EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 59329, July 19, 1985 ]
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
R E S O L U T I O N
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action.
The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents" general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 25. 1985. before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tib ay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.[1]
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71 ] American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil.' 152], Vera v. Area [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382]. and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of . communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different l.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 73 1) this Court was already stressing that:
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief statement.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., I concur only in the dispositive portion for dismissal as moot and academic.
Concepcion Jr., J., for dismissal being moot and academic.
Abad Santos, J., see concurring opinion.
De la Fuente, J., In the dismissal, as prayed for by petitioner per its motion to dismiss.
Aquino, J., no part.
[1] The requirements are: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof: (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented: (3) the decision must have something to support itself: (4) the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion: (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate: (7) the board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
CONCURRING
FERNANDO, C.J.,:
I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the clear and present danger principle as the standard of limitation on free speech and press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing.[1]
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr. and de la Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being moot and academic, the appropriate disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning. The Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early as Alejandrino v. Quezon[2] decided in 1924. this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should govern. Similarly in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun[3] notwithstanding well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction and a finding that the case should be dismissed for being moot and academic, this Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal question raised. In that sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from that of the United States, notwithstanding the influence of American Constitutional law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been released in April after the petitioner on March 25, 1 985 "filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition." After that date, some members of the Court wanted the matter discussed anew as to its appropriate disposition. That is the explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office of the Chief Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even if a decision signed by all the other members were thus submitted, the practice traditionally followed is for whoever is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his views if minded to do so.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action.
The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents" general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 25. 1985. before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
"1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment;The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines;
"2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE;
"3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner. Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further."
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tib ay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.[1]
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71 ] American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil.' 152], Vera v. Area [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382]. and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of . communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different l.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 73 1) this Court was already stressing that:
"The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted."(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief statement.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., I concur only in the dispositive portion for dismissal as moot and academic.
Concepcion Jr., J., for dismissal being moot and academic.
Abad Santos, J., see concurring opinion.
De la Fuente, J., In the dismissal, as prayed for by petitioner per its motion to dismiss.
Aquino, J., no part.
[1] The requirements are: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof: (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented: (3) the decision must have something to support itself: (4) the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion: (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate: (7) the board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
FERNANDO, C.J.,:
I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the clear and present danger principle as the standard of limitation on free speech and press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing.[1]
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr. and de la Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being moot and academic, the appropriate disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning. The Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early as Alejandrino v. Quezon[2] decided in 1924. this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should govern. Similarly in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun[3] notwithstanding well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction and a finding that the case should be dismissed for being moot and academic, this Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal question raised. In that sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from that of the United States, notwithstanding the influence of American Constitutional law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been released in April after the petitioner on March 25, 1 985 "filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition." After that date, some members of the Court wanted the matter discussed anew as to its appropriate disposition. That is the explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office of the Chief Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even if a decision signed by all the other members were thus submitted, the practice traditionally followed is for whoever is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his views if minded to do so.