These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and moral damages of P200,000.00. G.R. No. 69564 is the automatic review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari of said decision, the recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober "to cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his fate."^[1]

Juan Escober, together with four unidenti­fied persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty" with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:

"One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte,^* was formerly a co-security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village, Batintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug.16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22, 1983].

"At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with three companions, one of whom he later identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22, 1983].

"After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year old daughter Tiffany. On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the office, the two children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

"Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen had talked with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].

"At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her husband and two children. On her way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard a shot coming from the direction of the garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she rushed back inside the house to contact her husband through the intercom. But since the intercom was out of order, she hurriedly went outside and met appellant Escober who volunteered the information 'that he was not hit'. [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].

"Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a scissor blade [Exhibit 'E'] full of blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all his drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp. 13-14, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

"Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as their children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a second one.After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the two cars, they were brought to the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

"It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate the incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he arrived at the hospital at past 9:00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a cursory examination of the victims and indicated on two separate sketches (Exhibits 'C' and 'D'), the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From there, he proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan, Pat. Robanera and a police photographer, who arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5, 1983].

"Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit 'E') which the former said was found beside the pool of blood inside the room where the incident happened. In the course of his investi­gation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of Vicente Chua were forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].

"Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant Escober, the security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version of the incident (Exhibit 'F'). Aside from that of Escober, the written statements of the victims' parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits 'G' & 'H', respectively). Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit 'I') the result of his investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations: 'Detained the accused as prima facie case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail recommended.' [pp. 13-23, ibid].

"Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily identified by the victims' mother, Lina Chua, as one of those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of the incident on December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit 'F') was, therefore, taken on December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982. Also taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus Zaragosa (Exhibit 'K') and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects, who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan waived his constitutional rights under custodial investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit 'M'), wherein he did not only admit his participation in the commission of the crime, but also implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

"Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit 'J') to the Fiscal, Police Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]."^[2]

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his defense. His testimony is detailed in his Brief, thus:

"Escober was then a security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St., Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City, owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982, at 7 p.m. he reported for work. When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the guardhouse dirty and also because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty must clean it. There was a janitor but the security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to, and two men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large] entered and one man [co?accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was not able to talk to Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his companions aimed a gun at Escober and also a knife and they said they would kill him. He does not know the man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because he (Alorte) used to be his co-guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into (climbed) the pick-up car inside the garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real name of Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man who was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the courtroom and he pointed to the person who answered by the name of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co-accused. Escober did not see what Punzalan was doing because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to get that gun when these four men entered because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte did not continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up the office, they came down and talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at him. He was not hit for he was able to avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pick-up and he heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua at the house because, according to Chua, their children were stabbed. So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he, together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could not understand him because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car, parked it and returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the office, he was bringing his son and placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he called Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his son and placed him at the balcony. The two children who were stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only two cars at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave him a directory and asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police came and after that, the owner of the security agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform also arrived. They interviewed Escober and forced him to go with them to the police precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had not then arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard the Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought Escober to the precinct to get his statement and there the police was forcing him to admit he was the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he told them: 'I do not know everything.' The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together with Abuyen (Alorte) inside the garage is not true because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was 'finding (sic) to call' him (Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He identified his statement, Exhibit 1 for the defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his. He knows the police who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober was at the precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3, 1983, the date he testified in court (tsn, 2-13)."^[3]

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is found in his Brief as fo­llows:

"PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at 'the market of Monunento'. In the afternoon of 3 December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a 'place near Abonce Beer House'; ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions whom he introduced as his relatives; after several drinks, he was requested to join the group to proceed to another place for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a high gate' because ABUYEN/ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE 'knocked at the little door' and the security guard (PUNZALAN identified accused Escober as the security guard) opened the door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed PUNZALAN 'to wait for him outside'; and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound (TSN, pp. 11­-14, Nov. 9, 1983).

"PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while waiting he 'heard the mourn (sic) of a child'; that he was then about to enter the premises but he met ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and 'saw them with blood stains in their arms'; that ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he followed them; that in response to his query ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he 'stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a taxi and he was 'brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN, pp. 14-18, Nov. 9, 1983).

