EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 68351-52, July 09, 1985 ]
CARLOS M. PADILLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LEONARDO B. PEREZ, AND THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
DE LA FUENTE, J.:
Petition for certiorari brought pursuant to Section 11, Article XII(c) of the 1973 Constitution, to annul and set aside the decision dated August 7, 1984 of respondent Commission on Elections (Second Division), which sustained and affirmed the rulings
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Nueva Vizcaya excluding from the canvass of votes sixteen (16) election returns from 6 municipalities[1], and including seventy six (76) election returns from 5 municipalities[2],
of Nueva Vizcaya with a prayer that respondent Commission be ordered to direct respondent Board to reconvene and recanvass the election returns after taking into account the said excluded returns and excluding the above-mentioned 76 returns.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and the issues raised, we required the respondents to answer the petition.[3] After the hearing held on January 31, 1985, the above-captioned cases were deemed submitted for decision.
The pertinent facts, briefly stated, are as follows:
The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, "not as broad as it used to be" under the old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process."[9] Moreover, the legislative construction[10] of the constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo,[11] a case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruled that "this Court can not xxx review rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections",[12] as there is "no reason to believe that the framer's of our Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission created and explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not "disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings").[13] Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either "as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari ... [for] the main issue in … certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of juris diction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while "petitions for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law."[14]
The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier.[15] Indeed, a early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,[16] this Court held that the Electoral Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the language of the provision, "judgment rendered ... in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interfernce, except ... 'upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law'."[17] Originally lodged in the legislature, that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contests "relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late Justice Jose P. Laurel, "was intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature ..."[18] These observations remain valid and applicable to the exercise of that function, as now vested in the respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission, petitioner insists on the genuineness of the 16 excluded returns. He also impugns the authenticity of the 76 contested returns included in the canvass of votes, citing "irregularities" or "anomalies" in the preparation of the contested election returns as indicated by the alleged non-alignment, smudging, lack of uniformity in the size and placement of serial numbers, alleged "unreasonable delay" in the delivery of some returns, etc. As evidence, petitioner submitted the contested returns, alleged KBL or DOP copies of election returns, certificates of votes, affidavits, counter-affidavits, etc. On the other hand, these allegations and submissions have been denied or disputed by the private respondent who likewise submitted counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence. In its decision affirming the rulings of the board of canvassers, the respondent Commission noted that petitioner failed to authenticate the supposed copies of the election returns, that mere certificates of votes cannot be considered authentic copies of the returns, that the reports relied upon by the petitioner were not official, and there was no "unreasonable delay" in the submission of returns considering that the questioned returns came from remote barangays in mountainous areas (accessible only by hiking), taking into account past experience in the delivery of returns from said places. It also pointed out that the inclusion in the canvass of the 16 returns (which would give petitioner 2511 votes and private respondent 608 votes) would not change the result as private respondent would still be the winner by "over 600 votes."[19]
It is readily seen, upon examination of the 115-page petition (with annexes consisting of 395 pages) and the other pleadings filed, that the questions raised therein are mostly factual. We are called upon to look into the credibility and probative value of evidence presented and relied upon by one party and weigh the same in relation to that submitted by the adverse party. A review of the respondent Commission's factual findings/conclusions made on the basis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the petitioner, "if only to guard against or prevent any possible misuse or abuse of power."[20] To do so would mean "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment" rendered on matters within the exclusive function of the Commission, which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this Court. And the possibility of abuse is not a valid argument for, as observed in Angara: "All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary"; "if any mistake" was committed in investing the respondent Commission with such "exclusive jurisdiction ... the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through ordinary processes of democracy."[21]
Petitioner, it appears, believes that there was preponderance of evidence in his favor in view of the voluminous evidence he presented to the respondent Commission. It is not necessarily so. For the alleged absence of "substantial evidence"[22] in support of the questioned decision "is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial ... for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief."[23] Granting, arguendo, the petitioner's claim that alone would not be adequate basis for us to conclude that the Commission's affirmance of the board's rulings was not supported by substantial evidence; hence arbitrary, whimsical, and without any rational basis.
