Bitter rivalry in the movie theater industry led to the slaying of one of the more prominent citizens of Cagayan de Oro almost twenty (20) years ago. Those charged for the sensational manslaughter were either convicted or acquitted by a military court. But the verdict did not put to rest the wounded feelings spawned by the killing; it merely terminated the criminal prosecution of those already haled to court.

The problem now before us concerns the civil aspect of the case. Petitioners claim that the complaint^[1] filed against them in the trial court has already prescribed, hence, should be, as it should have been, dismissed by respondent Judge. On the other hand, private respondents insist that the issue on prescription may no longer be relitigated on the ground that we have already resolved the same in G.R. No. 69418, and that assuming that the same may still be activated, respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss grounded on prescription because private respondents' cause of action for damages is coterminous with the crime of murder on which it is based.^[2]

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in denying the motion to dismiss.

Florentino Lim, a scion of the wealthy Limketkai family of Cagayan de Oro City, was shot dead in his office on 25 August 1973. The Constabulary, the NBI and the police conducted a joint investigation of the case. As a result, on 17 April 1975, the brothers Luis, William, Joaquin, Vicente, Alfonso and Eusebio, all surnamed Tan, and Go E Kuan, together with eight (8) others, were charged with murder, and unlawful possession, control and custody of a pistol before Military Commission No. 1.^[3] Incidentally, Alfonso, Eusebio and Go E Kuan died even before the instant petition could be filed. Thereafter, William also died.

On 11 June 1976, after trial, Military Commission No. 1 convicted Luis and five (5) of his co-accused^[4] for murder, while the gunman was also found guilty of illegal possession of firearm.^[5] The other brothers of Luis were simply declared "not guilty" in both cases.^[6]

On 11 February 1983, private respondent Rosita B. Lim, together with her minor children, Jennifer, Lysander and Beverlie, all surnamed Limketkai, commenced in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a civil action for damages against all those charged with the slaying of Florentino Lim.^[7] The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge David G. Nitafan.

On 10 May 1983, instead of filing an answer, the Tan brothers filed a motion to dismiss^[8] contending that venue was improperly laid, and that private respondents' cause of action was already barred or extinguished by the acquittal of William, Joaquin, Vicente, Alfonso, Eusebio and Go E Kuan by Military Commission No. 1. But respondent Judge disagreed and denied petitioners' motion, prompting the latter to elevate the issue to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) by way of certiorari,^[9] which likewise rejected their arguments and denied their plea. Then they came to this Court raising the propriety of the denial of their motion to dismiss.^[10]

On 23 May 1984, we dismissed the petition. We ruled that the action for damages against the convicted defendants was sanctioned by Art. 33 of the Civil Code which allowed an independent civil action in case of physical injuries, which include death. We further held that the complaint stated a cause of action against those acquitted because the Military Commission did not explain the grounds for their acquittal. After all, it was not under any obligation to do so. Hence, we concluded, it would be premature to dismiss the civil action against them.^[11]

Thereafter, petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. Prescription was not one of their affirmative defenses.

On 26 July 1984, Mariano Velez, Jr., a co-­defendant of petitioners in Civil Case No. 83-15633, filed a separate motion to dismiss based on prescription and waiver or abandonment of claim by private respondents.^[12] Invoking Escueta v. Fandialan,^[13] Velez argued that the prescriptive period for an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code was four (4) years, and since it took private respondents almost ten (10) years to file the instant civil action, prescription had already set in.

On 10 September 1984, with leave of court, petitioners filed an amended answer adopting the grounds of Velez in his motion to dismiss as additional affirmative defenses.

On 18 September 1984, respondent Judge denied Velez' motion to dismiss while noting that petitioners expressly adopted the grounds therein stated. The motion to reconsider the order of denial, which was again joined in by petitioners, was likewise denied.

On 21 December 1984, Velez instituted a petition for certiorari^[14] questioning the denial of his motion to dismiss, the second incident to reach this Court stemming from the civil action for damages. Petitioners did not join Velez in the petition. On 25 March 1985, in a minute resolution, the Court dismissed Velez' petition.^[15]

On 16 January 1986, at the pre-trial, petitioners asked for time to file a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted purportedly to consider the "intents and purposes of Section 3 of Rule 20, under which if the Court finds that jurisdiction is lacking x x x or if the admitted facts and proof show that plaintiff has no cause of action x x x the Court may render judgment dismissing the case."^[16]

On 28 January 1986, petitioners filed their motion to dismiss, which merely reiterated prescription and lack of cause of action as grounds therefor. On 20 March 1986, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss ruling that the grounds upon which the motion was anchored were "already passed upon adversely by this Court (trial court) and such adverse rulings were even affirmed by superior courts x x x x"^[17] On 29 July 1986, reconsideration of the Order of 20 March 1986 was denied.

