EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 69576, November 19, 1985 ]
CICERO J. PUNSALAN, ETC., PETITIONER, VS. MINISTER ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, ETC., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
DE LA FUENTE, J.:
Petition for quo warranto and prohibition seeking inter alia the ouster of the respondent, Hon. Estelito P. Mendoza, from the governorship of Pampanga. It is alleged that petitioner Cicero J. Punsalan is the "rightful Governor" and that
he is suing the respondent as "ex-governor ... who returned to his old post while being occupied by petitioner,"[1] respondent having already "lost his seat by his own acts."[2]
A motion for intervention was filed by counsel for Robin Nepomuceno,[3] "senior member" of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan who took his oath of office as "Vice-Governor" after the petitioner began discharging the duties of the Governor. Petitioner subsequently manifested his conformity to said motion[4] which was granted by this Court.[5] At the hearing of this case, petitioner appeared and argued in his own behalf.[6] Respondent likewise appeared, submitting personally his arguments on the issues raised.[7] Counsel for the intervenor also briefly argued in his behalf.[8] Various pleadings and memoranda were thereafter filed by the parties. This case was deemed submitted for decision when the petitioner filed on May 2, 1985, a manifestation that he "will not file any rebuttal" to the rejoinder "in order not to cause a delay in the speedy resolution of this case."[9]
Brushing aside the minutiae, the bare facts and circumstances are the following: As official KBL[*] bets for Governor and Vice-Governor in the 1980 local elections, the respondent and the petitioner easily vanquished the other aspirants.[10] Accepting the mandate from the people of Pampanga, they took in due time their oaths of office, discharging thereafter the duties and responsibilities of Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively. However, in the 1984 national elections for provincial/city/district representatives to the Batasan, three opposition candidates received the blessings of the electorate. The only KBL survivor placed fourth. Apparently jolted by the results, the respondent (who was KBL campaign manager) tendered on May 17, 1984, his resignation from the Governorship and his Cabinet post,[11] "effective at the President's pleasure."[12] On June 30, 1984, or about six weeks later, the President appointed the respondent Minister of Justice and, on July 14, 1984, concurrently Member of the Batasang Pambansa.[13]
On July 13, 1984, it appears, respondent again tendered his "resignation as Governor of the Province of Pampanga, effective at the pleasure of the President."[14] On July 16, 1984, he sent a letter[15] to the Minister of Local Government, Hon. Jose A. Roño, requesting that he "be considered on leave of absence" while the matter was "pending consideration by the President." On July 20, 1984, he received the Minister's reply approving his request.[16] On July 21, 1984, according to the respondent, he advised the petitioner to assume "temporarily" the performance of the duties and functions of the Governor.[17] Whereupon, the petitioner took his oath of office on July 23, 1984, before the Provincial Attorney, as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor),[18] relying on an alleged press release in the July 23, 1984 issue of Bulletin Today, that "the inhibition against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised," but it "allows the holding of two positions if the Batasan Member is appointed Prime Minister or Member of the Batasan."[19] Petitioner was able to discharge "all the powers and functions of Governor" until the end of the year.
