This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB).

Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20, 1982, which reads: 

"Madam: 

"Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee. 

"Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. 

Very truly yours, 

(SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA
  Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)
  Chairman" 

Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by respondents. The complaint included a staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.)

Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.

In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange ideas; and that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending before any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that this case has been rendered moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated.

The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit.

Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted.

The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.

Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous warning that "failure to appear...shall be considered as a waiver...and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.

Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.

Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent.

Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained.

Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De La Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a separate opinion.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Makasiar and Aquino, JJ., in the result.

Concepcion, Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., on leave.

Abad Santos, J., see dissenting opinion.

---

CONCURRING WITH A SEPARATE OPINION

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Plana, written in his usual lucid style, is entitled to commendation. It is characterized by fealty to what has long been accepted as the task incumbent on the judiciary, namely, to resolve disputes. There is no departure from the practice very much in evidence in the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth countries. As pointed out by him: "The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit."^[1]  Why it cannot be granted is made clear in these words: "The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters."^[2]  As he further stated in the latter portion of the opinion: "Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation."^[3] 

After pointing out the moot and academic character of the petition, Justice Plana, noted that "ordinarily an invitation to attend a hearing and answer sane questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure" is not per se illegal or unconstitutional and hence free from objection. Then he made the apt observation that under the circumstances at present obtaining, it can be viewed "as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous warning that 'failure to appear * * * shall be considered as a waiver * * * and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.'"^[4]  To this extent, there is conformity to that also has been traditional in this jurisdiction. This Court, whenever an occasion calls for it, has given expression to views indicative of its appraisal of how to avoid the at tines thin line separating what is juridically impeccable from that which may give rise to well-founded doubts as to its legality or at the very least cast a reflection on the ways of the law. What this Court or a member thereof says then may be of persuasive character.

Why prohibition will not issue with respect to the libel charges pending in court against petitioners and suits of a similar character that could be filed, Justice Plana explained in this manner: "Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent. Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates Who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit."^[5] 

In terms of the tried and tested concepts of strict law, it thus becomes obvious why concurrence is unavoidable. This Tribunal, however, is likewise a court of equity. It is reliance on that aspect that distinguishes the separate opinions of Justices Teehankee and Abad Santos. True to the tradition that cases on freedom of expression furnish the opportunity for moving utterances, they stress in language both lofty and persuasive, the exacting responsibility of the judiciary in preserving unimpaired press freedom. They have done me the honor of citing or referring to excerpts from my opinions as well as my other writings. I am, of course, appreciative. Moreover, there has been no change of heart on my part. I stand by then. I am unable, however, to go 'as far as they would wish this Court to go. It is my considered opinion that it suffices that I follow what, as ponente, I did in De la Camara v. Enage,^[6]  namely to furnish guidelines for the lower courts, based on authoritative doctrines. Thus: "While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not warranted, still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required."^[7] 

1. Fortunately, there is a case that serves such a purpose. I refer to Lopez v. Court of Appeals.^[8]  It deals with a civil action for libel, but the principles therein enunciated apply as well to criminal prosecutions. As was set forth early in the opinion of the Court: "It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate that no action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture of respondent Cruz identified as responsible for the hoax of the year, when such was not the case at all. It is easily understandable why. No liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it canes within the well-nigh all-embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing could be plausibly made, however, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of such quasi-delict."^[9] 

2. Further on the question of the decisive character of press freedom in the adjudication of libel suits, the Lopez opinion had this to say: "There is an impressive recognition in our decisions of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right. Thus, in the first leading case, United States v. Bustos, Justice Malcolm could correctly stress: 'The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to moment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good.' On this aspect of the question which, as answered by him, would require that a criminal suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he categorically declared: 'Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.'"^[10] 

3. So it is in the United States except for the fact that it was not until 1964, 36 years after Bustos, that its Supreme Court had occasion to rule likewise. To quote anew from the Lopez opinion: "In the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the nature of the question presented was set forth by Justice Brennan for the Court in the opening paragraph of his opinion: 'We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.' This is the Court's approach to such an issue: 'In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. * * * Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulas for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.' Continuing the same trend, the opinion stressed further: 'Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. * * * The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seen clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.'"^[11] 

