EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-42636, August 01, 1985 ]
MARIA LUISA DE LEON ESCALER AND ERNESTO ESCALER, CECILIA J. ROXAS AND PEDRO ROXAS, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE L. REYNOSO, NOW DECEASED, TO BE SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND AFRICA V. REYNOSO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CUEVAS, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate Court) and of its Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, in CA-G.R. No. 41953-R, which was an appeal from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 9014 entitled "Maria Luisa de Leon Escaler, et al vs. Jose L. Reynoso and Africa Reynoso".
The following are the pertinent background facts:
On March 7, 1958, the spouses Africa V. Reynoso and Jose L. Reynoso sold to petitioners several others, a parcel of land, situated in Antipolo, Rizal with an area of 239,479 square meters and covered by TCT No. 57400 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. The Deed of Sale[1] contained the following covenant against eviction, to wit:
On June 10, 1964, an Order[2] was issued in the said case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The complaint among others, alleged that the Order issued in Case No. 4252 which cancelled the title of Angelina C. Reynoso and all subsequent Transfer Certificates of Title derived and/or emanating therefrom and which includes the titles of petitioners, is now final, and by reason thereof petitioners lost their right over the property sold; and that in said Case No. 4252, the respondents were summoned and/or given their day in court at the instance of the petitioners.[3]
The respondents, as defendants, filed their answer alleging, among others, by way of affirmative defenses that "the cause of action, if any, of plaintiffs against defendants have been fully adjudicated in Case No. 4252 when plaintiffs failed to file a third-party complaint against defendants."[4]
On August 18, 1967, petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging the facts already averred in the complaint, and further alleging that the defendants were summoned and were given their day in court at the instance of plaintiffs in Case No. 4252. In support of their said motion, the plaintiffs attached the affidavit of Atty. Alberto R. Avanceña who had represented the plaintiffs in Case No. 4252 and had filed a joint opposition in behalf of all the vendees. The pertinent portion of that affidavit, states
In reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing the case, the then Court of Appeals found and so ruled that petitioners as vendees had not given private respondents-vendors, formal notice of the eviction case as mandated by Arts. 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code.
Hence, the instant recourse, petitioners contending
Article 1548, in relation to Article 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
In the case at bar, the fourth requisite - that of being summoned in the suit for eviction (Case No. 4252) at the instance of the vendee is not present. All that the petitioners did, per their very admission, was to furnish respondents, by registered mail, with a copy of the opposition they (petitioners) filed in the eviction suit. Decidedly, this is not the kind of notice prescribed by the afore-quoted Articles 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code. The term "unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee" means that the respondents as vendor/s should be made parties to the suit at the instance of petitioners-vendees, either by way of asking that the former be made a co-defendant or by the filing of a third-party complaint against said vendors. Nothing of that sort appeared to have been done by the petitioners in the instant case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of the then Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, and Alampay, JJ., joins J. Aquino, in his dissent.
Aquino,J., see dissent.
[1] Annex "A", pp. 7-12, Record on Appeal, Page 29, Rollo.
[2] pp. 13-21 Record on Appeal, p. 29 Rollo.
[3] pp. 1-7, Record on Appeal, p. 29, Rollo.
[4] pp. 25-26, Record on Appeal, p. 29, Rollo.
[5] CA-G.R. No. 41953
[6] Bautista et al vs. Laserna, et al, 72 Phil 506; Jovellano, et al vs. Lualhati, 47 Phil 371; Canizares Tiana vs. Torrejos, 21 Phil 127.
The following are the pertinent background facts:
On March 7, 1958, the spouses Africa V. Reynoso and Jose L. Reynoso sold to petitioners several others, a parcel of land, situated in Antipolo, Rizal with an area of 239,479 square meters and covered by TCT No. 57400 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. The Deed of Sale[1] contained the following covenant against eviction, to wit:
"That the VENDOR is the absolute owner of a parcel of land x x x the ownership thereto being evidenced by an absolute deed of sale executed in her favor by registered owner ANGELINA C. REYNOSO, x x x;On April 21, 1961, the Register of Deeds of Rizal and A. Doronilla Resources Development, Inc. filed Case No. 4252 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the cancellation of OCT No. 1526 issued in the name of Angelina C. Reynoso (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents-vendors) on February 26, 1958 under Decree No. 62373, LRC Record No. N-13783, on the ground that the property covered by said title is already previously registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42999 issued in the name of A. Doronilla Development, Inc. Petitioners as vendees filed their opposition to the said petition.
That the VENDOR warrants valid title to and ownership of said parcel of land and further, warrant to defend the property herein sold and conveyed, unto the VENDEES, their heirs, and assignees, from any and all claims of any persons whatsoever."
On June 10, 1964, an Order[2] was issued in the said case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is constrained to set aside Decree No. 62373 issued in L.R.C. Rec. No. N-13783 and the Register of Deeds of Rizal is directed to cancel OCT No. 1526 of his office and all Transfer Certificates of Title issued subsequently thereafter to purchaser of said property or portions thereof, the same being null and void, the expenses for such cancellation to be charged to spouses Angelina Reynoso and Floro Reynoso. The owner's duplicates in the possession of the transferees of the property covered by OCT No. 1526 are declared null and void and said transferees are directed to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Rizal, said owner's duplicates for cancellation.On August 31, 1965, herein petitioners, spouses Maria de Leon Escaler and Ernesto Escaler and spouses Cecilia J. Roxas and Pedro Roxas, filed Civil Case No. 9014 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against their vendors, herein private respondents spouses Jose L. Reynoso and Africa Reynoso for the recovery of the value of the property sold to them, plus damages on the ground that the latter have violated the vendors' "warranty against eviction."