The controversy erupted on January 8, 1985, when petitioner was informed by his wife at about 2:00 o'clock P. M., in Angeles City where he was the guest speaker at the induction ceremonies of a rural bankers' federation, that respondent unexpectedly "appeared and occupied the /governor's/ office ..."[20] Earlier, he already learned by radio, while inspecting an area razed by fire in Sexmoan, Pampanga, that soldiers had "gathered at the Provincial Capitol grounds."[21] He immediately denounced the takeover, alleging it was a "forcible entry coup d' etat style ... without prior notice to petitioner."[22] The respondent avers, in his comment, that he "reassumed the position of Governor ... peacefully and ... without the use of force or pressure [and] ... was welcomed by the employees," adding that it was an implementation of the KBL caucus recommendation approved by the President.[23]
At this point, it is pertinent to note that on January 7, 1985, soon after receipt of notice of the said approval, the respondent immediately wrote Minister Roño to apprise him of his intention to reassume the governorship and to request that the Ministry's Regional Director as well as the petitioner be advised accordingly.[24] On the same day, Minster Roño wrote three letters to notify them and, also, the intervenor that the respondent would reassume the governorship on January 8th.[25] According to the petitioner, the letter addressed to him was received by his "office on January 8, 1985, at 1:35 p.m."[26] Incidentally, respondent resigned from his Batasan membership on January 8, 1985, which resignation was accepted by the President two days later.[27]
We have carefully examined the pleadings and the lengthy memoranda and annexes thereof, in the light of the submission and oral arguments ventilated at the hearing of this case. The issues presented to this Court boil down to one determinative question: Can the respondent validly reassume the governorship of Pampanga after having tendered his resignation therefrom and having accepted an appointment as Minister of Justice as well as an "appointive" Batasan seat?
Petitioner's contention. NO. Reasons: (a) Respondent permanently vacated the Governor's office as a result of his resignation and its "implied acceptance" by the President, and of abandonment when he failed to discharge the duties and responsibilities of the office from July 23, 1984 up to January 7, 1985; (b) Respondent's reassumption is an unlawful "usurpation" of the powers and functions already being exercised by the petitioner as Governor by "right of succession"; (c) Respondent had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of "appointive" Batasan Member because of the "incompatibility" of the positions with the Governor's office (Section 10, Art. VIII of the Constitution).
Respondent's submission. YES because: (a) The resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President" was implicitly not accepted expressly or impliedly by the President; it was implicitly "rejected"; (b) The alleged "abandonment of office" is predicated on the erroneous assumption that he just left the Governor's post "without any leave of absence."[28] He was granted such leave "pending consideration" of his resignation; (c) It cannot be said that he clearly intended to "absolutely relinquish" the governorship during his absence; he asked petitioner merely to exercise "temporarily" the Governor's duties and functions; (d) As Governor, respondent is eligible for appointment as Cabinet Member pursuant to Section 4(1), Article XII-B. As such Cabinet Member, he may subsequently be chosen to serve in the Batasan in accordance with Section 2, Art. VIII; and (e) The provision cited by the petitioner applies to an "elective" Batasan Member, but not to a Cabinet Member whose membership in the Batasan is "temporary" in nature. The disqualifications of a Cabinet Member are those specifically mentioned in Section 7 of Article IX, as amended; it no longer includes by reference "Section 10 ... of Article VIII.
We find the petitioner's conclusions factually and legally untenable.
To begin with, neither the alleged "implied acceptance" of the respondent's resignation nor the imputed "abandonment of office" has any factual support in the record. There was a tender of resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President." Obviously, it was not meant to be effective immediately; acceptance was still necessary.[29] Abandonment by the incumbent of his office before acceptance of his resignation is punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[30] Petitioner claims that there was "implied" acceptance of said resignation. It appears, however, that action thereon was held in abeyance. The President, apparently, needed more time to consider the validity of the view submitted by the respondent in his memorandum[31] and confidential letter.[32] As Governor, the respondent contended, he can be appointed Cabinet Minister and, as such, assigned later to the Batasan without forfeiting the governorship. When the President finally acted, he shelved the resignation, approving instead the KBL caucus recommendation for the respondent to reassume the governorship. Plainly, abandonment cannot be inferred from the conduct of the respondent. There was abandonment, petitioner believes, because respondent failed to discharge the Governor's duties for "a period of more than five (5) months without any leave of absence."[33] This is belied, however, by the Local Government Minister's approval of the request of the respondent that he be considered "on leave of absence" while his resignation was "pending consideration by the President."[34] It now appears that the petitioner was totally unaware of this important detail when he assumed office as "Gobernador ng Pampanga," and even at the time of the filing of the instant petition. His naked claim that the said approval of the respondent's leave is "highly suspicious and dubious"[35] is neither proof nor sufficient showing that the same is spurious. Good faith and the regularity in the performance of official duty are always presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
This brings us to the pivotal legal issue.
