EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-58512, July 23, 1985 ]
MANUEL I. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RICARDO J. RUFINO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CUEVAS, J.:
Assailed and challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and mandamus, for allegedly having been issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, is the Resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated October 3, 1981, issued in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows
Petitioner elevated to this court on certiorari[1] Comelec's aforesaid resolution disqualifying him to run as mayor of Taytay. The petition prayed for the issuance of a restraining order against the enforcement of the questioned resolution which We granted in order to give petitioner a chance to be voted for since the question of his disqualification could not be resolved because of time constraints. On January 30, 1980, while the disqualification case was still pending with this Court, petitioner was, upon completion of the canvass, proclaimed Mayor of Taytay having garnered the highest number of votes (15,463) cast in the said mayoralty election. Private respondent Ricardo J. Rufino came next with 11,137 votes; and Benjamin P. Esguerra, a poor third with 130 votes, per canvass of votes prepared and signed by the Chairman and members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Following petitioner's proclamation, private respondent filed on February 11, 1980 with the Comelec a Petition for "Recanvass, Annulment and/or Suspension of Proclamation" which was docketed therein as PPC Case No. 379 and ordered consolidated with PDC No. 66. Finally, in a Resolution promulgated on March 31, 1981 this Court,[2] affirmed the disqualification of the petitioner and upheld the validity of the Comelec's assailed resolution.
Capitalizing on this development, private respondent filed on April 22, 1981, a "Motion for Proclamation" in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379, praying for his proclamation as the elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, alleging among others, that petitioner Santos was disqualified by the Comelec from running as mayor of Taytay, Rizal in PDC Case No. 66 in the local elections of January 30, 1980 on ground of political turncoatism per Comelec Resolution No. 8409: that petitioner Santos appealed said resolution to this Court[3] which affirmed the aforesaid Comelec's Resolution in a decision dated March 31, 1981: and that petitioner Santos having been disqualified from running for mayor of Taytay, Rizal, he is therefore considered a non-candidate and whatever votes obtained by him must be disregarded and should not be counted.
Petitioner Santos filed his opposition to the private respondent's motion for proclamation arguing that the Monsale vs. Nico[4] doctrine relied upon by respondent Rufino could not be applied to his case since said case involved a candidate who withdrew his candidacy; whereas, in the case at bar, a candidate was disqualified. Moreover, petitioner argues that the Monsale doctrine had already been abandoned in the subsequent case of Luison vs. Garcia,[5] wherein it was held that despite the ineligibility of the winning candidate who insisted to run for election, the opponent who obtained the second highest number of votes does not thereby become entitled to the contested office. Furthermore, respondent Rufino is estopped from having himself proclaimed as mayor having questioned in PPC No. 379 the legality, accuracy and validity of the election returns on ground of alleged irregularity committed during the election.
In view of the pendency of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with this Court, Comelec deferred action on respondent Rufino's motion for proclamation. On October 15, 1981, however, this Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the Comelec, upon motion of respondent Rufino, in a Resolution dated October 23, 1981, which is now assailed, recalled and revoked the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Taytay, Rizal, and proclaimed private respondent Rufino as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal in the January 30, 1980 elections. Comelec likewise directed respondent Rufino to take his oath of office and to assume the duties and functions of the said office. On October 27, 1981, respondent Rufino took his oath of office and assumed the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor of Taytay, Rizal.
Unable to obtain a favorable reconsideration of Comelec's Resolution No. 8409, petitioner now comes before this Court through the instant petition praying for the nullification of the said Resolution of October 23, 1981, and for the issuance of an Order directing respondent Comelec to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing said Resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order.
The alleged lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction imputed against respondent Comelec consists in the latter's decreeing respondent Rufino's proclamation which allegedly was never the subject of pleadings in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379. Petitioner argues that respondent Rufino was never a party in PDC No. 66 and therefore his proclamation as the elected Mayor can not be dealt with nor passed upon much less adjudicated by the respondent Comelec in resolving the said case. With respect to PPC No. 379, although private respondent was a party thereto, nevertheless the issues involved therein has no relation to the disqualification of the petitioner but the irregularities allegedly committed during the elections. Hence, Comelec's questioned Resolution proclaiming private respondent has no factual nor any legal basis.
