court, we are of the opinion  that the judgment of the lower court should  be modified and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants  Martin Ocampo, Teodoro  M. Kalaw, Manuel Palma,  Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment should be entered absolving Lope K. Santos from any liability under said complaint.   So ordered.

Carson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.

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ARELLANO, C. J., and MAPA, J.:

We concur, except with reference to the liability imposed upon Galo Lichauco  based on  the testimony  of one of the defendants, Arcadio  Arellano, and an  article published in the newspaper itself, "El Renacimiento."   In a case against Sedano, Arcadio Arellano said that Galo  Lichauco  was one of the owners of that newspaper and in the criminal case prosecuted for libel against some of  the defendants herein that he was one of the founders.  Also, it was  asserted in an article in "El Renacimiento" that Galo Lichauco was one of its stockholders.

If these things could be taken as evidence of his right as a partner, coowner or  participant in a business or company, it would follow that they could be evidence of an obligation or liability emanating from such business,  but it is quite impossible that they be regarded as evidence of such nature, that is, in his favor.   Therefore, they can not be held to be sufficient proof against him to conclude that he has contracted an  obligation or established  a basis for liability, such as that of answering with all his property for the consequences of the act of another.  Such person could not on this evidence claim a share of the earnings or profits of the Renacimiento company, because it is inconsistent with all the provisions and prohibitions of law bearing upon the validity and force of such pretended right of participation. He could not be held to be  in the situation of the other so-called founders of "El Renacimiento," under article 117 of the Code of Commerce, according to which:

"Articles of association, executed with the essential requisites  of law, shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto, no matter what form,  conditions, and combinations, legal and honest, are embraced therein, provided they are not expressly prohibited by this code."

There operates in favor of these other so-called founders of "El Renacimiento" the testimony of the real founder and manager thereof, Martin Ocampo, who at the trial admitted that they had  subscribed and  paid sums of money to aid him in the business he had projected.

But with  reference to Galo Uchauco,  Martin Ocampo explicitly stated that he offered to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. It is  incomprehensible  how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company  when  he had  put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible how one could share  in  the losses  thereof, and still less  incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said  company - an unrestricted liability to  the extent of all his property, as though he were a  regular general partner when he was not such.

If there could  be  one law for and  another against, or, in other words, one for rights and another for obligations, emanating from the same source, as in a contract of partnership, then it  might well happen  that  one could be a partner for assuming obligations, losses and liabilities, and not a partner in the sense of exercising rights and of participation in the earnings and profits of partnership.  But the contrary is a legal axiom, and it is impossible to  set aside the principle of reciprocity that pervades and regulates in equal manner rights and obligations.  Hence it is impossible to reach  as a conclusion derived from the evidence set. forth that Galo  Lichauco is a partner in the Renacimiento  company  and coowner of the newspaper of that name.

Judgment so rendered  would not clothe Galo Lichauco, after he had been sentenced to pay  damages for acts of "El  Renacimiento,"  with any  title,  right,  or reason for calling himself a  coowner of said business  and entitle him to claim a share of any earnings and profits which might be realized in the meantime or in  the future.  He would not be entitled to register  in  the  mercantile registry  on such ground, nor would or could any court oblige the Renacimiento company or Martin Ocampo to  regard Galo Lichauco as a partner or coowner.

From the testimony of a single witness, corroborated by a newspaper article, wherein it is asserted that a certain person is a partner or coowner of the Y. M. C. A., the witness believing for a certain amount and the newspaper merely saying that he was a. stockholder in that association, offset by the assertion of its  president that he  was not such, no court is  capable  of rendering judgment declaring that such person is  actually a partner or  coSwner of the Y. M. C. A., and must pay damages for a culpable action of said association and must in exchange be recognized and admitted as a partner and co5wher  of the Y. M. C. A. and as a sharer in the. earnings, profits and advantages thereof.

Neither could a person  be recognized and held out to be the owner of one or  more parcels of real estate on the testimony of one witness, the evidence of a newspaper article and the strength of a judgment based upon such testimony and newspaper article, in order that he might be required to pay the land tax and in exchange collect the rents from such property; it is no argument, either pro or con, to say that such person has neither impugned that testimony nor corrected or denied the article published.  Should a newspaper publish a list of millionaires and include therein one who is not such, or if a millionaire should figure in a list of paupers, there is no law imposing upon the  pauper or the millionaire the duty of denying or correcting the inaccurate report.   Neither is there any law that creates the presumption that failure to make such correction implies the truth of what  is so asserted.  It is not a rational and acceptable rule to  infer  consequences  from the failure to correct (whether proper or not) newspaper statements,  and still less when in a judicial action such assertion is not substantiated, as has resulted  in the case at bar.