As Provincial Governor, an elective official, respondent is eligible for appointment to the Cabinet pursuant to Section 4(1), Article XII-B, to wit:
We do not agree.
The provision cited by the petitioner reads as follows:
Taking into account its context, however, as well as the pertinent and related constitutional provisions, it is quite clear that the said prohibition may not be construed and applied broadly or expansively. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representatives; the sectoral representatives who are either "elected or selected as may be provided by law"; and those "chosen" from Members of the Cabinet.[38] It is our opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet.
In the first place, the second prohibition in said Section 10, which also refers to the same "member" of the Batasan forbidden by the first sentence from holding concurrently "any other office or employment," etc., is quite explicit:
Secondly, this conclusion is supported by the history of "Section 10" (Art. VIII) and the constitutional amendments adopted after 1973. The two prohibitions were intended by the framers of the 1973 Constitution to apply only to the members of the National Assembly, an all-elective parliamentary body. Of course, said section was then made applicable also to Cabinet members by virtue of Section 8 (now 7) of Article IX, which expressly incorporated those prohibitions in the following tenor:
Thirdly, there are valid reasons for the distinction. The "Cabinet representatives" to the Batasan differ in many respects from the regular Batasan Members: the elective provincial/city/district representatives. The latter, inter alia, (a) are voted into office for a fixed term of 6 years by the electorate of the political subdivisions or units thereof that they respectively represent; (b) the Speaker is elected "from among the elected provincial, city and district representatives";[41] (c) it is mandated that "a majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of Ministries shall come from the elective provincial, city or district representatives";[42] (d) they do not vacate their Batasan seats in case of resignation from their Cabinet posts for any cause;[43] and (e) pursuant to the prohibitions in Article VIII, these elective Batasan Members may appear before a court with appellate jurisdiction but are forbidden from appearing as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body.
On the other hand: (a) Cabinet Members with Batasan assignments do not serve for a fixed term but at the pleasure of the President and they simply represent the Cabinet instead of a province or similar constituency; (b) they can not qualify for election to the Speakership; (c) they belong to the minority of Cabinet Members who are hands of Ministries; (d) they ipso facto vacate their Batasan seats upon resignation or separation from their Cabinet posts; and (e) a Cabinet Member cannot appear as counsel before any court ... or take part in the management of any business, or practice any profession, and is also "subject to such other disqualifications as may be prescribed by law," as explicitly provided in Section 7, Article IX.
Fourthly, reciprocal representation in two branches the executive and the legislative of the government is a feature of our present modified Presidential or semi-parliamentary system, resulting in the modification to a certain extent of the principle of separation of powers. At least half of the Cabinet positions with Ministries are allocated to and occupied by the "elective" Batasan Members. Non-elective Cabinet Members, on the other hand, are assigned to Batasan seats to represent the Cabinet (which is "responsible" to the Batasan "for the program of government").[44] Nonetheless, for purposes of the disqualification clause, Cabinet Minister given such legislative assignment remains primarily a Cabinet Member who serves in the Batasan in an ex officio capacity or as a mere incident of his membership in the Cabinet.
Needless to state, we find it inadequate to consider just the broad connotation of the word "member" found in the first prohibition of Section 10, Article VIII. Resolution of the issue raised calls for a different approach, especially so because the respondent unlike the elected provincial/city/district representatives is one of several Cabinet Members who sit in the Batasan not because of an electoral mandate but by reason of his Cabinet membership. One of the duties of a Cabinet Member is to serve in the Batasan if so directed by the President. We see no other constitutional provision which would operate to restrict or limit the President's choice as to such Cabinet representatives to the Batasan. A local government executive drafted into the Cabinet because of competence may be given such assignment if, in the judgment of the President, he can effectively espouse and defend in the Batasan the Cabinet's "program of government." This is in consonance with the rule that constitutional provisions should be coordinated, harmonized and so construed in order to give effect to all of them, after reconciling apparent conflicts.[45]
The root cause of this controversy may be traced to the oath-taking of the petitioner as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor) on July 23, 1984, without waiting for the formal acceptance of the respondent's resignation. Petitioner misread a newspaper item mentioned earlier and was misled into believing that there was an "implied acceptance" thereof. The so-called press release, however, merely attributed to the President a statement to the effect that a Governor (or City Mayor) who was elected to the Batasan cannot hold "two elective positions." This is correct as held recently by this Court in Pacana vs. Adaza,[46] a case involving a Governor who got himself elected Mambabatas Pambansa and qualified as such, and who wanted also to retain his elective governorship. It is not so in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay, and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., see dissenting opinion.
