EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 52830, November 28, 1980 ]
ANTONIO O. SINGCO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND FRANKLIN ONG, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner Antonio O. Singco seeks the reversal of the COMELEC's Resolution No. 9310 dated February 26, 1980 which resolved:
On February 26, 1980, COMELEC issued the above-quoted Resolution No. 9310 declaring Antonio O. Singco a disqualified candidate. Chairman Leonardo B. Perez dissented as he was "for allowing the winner to be proclaimed, without prejudice to disqualification case being heard and decided, following (the) ruling in the case of Pimentel vs. COMELEC."[4] Pursuant to said resolution, respondent Franklin Ong was proclaimed Mayor of Ginatilan, Cebu. After taking his oath of office as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Ginatilan, Cebu, private respondent immediately discharged the duties and functions of said office.
On March 6, 1980, this Court, acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining both the COMELEC from implementing its resolution of February 26, 1980 and private respondent from assuming the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Ginatilan.[5] Before said writ could be implemented, however, private respondent designated Jaime Calunsod, a new elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan who received the second most number of votes for Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality, as officer-in-charge of the Municipality of Ginatilan, Cebu.[6]
Invoking Our ruling in Renato Reyes vs. Comelec,[7] petitioner seeks the nullification of the challenged resolution on ground of denial of due process, alleging that said resolution was issued without benefit of hearing and the same was not supported by substantial evidence. He pointed out that when private respondent prayed in his manifestation and motion dated February 2, 1980 that the case be calendared for hearing or in the alternative, the decision be rendered based on documentary evidence attached to the petition,[8] petitioner vehemently objected to the alternative prayer, inviting the attention of the COMELEC to the fact that to admit such evidence consisting of affidavits and to decide the petition on the basis thereof would be violative of due process of law, for one of the affidavits attached to the petition was secured thru coercion, as shown in the subsequent affidavit of the coerced affiant.[9]
Petitioner also claims denial of due process in the annulment of his proclamation which was ordered by the COMELEC without any hearing. He disputes the applicability of the cases of Pedido vs. Commission on Elections[10] and Aguam vs. Commission on Elections[11] upon which private respondent relies to justify the annulment, alleging that the decisions therein would show that the authority to annul the proclamation exists where the basis of the proclamation is illegal canvass. He maintains that the case particularly apt to the case at bar is the case of Pimentel vs. COMELEC[12] where this Court ordered the proclamation of the winning candidates without prejudice to the disqualification suit.
Petitioner also contends that the questioned resolution was not supported by substantial evidence and insists that since he had disclaimed and refuted the documents which supposedly showed his affiliation with the KBL, alleging that his signature appearing in the document was forged, and that the identical affidavits were either coerced or of doubtful credibility, the COMELEC should have accepted them with circumspection.
In separate comments, respondents COMELEC and Ong do not deny the lack of formal hearing in this case, but they would defend the assailed resolution by insisting that since petitioner was informed of the disqualification suit as well as the documentary evidence to support the petition to which he was given the opportunity to answer, and in view of the time constraints imposed upon the COMELEC in resolving the controversy, it cannot be said that petitioner was denied due process. They also contend that even assuming that there was denial of due process, there is nothing in petitioner's petition which would give the remotest hint that if he was thus heard, the stand taken by the COMELEC would have been different.
In several cases brought to this Court on certiorari, We have always expressed Our disapproval to the summary proceedings taken by the respondent COMELEC, and stressed the need of complying with the essential requirement of procedural due process.[13] In the latest case of Renato Reyes vs. COMELEC where the questioned resolution was based merely on the pleadings and no formal hearing was ever conducted, this Court thru Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, set aside the resolution and ordered the remand of the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings in accordance with the cardinal requirements of due process, guided by the authoritative command in Ang Tibay vs. CIR[14] as to the observance by the administrative agencies, exercising quasi-judicial functions of the cardinal requirements of due process, the most prominent of which, according to Mr. Chief Justice, are the right to be heard and the necessity of substantial evidence to support its decision, and Our ruling in Pimentel vs. COMELEC where this Court, not satisfied that petitioner was fully heard, remanded the case to the COMELEC also for the observance of the cardinal requirements of due process. In both cases, We ordered the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates.
There is thus no proper course to take in the premises other than to remand also the present case and give full force and effect to Singco's proclamation without prejudice to the disqualification suit with the directive that COMELEC should hold a full dress hearing in accordance with the requirements of due process, and the parties given full opportunity to present all evidence relevant to the issue of turncoatism. Unquestionably, the challenged resolution in the present case was based merely on pleadings without petitioner having been accorded the right to be fully heard as he demanded, clearly in disregard to his right to due process. For it is not enough that petitioner was given the opportunity to answer the petition for disqualification. Petitioner disowned the documents attached to the petition which allegedly were submitted by him as Chairman of the KBL, alleging that his signature was forged. He also refuted the affidavit by the supposed witness to his attendance to a KBL meeting by submitting another affidavit of the same witness who claimed that the first affidavit was secured thru coercion. These allegations raise questions of fact that could have been thresed out fully by the COMELEC through an actual hearing.
