This case is a good example of the saying: "much ado about nothing." And it serves as a reminder of the suggestion that we should relax, take it easy and not get unduly excited. For these reasons, a little whimsy is not out of place.

This case was originally assigned to Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera who was an outstanding student of the Chief Justice. The facts which led to the filing of the case had attracted national attention so it was thought that Justice Melencio-Herrera would once again pen a significant opinion. Due solely to the vagaries of chance, according to the Chief Justice, the lady justice was writing the decisions in leading cases. At one time Justice Antonio P. Barredo remarked that despite his long service with the Court he had not penned a landmark case. But that was before the Federation of Free Farmers case (107 SCRA 352-490 [1981] ) which competes with the McDougal and Feliciano tomes in their soporific effects.

Justice Melencio-Herrera in fact already had a ponencia to which nine (9) other justices concurred: But alas, before it could be promulgated some of the brethren changed their minds. No, they did not exactly flip-flop; they merely flipped. Justice Melencio-Herrera has "threatened" to write a separate opinion and hopefully she will tell it all.

It is now my task to write a "decision" which is a misnomer because this opinion will certainly not decide anything. The only function it can serve is that of a resolution to dismiss the petition which will be explained by the Chief Justice later.

In the afternoon of June 16, 1981, which was an election day, Salvador F. Reyes who was a radio reporter for Radio Veritas, addressed certain questions relating to voting procedure to Mayor Emiliano R. Caruncho, Jr. of Pasig, Metro Manila. The good mayor must have had a trying day because instead of answering the questions, he questioned Reyes for questioning him. What happened next could have been settled easily but for the fact that it was televised nationally. Mayor Caruncho and some of his companions manhandled Salvador F. Reyes and the incident was on tape. Understandably, there was an outcry against Caruncho, et al. Understandably also, Reyes sought the assistance of the law so that on July 2, 1981, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information in the Municipal Court of Pasig, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35961 and which reads as follows:

  "The undersigned City Fiscal of Quezon City pursuant to the authority under Ministry Order No. 109, dated June 22, 1981, accuses Emiliano Caruncho, Jr., Alfonso Cordova, Cesar Corpuz, Jacinto Gonzales and John Doe whose true name and real identity has not as yet been ascertained, of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.

  "That on or about the 16th day of June, 1981, in Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of SALVADOR F. REYES, by then and there pulling his hair, strangling him and hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Salvador F. Reyes physical injuries which have required medical attendance and/or incapacitated him from performing his nine (9) days, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines."

Municipal Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu fixed bail at P200.00 for each accused which was duly posted.

The accused entered pleas of not guilty on July 16, 1981, and on July 23, 1981, they moved to dismiss on the ground that Reyes had executed an affidavit of desistance. In his affidavit Reyes said that the accused had no intention to physically injure, insult, dishonor or discredit him because the incident was "the result of our failure to understand each other."

The motion was opposed by the City Fiscal. He said he had evidence other than the testimony of Reyes and such evidence was sufficient to convict.

Judge Espiritu must have perceived that his action on the motion would attract a lot of attention for he had noted the "wide publicity" given to the incident. And so he carefully composed a 9-page Order which dismissed the case on the ground that:

  "x x x the said affidavit of desistance is in complete consonance with the objective and intention of P.D. 1508 as supplemented by its pertinent letters of instructions and implementations. It leaves therefore, no alternative for this Court except to uphold said affi­davit of desistance and to make a finding for all the accused."

The dismissal of the case evoked criticisms from some sectors of the citizenry. Reyes was accused of betraying his profession. It was said that the freedom to gather information had suffered a set-back because of his action.

Enter the Solicitor General in representation of the People of the Philippines. In his petition for certiorari and mandamus, the prayer is for the annulment of the order of dismissal and to order a trial on the merits "without further delay" on the ground "that the order of dismissal is void for it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amount­ing to lack of jurisdiction."

In the light of the foregoing the issue is simple: Did Judge Espiritu commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case against Caruncho, et al. on the basis of the affidavit of desistance? It should be noted that the operative words are "grave abuse of discretion." Accordingly, even if there be an abuse of discretion, if it is not grave and does not inflict substantial harm, the issuance of the prerogative writ of certiorari will not be warranted. On this basis, the petition must fail.

Long before this case was re-assigned to me, Justices Guerrero and de Castro and I had already filed dissenting opinions. Because Justice de Castro's dissent is more comprehensive, he was the logical heir to the case. Unfortunately, however, he was seriously injured in a vehicular accident. It will take sometime before Justice de Castro can work again. In acknowledgment of his contribution, Justice de Castro's opinion is quoted in full as follows:

 

"I vote to dismiss the petition. I am of the opinion that the order sought to be annulled is perfectly legal.

 

"As I see it, the petition is anchored on just two (2) grounds (1) the crime charged is not subject to compromise, and (2) even if it is, protagonists not being of the same barangay, or barangays in the same city or municipality nor of adjoining barangays, the barangay lupon cannot assume jurisdiction to effect a compromise under Presidential Decree No. 1508, commonly referred to as the Barangay Court Law.

