THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 106541-42, March 31, 1995 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MENANDRO TRIMOR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
What fate may await the weak of mind while performing a simple household chore? For Benedicta Decena, a 27-year old retardate, it was a violation of her virtue.
In the early morning of October 7, 1987, Decena went to Dagat-Dagatan (a lagoon in Tadlac, Los Banos, Laguna) to wash some clothes. She was standing alone in waist-deep waters when two men, whom she later identified as Menandro Trimor and Antonio Magsipoc, approached her. Trimor dove into the water, removed her panty and threatened to kill her if she resisted. Magsipoc held her shoulder while pointing a knife at her. The intimidation was enough to snuff out any fight in the girl.
Decena was then made to lie on top of a rock on the shore where Trimor succeeded in satisfying his carnal desires despite her resistance which she exhibited by pushing him away when she felt pain. Thereafter, Magsipoc took his turn in raping her.
Two days later, as was her wont, Decena returned to the same place to wash clothes. Her two ravishers struck anew and repeated their dastardly deed.
At first, Decena kept the incident a secret, but she broke her silence when her sister Florita noticed her bulging stomach. On July 8, 1988, she gave birth to a baby boy.
Trimor and Magsipoc were charged with two counts of rape but only the case against Trimor prospered; the accusation against Magsipoc was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence upon the prosecutor's recommendation.
The prosecution presented, among other witnesses, Dr. Erlinda Marfil, head of the National Bureau of Investigation Neuro-Psychiatric Service, to prove that Decena was a woman with a child's intelligence. Marfil testified that Decena was, based on her psychiatric evaluation of the victim, indeed a retardate with the comprehension of a seven-year old child.
Trimor's defense consisted mainly of denial and alibi.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo reached a verdict, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the instant appeal, Trimor abandoned his initial defense of denial and alibi and claimed that Decena consented to the sexual act.
We find for the People.
In the first place, Trimor's change of theory from alibi to voluntary sexual congress on the part of Decena militates against his credibility. Changing the defense on appeal is an indication of desperation on the part of the accused-appellant, due to the seeming inadequacy of his defense adopted in the first instance.
In the second place, it may be stressed, to the point of being repetitious, that this Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court. The court a quo was convinced, as we are, that Decena was a retardate with the mental age of a seven-year old child at the time of the commission of the crime. This is amply demonstrated by her testimony to the effect that she continued washing the clothes while Trimor was removing her panty.[1] Such testimony showed either an unintelligent answer which a retardate would naturally give in open court or a failure to grasp the implications of what was happening to her due to her immaturity and inexperience.
Noticeable, too, is the way Decena was treated on the witness stand by the court and by the prosecutor. A scrutiny of the records would reveal that the questions propounded to Decena were very simple and elementary, even patronizing, phrased as they were to be understood by an average child rather than by a discerning adult. To illustrate this point, we are quoting hereunder portions of her testimony:
The trial court's conclusion that Decena was indeed a retardate relied heavily on the expert opinion of Dr. Marfil. Was the doctor's testimony credible? At the time she testified, Dr. Marfil was the head of the Neuro-Psychiatric Services Division of the NBI. As a licensed doctor of psychiatric medicine, she was authorized to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of the victim, which is much more than what a psychologist a non-doctor can offer. It must also be noted that in ascertaining if one is insane only a psychiatric examination is required; no psychological examination is necessary. Surely, the standard for determining if one is a retardate cannot be more stringent than the test for insanity. When Dr. Marfil completed her examination of Decena, nothing else was needed to buttress her finding of retardation.
Considering the mental state of the victim, proof of force, violence, or intimidation is superfluous, as the crime is deemed to be akin to statutory rape.[4] Precisely because the victim in this case is not possessed of the intelligence of a woman her age, we cannot apply to the peculiar circumstances of this case the principles previously adopted by this Court in ordinary rape cases, such as (a) that inconsistencies between the sworn statement of an alleged rape victim before a municipal judge and her testimony in court impair her credibility; (b) that delay in reporting a rape case may be justified where such is due to strong reasons; and (c) that her conduct during and after the incident renders her testimony worthless and unbelievable.