An examination of the pleadings filed in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379 readily disputes and controverts petitioner's aforesaid submittal. For in PPC No. 379, private respondent Rufino expressly and specifically prayed that he be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal.[6]
With respect to PDC No. 66, Comelec having disqualified petitioner as a mayoralty candidate thus declaring him a noncandidate, it became legally incumbent upon the Comelec to proclaim the rightful winner in the said elections a function and duty encompass within its exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections pursuant to Sections 2(1) and 3 Art. 12 C of the Constitution; and Arts. 185, 168 and 169 of the Election Code. The Comelec, therefore, in proclaiming private respondent as mayor elect, after having resolved the pending pre-proclamation controversy between petitioner and private respondent was simply complying with its legal duty under the law and the constitution.
Furthermore, the record indubitably shows that as early as April 20, 1981, private respondent had, by a motion filed with the Comelec, sought his proclamation as the duly elected mayor of Taytay, Rizal. Said motion was a litigated motion and vehemently opposed by petitioner. Nowhere however in petitioner's formal written oppositon to the said motion has he ever set up the defense, much less advanced the argument, of lack of jurisdiction and authority on the part of respondent Comelec to act on said motion. Petitioner's opposition centered merely on the pendency with this Court of his motion for reconsideration of the decision affirming his (petitioner's) disqualification. That motion for reconsideration was, however, denied by this Court on October 15, 1981 which finally wrote finis to petitioner's questioned disqualification.
Petitioner further insists that respondent Rufino's proclamation must be raised and dealt with in another judicial proceeding. Such a stand is decidedly in derogation of the rule against multiplicity of suits and more importantly, repugnant to the rules governing speedy disposition of election controversies in order to give meaning and effect to the choice of the electorate. We see nothing, much less perceive any legal impediment that bars or prohibits respondent Comelec in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379 from passing upon and resolving the question of respondent Rufino's proclamation. From the practical view point, the present petition does not even by a bit advance petitioner's cause. For even assuming that his premises are correct, all that need be done is to proclaim private respondent as the winner in the January 30, 1980 elections. And whatever glimmer of hope petitioner may have entertained must have been totally blasted by this court's final declaration that he is disqualified as mayoralty candidate of Taytay, Rizal.
Anent petitioner's contention that his disqualification does not
Finally, petitioner asks that we issue a writ of prohibition commanding Comelec to desist further from acting on PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379. Such a relief is no longer legally feasible private respondent having taken his oath of office wayback in October 21, 1981, and has since then been discharging the powers and duties of Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, thus rendering petitioner's cause moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De La Fuente, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Acting Chief Justice, files a separate dissent on the authority of the Court's recent near-unanimous decision in Geronimo that it is a terrible affront against the electorate to allow the repudiated loser to usurp the mayoralty against their express will and mandate.
Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.
Abad Santos, J., joins with J. Melencio-Herrera.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I abide by their ruling in Geronimo vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 60504, May 17, 1985, and accordingly, dissent.
Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., reserve their votes in this case.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., because of this Court's decisions in Yanson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52713, January 31, 1985 and Geronimo v. Ramos, G.R. No. 60504 and two related cases, May 14, 1985, I RESERVE my vote in this case.
Fernando, C.J., on official leave.
[1] G.R. No. L-52390.
[2] G.R. No. 52390, 103 SCRA 628.
[3] G.R. No. 52390.
[4] 83 Phil. 758.
[5] 103 Phil. 453.
[6] Par. 3 of the prayer, p. 9, Annex "A".
"Considering that after declaring all the votes received by respondent Manuel I. Santos as stray votes and therefore should not be counted, Ricardo J. Rufino should be proclaimed as duly elected Mayor for having obtained the highest number of votes as appearing in the canvass of votes submitted by the board of canvassers in connection with the January 30, 1980 elections for the position of Municipal Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, NOW THEREFORE, this Commission (Third Division) RESOLVES as follows:Petitioner Manuel I. Santos was the Nacionalista Party candidate for Mayor of Taytay, Rizal in the January 30, 1980 general local elections. Private respondent Ricardo J. Rufino, on the other hand, was the KBL official candidate for the same position. Earlier, however, or to be more precise, on January 14, 1980, a disqualification case on ground of turncoatism was filed with the Comelec against the herein petitioner by Ricardo Naval and Juanita Limson, duly registered voters of Taytay, Rizal. The case was docketed as PDC No. 66. On January 19, 1980, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8409 disqualifying petitioner from being a candidate for Mayor of Taytay, Rizal.