Anent the petitioner's submission that the board was not authorized to proclaim the winner, it is noted that the Commission's resolution of May 30, 1984 directed the new board "to immediately resume ... the canvass ... and to immediately proclaim the winner in the May 14, 1984 election." This was issued prior to the objections of petitioner during the canvass. It is, however, important to consider that immediate proclamation was prayed for by the petitioner himself in an urgent ex parte motion filed in the pending case. Also, up to the hearing on May 21, 1984 (and its continuation on May 29), he had no complaint whatsoever about the alleged tampering or substitution of returns delivered to the PC/INP headquarters in Bayombong (some of which he denounced later on as "spurious" or "manufactured" because of "unreasonable delay"). At that time unofficial reports indicated that petitioner won by a wide margin. Such was the factual setting when he made an urgent plea for immediate canvass of the election returns and, thereafter, immediate proclamation of the winner, which was granted.
The said authorization, it is true, was not strictly in accordance with Section 54 of B.P. 697. It was defective, premature as in the case of an authority to proclaim given within the 5-day period for appeal. It may be argued that the directive was not the authorization contemplated by the law. Politics, however, "is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory."[24] It is relevant to ask whether it would be realistic to say that, notwithstanding the directive to "immediately proclaim" the winner per results of their canvass, the board members should have deferred the proclamation under the circumstances and considered the legality or sufficiency of the authorization. There is, moreover, jurisprudence to the effect that some requirements "are mandatory before election but ... after the elections they are held to be directory only."[25] In any event, the respondent Commission entertained the petitioner's appeal and passed upon his objections to the board's rulings; after due hearing, the said rulings were affirmed. The Commission likewise confirmed or ratified the proclamation of private respondent.[26] There was no denial, then, of the right to appeal. The ratification cured the alleged defect of the authority to proclaim, rendering moot the issue raised.
The matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. The decision of the respondent Commission was promulgated on August 7, 1984. The instant petition was filed with this Court on August 20, 1984, or three months after the May 14, 1984 election. Private respondent was proclaimed on June 2, 1984, as the duly-elected Assemblyman for Nueva Vizcaya. He took his oath of office in due time, discharging thereafter his duties and functions as Assemblyman. Such pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should be dismissed as held by this Court in Venezuela and other cases.[27]Pre-proclamation proceedings are summary in nature. There was no fulldress hearing essential to the task of adjudication with respect to the serious charges of "irregularities", etc. made by petitioner. An election contest would be the most appropriate remedy. Instead of the submission of mere affidavits, the parties would be able to present witnesses subject to the right of confrontation, etc. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matters in controversy "conclusively and once and for all".
Finally, as emphatically stated by the distinguished Chief Justice in the case of Sidro,[28] this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect ..." There is justification in this case to apply and reiterate the principle again.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of an election protest within a period of ten (10) days from notice, if so desired by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Relova, concur, in this pre-proclamation controversy, as held in Valezuela vs. COMELEC, 98 SCRA 701, the matter should be passed upon in an election protest.
Teehankee, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Fernando, C.J., and Plana, J., no part.
[1] Ambaguio, Aritao, Bagabag, Bayombong, Dupax del Norte and Dupax del Sur.
[2] Kayapa, Diadi, Kasibu, Castañeda and Bambang.
[3] Page 508; rollo.
[4] Independent and official KBL, respectively.
[5] Page 7 of Decision (Annex G of Petition).
[6] Ibid., pages 10-11; underscoring supplied.
[7] G. R. No. 68113.
[8] About 120,000 voters, page 7, Annex F of Petition.
[9] 88 SCRA 251.
[10] Ibid., page 270.
[11] 33 SCRA (1970) 387.
[12] Citing Sotto vs. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516.
[13] Lucman, Id., page 401, underscoring supplied.
[14] Ibid., page 399.
[15] 103 SCRA 671; 43 SCRA 238.
[16] which provided: "... The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
[17] Morrero vs. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429, 431.
[18] Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 175.
[19] Page 113 of Decision; Annex G, Petition.
[20] Page 2, Petition.
[21] 63 Phil. 139, 177.
[22] Defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion".
[23] Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1483, 1489, underscoring supplied, citing Chavez vs. CAR, 9 SCRA 412, Lustre vs. CAR, 10 SCRA 659.
[24] Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 295.
[25] Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208; de Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211.
[26] Equivalent to a reproclamation, assuming that the board's proclamation was null and void ab initio.