4. The test to be followed, according to the language of the New York Times decision, as reinforced by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, was set forth thus in the Lopez opinion: "For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: 'The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' The United States Supreme Court went further in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, where such humanity was held as covering statements concerning public figures regardless of whether or not they are government officials. Why there should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues. What can be more logical and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the principle. As noted by a commentator: 'Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without reference to the men involved on both sides of such issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public officials, one cannot but agree that the Court was right in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public figures.'"^[12] 

5. Accordingly, the Lopez opinion could rightfully stress: "The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive for their consistency is quite obvious. No inroads oh press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored."^[13] 

6. There is no ambiguity in the above authoritative doctrines. Press freedom is a preferred right.^[14]  It is entitled to the fullest protection that the law affords. A person who deems himself aggrieved by defamatory statements is of course entitled to seek redress in the courts. Nonetheless, in the felicitous language of the New York Tines decisions, "libel can claim no talismatic immunity from constitutional limitations." While there is an undeniable public interest in assuring that a man's reputation be safeguarded from calumny and unjust accusation, on matters of public concern, he cannot be shielded from the scrutiny of the press and the expression thereafter of whatever failings it might uncover on matters of public concern. Care is to be taken, however, that in its publication there is avoidance of affirming what is not true or disregarding in a manner deemed reckless to take the necessary steps of ascertaining its truth or falsity. That is as it should be. Justice Holmes, in his classic dissent in Abrams, after stressing that the ultimate good desired is better reached by a free trade of ideas, and that there should be the competition in the open market, was insistent that truth is the only ground upon which man's wishes can be safely carried out.^[15]  Professor Emerson, at present the foremost scholar in the field, emphasized the value of freedom of expression as "an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth."^[16] 

7. There is no more exacting duty on the part of the judiciary, therefore, than to heed the clear and unmistakable mandate of the Constitution in passing upon the conflicting claims of the parties in libel cases. To repeat, the law cannot ignore a man's inherent right to have his reputation remain free from unjustified and unwarranted imputations of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, because of the primacy enjoyed by the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution, even on the assumption that there has been injury to man's reputation, the damages to be assessed, if at all warranted, should not be lacking in the quality of realism. The same sense of realism should likewise be displayed by the plaintiff in a libel suit in estimating the amount due him for the injury inflicted on his good name. The times are difficult, even perilous. It is of the essence, therefore, that there be on the part of public officials and journalists alike an attitude of trust and confidence in the good faith that motivates them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Such an attitude may lessen the atmosphere of confrontation and dissipate the fear that press freedom has become a casualty under the circumstances. It is for the judiciary to be ever on the alert that such be not the case.

---

^[1]  Decision of the Court, 3.

^[2]  Ibid.

^[3]  Ibid, 4.

^[4]  Ibid.

^[5]  Ibid. As to the second reason, this sentence is included: "The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained." The opinion of the Court set forth the above grounds in three separate paragraphs.

^[6]  41 SCRA 1 (1971).

^[7]  Ibid, 6. This excerpt has been cited with approval by Justice Teehankee in his dissent, p. 5.

^[8]  34 SCRA 116 (1970).

^[9]  Ibid, 119-120.

^[10]  Ibid, 123-124.

^[11]  Ibid, 125-126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is reported in 376 US 254.

^[12]  Ibid, 126-127. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts is reported in 388 US 130. It was decided in 1967. The rule thus announced was followed in the subsequent cases of: St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 US 727 (1968); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Asso. v. Brusler, 398 US 6 (1970); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 US 295 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 US 29 (1971); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. The Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 US 376 (1973); The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, Jr., 418 US 241 (1974); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 US 264 (1974); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 US 245 (1974); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 US 448 (1976).

^[13]  Ibid, 127.

^[14]  Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, 570 (1983).

^[15]  Abrams v. US, 250 US 616, 630 (1919). The separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos quotes from such dissent extensively.

^[16]  Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 (1969).

tags