Although Arcadio Arellano may say during a trial, as he has said, once, twice or a hundred times that  Galo Lichauco is the proprietor or founder of "El Renacimiento;"  although "El Renacimiento" may have asserted extrajudicially, in an article in reply to another newspaper, that Galo Lichauco is one of the  stockholders of the business it conducts;  yet when its editor on trial testifies that such report had been secured  from mere hearsay among his associates in the newspaper office and not from the organizer,  manager or administrator of the newspaper, Martin Ocampo, it can not in justice be concluded that Galo Lichauco is a partner in the business or coowner of  the  newspaper "El  Renacimiento."

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TORRES, J.:

I concur  in the  foregoing  decision of the majority in regard to the defendants Martin Ocampo and Teodoro Kalaw, but dissent from it with reference to the  others - Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe  Barretto, and   Gregorio  Cansipit - for they  had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages, nor were they owners or proprietors  of the newspaper "El  Renacimiento,"  its press or other equipment.   Consequently they are not liable for the damages claimed and should be absolved from the complaint.

With the exception of Galo Lichauco, who did not pay up the sum he  subscribed toward the founding of said newspaper, it is undeniable and clearly proven that the other five - Palma, Arellano, Jose, Barretto, and Cansipit - contributed different  sums  for  the object stated.  Martin Ocampo was placed at the head of the business and from the funds he took charge of purchased the press and other necessary equipment for printing and publishing said newspaper.

It is not conclusively shown in the record that a company was  formed to found and publish "El Renacimiento,"  and divide the earnings  and profits among the partners, through a contract entered  into, among them,  nor that there was established a community of ownership over the said newspaper, its press and the other equipment indispensable for its publication.

From the fact that the said five individuals contributed, each turning over to Ocampo a certain sum for the purpose of founding, editing and issuing the said newspaper,  it is improper to deduce  that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature, just as it is inadmissible to presume the existence of a company unless it appears that the formation thereof was  agreed upon  among  the partners. Aside from the fact of the contribution, it is not shown in the record that said six contributors had anything to do with acquiring the press, type and other equipment indispensable for getting out the newspaper; that any contract, either verbal or written, as to  how and  in what manner the  publication with its receipts and expenditures should be managed, and in what manner profits should be divided or deficit made up in case of loss; or that at any time meetings  were held  for discussing  the  business and dividing the profits, as though they were  really in partnership.  Up to the time  when said newspaper  ceased publication, its sole manager, Martin Ocampo, acted freely, just as  if he  were the absolute owner of the publication,  nor does it appear that he ever rendered any report of his acts to  those  who contributed  their money to the founding of "El Renacimiento."

The six contributors mentioned believed in  all good faith that it was necessary, expedient and useful for the rights and interests of the inhabitants of the Philippines to found a newspaper and that out of love and duty to  their country they ought to contribute from their private fortunes toward the expenses indispensable thereto, and in so  doing unconditionally  and with liberality they made a  genuine gift, each one freely turning over to Martin Ocampo the amount he could spare.

The case comes under article 618 of the Civil Code, which says:

"A gift is an act of liberality by which a person disposes gratuitously of a thing in favor of another, who accepts it."

It is true that Martin Ocampo is not the real donee, but considering that such acts  of  liberality were  executed by said six contributors for the common good of  the Filipino people and that it  was Martin  Ocampo  who voluntarily undertook  to realize and carry out the perfectly legitimate purpose of the  contributors,  his acceptance of  the sums donated, not having been actually repudiated or disapproved by  the community, must be understood to  have been made in  their name, and thus is fulfilled the requirement of acceptance established by the article  of the code  cited.

According to this theory the donors, after they had freely and spontaneously parted with  the sums donated, could not retain any right over the objects  to which these sums were applied, because the donor by  his gift voluntarily conveys to the donee his rights of ownership over the thing donated. Therefore the said donors can not in strict logic be regarded as the proprietors of the newspaper "El Renacimiento," its press and equipment, because after having  turned over the money to Martin Ocampo, who accepted the commission of carrying out the wishes and purposes of the contributors, they retained no right over the newspaper or the press, fixtures and equipment thereof.