[27] 98 SCRA 790; Arcenas v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 437; Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 1; Singco v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 420; Laguda v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 857; Agcaoili v. Santos & Comelec, 103 SCRA 350; Mitmug v. Comelec, 103 SCRA 455; Jagunap v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 204; Mogueis v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 576; Faderanga v. Comelec, 105 SCRA 123; Pasion v. Comelec, 109 SCRA 238; Mangca v. Comelec, 112 SCRA 273; Disini v. comelec, 119 SCRA 511; and Robes v. Comelec, 123 SCRA 193.
[28] 123 SCRA 759, 762.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and the issues raised, we required the respondents to answer the petition.[3] After the hearing held on January 31, 1985, the above-captioned cases were deemed submitted for decision.
The pertinent facts, briefly stated, are as follows:
1. Petitioner Carlos M. Padilla and private respondent Leonardo B. Perez were candidates[4] for the position of Assemblyman for Nueva Vizcaya in the national elections of May 14, 1984; on May 15, 1984, Quirico Pilotin, an independent candidate, filed a petition contesting the composition of the Board of Canvassers for Nueva Vizcaya, which led to the suspension of the canvass; this was followed by Pilotin's telegraphic petition requesting the respondent Commission to transfer the canvass to Manila. On May 17 petitioner Padilla filed a Counter-Petition likewise contesting the said board's composition and praying for dismissal of Pilotin's petition (PPC No. 19-84); and on May 21 the Board submitted a manifestation asking for replacement of its members.To begin with, we find no merit in the alternative prayer of petitioner "that this petition be considered as an appeal" from the decision of the respondent Commission, which was reiterated in his reply invoking this Court's resolution of October 31, 1984, in the case of Pimentel.[7] There, an urgent motion was deemed "an appeal by certiorari" in the exercise of this Court's "powers of equity on a matter of extreme urgency and of great public interest"; and we ordered that the "ballots be brought to the Supreme Court … for the purpose of counting the votes" in order to determine "who is entitled to the office of Assemblyman". But this treatment may not be applied here, the factual situation in Pimentel being dissimilar to that under consideration. In Pimentel, the board's proclamation was set aside on appeal and Roa was the one proclaimed as duly-elected Assemblyman for Cagayan de Oro City; but this Court restrained both Pimentel and Roa "from discharging functions of a member of Batasang Pambansa", thereby depriving temporarily said city of its representation in that legislative body; and the Commission's decision in favor of Roa disenfranchised more than 29,000 voters (about 25% of the city's electorate) solely on the basis of affidavits submitted by Roa. In the case of Padilla, since the proclamation of Perez was not set aside the province of Nueva Vizcaya has not been deprived of its representation in the Batasang Pambansa; the Commission's decision upholding the board's ruling which excluded 16 election returns would have the effect of disenfranchising 3581 voters representing about 3% only of the total number of voters in Nueva Vizcaya who participated in the May 14 election.[8] There is no sufficient justification for the application of the Pimentel precedent for the purpose of determining, by counting the votes, "who is entitled to the office of assemblyman" for Nueva Vizcaya.
2. On May 24 petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition with a prayer for a restraining order to prevent the transfer of the venue of the canvass to Manila, which was granted by this Court in G.R. No. 67444.
3. In PPC No. 19-84, petitioner also filed an urgent ex parte motion to direct the said Board to commence with the canvass of election returns and "thereafter, to proclaim the winner."[5] On May 30 the respondent Commission issued in said case its resolution (a) denying Pilotin's petition to transfer the situs of the canvass, (b) replacing all the members of the Board, and (c) directing the new Board to meet at the PC/INP provincial headquarters at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, "where the election return copies ... are safely deposited, and to immediately resume, until terminated, the canvass and to immediately proclaim the winner in the May 14, 1984 elections for Assemblyman of Nueva Vizcaya."[6]
4. On June 1 the new Board canvassed the returns as instructed; written objections were seasonably made by both petitioner and private respondent to the inclusion/exclusion of certain returns; the respondent Board ruled on said objections; after the completion of the canvass the returns were: private respondent obtained 56,182 votes against 53,063 votes for the petitioner; and the respondent Board forthwith proclaimed, on June 2, private respondent Perez as the duly elected Assemblyman to represent Nueva Vizcaya in the Batasang Pambansa.
5. Both petitioner and private respondent appealed to the respondent Commission the adverse rulings of the respondent Board on their respective written objections. On August 7, 1984, the respondent Commission promulgated its decision upholding the rulings of the respondent Board and affirming the proclamation of the private respondent.