Aquino, J., see concurrence.
Concepcion, Jr., J., in the result.
Escolin, J., I reserve my vote in separate opinion.
Makasiar, C.J. and Abad Santos, JJ., no part.
Relova, J., on leave.
[1] page 1, Petition; underscoring supplied.
[2] page 2, Reply, etc.; page 165, Rollo.
[3] on July 25, 1985.
[4] on February 8, 1985.
[5] Resolution of February 14, 1985.
[6] assisted by Attys. Juan T. David, Cesar Carreon and Diosdado Roncal.
[7] assisted by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, Attys. Jose Africa and Eduardo Hernandez.
[8] Atty. Amelito Mutuc.
[9] page 487, Rollo.
[10] Governor Mendoza, 192, 769 votes; Vice-Governor Punsalan, 186, 919 votes.
[11] that of Solicitor General.
[12] pages 114 and 399, Rollo.
[13] but respondent assumed office as such member on July 23, 1985.
[14] pages 115, 401 and 470, Rollo.
[15] pages 115, 471, Ibid.
[16] pages 116, 402, Ibid.
[17] it was "not for a temporary period," according to petitioner, page 182, Ibid.; respondent's version on pages 116 and 402.
[18] Annex "B", Petition, page 26, Rollo.
[19] quoted in full, page 14, Petition; page 15, Ibid.
[20] page 9, Ibid.
[21] page 8, Ibid.
[22] page 10, Ibid.
[23] Footnote reference not found in original copy.
[24] page 118, Ibid.
[25] pages 405, 481, 482 and 483, Ibid.
[26] Annex "LL-1", Reply; page 338, Rollo.
[27] pages 406, 484 and 485, Ibid.
[28] page 14, Ibid.
[29] Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1.
[30] Article 238.
[31] sent the President by letter dated May 25, 1984; page 458, Rollo.
[32] dated June 21, 1984, page 463, Ibid.
[33] paragraph 18 of Petition, page 14, Ibid.
[34] see letters both dated July 16, 1984; pages 472 and 473, Ibid.
[35] pages 253 and 293, Ibid.
[36] as amended February 1, 1984.
[37] page 221, Rollo.
[38] Section 2, Article VIII.
[39] Section 3(1) and Section 7(1), Ibid.
[40] as further amended in 1984; ratified on January 27, 1984, and declared in full force and effect pursuant to Proclamation No. 2332 dated February 1, 1984.
[41] Section 7 (1), Article VIII.
[42] Section 1, Article IX.
[43] Section 8, Ibid.
[44] Section 2, Ibid.
[45] Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 128-129.
[46] 135 SCRA 431.