Persons who contribute to the erection  of a church or a hospital, in spite of the fact that they freely  and liberally give money to  parties charged  with collecting it, do not therefore retain any right, nor can they be called coowners or coproprietors of the church or hospital constructed, and the receipt or  acknowledgment  of the sums  paid to the parties at the head of the  enterprise fulfills  the requirement of the law, perfects and brings within the legal pale the donation  voluntarily made from motives of piety or benevolence.

Such is the case of the said six contributors, who were animated by love of this country in which they were born. Five gave different sums to Martin Ocampo,  and a  sixth promised to give something,  for the founding of "El Renacimiento," believing in good faith that by their acts they, were rendering  a meritorious service to their country, but, notwithstanding the internal moral  satisfaction they  got, as  in the case of the benefactors of a church or hospital, they can never be called coSwners or coproprietors of said newspaper.

If, after  the  establishment of the newspaper, its staff, editor or manager made bad use of the publication and issued a libelous article, the donors who contributed to the funds necessary for  the founding of "El Renacimiento," from the very fact that they are not  proprietors of the newspaper or of the press  from which it is issued, are not liable for the publication of said article, because they did not participate therein  either directly Or indirectly, just  as in the criminal case  they  were not indicted  even on  the ground that they are members of the company that is alleged to have been formed for the establishment of the said newspaper, "El Renacimiento."  But this is a theory which, as we  hjave already said, we do not admit, because proof is entirely lacking of  the  existence of that company wherefrom it is attempted to derive the character of owner attrib- uted to  the  said  donees and the consequent obligation  to indemnify the plaintiff for the damages claimed.

After Martin Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered by the said Palma, Jose, Arellano, Barretto, and Cansipit, these latter ceased  to be the owners  of and surrendered all  right to the money donated and to the objects that were, acquired therewith for the purpose of establishing the newspaper "El Renacimiento," from which business said five individuals, as also Galo Lichauco, are entirely separated.  Therefore they can not incur, jointly and severally with the director and manager of "El Renacimiento," the liability  to indemnify the plaintiff  for the publication therein of an article constituting  libel.

Section  11 of Act No. 277, applicable to the case,  prescribes :

"In addition to the criminal action  hereby prescribed, a  right of civil action is also hereby given to  any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth against the person libeling him for damages sustained  by such libel,  and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such  civil action not only the actual pecuniary  damages sustained by  him but also  damages for injury to his feelings and reputation, and in addition to such punitive damages as the court may think.will  be a just  punishment to the libeler  and an example to others.  Suit  may  be brought in any  Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties.  The presumptions, rules  of evidence, and special defenses herein provided for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in civil  actions under this section."

It is certain that lachauco, who merely promised a  certain sum, and each of the other five mentioned, who gave the amounts  they could  spare, did  not write, edit, or publish the libelous article that gave rise to  this action, neither did they take part  directly or indirectly in writing  and publishing said article for the purpose  of discrediting the plaintiff, and for this reason there does not in our opinion exist any just or legal ground for bringing against them the corresponding civil action for damages, since the mere fact of having contributed from their  respective  fortunes to the establishment of the newspaper  "El  Renacimiento," a contribution made in the nature of a gift,  and not for the purpose of forming a  company for  the sake  of  dividing among themselves earnings and profits,  can  not in  any way have given rise to or produced the obligation to indemnify the plaintiff and  place them on a par with those who have injured him by means of a defamatory article, because in making the gifts of money which they did the said six contributing defendants  did  not acquire, nor do they retain, any right of property or of participation in the said newspaper, its press  and equipment.  As it does  not appear from the record  to have  been  ascertained or proven  that they contributed  with bad faith and  criminal intension to the founding of a newspaper expressly  intended to publish libelous articles,  or  in so doing that they executed  acts prohibited by law or contrary to public morality, those who gave money nine years ago for its establishment are certainly not responsible for the bad use that those who wrote and managed  said newspaper  made of it, especially when the penal action from which the obligation arises was committed many years later, unless it appears that said original donors had knowledge of or participation in the defamatory  acts performed.

For  these reasons it follows  in our opinion that justice requires  that the judgment appealed  from with regard to the defendants Galo Lichauco, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe  Barretto, and  Gregorio Cansipit should be reversed and that they should be absolved from the complaint entered against them for  damages,  with no special finding as to six-ninths of the costs in  both instances. I concur in the decision of the  majority with reference to the others - Kalaw, Ocampo, and the rest of the defendants.

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^[1] Causin vs. Jakosalem.

⁽¹⁾ Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Co.

^{1} 12 Phil., Rep., 428