The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 11, Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, "not as broad as it used to be" under the old Constitution and it "should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process."[9] Moreover, the legislative construction[10] of the constitutional provision has narrowed down "the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review." And in Lucman vs. Dimaporo,[11] a case decided under the Constitution of 1935, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion, ruled that "this Court can not xxx review rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections",[12] as there is "no reason to believe that the framer's of our Constitution intended to place the [said] Commission created and explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself on a lower level" than statutory administrative organs (whose factual findings are not "disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings").[13] Factual matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings brought either "as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari ... [for] the main issue in … certiorari is one of jurisdiction lack of juris diction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" while "petitions for review on certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law."[14]
The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon and Bashier.[15] Indeed, a early as the year 1938, applying Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,[16] this Court held that the Electoral Commission's "exclusive jurisdiction" being clear from the language of the provision, "judgment rendered ... in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interfernce, except ... 'upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law'."[17] Originally lodged in the legislature, that exclusive function of being the "sole judge" of contests "relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the legislature was transferred "in its totality" to the Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. That grant of power, to use the language of the late Justice Jose P. Laurel, "was intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature ..."[18] These observations remain valid and applicable to the exercise of that function, as now vested in the respondent Commission by the 1973 Constitution.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission, petitioner insists on the genuineness of the 16 excluded returns. He also impugns the authenticity of the 76 contested returns included in the canvass of votes, citing "irregularities" or "anomalies" in the preparation of the contested election returns as indicated by the alleged non-alignment, smudging, lack of uniformity in the size and placement of serial numbers, alleged "unreasonable delay" in the delivery of some returns, etc. As evidence, petitioner submitted the contested returns, alleged KBL or DOP copies of election returns, certificates of votes, affidavits, counter-affidavits, etc. On the other hand, these allegations and submissions have been denied or disputed by the private respondent who likewise submitted counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence. In its decision affirming the rulings of the board of canvassers, the respondent Commission noted that petitioner failed to authenticate the supposed copies of the election returns, that mere certificates of votes cannot be considered authentic copies of the returns, that the reports relied upon by the petitioner were not official, and there was no "unreasonable delay" in the submission of returns considering that the questioned returns came from remote barangays in mountainous areas (accessible only by hiking), taking into account past experience in the delivery of returns from said places. It also pointed out that the inclusion in the canvass of the 16 returns (which would give petitioner 2511 votes and private respondent 608 votes) would not change the result as private respondent would still be the winner by "over 600 votes."[19]
It is readily seen, upon examination of the 115-page petition (with annexes consisting of 395 pages) and the other pleadings filed, that the questions raised therein are mostly factual. We are called upon to look into the credibility and probative value of evidence presented and relied upon by one party and weigh the same in relation to that submitted by the adverse party. A review of the respondent Commission's factual findings/conclusions made on the basis of the evidence evaluated is urged by the petitioner, "if only to guard against or prevent any possible misuse or abuse of power."[20] To do so would mean "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment" rendered on matters within the exclusive function of the Commission, which is proscribed by the Aratuc and other decisions of this Court. And the possibility of abuse is not a valid argument for, as observed in Angara: "All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary"; "if any mistake" was committed in investing the respondent Commission with such "exclusive jurisdiction ... the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through ordinary processes of democracy."[21]
Petitioner, it appears, believes that there was preponderance of evidence in his favor in view of the voluminous evidence he presented to the respondent Commission. It is not necessarily so. For the alleged absence of "substantial evidence"[22] in support of the questioned decision "is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial ... for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief."[23] Granting, arguendo, the petitioner's claim that alone would not be adequate basis for us to conclude that the Commission's affirmance of the board's rulings was not supported by substantial evidence; hence arbitrary, whimsical, and without any rational basis.
Anent the petitioner's submission that the board was not authorized to proclaim the winner, it is noted that the Commission's resolution of May 30, 1984 directed the new board "to immediately resume ... the canvass ... and to immediately proclaim the winner in the May 14, 1984 election." This was issued prior to the objections of petitioner during the canvass. It is, however, important to consider that immediate proclamation was prayed for by the petitioner himself in an urgent ex parte motion filed in the pending case. Also, up to the hearing on May 21, 1984 (and its continuation on May 29), he had no complaint whatsoever about the alleged tampering or substitution of returns delivered to the PC/INP headquarters in Bayombong (some of which he denounced later on as "spurious" or "manufactured" because of "unreasonable delay"). At that time unofficial reports indicated that petitioner won by a wide margin. Such was the factual setting when he made an urgent plea for immediate canvass of the election returns and, thereafter, immediate proclamation of the winner, which was granted.
