The plaintiff brought this original action of mandamus in this court to compel the defendant, the clerk  of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to send to this court that part of the record of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Francisca Hilario, deceased, which related to two orders entered therein, one on the 26th day of September, 1904, and the other on the 3d day of October, 1904, the plaintiff  claiming that he had  duly appealed from both of said orders.  The defendant has demurred to the complaint and  the case is now before us for the resolution of the demurrer.

It  appears from the complaint that by the order  of the 26th of September, 1904, the  plaintiff, Calderon, was directed to pay into court on or before the 3d day of October, 1904, P10,514.14.  The  plaintiff alleged that  on the 30th day of September, 1904, he appealed from such order.  There  is no allegation in the complaint that  he gave  any bond, such as is required by the Code of Civil Procedure upon every  appeal  from an order made in a special proceeding relating to the estate of  a deceased person.  Without such a bond, the appeal was not perfected, and until such  bond was presented and approved by the court below the clerk was under no obligation  to send the record here.  This part of the complaint constitutes no cause of action. The order made on the 3d day of October, 1904, recited that the plaintiff had not  complied with the order of the 26th of September and that in lieu  thereof he had appealed therefrom.  The court considered that this failure to comply with that order was a contempt and adjudged that the plaintiff be imprisoned in Bilibid until he  complied with the same.

The plaintiff in this action alleges that against this order of the 3d of October he appealed and gave a bond in the sum of P10,000, which was approved by the judge.

We think that the complaint shows that the plaintiff did all that the law  required him to do in order to perfect his appeal from this order and that it is the duty of the clerk to send up that part of the record which relates thereto.

It is suggested by the defendant that this appeal was never allowed by the court below.  It is true that section 780 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that before an appeal is allowed the persons appealing shall give a bond. We do not think that this section can be so construed as to require an order of the court approving the appeal before it can be considered as perfected, since section 779 provides as follows:

"Method of  perfecting such appeal. The person thus appealing shall perfect his  appeal within twenty-one days after the entry of the order,  decree, or judgment by the Court of First Instance, by filing with the clerk of that court a statement in writing that he appeals to the Supreme Court from such order, decree,  or judgment.   The clerk shall thereupon transmit to the Supreme Court a certified transcript of the account embraced in the order, decree, or judgment, and of the order, decree, or judgment appealed from, and of the appeal."

It is also suggested by the defendant that, the order of the 3d of October, 1904, being an order punishing the plaintiff for contempt,  the practice upon  appeal is governed by section 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   That section is as follows:

"Final judgment. The judgment and orders of a Court of First Instance, made in  cases  of contempt, except in cases arising under section  two hundred and thirty-one, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court; but execution of the judgment and orders shall not  be suspended  until there is filed by the person  in  contempt, in the court rendering the judgment or making the order, an obligation with sureties to the acceptance of the judge, in an amount to be by him fixed, and conditioned that if the judgment be against him  he will abide and perform the order or judgment.  But such  review shall be  had only after final judgment in the action  in  the Court of  First Instance, and when the cause has regularly passed to the Supreme Court by bill of exceptions, as  in this act provided."

The defendant relies upon the  last sentence  of that section.

It is to be observed that this is not an action, but is a special proceeding.  Ordinary actions are brought to this court by bills of exceptions,  but no special proceeding can be brought  here in such a way except in the one case provided for by section 777 of the code.  It is further to be noted that no ordinary action can be brought to this court until a final judgment is entered in the lower court, which puts an end to the litigation in that court.  (Sec. 123 of the Code  of Civil Procedure.)  In special  proceedings, however, any final order, and orders relating to the settlement of accounts,  the  allowance or disallowance of a will, and  the decree of distribution may be brought here before a final determination of the entire special  proceeding pending in that court  The  case of  Enriquez vs. Enriquez (5 Phil. Rep., 668) was an appeal from an order punishing Francisco1 Enriquez for contempt.  That order was made in q, special proceeding relating to the settlement of the estate of Antonio Enriquez, deceased, and it was reviewed by this court before any final judgment or decree had been entered in the court below terminating the proceedings  relating to that  estate.  In our  opinion the last part of section 240, above quoted,  does not apply to orders for contempt made in special proceeding, and appeals from such orders may be  brought here at any time.  We therefore hold that as to the order of the  3d of October, 1904, the complaint constitutes a cause of action.  The demurrer is accordingly overruled and the defendant is given ten days from the date of this decision within which to file  an answer to the  complaint.   So ordered.

Arellano, C.  J., Torres,  Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Tracey, JJ., concur.