A motion for intervention was filed by counsel for Robin Nepomuceno,[3] "senior member" of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan who took his oath of office as "Vice-Governor" after the petitioner began discharging the duties of the Governor. Petitioner subsequently manifested his conformity to said motion[4] which was granted by this Court.[5] At the hearing of this case, petitioner appeared and argued in his own behalf.[6] Respondent likewise appeared, submitting personally his arguments on the issues raised.[7] Counsel for the intervenor also briefly argued in his behalf.[8] Various pleadings and memoranda were thereafter filed by the parties. This case was deemed submitted for decision when the petitioner filed on May 2, 1985, a manifestation that he "will not file any rebuttal" to the rejoinder "in order not to cause a delay in the speedy resolution of this case."[9]
Brushing aside the minutiae, the bare facts and circumstances are the following: As official KBL[*] bets for Governor and Vice-Governor in the 1980 local elections, the respondent and the petitioner easily vanquished the other aspirants.[10] Accepting the mandate from the people of Pampanga, they took in due time their oaths of office, discharging thereafter the duties and responsibilities of Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively. However, in the 1984 national elections for provincial/city/district representatives to the Batasan, three opposition candidates received the blessings of the electorate. The only KBL survivor placed fourth. Apparently jolted by the results, the respondent (who was KBL campaign manager) tendered on May 17, 1984, his resignation from the Governorship and his Cabinet post,[11] "effective at the President's pleasure."[12] On June 30, 1984, or about six weeks later, the President appointed the respondent Minister of Justice and, on July 14, 1984, concurrently Member of the Batasang Pambansa.[13]
On July 13, 1984, it appears, respondent again tendered his "resignation as Governor of the Province of Pampanga, effective at the pleasure of the President."[14] On July 16, 1984, he sent a letter[15] to the Minister of Local Government, Hon. Jose A. Roño, requesting that he "be considered on leave of absence" while the matter was "pending consideration by the President." On July 20, 1984, he received the Minister's reply approving his request.[16] On July 21, 1984, according to the respondent, he advised the petitioner to assume "temporarily" the performance of the duties and functions of the Governor.[17] Whereupon, the petitioner took his oath of office on July 23, 1984, before the Provincial Attorney, as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor),[18] relying on an alleged press release in the July 23, 1984 issue of Bulletin Today, that "the inhibition against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised," but it "allows the holding of two positions if the Batasan Member is appointed Prime Minister or Member of the Batasan."[19] Petitioner was able to discharge "all the powers and functions of Governor" until the end of the year.
The controversy erupted on January 8, 1985, when petitioner was informed by his wife at about 2:00 o'clock P. M., in Angeles City where he was the guest speaker at the induction ceremonies of a rural bankers' federation, that respondent unexpectedly "appeared and occupied the /governor's/ office ..."[20] Earlier, he already learned by radio, while inspecting an area razed by fire in Sexmoan, Pampanga, that soldiers had "gathered at the Provincial Capitol grounds."[21] He immediately denounced the takeover, alleging it was a "forcible entry coup d' etat style ... without prior notice to petitioner."[22] The respondent avers, in his comment, that he "reassumed the position of Governor ... peacefully and ... without the use of force or pressure [and] ... was welcomed by the employees," adding that it was an implementation of the KBL caucus recommendation approved by the President.[23]
At this point, it is pertinent to note that on January 7, 1985, soon after receipt of notice of the said approval, the respondent immediately wrote Minister Roño to apprise him of his intention to reassume the governorship and to request that the Ministry's Regional Director as well as the petitioner be advised accordingly.[24] On the same day, Minster Roño wrote three letters to notify them and, also, the intervenor that the respondent would reassume the governorship on January 8th.[25] According to the petitioner, the letter addressed to him was received by his "office on January 8, 1985, at 1:35 p.m."[26] Incidentally, respondent resigned from his Batasan membership on January 8, 1985, which resignation was accepted by the President two days later.[27]
We have carefully examined the pleadings and the lengthy memoranda and annexes thereof, in the light of the submission and oral arguments ventilated at the hearing of this case. The issues presented to this Court boil down to one determinative question: Can the respondent validly reassume the governorship of Pampanga after having tendered his resignation therefrom and having accepted an appointment as Minister of Justice as well as an "appointive" Batasan seat?
Petitioner's contention. NO. Reasons: (a) Respondent permanently vacated the Governor's office as a result of his resignation and its "implied acceptance" by the President, and of abandonment when he failed to discharge the duties and responsibilities of the office from July 23, 1984 up to January 7, 1985; (b) Respondent's reassumption is an unlawful "usurpation" of the powers and functions already being exercised by the petitioner as Governor by "right of succession"; (c) Respondent had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice and that of "appointive" Batasan Member because of the "incompatibility" of the positions with the Governor's office (Section 10, Art. VIII of the Constitution).