1. To recall and revoke the proclamation of Manuel I. Santos as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal made by the board of canvassers on January 30, 1980;
2. To proclaim Ricardo J. Rufino who received 11,137 votes as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal in the January 30, 1980 elections; and
3. To direct Ricardo J. Rufino to take his oath of office and assume the duties and functions of said office.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner elevated to this court on certiorari[1] Comelec's aforesaid resolution disqualifying him to run as mayor of Taytay. The petition prayed for the issuance of a restraining order against the enforcement of the questioned resolution which We granted in order to give petitioner a chance to be voted for since the question of his disqualification could not be resolved because of time constraints. On January 30, 1980, while the disqualification case was still pending with this Court, petitioner was, upon completion of the canvass, proclaimed Mayor of Taytay having garnered the highest number of votes (15,463) cast in the said mayoralty election. Private respondent Ricardo J. Rufino came next with 11,137 votes; and Benjamin P. Esguerra, a poor third with 130 votes, per canvass of votes prepared and signed by the Chairman and members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Following petitioner's proclamation, private respondent filed on February 11, 1980 with the Comelec a Petition for "Recanvass, Annulment and/or Suspension of Proclamation" which was docketed therein as PPC Case No. 379 and ordered consolidated with PDC No. 66. Finally, in a Resolution promulgated on March 31, 1981 this Court,[2] affirmed the disqualification of the petitioner and upheld the validity of the Comelec's assailed resolution.
Capitalizing on this development, private respondent filed on April 22, 1981, a "Motion for Proclamation" in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379, praying for his proclamation as the elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, alleging among others, that petitioner Santos was disqualified by the Comelec from running as mayor of Taytay, Rizal in PDC Case No. 66 in the local elections of January 30, 1980 on ground of political turncoatism per Comelec Resolution No. 8409: that petitioner Santos appealed said resolution to this Court[3] which affirmed the aforesaid Comelec's Resolution in a decision dated March 31, 1981: and that petitioner Santos having been disqualified from running for mayor of Taytay, Rizal, he is therefore considered a non-candidate and whatever votes obtained by him must be disregarded and should not be counted.
Petitioner Santos filed his opposition to the private respondent's motion for proclamation arguing that the Monsale vs. Nico[4] doctrine relied upon by respondent Rufino could not be applied to his case since said case involved a candidate who withdrew his candidacy; whereas, in the case at bar, a candidate was disqualified. Moreover, petitioner argues that the Monsale doctrine had already been abandoned in the subsequent case of Luison vs. Garcia,[5] wherein it was held that despite the ineligibility of the winning candidate who insisted to run for election, the opponent who obtained the second highest number of votes does not thereby become entitled to the contested office. Furthermore, respondent Rufino is estopped from having himself proclaimed as mayor having questioned in PPC No. 379 the legality, accuracy and validity of the election returns on ground of alleged irregularity committed during the election.
In view of the pendency of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with this Court, Comelec deferred action on respondent Rufino's motion for proclamation. On October 15, 1981, however, this Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the Comelec, upon motion of respondent Rufino, in a Resolution dated October 23, 1981, which is now assailed, recalled and revoked the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Taytay, Rizal, and proclaimed private respondent Rufino as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal in the January 30, 1980 elections. Comelec likewise directed respondent Rufino to take his oath of office and to assume the duties and functions of the said office. On October 27, 1981, respondent Rufino took his oath of office and assumed the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor of Taytay, Rizal.
Unable to obtain a favorable reconsideration of Comelec's Resolution No. 8409, petitioner now comes before this Court through the instant petition praying for the nullification of the said Resolution of October 23, 1981, and for the issuance of an Order directing respondent Comelec to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing said Resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order.
The alleged lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction imputed against respondent Comelec consists in the latter's decreeing respondent Rufino's proclamation which allegedly was never the subject of pleadings in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379. Petitioner argues that respondent Rufino was never a party in PDC No. 66 and therefore his proclamation as the elected Mayor can not be dealt with nor passed upon much less adjudicated by the respondent Comelec in resolving the said case. With respect to PPC No. 379, although private respondent was a party thereto, nevertheless the issues involved therein has no relation to the disqualification of the petitioner but the irregularities allegedly committed during the elections. Hence, Comelec's questioned Resolution proclaiming private respondent has no factual nor any legal basis.
