An earlier decision, Reyes v. Commission on Elections^[1] is decisive of this controversy. Petitioner and public respondent Commission on Elections were the same parties in that certiorari and mandamus proceeding. This Court granted the writ of certiorari nullifying and setting aside the resolution of respondent Commission disqualifying petitioner to become a candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. As it was issued, however, on February 7, 1980 although the petition for disqualification was filed on January 25, 1980, he was voted for the position of municipal mayor in the election held on January 30 and was certified as having obtained more votes than his opponent, Jose A. Enriquez. The February 7 resolution of the Commission on Elections led to the Board of Canvassers declaring Enriquez as mayor-elect of Bongabon. Such proclamation was likewise nullified and set aside by this Court. This Court in the same decision granted the writ of mandamus ordering respondent Board of Canvassers of Bongabon to proclaim in accordance with the canvass already terminated petitioner Reyes as mayor-elect. The basis for the decision was the absence of procedural due process, petitioner not having been heard on the question of his being disqualified for having changed his party within the six-month period contrary to a constitutional provision. Characterizing the ban on a change of party affiliation as "both innovative and mandatory,"^[2] this Court likewise ordered: "Thereafter, the case is referred to the respondent Commission on Elections so that it could proceed to pass on the question of the disqualification of petitioner Renato U. Reyes after a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal require­ments of procedural due process."^[3]

Accordingly, respondent Commission set anew for hearing the disqualification case against petitioner. Thereafter, he filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction of respondent Commission on the ground that it had previously given due course to his certificate of candidacy and that he was thereafter voted for, with a majority of the votes being cast in his favor.^[4] Another ground mentioned is that there is an election protest against the petitioner, one of the issues raised being the change of his political party affiliation.^[5] In the Order denying such motion to dismiss, respondent Commission stated: "Things were held in abeyance until May 19, 1980 upon notice of the Decision dated May 15, 1980 of the Supreme Court in the above-cited case, wherein it was directed, among others, that the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Reyes and the proclamation of Enriquez as mayor-elect were nullified; the proclamation of Reyes as mayor-elect was ordered; and the case was returned to the Commission for a hearing on the question of the disqualification of Reyes."^[6]

It is then quite clear why as set forth at the beginning of this opinion, the decision in the first Reyes case is controlling.

1. The doctrine of "the law of the case" identified as the opinion delivered in the former appeal is an insurmountable obstacle to this petition being granted. "More specifically," according to People v. Pinuila,^[7] "it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the Court."^[8] To the same effect is this holding in Kabigting v. Director of Prisons,^[9] the opinion coming from the then Justice, later Chief Justice, now Speaker Makalintal: "It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the Court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case."^[10] Nowhere is there a more emphatic statement of such a principle than in the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Olarte.^[11] Thus: "Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027, rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and even if erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago."^[12] The all-embracing scope of such a principle was duly noted in the latest case in point, Festin v. Faderanga^[13] in these words: "What is express as well as what is implied in a decision is included, to be implemented faithfully, no circumvention or evasion being allowed."^[14]

2. Petitioner, however, seeks to escape from the imperative character of such a principle. His reliance is on what was said in Arcenas v. Commission on Elections:^[15] "It is now the prevailing doctrine that after an election duly held and a proclamation thereafter made, a pre-proclamation controversy should no longer be viable."^[16] Such reliance is misplaced. Arcenas and the cases cited therein^[17] dealt with petitions filed with this Court, not previously decided. This is not the situation here. This is the second time for petitioner to come to this Court. He was successful the first time he sought relief. The decision in his favor ordered precisely what should be done by respondent Commission. Now that it is performing such a task hearing the evidence to satisfy the demands of procedural due process on the question of whether or not, he should be disqualified, petitioner files a new action to stop it from going ahead. It is hardly in consonance with equity to indulge him in his change of mind. That is an affront to reason. It is offensive to fairness, which is the essence of due process. Considering the difference in the environmental circumstances between this case and Arcenas, petitioner cannot be heard to argue that there was a modification of the doctrine announced in the first Reyes decision. Even if there were, however, petitioner is still not entitled to the remedy now sought. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the same Olarte opinion cannot be any more categorical: "A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined."^[18]

3. The other ground alleged by petitioner for the dismissal of the proceedings in respondent. Commission is that there is another action pending in Court for the same cause.^[19] It is alleged in his petition: "In March 1980, Jose A. Enriquez, the losing candidate, filed with the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro an election protest against the election of petitioner, docketed as Election Case No. R-8, which to date is still pending."^[20] Clearly, such a ground is unavailing. Petitioner pleaded and succeeded in his first case to get a favorable decision on May 15, 1980. That was two months after the filing of the election protest against him. He was quite content with the result. He knew then that the matter was referred back to respondent Commission. He did not seek any change or modification. What other con­clusion can there be then except full awareness and recog­nition on his part that according to law, respondent Commission is precisely the agency to receive evidence on the question of whether or not he ought to be dis­qualified. Now he would assert lack of jurisdiction on the ground of another action pending in Court for the same cause. In the first place, the principle of the law of the case is, as set forth previously, an insurmountable obstacle. Even in the absence of such a principle, petition still is doomed to fail. The Election Code mandates: "The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its deci­sions, orders, and rulings shall be final and executory."^[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Aquino, J., see attached concurrence.

Abad Santos, J., see dissenting opinion.

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^[1] G. R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980, 97 SCRA 500.

^[2] Ibid, 504.

^[3] Ibid, 510.

^[4] Petition, Annex "C".

^[5] Ibid.

^[6] Ibid, Annex "D".

^[7] 103 Phil. 992 (1958).

^[8] Ibid, 999.

^[9] 116 Phil. 589 (1962).

^[10] Ibid, 594.

^[11] L-22465, Feb. 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 494.

^[12] Ibid, 498. The Olarte opinion finds support in Fernando v. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585 (1951); Padilla v. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884 (1953); Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. v. Chua Guan, 96 Phil. 974 (1955); People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 (1958) and Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50 (1960). Cf. Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-26932, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 490.

^[13] G.R. No.57351, Jan. 16, 1982, 111 SCRA 1.

^[14] Ibid, 7. The following cases were cited: Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17; Palad v. Governor of Quezon Province, L-24302, Aug. 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 354; Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, L-35386, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 153; Mangayao v. de Guzman, L-24787, Feb. 22, 1974, 55 SCRA 540; National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. CIR, L-31852, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 642; Cosmos Foundry Ship Workers Union v. Lo Bu, L-40136, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 313; National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607; Villanueva v. WCC, L-44108, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 423; Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, L-45911, April 11, 1979, 89 SCRA 336; Bueno Industrial and Development Corporation v. R.C. Aquino Timber and Plywood Co., Inc., L-25747, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 109.

^[15] G.R. No. 54039, November 28, 1980, 101 SCRA 437.

^[16] Ibid, 440.

^[17] Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 53522, July 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 790; Villegas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52563, Sept. 1980, 99 SCRA 595. The rather broad statement in Arcenas has been made more precise in Sande Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 53953, January 5, 1981, 102 SCRA 1.

^[18] People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, 498.

^[19] Petition, par. 7.

^[20] Ibid, par. 6.

^[21] Section 175, 1978 Election Code.

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