Private respondent's averment that the proliferation of cases in the COMELEC and the time constraints could neither justify the summary resolution under question. The demands of due process cannot be sacrificed in the face of a good and substantial defense. Same must be applied at all times, for "while an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers is free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process."[15] Significantly, by its own Resolution No. 1428, which provides the guidelines on the filing of petition to disqualify candidates in the January 30, 1980 elections, Sections 1 and 6 thereof expressly provide for hearing of said petitions. Thus -
As happened in this case, the losing candidate respondent Ong was proclaimed, and he would have assumed the position without perhaps having any right thereto under a previous ruling of this Court[16] had he not been restrained.[17] If by the uncalled for inducement of the aforementioned Resolution, a petition for disqualification of private respondent Ong had also been filed against him, then no candidate for the position of Mayor could have been proclaimed, by the application of said Resolution in utter disregard of the will of the electorate. Hence, at least insofar as Resolution No. 8584 was applied by COMELEC in this case, We declare the said Resolution without effect.[18]
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The Resolution No. 9310 of respondent Commission on Elections of February 26, 1980 declaring petitioner Antonio O. Singco, a disqualified candidate, and the proclamation of respondent Board of Canvassers declaring Franklin Ong as Mayor-elect of Ginatilan, Cebu, are hereby nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The proclamation of petitioner as the Mayor-elect of Ginatilan, Cebu, on January 31, 1980 is hereby given full force and effect, without prejudice to the ruling thereafter on the question of disqualification of petitioner Singco after a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal requirements of procedural due process.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., considering that the electorate was erroneous of the disqualification proceeding on election day, I concur.
Fernando, C.J., in the result and with a brief concurrence to indicate how far he is in agreement.
Aquino, J., took no part.
[1] p. 31, Rollo.
[2] p. 85, Id.
[3] p. 85, COMELEC Resolution, Item 8710, Id.
[4] G.R. No. 52428, Resolution of February 21, 1980.
[5] p. 35, Rollo.
[6] p. 53, Id.
[7] G.R. No. 52699, promulgated May 15, 1980.
[8] p. 28, Rollo.
[9] Ibid.
[10] L-28538, 22 SCRA 1403.
[11] L-28955, 23 SCRA 883.
[12] Supra.
[13] G.R. Nos. 52427 & 52506, Cesar E. Nepomuceno, Leon C. Arcillas and Ruben C. Avenido vs. Commission on Elections, Resolution of May 15, 1980; Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, supra; Renato Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
[14] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[15] Serrano vs. PSC, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 867.
[16] Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238.
[17] See fn. 5.
[18] See also Pimentel v. Comelec, supra.
"x x x not to give due course to the Certificate of candidacy of respondent Antonio O. Singco for being a disqualified candidate and hereby orders the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ginatilan, Cebu, to consider all votes cast in favor of respondent Singco as stray votes and consequently, hereby orders the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ginatilan, Cebu, to proclaim the remaining candidate who obtained the highest number of votes as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Ginatilan, Cebu."[1]Petitioner was a candidate for Mayor in Ginatilan, Cebu, in the elections of January 30, 1980 under the banner of the National Union for Liberation (NUL). Private respondent was also a candidate for the same post under the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Before the elections, on January 16, 1980, private respondent filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on ground of turncoatism, attaching thereto three identical affidavits and other documentary evidence to support his allegations. In due time, petitioner filed his answer. Since the petition was not acted before the election day, Antonio O. Singco was voted for and elected Mayor of the Municipality, having obtained the highest number of votes. Considering the pendency of the disqualification suit against petitioner, the COMELEC on January 31, 1980 sent a telegram order to the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ginatilan ordering the latter to suspend the proclamation with respect to petitioner, pursuant to the COMELEC's earlier Resolution No. 8584,[2] holding in abeyance the proclamation of any candidate that has any disqualification suit. Despite said order, however, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proceeded to proclaim petitioner as Mayor of Ginatilan, Cebu, prompting private respondent to immediately inform the COMELEC of the proclamation of Singco and pray in his motion for the setting aside of the proclamation of Singco. Acting on the motion, the COMELEC, on February 2, 1980, set aside petitioner's proclamation and required the Board of Canvassers to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against it.[3]
On February 26, 1980, COMELEC issued the above-quoted Resolution No. 9310 declaring Antonio O. Singco a disqualified candidate. Chairman Leonardo B. Perez dissented as he was "for allowing the winner to be proclaimed, without prejudice to disqualification case being heard and decided, following (the) ruling in the case of Pimentel vs. COMELEC."[4] Pursuant to said resolution, respondent Franklin Ong was proclaimed Mayor of Ginatilan, Cebu. After taking his oath of office as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Ginatilan, Cebu, private respondent immediately discharged the duties and functions of said office.