The other reliefs sought for by the party oppositors are denied the same not falling within the jurisdiction of this Court under this proceeding.
SO ORDERED."
The complaint among others, alleged that the Order issued in Case No. 4252 which cancelled the title of Angelina C. Reynoso and all subsequent Transfer Certificates of Title derived and/or emanating therefrom and which includes the titles of petitioners, is now final, and by reason thereof petitioners lost their right over the property sold; and that in said Case No. 4252, the respondents were summoned and/or given their day in court at the instance of the petitioners.[3]
The respondents, as defendants, filed their answer alleging, among others, by way of affirmative defenses that "the cause of action, if any, of plaintiffs against defendants have been fully adjudicated in Case No. 4252 when plaintiffs failed to file a third-party complaint against defendants."[4]
On August 18, 1967, petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging the facts already averred in the complaint, and further alleging that the defendants were summoned and were given their day in court at the instance of plaintiffs in Case No. 4252. In support of their said motion, the plaintiffs attached the affidavit of Atty. Alberto R. Avanceña who had represented the plaintiffs in Case No. 4252 and had filed a joint opposition in behalf of all the vendees. The pertinent portion of that affidavit, states
"4. That he has furnished a copy of said joint opposition to Africa Reynoso, wife of Jose L. Reynoso, at her given address at c/o Antipolo Enterprises, Antipolo, Rizal and the latter had received the same, as evidenced by the photostatic copy of the Registry Return Receipt thereto affixed as Annex 'C-1';On September 27, 1967, judgment was rendered by the trial court, the pertinent portion of which reads
xxx xxx xxx
"6. That he hereby executed this Affidavit to prove that said defendants Africa Reynoso and Jose L. Reynoso were given their day in Court and/or were afforded their opportunity to be heard in case No. 4252 aforecited."
"Considering the foregoing motion for summary judgment and it appearing that the defendants under a Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "C") have expressly warranted their valid title and ownership of the said parcel of land and further warranted to defend said property from any and all claims of any persons whomever in favor of plaintiffs; that the said warranties were violated when on June 10, 1964, an Order was promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. 4252 (Related to LRC Case No. 1559, LRC Record No. N-13293). In Re: Petition for Cancellation of Original Registration, etc., covering the parcel of land in question; that said order of June 10, 1964 has become final and executory there being no appeal interposed thereto and defendants were summoned and were given a day in court at the instance of the plaintiffs in Case No. 4252, the Court hereby grants the motion for summary judgment, and hereby orders the defendants to jointly and severally return to the plaintiffs Maria Luisa de Leon Escaler and Ernesto Escaler, Cecilia J. Roxas and Pedro Roxas, the value of the property sold to them at the time of eviction which is not to be less than P5,500.00 to reimburse to each one of the plaintiffs the expenses of contract and litigation and the amount of P2,250.00 to pay the attorney's fees of P1,000.00 plus the costs of suit.Private respondents appealed the aforesaid decision to the then Court of Appeals[5] assigning as sole error that the lower court erred in finding that they were summoned and were given their day in court at the instance of petitioners-plaintiffs in Case No. 4252.
SO ORDERED."
In reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing the case, the then Court of Appeals found and so ruled that petitioners as vendees had not given private respondents-vendors, formal notice of the eviction case as mandated by Arts. 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code.
Hence, the instant recourse, petitioners contending
1) that the Court of Appeals erred in applying strictly to the instant case the provisions of Articles 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code; andThe petition is devoid of merit. Consequently, it must be dismissed.
2) that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal should have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals or at least, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court, for hearing on the merits.
Article 1548, in relation to Article 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
"Art. 1548. Eviction shall take place whenever by a final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or an act imputable to the vendor, the vendee is deprived of the whole or of a part of the thing purchased.In order that a vendor's liability for eviction may be enforced, the following requisites must concur a) there must be a final judgment; b) the purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; c) said deprivation was by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and d) the vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee.[6]
"The vendor shall answer for the eviction even though nothing has been said in the contract on the subject.
"The contracting parties, however, may increase, diminish, or suppress this legal obligation of the vendor.
"Art. 1558. The vendor shall not be obliged to make good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. (underscoring supplied)
"Art. 1559. The defendant vendee shall ask, within the time fixed in the Rules of Court for answering the complaint that the vendor be made as co-defendant."
In the case at bar, the fourth requisite - that of being summoned in the suit for eviction (Case No. 4252) at the instance of the vendee is not present. All that the petitioners did, per their very admission, was to furnish respondents, by registered mail, with a copy of the opposition they (petitioners) filed in the eviction suit. Decidedly, this is not the kind of notice prescribed by the afore-quoted Articles 1558 and 1559 of the New Civil Code. The term "unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee" means that the respondents as vendor/s should be made parties to the suit at the instance of petitioners-vendees, either by way of asking that the former be made a co-defendant or by the filing of a third-party complaint against said vendors. Nothing of that sort appeared to have been done by the petitioners in the instant case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of the then Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, and Alampay, JJ., joins J. Aquino, in his dissent.
Aquino,J., see dissent.
[1] Annex "A", pp. 7-12, Record on Appeal, Page 29, Rollo.
[2] pp. 13-21 Record on Appeal, p. 29 Rollo.
[3] pp. 1-7, Record on Appeal, p. 29, Rollo.
[4] pp. 25-26, Record on Appeal, p. 29, Rollo.
[5] CA-G.R. No. 41953
[6] Bautista et al vs. Laserna, et al, 72 Phil 506; Jovellano, et al vs. Lualhati, 47 Phil 371; Canizares Tiana vs. Torrejos, 21 Phil 127.