An examination of the pleadings filed in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379 readily disputes and controverts petitioner's aforesaid submittal. For in PPC No. 379, private respondent Rufino expressly and specifically prayed that he be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal.[6]
With respect to PDC No. 66, Comelec having disqualified petitioner as a mayoralty candidate thus declaring him a noncandidate, it became legally incumbent upon the Comelec to proclaim the rightful winner in the said elections a function and duty encompass within its exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections pursuant to Sections 2(1) and 3 Art. 12 C of the Constitution; and Arts. 185, 168 and 169 of the Election Code. The Comelec, therefore, in proclaiming private respondent as mayor elect, after having resolved the pending pre-proclamation controversy between petitioner and private respondent was simply complying with its legal duty under the law and the constitution.
Furthermore, the record indubitably shows that as early as April 20, 1981, private respondent had, by a motion filed with the Comelec, sought his proclamation as the duly elected mayor of Taytay, Rizal. Said motion was a litigated motion and vehemently opposed by petitioner. Nowhere however in petitioner's formal written oppositon to the said motion has he ever set up the defense, much less advanced the argument, of lack of jurisdiction and authority on the part of respondent Comelec to act on said motion. Petitioner's opposition centered merely on the pendency with this Court of his motion for reconsideration of the decision affirming his (petitioner's) disqualification. That motion for reconsideration was, however, denied by this Court on October 15, 1981 which finally wrote finis to petitioner's questioned disqualification.
Petitioner further insists that respondent Rufino's proclamation must be raised and dealt with in another judicial proceeding. Such a stand is decidedly in derogation of the rule against multiplicity of suits and more importantly, repugnant to the rules governing speedy disposition of election controversies in order to give meaning and effect to the choice of the electorate. We see nothing, much less perceive any legal impediment that bars or prohibits respondent Comelec in PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379 from passing upon and resolving the question of respondent Rufino's proclamation. From the practical view point, the present petition does not even by a bit advance petitioner's cause. For even assuming that his premises are correct, all that need be done is to proclaim private respondent as the winner in the January 30, 1980 elections. And whatever glimmer of hope petitioner may have entertained must have been totally blasted by this court's final declaration that he is disqualified as mayoralty candidate of Taytay, Rizal.
Anent petitioner's contention that his disqualification does not
"Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot." (Underscoring supplied)Considering that all the votes garnered by the petitioner are stray votes and therefore should not be counted, We find no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec, in proclaiming private respondent Ricardo J. Rufino as the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, he having obtained the highest number of votes as appearing and certified in the canvass of votes submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers petitioner having been legally disqualified. Such a proclamation finds legal support from the case of Ticzon vs. Comelec, 103 SCRA 671, wherein disqualified candidate Ticzon likewise questioned the legality of the Resolution of the Comelec which not only disqualified him but further proclaimed Dizon, the only candidate left for the disputed position, and this Court upheld the proclamation of Cesar Dizon as Mayor of San Pablo City.
Finally, petitioner asks that we issue a writ of prohibition commanding Comelec to desist further from acting on PDC No. 66 and PPC No. 379. Such a relief is no longer legally feasible private respondent having taken his oath of office wayback in October 21, 1981, and has since then been discharging the powers and duties of Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, thus rendering petitioner's cause moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De La Fuente, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Acting Chief Justice, files a separate dissent on the authority of the Court's recent near-unanimous decision in Geronimo that it is a terrible affront against the electorate to allow the repudiated loser to usurp the mayoralty against their express will and mandate.
Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.
Abad Santos, J., joins with J. Melencio-Herrera.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I abide by their ruling in Geronimo vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 60504, May 17, 1985, and accordingly, dissent.
Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., reserve their votes in this case.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., because of this Court's decisions in Yanson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52713, January 31, 1985 and Geronimo v. Ramos, G.R. No. 60504 and two related cases, May 14, 1985, I RESERVE my vote in this case.
Fernando, C.J., on official leave.
[1] G.R. No. L-52390.
[2] G.R. No. 52390, 103 SCRA 628.
[3] G.R. No. 52390.
[4] 83 Phil. 758.
[5] 103 Phil. 453.
[6] Par. 3 of the prayer, p. 9, Annex "A".