Decena's behavior after the incident, such as, for instance, continuing to wash clothes even as she was already being molested, failure to resist as the act was being consummated (although she did try to push Trimor away when she felt some pain), resuming her chore even after the coitus, and later returning to the same place thereby giving her ravishers another opportunity to repeat their deed would seem unnatural for a woman her age, but in this case only reinforces the trial court's finding that, indeed, the victim has the mind of a seven-year old child. Decena cannot possibly be expected to comprehend what was happening to her, much less, the implications on her womanhood. Neither can she be faulted for not reporting the incident either to her parents or to the police until her sister started probing her on her condition: her mental state is a cogent reason for her silence.
Assuming arguendo that the victim was not confirmed to be a retardate, the Court agrees with the trial court that intimidation was present. The crime scene was deserted. Two men accosted the victim while she was in the water with nowhere to run. One of the men was holding a knife while holding her shoulder, while the other was threatening to kill her even as he was removing her panty.
Decena also showed resistance to the attack when, even as she was being threatened by two men one of whom was armed with a knife, she attempted to push Trimor away upon feeling pain, although the defense belittled such opposition and tried to portray it as voluntary submission.
The defense would also like to make an issue out of a small detail in Decena's narration of facts. Trimor argues that her testimony on how she reached the rock by the shore where she was raped is inconsistent. At one point she said she was carried there;[5] at another, she went ahead of Trimor.[6] This is a very minuscule fact which does not in any way affect the truth of her other statements nor her credibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, modified only as far as the award of damages is concerned, which should be increased to P40,000.00 in view of the doctrine laid down in Antonio.[7]
Feliciano, (Chairman), Vitug, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1] T.S.N., February 6, 1990, pp. 16, 22-23.
[2] ibid., pp. 3-4.
[3] Id., pp. 7-8.
[4] People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 107950, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 283.
[5] T.S.N., February 6, 1990, p. 27.
[6] ibid., p. 25.
[7] Supra.
In the early morning of October 7, 1987, Decena went to Dagat-Dagatan (a lagoon in Tadlac, Los Banos, Laguna) to wash some clothes. She was standing alone in waist-deep waters when two men, whom she later identified as Menandro Trimor and Antonio Magsipoc, approached her. Trimor dove into the water, removed her panty and threatened to kill her if she resisted. Magsipoc held her shoulder while pointing a knife at her. The intimidation was enough to snuff out any fight in the girl.
Decena was then made to lie on top of a rock on the shore where Trimor succeeded in satisfying his carnal desires despite her resistance which she exhibited by pushing him away when she felt pain. Thereafter, Magsipoc took his turn in raping her.
Two days later, as was her wont, Decena returned to the same place to wash clothes. Her two ravishers struck anew and repeated their dastardly deed.
At first, Decena kept the incident a secret, but she broke her silence when her sister Florita noticed her bulging stomach. On July 8, 1988, she gave birth to a baby boy.
Trimor and Magsipoc were charged with two counts of rape but only the case against Trimor prospered; the accusation against Magsipoc was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence upon the prosecutor's recommendation.
The prosecution presented, among other witnesses, Dr. Erlinda Marfil, head of the National Bureau of Investigation Neuro-Psychiatric Service, to prove that Decena was a woman with a child's intelligence. Marfil testified that Decena was, based on her psychiatric evaluation of the victim, indeed a retardate with the comprehension of a seven-year old child.
Trimor's defense consisted mainly of denial and alibi.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo reached a verdict, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused MENANDRO TRIMOR of having committed the crime of rape twice on October 7 and 9, 1987. He is hereby sentenced to serve separate penalty (sic) of reclusion perpetua for each of the offense(s) charged.
The accused is further ordered to pay complainant Benedicta Decena actual and moral damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED."
In the instant appeal, Trimor abandoned his initial defense of denial and alibi and claimed that Decena consented to the sexual act.
We find for the People.
In the first place, Trimor's change of theory from alibi to voluntary sexual congress on the part of Decena militates against his credibility. Changing the defense on appeal is an indication of desperation on the part of the accused-appellant, due to the seeming inadequacy of his defense adopted in the first instance.