On March 6, 1980, this Court, acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining both the COMELEC from implementing its resolution of February 26, 1980 and private respondent from assuming the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Ginatilan.[5] Before said writ could be implemented, however, private respondent designated Jaime Calunsod, a new elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan who received the second most number of votes for Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality, as officer-in-charge of the Municipality of Ginatilan, Cebu.[6]
Invoking Our ruling in Renato Reyes vs. Comelec,[7] petitioner seeks the nullification of the challenged resolution on ground of denial of due process, alleging that said resolution was issued without benefit of hearing and the same was not supported by substantial evidence. He pointed out that when private respondent prayed in his manifestation and motion dated February 2, 1980 that the case be calendared for hearing or in the alternative, the decision be rendered based on documentary evidence attached to the petition,[8] petitioner vehemently objected to the alternative prayer, inviting the attention of the COMELEC to the fact that to admit such evidence consisting of affidavits and to decide the petition on the basis thereof would be violative of due process of law, for one of the affidavits attached to the petition was secured thru coercion, as shown in the subsequent affidavit of the coerced affiant.[9]
Petitioner also claims denial of due process in the annulment of his proclamation which was ordered by the COMELEC without any hearing. He disputes the applicability of the cases of Pedido vs. Commission on Elections[10] and Aguam vs. Commission on Elections[11] upon which private respondent relies to justify the annulment, alleging that the decisions therein would show that the authority to annul the proclamation exists where the basis of the proclamation is illegal canvass. He maintains that the case particularly apt to the case at bar is the case of Pimentel vs. COMELEC[12] where this Court ordered the proclamation of the winning candidates without prejudice to the disqualification suit.
Petitioner also contends that the questioned resolution was not supported by substantial evidence and insists that since he had disclaimed and refuted the documents which supposedly showed his affiliation with the KBL, alleging that his signature appearing in the document was forged, and that the identical affidavits were either coerced or of doubtful credibility, the COMELEC should have accepted them with circumspection.
In separate comments, respondents COMELEC and Ong do not deny the lack of formal hearing in this case, but they would defend the assailed resolution by insisting that since petitioner was informed of the disqualification suit as well as the documentary evidence to support the petition to which he was given the opportunity to answer, and in view of the time constraints imposed upon the COMELEC in resolving the controversy, it cannot be said that petitioner was denied due process. They also contend that even assuming that there was denial of due process, there is nothing in petitioner's petition which would give the remotest hint that if he was thus heard, the stand taken by the COMELEC would have been different.
In several cases brought to this Court on certiorari, We have always expressed Our disapproval to the summary proceedings taken by the respondent COMELEC, and stressed the need of complying with the essential requirement of procedural due process.[13] In the latest case of Renato Reyes vs. COMELEC where the questioned resolution was based merely on the pleadings and no formal hearing was ever conducted, this Court thru Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, set aside the resolution and ordered the remand of the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings in accordance with the cardinal requirements of due process, guided by the authoritative command in Ang Tibay vs. CIR[14] as to the observance by the administrative agencies, exercising quasi-judicial functions of the cardinal requirements of due process, the most prominent of which, according to Mr. Chief Justice, are the right to be heard and the necessity of substantial evidence to support its decision, and Our ruling in Pimentel vs. COMELEC where this Court, not satisfied that petitioner was fully heard, remanded the case to the COMELEC also for the observance of the cardinal requirements of due process. In both cases, We ordered the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates.
There is thus no proper course to take in the premises other than to remand also the present case and give full force and effect to Singco's proclamation without prejudice to the disqualification suit with the directive that COMELEC should hold a full dress hearing in accordance with the requirements of due process, and the parties given full opportunity to present all evidence relevant to the issue of turncoatism. Unquestionably, the challenged resolution in the present case was based merely on pleadings without petitioner having been accorded the right to be fully heard as he demanded, clearly in disregard to his right to due process. For it is not enough that petitioner was given the opportunity to answer the petition for disqualification. Petitioner disowned the documents attached to the petition which allegedly were submitted by him as Chairman of the KBL, alleging that his signature was forged. He also refuted the affidavit by the supposed witness to his attendance to a KBL meeting by submitting another affidavit of the same witness who claimed that the first affidavit was secured thru coercion. These allegations raise questions of fact that could have been thresed out fully by the COMELEC through an actual hearing.