"PUNZALAN was apprehended 'early dawn' of 10 December 1982 at the Monumento market. No lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation despite the fact that he informed the police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce Beer House'. PUNZALAN asserted that, when Exh. M was presented for his signature, 'he refused to sign' (Exh. 'M') because 'many statements thereon are not correct'; that he nevertheless signed Exh. 'M' because 'he was already tired' and 'was forced to sign it' after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water therapy' and he 'could not endure the pain, when they gave (him) the electric shock treatment'; and that the portions of Exh. 'M' which are incorrect are those identified as Exhs. '11-A and 11-B' (TSN, pp. 19?32, Nov. 9, 1983)."^[4]

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the pro­secution. After an exchange of pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

"RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO?PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER X X X;

"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED 'AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION' CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND: 'THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER (PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRA­DICTIONS.

"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVINCING PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION x x x OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984."^[5]

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.

On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

"PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE PHASES OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, PRELI­MINARY INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;

"THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND."^[6]

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to the form and substance of the decision under review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and void for it does not conform with the re­quirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Consti­tution and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had been trans­cribed.

We find merit in this contention. The deci­sion of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions. It reads:

"The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of Robbery with Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on or about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confe­derating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimida­tion against persons robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of said robbery employed personal violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate deaths, to the damage of their heirs.

"Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan, Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina Qua, and Exhibits 'A' to 'Z' with sub-exhibits,; while Defense evidence consisted of the testimonies of the two named accused above and some exhibits, contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.

"In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties, the arguments and authori­ties cited therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable cooperation as defined in Article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating circumstances, and attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the commission of the crime, taking advantage of number and superior strength, treachery, in band, among others, and that the defenses and excuses of the accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory and uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact, among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused Juan Escober in opening the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of firing a gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and volunteering the information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some drinks, not to get drunk admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve the better to commit the crime planned.

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the amended information, this Court holding firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound under his protection to four men who turn out to be robbers and murderers or when a former security guard accompanies and meets with said malefactors immediately before the commission of the offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said malefactors then the burden of proof is shifted to him to exculpate and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous (sic) justifica­tions for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of being 'held-­up' at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing garbage and being fired at but not getting hit but not knowing so many vital details a truthful witness would certainly not forget, among others, thus that this court after a total appreciation of all the evidence on record is convinced that there being apple (sic) circumstances present that could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for the most heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby sentences the said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided by Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is DEATH and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and severally.

"SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984."^[7]

Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution directed that:

"Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based x x x."

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclu­sion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others", but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480, reiterating Monte­libano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular Government, 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3 Phil. 458:

"Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is impossible to administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

"It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in an action suit, the circumstances of each question raised, and the nature and conditions of the proofs furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by the contending parties which he finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion he has formed on the issues raised; then only can he intelligently set forth the legal grounds and considerations proper in his opinion for the due determination of the case."

As it is written, the decision renders a re­view thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization of the evidence, testimonial or docu­mentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence re­lied upon by the trial court.

Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by respondent judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of the testimonies of the wit­nesses on which he apparently based his decision, as the transcript of the stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.

Speed in the administration of justice, how­ever, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:

"At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude displayed by the trial court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the body which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three typewritten pages, double-spaced and wide-margined. While brevity should characterize a court's decision and length is not necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding this murder case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence presented by both prosecution and the defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on record and the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the court's decision.

"This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the decision. The issues raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues raised are quite serious and they deserved better treatment." [Underscoring supplied].

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused-appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-apellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases.^[8]

The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefarious plan. These acts consist of: [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermind, after the gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's version of the incident is too replete with contra­dictions to merit belief.

After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his allega­tions convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to exclude from the premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte. It was there­fore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact, even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with Abuyen/Alorte admitted in his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound thus:

"20.	T-Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?
S-	Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong buwan ng Septyembte at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.
"21.	T-Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?
S-	Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply."[9]

The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that "x x x it is not a 'common experience' that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the stupidest person on earth if he allows that x x x to avoid sus­picion that he was in cohoots [sic] with 'malefactors'. The least or perhaps the safest way for that evil pur­pose is to allow himself to be rendered ineffective, i,e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a 'ritual' for he might get killed."^[10]

Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Alorte to have remembered it considering the unexpected appearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the need for immediate escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.