On 16 January 1987, or almost six (6) months after such denial, petitioners commenced the present petition for certiorari, the third to emanate from Civil Case No. 83-15633, moored solely on the ground of prescription. After private respondents filed their comment, petitioner Luis Tan through counsel filed his own reply, while William, Joaquin and Vicente, also through counsel, filed jointly a separate reply particularly introducing another issue, i.e., whether a civil action for damages filed under Art. 29 of the Civil Code^[18] can still prosper against them considering that their acquittal by Military Commission No. 1 simply declared them "not guilty," hence, without any qualification and not merely based on reasonable doubt. But, this is an issue which was already resolved in G.R. No. 67029.

Meanwhile, on 22 May 1987, pending resolution of the instant petition, a decision in the twin cases of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34^[19] was promulgated. Therein, through Mr. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, we ruled that courts martial could not try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them for as long as the civil courts were open and functioning, which was the prevailing condition during the period of martial law. Thus, in Cruz v. Enrile,^[20] penned by then Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, now Chief Justice, we nullified the proceedings against non-political detainees who were convicted by courts martial and who were still serving sentence, although they were not immediately released as the Department of Justice was simply directed to file the corresponding informations against them in the civil courts.

Consequently, the Secretary of Justice designated a State Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 and, if warranted, to prosecute the case.^[21] The State Prosecutor then, without conducting a reinvestigation, filed two (2) informations, one for illegal possession of firearm,^[22] and another for murder,^[23] against the fifteen (15) original accused in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro.

On 7 November 1988, the brothers William, Joaquin and Vicente instituted a petition for certiorari as well as for prohibition before this Court^[24] asserting that the refiling of the two (2) informations against them constituted double jeopardy as they were already acquitted by Military Commission No. 1.

On 18 October 1990, through Mme. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, this Court sustained the position of William, Joaquin and Vicente in G.R. Nos. 85481-82 and ordered their discharge from the information in Crim. Case No. 88-825, ruling that the refiling of the informations against the three (3) brothers who had been acquitted by the military court long before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision would place them in double jeopardy.^[25]

With the quashal of the information for murder, private respondents were left with no recourse but to pursue Civil Case No. 83-15633 pending in the RTC of Manila. Unfortunately, this case has been hibernating therein for ten (10) years, the delay being attributable mainly to the tactical maneuvers of petitioners herein, who are defendants therein.

This petition for certiorari must fail. For, prescription may be effectively pleaded in a motion to dismiss only if the complaint shows on its face that the action had already prescribed at the time it was filed.^[26] But this is not the situation here. On the contrary, the applicable prescriptive period in this case is, at most, dubitable. While petitioners contend that it is four (4) years hence the cause of action of private respondents already prescribed, the trial court ruled that it was coterminous with the crime so that, in this case where the accused were charged with murder, the prescriptive period for the offense being twenty (20) years, the action had not yet prescribed it having been instituted less than ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued.

Be that as it may, in G.R. No. 69418 we already affirmed the ruling of the trial court that prescription had not yet set in, albeit in a minute resolution. But, it is axiomatic that when a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for lack of merit, the challenged decision or order, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.^[27] Correspondingly, the impression that no legal rule was enunciated in G.R. No. 69418,^[28] as espoused by petitioners, is wrong and must be corrected. The resolution in G.R. No. 69418 having already attained finality, it becomes the "law of the case" as to the issue of prescription, which simply means that if an appellate court has passed upon a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts.^[29] The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any, and every subsequent appeal.^[30] Thus, the matter on prescription in the case before us is already a settled issue, now long dead to be revived. Corollary thereto, the issue of whether a cause of action exists against petitioners who were acquitted was already adjudicated in G.R. No. 67029, hence, is now the law of the case, at least insofar as that issue is concerned.