Private respondent's averment that the proliferation of cases in the COMELEC and the time constraints could neither justify the summary resolution under question. The demands of due process cannot be sacrificed in the face of a good and substantial defense. Same must be applied at all times, for "while an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers is free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process."[15] Significantly, by its own Resolution No. 1428, which provides the guidelines on the filing of petition to disqualify candidates in the January 30, 1980 elections, Sections 1 and 6 thereof expressly provide for hearing of said petitions. Thus -
"Section 1. Special Disqualifications of Candidates. - The Commission on Election shall, motu propio, of upon petition of any voter, political party or candidate, after due notice and hearing, refuse to give due course to a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the person filing the same does not possess all the necessary qualifications for the office concerned or is disqualified from running for said office as provided by law.Section 185 of the Election Code which provides the powers of the COMELEC states:
"Section 6. Hearing. - The Commission sitting en banc or by division shall conduct a hearing after due notice to all parties concerned."
"Section 185. - The Commission shall, in addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall:Section 7 of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 provides:
x x x
"(1) Summons the parties to a controversies pending before it, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or hearing before it x x x. In case of failure of a witness to attend, the Commission, upon proof of service of the subpoena to said witness, may issue a warrant to arrest the witness and bring him before the Commission or the officer before whom his attendance is required. x x x Any controversy submitted to the Commission, shall after compliance with the requirements of due process, be heard and decided by it within the reglementary period provided by law."
Accordingly, We hold that, COMELEC Resolution No. 9310 dated February 26, 1980, disqualifying petitioner produced no legal effect, petitioner's candidacy was, consequently, valid and subsisting when he was voted for during the election, and his proclamation as the winner, having obtained the highest number of votes, was perfectly in order and legal. The mere pendency of the disqualification case against petitioner without the COMELEC having resolved the same before the election and even before the canvass, does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the election, as was done pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8584. To so hold would unduly encourage the filing of even an entirely baseless petition for disqualification just to effect the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice but also to the frustration of the sovereign will of the electorate, and for the undue benefit of undeserving third party or parties. Such an ulterior motive can easily be accomplished by a late filing of the petition to assure that no action thereon by COMELEC can be taken before the election and the canvassing, and thereby bring into operation Resolution No. 8584.x x x
"The Commission on Elections shall motu propio or upon sworn petition of any voter, political party or candidate, after due notice and hearing, refuse to give due course to a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the person filing the same does not possess all the necessary qualifications for the office concerned or is disqualified from running for said office as provided by law."
As happened in this case, the losing candidate respondent Ong was proclaimed, and he would have assumed the position without perhaps having any right thereto under a previous ruling of this Court[16] had he not been restrained.[17] If by the uncalled for inducement of the aforementioned Resolution, a petition for disqualification of private respondent Ong had also been filed against him, then no candidate for the position of Mayor could have been proclaimed, by the application of said Resolution in utter disregard of the will of the electorate. Hence, at least insofar as Resolution No. 8584 was applied by COMELEC in this case, We declare the said Resolution without effect.[18]
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The Resolution No. 9310 of respondent Commission on Elections of February 26, 1980 declaring petitioner Antonio O. Singco, a disqualified candidate, and the proclamation of respondent Board of Canvassers declaring Franklin Ong as Mayor-elect of Ginatilan, Cebu, are hereby nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The proclamation of petitioner as the Mayor-elect of Ginatilan, Cebu, on January 31, 1980 is hereby given full force and effect, without prejudice to the ruling thereafter on the question of disqualification of petitioner Singco after a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal requirements of procedural due process.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., considering that the electorate was erroneous of the disqualification proceeding on election day, I concur.
Fernando, C.J., in the result and with a brief concurrence to indicate how far he is in agreement.
Aquino, J., took no part.
[1] p. 31, Rollo.
[2] p. 85, Id.
[3] p. 85, COMELEC Resolution, Item 8710, Id.
[4] G.R. No. 52428, Resolution of February 21, 1980.
[5] p. 35, Rollo.
[6] p. 53, Id.
[7] G.R. No. 52699, promulgated May 15, 1980.
[8] p. 28, Rollo.
[9] Ibid.
[10] L-28538, 22 SCRA 1403.
[11] L-28955, 23 SCRA 883.
[12] Supra.
[13] G.R. Nos. 52427 & 52506, Cesar E. Nepomuceno, Leon C. Arcillas and Ruben C. Avenido vs. Commission on Elections, Resolution of May 15, 1980; Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, supra; Renato Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
[14] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[15] Serrano vs. PSC, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 867.
[16] Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238.
[17] See fn. 5.
[18] See also Pimentel v. Comelec, supra.