Respondent's submission. YES because: (a) The resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President" was implicitly not accepted expressly or impliedly by the President; it was implicitly "rejected"; (b) The alleged "abandonment of office" is predicated on the erroneous assumption that he just left the Governor's post "without any leave of absence."[28] He was granted such leave "pending consideration" of his resignation; (c) It cannot be said that he clearly intended to "absolutely relinquish" the governorship during his absence; he asked petitioner merely to exercise "temporarily" the Governor's duties and functions; (d) As Governor, respondent is eligible for appointment as Cabinet Member pursuant to Section 4(1), Article XII-B. As such Cabinet Member, he may subsequently be chosen to serve in the Batasan in accordance with Section 2, Art. VIII; and (e) The provision cited by the petitioner applies to an "elective" Batasan Member, but not to a Cabinet Member whose membership in the Batasan is "temporary" in nature. The disqualifications of a Cabinet Member are those specifically mentioned in Section 7 of Article IX, as amended; it no longer includes by reference "Section 10 ... of Article VIII.
We find the petitioner's conclusions factually and legally untenable.
To begin with, neither the alleged "implied acceptance" of the respondent's resignation nor the imputed "abandonment of office" has any factual support in the record. There was a tender of resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President." Obviously, it was not meant to be effective immediately; acceptance was still necessary.[29] Abandonment by the incumbent of his office before acceptance of his resignation is punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[30] Petitioner claims that there was "implied" acceptance of said resignation. It appears, however, that action thereon was held in abeyance. The President, apparently, needed more time to consider the validity of the view submitted by the respondent in his memorandum[31] and confidential letter.[32] As Governor, the respondent contended, he can be appointed Cabinet Minister and, as such, assigned later to the Batasan without forfeiting the governorship. When the President finally acted, he shelved the resignation, approving instead the KBL caucus recommendation for the respondent to reassume the governorship. Plainly, abandonment cannot be inferred from the conduct of the respondent. There was abandonment, petitioner believes, because respondent failed to discharge the Governor's duties for "a period of more than five (5) months without any leave of absence."[33] This is belied, however, by the Local Government Minister's approval of the request of the respondent that he be considered "on leave of absence" while his resignation was "pending consideration by the President."[34] It now appears that the petitioner was totally unaware of this important detail when he assumed office as "Gobernador ng Pampanga," and even at the time of the filing of the instant petition. His naked claim that the said approval of the respondent's leave is "highly suspicious and dubious"[35] is neither proof nor sufficient showing that the same is spurious. Good faith and the regularity in the performance of official duty are always presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
This brings us to the pivotal legal issue.
As Provincial Governor, an elective official, respondent is eligible for appointment to the Cabinet pursuant to Section 4(1), Article XII-B, to wit:
"SEC. 4(1). Unless otherwise provided by law, no elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his tenure except as Member of the Cabinet."[36]But it is insisted by petitioner: "If a cabinet member is appointed to the Batasan and becomes a member thereof ... Section 10 of Article VIII applies to him. It is that simple."[37]
We do not agree.
The provision cited by the petitioner reads as follows:
"SEC. 10. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa."The petitioner relies on the broad or general import of the first prohibition which provides that "A Member" of the Batasan cannot "hold any other office or employment in the Government," etc., except the four positions therein specifically mentioned.
Taking into account its context, however, as well as the pertinent and related constitutional provisions, it is quite clear that the said prohibition may not be construed and applied broadly or expansively. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective provincial/city/district representatives; the sectoral representatives who are either "elected or selected as may be provided by law"; and those "chosen" from Members of the Cabinet.[38] It is our opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet.