That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are further bolstered by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the preli­minary investigation, and the extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen/Alorte dated April 16, 1986, sub­mitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement reads:

"FISCAL:	Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?
PUNZALAN:	Hindi ko po alam, sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Alorte.
FISCAL:	Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]
PUNZALAN:	Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]
FISCAL:	Noong pagkatapos ng pag-­uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?
PUNZALAN:	Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.
FISCAL:	Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN:	Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.
FISCAL:	Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?
PUNZALAN:	Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL:	Bakit?
PUNZALAN:	Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL:	Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.
PUNZALAN:	Hindi po.
FISCAL:	Bakit?
PUNZALAN:	Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto kung mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh."[11]

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

"x x x Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong paano ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON?DON iyong baril na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. chua. Ako naman ay pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi naman pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo na kami x x x".^[12]

These exculpatory statements although emanating from alleged co-conspirators and therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted", deserve credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even respon­sive to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which it was given lends credence to his statement that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/Alorte that he himself fired at Escober although the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him. That Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/or the hurried manner of its execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness. Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of justice and fair­ness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extra­judicial confession.

Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would want to inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of logic and reason.

The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the tes­timony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind.

We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave her state­ment on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So soon after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when she attributed the blame on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted in the tragic event.

Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from in­accuracy, aside from being susceptible to other inter­pretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testi­mony was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at which point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/Alorte, who was not walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua, Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be dif­ficult for her to determine for certain the distance between Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the lat­ter was merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.

Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that "they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were 'nagmamadali' [in a hurry]".^[13] This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober "walking" behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the "walking" by the descriptive term "nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the crime, and this can be interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.

"The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by it­self, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers, must be shown, and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself."^[14]

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime, such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding his actuations during the incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved^[15] and its corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.^[16]

Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could have been blinded by these suspicions and compas­sion for the two hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.

We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.

Punzalan's extra-judicial statement^[17] is prefaced by the following:

"PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.

lkaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpa­paalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
   
   
2. lkaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang paglilingkod nito.
   
   
3. lkaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.

"4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin, o gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan o pamimilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.

Tanong - Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?

Sagot -	Opo.
Tanong -	Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang abogado na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisi­yasat?
Sagot -	Opo.
Tanong -	Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong sarili?
Sagot -	Opo.
Tanong -	Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo, magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?
Sagot -	Opo.

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr."

Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial statement^[18], the latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The identical manner by which the police sought to in­form Escober and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for individual com­prehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level, educational background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told, considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of com­pliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during the custodial investigation.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's extra judicial statement cannot be con­sidered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact that it was done without the assist­ance of counsel, said waiver is not valid.^[19] Needless to say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.^[20]

With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary inves­tigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an absence of preliminary investi­gation, should have been raised before the trial court. Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and consistent in ruling that:

"The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961), this is the proper procedure since the 'absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.' The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.

"'x x x the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investiga­tion should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate court.'"^[21]

While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime.^[22] Escober's testimony, however, was merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, wit­nesses for the prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano.^[23]

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his companions an his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate his knowledge of the plan.

While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two help­less victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.^[24]

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and his imme­diate release from confinement is ordered, unless de­tained for some other crimes. Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sen­tenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., with a brief concurence.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., join in the dissenting and concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano.
Feliciano, J., dissents and concurs in a separate opinion.

---

^[1] p. 3, Petition, Rollo in G.R. No. 69658

^* Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte was subsequently apprehended, tried and convicted by the same trial court. His appeal is also before this Court.

^[2] pp. 4-10, Consolidated Brief, p. 376, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564

^[3] pp. 100-103, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564

^[4] pp. 163-165, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564

^[5] pp. 10-11, Rollo, G.R. No. 69658

^[6] pp. 167-168, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564

^[7] pp. 608-609, Original Records, Vol. I

^[8] Sec. 16, Article IV, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

^[9] Exh. "A", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2

^[10] pp. 38-39, G.R. No. 69658, Rollo

^[11] pp. 64-66, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Volume 3, Underscoring supplied

^[12] pp. 154 and 171, G.R. No. 69658, Rollo

^[13] tsn, August 1, 1986, p. 132

^[14] People vs. Sabilano, 132 SCRA 83

^[15] Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution

^[16] People vs. Bihasa, 130 SCRA 62; People vs. Castelo, 133 SCRA 667 and People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92

^[17] Exh. "M", pp. 22-23, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Vol. 3

^[18] Exh. "F", p. 7, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Vol. 3.

^[19] People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465; People vs. Pascual, Jr., 109 SCRA 192 and People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169.

^[20] Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 20.

^[21] Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349.

^[22] People vs. Encipido, 146 SCRA 478

^[23] See People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1

^[24] People vs. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807; People vs. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88; People vs. Pujinio, 27 SCRA 1186; People vs. Puno, 56 SCRA 659; People vs. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694; People vs. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233; People vs. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571; People vs. Solis, 128 SCRA 217; People vs. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178

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