The decisive issue in this certiorari proceeding is whether or not, as alleged by petitioner Guillermo Arcenas, the defeated mayoralty candidate for Hermosa, Bataan in the local election held on January 30, 1980, respondent Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing his action for disqualification of private respondent Jesus Vitug, Jr., the victor in such election.  He was thereafter subsequently proclaimed and is now holding such office.  For reason to be set forth, the answer must be in the negative.  There was no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one.

Petitioner Arcenas was the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagon Lipunan, with respondent Vitug, Jr. running under the Nacionalista Party banner.  On January 22, 1980, prior to the election, the latter was sought to be disqualified by petitioner before respondent Commission^[1] for violating the constitutional prohibition against a "candidate for public office [changing] his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election."^[2] It was alleged that he was the Chairman of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan chapter in Hermosa, was thereafter removed by the President, and then became the Nacionalista Party candidate.  As noted earlier, he won in the election and was duly proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Hermosa on January 31, 1980.  He took his oath and assumed office forthwith.  While the disqualification case was filed eight days before the election, it could not be heard during that period.  Petitioner then on February 3, 1980 filed with respondent Commission a motion to set it for hearing.  There were subsequent pleadings filed by him all in support of his plea for disqualification.  Then on February 22, 1980 came this resolution from respondent Commission:  "In the matter of the petition of Guillermo S. Arcenas, seeking the disqualification of [Jesus R. Vitug,] for Mayor, Hermosa, Bataan, on the ground that the respondent was the Chairman of the KBL Chapter in said municipality, was removed from office by the President, and then became a candidate of the NP; and the Urgent Omnibus Motion and/or Quo Warranto, filed by the same petitioner, submitting additional evidence to show the party affiliation of the respondent:  The Commission, on motion duly seconded, [resolved] to deny the petition, without prejudice to pursuing any other available legal remedy."^[3] A motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this proceeding.

As set forth at the outset, this petition must be dismissed.

1. The assailed resolution finds support in three recent decisions of this Court, Venezuela v. Comelec,^[4] Villegas v. Comelec,^[5] and Potencion v. Comelec,^[6] all impressed with relevance.  It is now the prevailing doctrine that after an election duly held and a proclamation thereafter made, a pre-proclamation controversy should no longer be viable.  As was pointed out in the Venezuela opinion:  "it would save the time and energy of the litigants as well as respondent Commission, and eventually this Court in review of its appellate jurisdiction, if the matter were passed upon in an election protest or quo warranto petition in the proper court or agency, the office involved being that of municipal mayor."^[7]
   
   
2. It is true that the facts of the Venezuela case could be distinguished as that petition for disqualification appeared to have been filed after the private respondent had already been proclaimed.  In this case, the petition for disqualification, as noted at the outset, was filed eight days before the election.  Such a distinction possesses no materiality.  The ratio decidendi is broad enough to cover the present situation for it would be time-consuming and in the end self-defeating if at this stage the pre-proclamation controversy is not laid to rest.  The better view, as noted in Venezuela, is that resort be had to the remedy of an election protest or a quo warranto, which ever is proper.
   
   
3. Nor does a decision of this character detract from the binding force of the principle announced in Reyes v. Comelec,^[8] that the provision on disqualification arising from a change in a political party affiliation by a candidate within six months is both "innovative and mandatory." As should be clear, the issue of disqualification has not been rendered moot and academic, only the remedy to be pursued is no longer the pre-proclamation controversy.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit.  The resolution of the Commission on Elections dated February 22, 1980 stands.

Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., files a separate concurrence.
Aquino, J., took no part.

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^[1] PDC No. 517, Annex A, Petition.

^[2] Article XII, C, Section 10 of the Constitution.

^[3] Resolution dated February 22, 1980.

^[4] G. R. No. 53532, July 25, 1980.

^[5] G. R. No. 52563, Sept. 4, 1980.

^[6] G. R. No. 52527, Sept. 4, 1980.

^[7] Venezuela v. Comelec, G. R. No. 53532, July 25, 1980, 3.

^[8] G. R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980.

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