In the second place, it may be stressed, to the point of being repetitious, that this Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court. The court a quo was convinced, as we are, that Decena was a retardate with the mental age of a seven-year old child at the time of the commission of the crime. This is amply demonstrated by her testimony to the effect that she continued washing the clothes while Trimor was removing her panty.[1] Such testimony showed either an unintelligent answer which a retardate would naturally give in open court or a failure to grasp the implications of what was happening to her due to her immaturity and inexperience.
Noticeable, too, is the way Decena was treated on the witness stand by the court and by the prosecutor. A scrutiny of the records would reveal that the questions propounded to Decena were very simple and elementary, even patronizing, phrased as they were to be understood by an average child rather than by a discerning adult. To illustrate this point, we are quoting hereunder portions of her testimony:
The trial court's conclusion that Decena was indeed a retardate relied heavily on the expert opinion of Dr. Marfil. Was the doctor's testimony credible? At the time she testified, Dr. Marfil was the head of the Neuro-Psychiatric Services Division of the NBI. As a licensed doctor of psychiatric medicine, she was authorized to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of the victim, which is much more than what a psychologist a non-doctor can offer. It must also be noted that in ascertaining if one is insane only a psychiatric examination is required; no psychological examination is necessary. Surely, the standard for determining if one is a retardate cannot be more stringent than the test for insanity. When Dr. Marfil completed her examination of Decena, nothing else was needed to buttress her finding of retardation.
Considering the mental state of the victim, proof of force, violence, or intimidation is superfluous, as the crime is deemed to be akin to statutory rape.[4] Precisely because the victim in this case is not possessed of the intelligence of a woman her age, we cannot apply to the peculiar circumstances of this case the principles previously adopted by this Court in ordinary rape cases, such as (a) that inconsistencies between the sworn statement of an alleged rape victim before a municipal judge and her testimony in court impair her credibility; (b) that delay in reporting a rape case may be justified where such is due to strong reasons; and (c) that her conduct during and after the incident renders her testimony worthless and unbelievable.
Decena's behavior after the incident, such as, for instance, continuing to wash clothes even as she was already being molested, failure to resist as the act was being consummated (although she did try to push Trimor away when she felt some pain), resuming her chore even after the coitus, and later returning to the same place thereby giving her ravishers another opportunity to repeat their deed would seem unnatural for a woman her age, but in this case only reinforces the trial court's finding that, indeed, the victim has the mind of a seven-year old child. Decena cannot possibly be expected to comprehend what was happening to her, much less, the implications on her womanhood. Neither can she be faulted for not reporting the incident either to her parents or to the police until her sister started probing her on her condition: her mental state is a cogent reason for her silence.
Assuming arguendo that the victim was not confirmed to be a retardate, the Court agrees with the trial court that intimidation was present. The crime scene was deserted. Two men accosted the victim while she was in the water with nowhere to run. One of the men was holding a knife while holding her shoulder, while the other was threatening to kill her even as he was removing her panty.
Decena also showed resistance to the attack when, even as she was being threatened by two men one of whom was armed with a knife, she attempted to push Trimor away upon feeling pain, although the defense belittled such opposition and tried to portray it as voluntary submission.
The defense would also like to make an issue out of a small detail in Decena's narration of facts. Trimor argues that her testimony on how she reached the rock by the shore where she was raped is inconsistent. At one point she said she was carried there;[5] at another, she went ahead of Trimor.[6] This is a very minuscule fact which does not in any way affect the truth of her other statements nor her credibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, modified only as far as the award of damages is concerned, which should be increased to P40,000.00 in view of the doctrine laid down in Antonio.[7]
Feliciano, (Chairman), Vitug, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1] T.S.N., February 6, 1990, pp. 16, 22-23.
[2] ibid., pp. 3-4.
[3] Id., pp. 7-8.
[4] People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 107950, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 283.
[5] T.S.N., February 6, 1990, p. 27.
[6] ibid., p. 25.
[7] Supra.