In the first place, the second prohibition in said Section 10, which also refers to the same "member" of the Batasan forbidden by the first sentence from holding concurrently "any other office or employment," etc., is quite explicit:
"... Neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased while he was a Member ..." (Underscoring supplied.)Both prohibitions, undoubtedly, deal with "a Member" who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the electorate of his constituency, the "elected" provincial or city or district representative with a "fixed term" (6 years) of office.[39]
Secondly, this conclusion is supported by the history of "Section 10" (Art. VIII) and the constitutional amendments adopted after 1973. The two prohibitions were intended by the framers of the 1973 Constitution to apply only to the members of the National Assembly, an all-elective parliamentary body. Of course, said section was then made applicable also to Cabinet members by virtue of Section 8 (now 7) of Article IX, which expressly incorporated those prohibitions in the following tenor:
"SEC. 8. The Prime Minister and the Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provisions of Sections ten and eleven of Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body or participate in the management of any business, or practice any profession." (Underscoring supplied.)But as amended in April 1981, such specific reference to "section ten" was deleted. In lieu thereof, the phrase "and shall also be subject to such other disqualifications..." was added, to wit:
"SEC. 7. The Prime Minister and the Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provisions of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear...and shall also be subject to such other disqualifications as may be provided by law."[40] (Underscoring supplied.)It may be pointed out, parenthetically, that one of the 1976 amendments (which provided for an interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly) included this provision: "the Cabinet shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe ..." Thus, even before 1981, Section 10 (Art. VIII) was not meant to apply ex proprio vigore to Cabinet Members assigned to sit in the interim Batasan in accordance with Amendment 1. Such assignment was not deemed equivalent to holding an office separate from and independent of their Cabinet posts. The 1981 amendment, deleting from Section 8 (now 7) of Article IX the aforementioned reference to "section ten ... of Article VIII hereof," makes it self-evident that it does not extend to, and cannot embrace within its purview, such Members of the Cabinet.
Thirdly, there are valid reasons for the distinction. The "Cabinet representatives" to the Batasan differ in many respects from the regular Batasan Members: the elective provincial/city/district representatives. The latter, inter alia, (a) are voted into office for a fixed term of 6 years by the electorate of the political subdivisions or units thereof that they respectively represent; (b) the Speaker is elected "from among the elected provincial, city and district representatives";[41] (c) it is mandated that "a majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of Ministries shall come from the elective provincial, city or district representatives";[42] (d) they do not vacate their Batasan seats in case of resignation from their Cabinet posts for any cause;[43] and (e) pursuant to the prohibitions in Article VIII, these elective Batasan Members may appear before a court with appellate jurisdiction but are forbidden from appearing as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body.
On the other hand: (a) Cabinet Members with Batasan assignments do not serve for a fixed term but at the pleasure of the President and they simply represent the Cabinet instead of a province or similar constituency; (b) they can not qualify for election to the Speakership; (c) they belong to the minority of Cabinet Members who are hands of Ministries; (d) they ipso facto vacate their Batasan seats upon resignation or separation from their Cabinet posts; and (e) a Cabinet Member cannot appear as counsel before any court ... or take part in the management of any business, or practice any profession, and is also "subject to such other disqualifications as may be prescribed by law," as explicitly provided in Section 7, Article IX.
Fourthly, reciprocal representation in two branches the executive and the legislative of the government is a feature of our present modified Presidential or semi-parliamentary system, resulting in the modification to a certain extent of the principle of separation of powers. At least half of the Cabinet positions with Ministries are allocated to and occupied by the "elective" Batasan Members. Non-elective Cabinet Members, on the other hand, are assigned to Batasan seats to represent the Cabinet (which is "responsible" to the Batasan "for the program of government").[44] Nonetheless, for purposes of the disqualification clause, Cabinet Minister given such legislative assignment remains primarily a Cabinet Member who serves in the Batasan in an ex officio capacity or as a mere incident of his membership in the Cabinet.
