This is a petition for review filed by the spouses Jose Salgado and Julieta Salgado to set aside the resolution of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-09407-R, dated September 18, 1980, which authorized the issuance of a writ of attachment against the property of said petitioners.

The pertinent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On May 8, 1978, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, hereinafter referred to as the Bank, filed an action against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 29392 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, to recover on a promissory note in the amount of P1,510,905.96, inclusive of interest and other bank charges. In its verified complaint, the Bank further prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment. As grounds therefor it alleged that petitioners had fraudently misappropriated and/or converted to their own personal use and benefit the sugar proceeds given as security for the payment of the indebtedness; that petitioners are guilty of fraud in contracting their obligation and have concealed, removed or disposed of the properties mortgaged or assigned to the plaintiff, or are concealing, removing or disposing or about to do so, with intent to defraud their creditor; that the obligation sought to be enforced is genuine and, therefore, a sufficient cause of action exists; and that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action. Attached to the complaint was the affidavit of Mrs. Helen Osias, Senior Branch Credit Division Manager of the Bank, wherein she stated, among others, "that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by this action."

On May 9, 1978, the trial court issued an order granting the Bank's prayer for preliminary attachment upon a bond in the sum of P1,510,905.96. Upon the filing of said bond, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon several parcels of land of pe­titioners situated in the province of Negros Occidental.

On September 15, 1978, petitioners Salgado moved to quash the writ of attachment on the ground that respondent Bank made fraudulent misrepresentation in securing the writ by deleting the words "R E M" or "Real Estate Mortgage" from the xerox copy of the promissory note attached to the complaint, thereby "making it appear that the note was unsecured when in truth and in fact it was fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate mortgages duly registered and annotated in the titles of the affected real properties in favor of the plaintiff Bank." In the same motion, petitioners stressed the lack of factual basis of the Bank's claim as to their alleged fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of the sugar proceeds given as security for their obli­gation.

After due hearing, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1979 granting petitioners' motion and lifting the writ of attachment previously issued.

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration the Bank went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari to annul the order of the trial court lifting the writ of attachment.

On November 29, 1979, the respondent Court of Appeals, finding that the order of the trial court was not arbitrarily issued, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

However, on motion of the Bank, the respondent Court reconsidered its decision of November 29, 1979 and issued the questioned resolution dated September 18, 1980, which authorized the issuance of a writ of attachment.

Hence, the present recourse.

We find the petition impressed with merit. The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant's property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satis­faction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.^[1]

The grounds upon which attachment may issue are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. But quite apart from the grounds stated therein, it is further provided in Section 3 of Rule 57 that "an order of attachment shall be granted only when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the applicant or some other person who personally knows the facts, that x x x there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be en­forced by the action."

The reason for the rule prohibiting attachment where indebtedness was already secured is to prevent the secured creditors from attaching additional property and thus tying up more of the debtor's property than was necessary to secure the indebtedness.^[2] Thus, to sustain an order of attachment, "it is incumbent upon plaintiff to establish either of these two facts, to wit: (a) that the obligation had not been secured originally, or (b) that, if secured at its beginning, the security later became valueless."^[3]

In the instant case, the allegation in the affidavit of the Bank's Credit Division Manager, Mrs. Helen Osias, to the effect that "there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by this action" has been shown to be false. It is undisputed that the note sued upon "is fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate mortgages duly registered and annotated in the titles of the affected real property in favor of the plaintiff Bank."

Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court authorizes the discharge of an attachment where the same had been improperly or irregularly issued. In National Coconut Corporation vs. Hon. Potenciano Pecson,^[4] this Court ruled that when the facts or some of them, stated in the plaintiff's affidavit, are shown by the defendant to be untrue, the writ of attachment may be considered as improperly or irregularly issued.

Since attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, the rule authorizing its issuance must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. It should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is the duty of the court before issuing the writ to en­sure that all the requisites of the law has been com­plied with.^[5]

Accordingly, the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated September 18, 1980, is hereby set aside. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, Acting C.J., (Chairman), joins J. Aquino in his dissent.

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^[1] 7 C.J.S. 190

^[2] Blankenship vs. Myers, 54 P. 2d 314, 316; 97 Idaho 356 (1975)

^[3] Giandeini vs. Ramirez, 54 Pacific Reporter (2d) 91-92

^[4] 90 Phil. 809

^[5] Guzman vs. Catolico, 65 Phil. 257; Salas vs. Adil, 90 SCRA 125

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