This is an  original action of mandamus  in this  court. The  grantor of the plaintiff, E. H.  Warner, obtained a final decree in the Court of Land Registration, by  virtue of which he  was  inscribed as the owner of the  Pasay Estate.  That judgment  was confirmed by this  court. (Warner vs. 771 Objectors, 5 Phil.  Rep., 153.)  After the case had been remanded to the Court of Land Registration and  a writ of possession had been  issued, under which a part only of the property had been  delivered to the  plaintiff,  it made in July, 1908, an application for  an alias execution.  The court,  by an order of July 17, 1908,  directed the  issue of another writ of  possession,  but expressly limited its effects to those  persons who,  being parties in the former  proceeding,  had appeared therein and opposed the petition.  The plaintiff, not being satisfied with a writ so limited, brought this  action against the judge of that court and certain defendants  in  the former proceeding who had been served  with process therein but had not appeared nor answered. Several answers have been filed in this proceeding, among which is one by the judge himself.  To that answer the plaintiff has demurred, and the case is now before us for the resolution of this demurrer.

Section 17 of the Land Registration Act  (No. 496), as amended by section  5 of Act No.  1108, is in part as follows :

"SEC.  17. The Court of Land Registration, in all matters over which it  has jurisdiction, may enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees in the same manner as orders, judgments, and decrees are enforced in the Courts of First Instance, including a writ of possession directing the governor or sheriff of any  province or of the city of Manila to place the applicant in possession of the  property covered by  a decree of the  court in his favor; "

The theory of the judge who made the order is that this writ of possession can be directed only against those who have been defeated in the suit, and those persons only can be  considered as defeated  who  have  appeared and answered and against whom a judgment  has been rendered.  In  effect,  the judge says that a person who has been duly served with process in a proceeding in the Land Court, who has failed to appear or answer, and against whom a judgment by default has been entered, can not be said to have been defeated in the suit, and against him no writ of possession can be issued.  This theory can not be sustained.  The question here has nothing to do with a person who is not duly  served with process, but is limited to those persons who, being served with process, have  neither appeared nor answered.  It is very clear that such persons  are just as much defeated in a suit  as they would have been if they had  appeared, answered, presented their evidence, and finally had a judgment entered against them.

In his answer, the judge moreover says, as to these persons who have not appeared, that the plaintiff has a remedy, by proceeding in a court of the justice of the peace against them: if they are tenants, for nonpayment of the rent or other breach of the conditions of the lease; or, if  they are precarious occupants, for their summary eviction.

But this construction of the law entirely defeats its purpose.  It would compel a successful litigant in the Court of Land Registration to commence other actions in other courts for the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory.  The evident purpose of the law was to prevent that very thing; and we think it clear, from  the language of section 17, above quoted, that the plaintiff is entitled to such a writ of possession as it asked for.

The demurrer is accordingly sustained, and the defendant judge allowed ten days within which to file an amended answer.   So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Tracey, JJ.,