Needless to state, we find it inadequate to consider just the broad connotation of the word "member" found in the first prohibition of Section 10, Article VIII. Resolution of the issue raised calls for a different approach, especially so because the respondent unlike the elected provincial/city/district representatives is one of several Cabinet Members who sit in the Batasan not because of an electoral mandate but by reason of his Cabinet membership. One of the duties of a Cabinet Member is to serve in the Batasan if so directed by the President. We see no other constitutional provision which would operate to restrict or limit the President's choice as to such Cabinet representatives to the Batasan. A local government executive drafted into the Cabinet because of competence may be given such assignment if, in the judgment of the President, he can effectively espouse and defend in the Batasan the Cabinet's "program of government." This is in consonance with the rule that constitutional provisions should be coordinated, harmonized and so construed in order to give effect to all of them, after reconciling apparent conflicts.[45]
The root cause of this controversy may be traced to the oath-taking of the petitioner as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor) on July 23, 1984, without waiting for the formal acceptance of the respondent's resignation. Petitioner misread a newspaper item mentioned earlier and was misled into believing that there was an "implied acceptance" thereof. The so-called press release, however, merely attributed to the President a statement to the effect that a Governor (or City Mayor) who was elected to the Batasan cannot hold "two elective positions." This is correct as held recently by this Court in Pacana vs. Adaza,[46] a case involving a Governor who got himself elected Mambabatas Pambansa and qualified as such, and who wanted also to retain his elective governorship. It is not so in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay, and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., see dissenting opinion.
Aquino, J., see concurrence.
Concepcion, Jr., J., in the result.
Escolin, J., I reserve my vote in separate opinion.
Makasiar, C.J. and Abad Santos, JJ., no part.
Relova, J., on leave.
[1] page 1, Petition; underscoring supplied.
[2] page 2, Reply, etc.; page 165, Rollo.
[3] on July 25, 1985.
[4] on February 8, 1985.
[5] Resolution of February 14, 1985.
[6] assisted by Attys. Juan T. David, Cesar Carreon and Diosdado Roncal.
[7] assisted by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, Attys. Jose Africa and Eduardo Hernandez.
[8] Atty. Amelito Mutuc.
[9] page 487, Rollo.
[10] Governor Mendoza, 192, 769 votes; Vice-Governor Punsalan, 186, 919 votes.
[11] that of Solicitor General.
[12] pages 114 and 399, Rollo.
[13] but respondent assumed office as such member on July 23, 1985.
[14] pages 115, 401 and 470, Rollo.
[15] pages 115, 471, Ibid.
[16] pages 116, 402, Ibid.
[17] it was "not for a temporary period," according to petitioner, page 182, Ibid.; respondent's version on pages 116 and 402.
[18] Annex "B", Petition, page 26, Rollo.
[19] quoted in full, page 14, Petition; page 15, Ibid.
[20] page 9, Ibid.
[21] page 8, Ibid.
[22] page 10, Ibid.
[23] Footnote reference not found in original copy.
[24] page 118, Ibid.
[25] pages 405, 481, 482 and 483, Ibid.
[26] Annex "LL-1", Reply; page 338, Rollo.
[27] pages 406, 484 and 485, Ibid.
[28] page 14, Ibid.
[29] Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1.
[30] Article 238.
[31] sent the President by letter dated May 25, 1984; page 458, Rollo.
[32] dated June 21, 1984, page 463, Ibid.
[33] paragraph 18 of Petition, page 14, Ibid.
[34] see letters both dated July 16, 1984; pages 472 and 473, Ibid.
[35] pages 253 and 293, Ibid.
[36] as amended February 1, 1984.
[37] page 221, Rollo.
[38] Section 2, Article VIII.
[39] Section 3(1) and Section 7(1), Ibid.
[40] as further amended in 1984; ratified on January 27, 1984, and declared in full force and effect pursuant to Proclamation No. 2332 dated February 1, 1984.
[41] Section 7 (1), Article VIII.
[42] Section 1, Article IX.
[43] Section 8, Ibid.
[44] Section 2, Ibid.
[45] Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 128-129.
[46] 135 SCRA 431.