The said authorization, it is true, was not strictly in accordance with Section 54 of B.P. 697. It was defective, premature as in the case of an authority to proclaim given within the 5-day period for appeal. It may be argued that the directive was not the authorization contemplated by the law. Politics, however, "is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory."[24] It is relevant to ask whether it would be realistic to say that, notwithstanding the directive to "immediately proclaim" the winner per results of their canvass, the board members should have deferred the proclamation under the circumstances and considered the legality or sufficiency of the authorization. There is, moreover, jurisprudence to the effect that some requirements "are mandatory before election but ... after the elections they are held to be directory only."[25] In any event, the respondent Commission entertained the petitioner's appeal and passed upon his objections to the board's rulings; after due hearing, the said rulings were affirmed. The Commission likewise confirmed or ratified the proclamation of private respondent.[26] There was no denial, then, of the right to appeal. The ratification cured the alleged defect of the authority to proclaim, rendering moot the issue raised.
The matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. The decision of the respondent Commission was promulgated on August 7, 1984. The instant petition was filed with this Court on August 20, 1984, or three months after the May 14, 1984 election. Private respondent was proclaimed on June 2, 1984, as the duly-elected Assemblyman for Nueva Vizcaya. He took his oath of office in due time, discharging thereafter his duties and functions as Assemblyman. Such pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should be dismissed as held by this Court in Venezuela and other cases.[27]Pre-proclamation proceedings are summary in nature. There was no fulldress hearing essential to the task of adjudication with respect to the serious charges of "irregularities", etc. made by petitioner. An election contest would be the most appropriate remedy. Instead of the submission of mere affidavits, the parties would be able to present witnesses subject to the right of confrontation, etc. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matters in controversy "conclusively and once and for all".
Finally, as emphatically stated by the distinguished Chief Justice in the case of Sidro,[28] this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect ..." There is justification in this case to apply and reiterate the principle again.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of an election protest within a period of ten (10) days from notice, if so desired by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Relova, concur, in this pre-proclamation controversy, as held in Valezuela vs. COMELEC, 98 SCRA 701, the matter should be passed upon in an election protest.
Teehankee, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Fernando, C.J., and Plana, J., no part.
[1] Ambaguio, Aritao, Bagabag, Bayombong, Dupax del Norte and Dupax del Sur.
[2] Kayapa, Diadi, Kasibu, Castañeda and Bambang.
[3] Page 508; rollo.
[4] Independent and official KBL, respectively.
[5] Page 7 of Decision (Annex G of Petition).
[6] Ibid., pages 10-11; underscoring supplied.
[7] G. R. No. 68113.
[8] About 120,000 voters, page 7, Annex F of Petition.
[9] 88 SCRA 251.
[10] Ibid., page 270.
[11] 33 SCRA (1970) 387.
[12] Citing Sotto vs. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516.
[13] Lucman, Id., page 401, underscoring supplied.
[14] Ibid., page 399.
[15] 103 SCRA 671; 43 SCRA 238.
[16] which provided: "... The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
[17] Morrero vs. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429, 431.
[18] Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 175.
[19] Page 113 of Decision; Annex G, Petition.
[20] Page 2, Petition.
[21] 63 Phil. 139, 177.
[22] Defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion".
[23] Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1483, 1489, underscoring supplied, citing Chavez vs. CAR, 9 SCRA 412, Lustre vs. CAR, 10 SCRA 659.
[24] Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 295.
[25] Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208; de Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211.
[26] Equivalent to a reproclamation, assuming that the board's proclamation was null and void ab initio.
[27] 98 SCRA 790; Arcenas v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 437; Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 1; Singco v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 420; Laguda v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 857; Agcaoili v. Santos & Comelec, 103 SCRA 350; Mitmug v. Comelec, 103 SCRA 455; Jagunap v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 204; Mogueis v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 576; Faderanga v. Comelec, 105 SCRA 123; Pasion v. Comelec, 109 SCRA 238; Mangca v. Comelec, 112 SCRA 273; Disini v. comelec, 119 SCRA 511; and Robes v. Comelec, 123 SCRA 193.
[28] 123 SCRA 759, 762.