Petitioners may not have been nominal parties in G.R. No. 69418, for which reason they claim that res judicata does not lie against them by reason thereof, they nevertheless took active part in the proceedings before the trial court that led to the denial of Velez' motion to dismiss by joining him in pleading prescription as a valid ground for dismissal of the complaint for damages, having adopted not only the grounds^[31] in his motion but those in his motion for reconsideration as well.^[32]

In retrospect, petitioners joined movant Velez in his twin motions, one to dismiss, and the other, for reconsideration, which were both denied by respondent Judge. We subsequently sustained the denial of both motions. However, petitioners herein did not join Velez in elevating both orders of denial to the appellate court. Consequently, as regards petitioners, that early the issue of prescription was already resolved against them. They can no longer revive that same issue in this petition as our Resolution in G.R. No. 69418 is already the law of the case. Indeed, it was only because of the inordinate reverence of respondent Judge to what he perceived to be the "intents and purposes" of Sec. 3, Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, hovering nevertheless on grave abuse of discretion, that the issue of prescription was resuscitated.

Perforce, the finality of our denial of Velez' motion to dismiss, which relied heavily on prescription, must also apply to petitioners who have joined cause with Velez on the same issue. Consequently, they are now precluded from contesting the validity of that denial even on the pretext that what is being questioned in the instant petition is the denial of their motion to dismiss of 28 January 1986,^[33] and not the previous motion of Velez. After all, petitioners are raising under the same factual backdrop the very issue of prescription as Velez did in G.R. No. 69418. The less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein.^[34] And prescription was one of the grounds raised in G.R. No. 69418. Courts frown upon litigants reiterating identical motions in the hope that they would entertain a possible change of opinion in the future.^[35]

Petitioners' motion to dismiss made at the pre­trial stage did not contain any new allegation on lack of jurisdiction or lack of cause of action, which are the only grounds allowed for such a motion. On the other hand, all the grounds raised by petitioners were mere reiterations of issues already settled by the trial court and affirmed in G.R. Nos. 67029 and 69418. Consequently, the only recourse open to the Court is to dismiss the petition. A contrary ruling of respondent Judge would have, instead, easily subjected him to certiorari on grave abuse of discretion for gross disobedience to settled pronouncements of this Court.

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge, this Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, or whichever branch of the same court this case may now be assigned, is directed to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil Case No. 83-15633 with the least possible delay. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Melo, Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., joins J. Quiason in his concurring opinion.
Quiason and Vitug JJ., concurring opinion.
 

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^[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 83-15633 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

^[2] This is a Petition for Certiorari of the 20 March 1986 Order (Annex "C", Petition) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 52, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss as well as the 29 July 1986 Order (Annex "E", Petition) denying reconsideration. This case was transferred to ponente from the Third Division on 13 May 1992.

^[3] Docketed as Crim. Case No. MC-1-67.

^[4] Marciano Benemerito, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Ocasiones and Leopoldo Nicolas.

^[5] Marciano Benemerito.

^[6] A military tribunal, unlike a regular court of justice, is not required to make a detailed finding of fact and conclusion of law; nor does it possess jurisdiction to award civil damages.

^[7] The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge David G. Nitafan, RTC, Br. 52, Manila.

^[8] Annex "C", Petition, p. 2.

^[9] Docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 01583.

^[10] Docketed as G.R. No. 67029.

^[11] Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67029, 24 May 1984, Second Division, Minute Resolution.

^[12] Annex "2", Comment.

^[13] No. L-39675, 29 November 1974, 61 SCRA 279.

^[14] Docketed as G.R. No. 69418.

^[15] Annex "5", Comment; Rollo, p. 82.

^[16] See Note 6, p. 1.

^[17] Referring to then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. SP No. 01583 and the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 67029 and 69418; See Note 7, p. 7.

^[18] Art. 29 provides: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious x x x x If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground."

^[19] G.R. Nos. 54558 and 69882, 22 May 1987, 150 SCRA 144.

^[20] G.R. No. 75983, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 700.

^[21] Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, 18 October 1990, 190 SCRA 686.

^[22] Docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824.

^[23] Docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825.

^[24] Docketed as G.R. Nos. 85481-82.

^[25] See Note 19.

^[26] Francisco v. Robles, 94 Phil 1035 (1954).

^[27] Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990, 186 SCRA 1.

^[28] Rollo, pp. 93-94.

^[29] Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 61 Mich App 62, 232 NW 2d 302, and Hinds v. McNair, 413 NE 2d 606, cited in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., pp. 886-887.

^[30] Ramos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72686, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 93.

^[31] Annex "3", Comment, p. 3.

^[32] Annex "4", Comment, p. 1.

^[33] Annex "B," Petition.

^[34] Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, 22 April 1992, 208 SCRA 215.

^[35] Medran v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil 165 (1949).

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