 

"In the oral argument, it was made clear that Mayor Caruncho was charged not as a public official, but as a private person. The information contains no allegation of respondent Caruncho being a holder of a public office, the very reason why the case was filed in the ordinary court, not in the Sandigan Bayan. The crime as charged against Mayor Caruncho may therefore be the subject of compromise, or amicably settled, under express provision of the aforementioned decree, (Section 2, par 3, PD No. 1508) as the Solicitor General readily admitted after this matter was clarified.

 

"The only reason then left to support the petition, as the Solicitor General also had to admit, that the compromise or amicable settlement upon which the questioned order of the public respondent is based, is of no legal effect because under Presidential Decree No. 1508, only when the parties belong to the same barangay or neighboring barangays may they be brought under the jurisdiction of the Barangay Court for the arbitration proceedings intended to reach an out of court settlement of the case. It is precisely because the barangay court cannot acquire jurisdiction that the compromise cannot be effected therein; otherwise there would have been no case filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig.

 

"The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according to the concept or of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character. And to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, and the policy behind it would be better served, if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties. At least, I find no legal obstacle, expressed or implied, in any existing law to the parties coming to an amicable settlement or compromise of their controversies. As the writer observed during the oral argument, this could even be more 'welcome,' because the compulsory proceedings also to effect just that kind of settlement, before the barangay court, which could result only in waste of time and expense, would be avoided.

 

"In civil cases, amicable settlement or some form of voluntary arbitration obviously to ease up case congestion in the courts, by avoiding full-blown judicial proceedings which usually go all the way from the trial court to the highest appellate court, is encouraged by no less than a specific provision of law. (See Articles 2029 and 2030, New Civil Code.) But amicable settlement of cases, if made to depend on the voluntary will of the parties, is generally hard to come by. Hence, there was felt the need of a compulsory arbitration proceedings as a more effective means of bringing about the desired result, as is precisely the purpose and reason for Presidential Decree No. 1508. Advisely, because of the compulsory nature of the proceedings thereunder, certain limitations have to be imposed not to subject the parties to undue expenses and inconvenience. Thus the territorial jurisdiction of the barangay courts is primarily based on the residence of the parties. The creation of these courts, however, could not have been intended to prevent voluntary settlement of cases being entered into without regard to the residence of the would-be litigants, which obviously, and in reality, is the more desirable mode of achieving the main objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 - that of declogging court dockets. This is so because in a compulsory arbitration, there is no sure guaranty of the case not reaching the regular courts. On the other hand, where the amicable settlement is voluntary, the case would certainly no longer entail any court action, or, at least, a long-drawn one.

 

"In the instant case, the affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Salvador Reyes, was made the basis of a motion to dismiss. This is not legally infeasible since the offense is admittedly subject to compromise under the law (PD No. 1508). Why should the parties undergo the compulsory arbitration proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 1508 where, acting on their own volition, they are willing to do exactly what the barangay court would wish or order them to do? Under the theory of the petitioner, this is precisely what would be unjustifiably required to be done. On ground of logic alone, it is hard to perceive any reason why it should be so.

 

"Even following petitioner's theory, the petition should be dismissed, it appearing that both the offended party and the offender are now residents of the same barangay as manifested to this Court (p. 8, Majority Opinion). If this is so, a mere reiteration of the affidavit of desistance would result in the dismissal of the case since the objection of the Solicitor General to giving effect to said affidavit has already been removed. It would, therefore, serve the cause of a speedy administration of justice to dismiss the instant petition, so as to allow the dismissal of the case against respondents-accused to stand.

 

"It is also contended by respondents that certiorari is not the proper remedy, citing the case Of People vs.  City Judge Villanueva, G. R. No. 56443, December 19, 1981. A supposedly crucial distinction is however, drawn in the majority opinion, between the case cited and the instant case in that in the former, the period of appeal had lapsed before the certiorari petition was filed, while the instant Petition was filed well within the period of appeal. The distinction pointed out is to me of no consequence, as not to constitute a hindrance to the application of the ruling of the Villanueva case. This is so because if the period of appeal has not yet lapsed when the instant Petition was filed, the impropriety of certiorari would even be more pronounced, for it then cannot be said that 'there is no appeal,' which is an indispensable requirement for certiorari to be properly resorted to. I neither cannot agree that there was such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to justify certiorari despite the availability of an appeal as the proper remedy, the error if any, being actually one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. As demonstrated above, there was in fact no error at all."

Justice Guerrero's opinion reads:

 

"I beg to dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that the public policy enunciated by the decree in allowing amicable settlement in cases of light offenses in order to promote the speedy administration of justice, preserve and develop Filipino culture in accordance with the constitutional mandate, strengthen the family as a basic social institution and thereby help relieve the courts of docket congestion and enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, should be the overriding consideration in resolving the petition at bar. I submit that his should be the functional attitude that the courts should take and consider the social justification of the decree, not through the purely legalistic, traditional and ana­lytical solution of the problem at hand.

 

"While it is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute criminal offenses and that the fiscal has the full control in public prosecution, P.D. No. 1508 itself stays the prosecuting arm of the government in cases of light offenses and allows the parties to settle their differences in the larger and greater interest of public peace and order. The objection that the settlement in the instant case is not effective because the parties reside in different barangays has, to my mind, been successfully overcome by the certification of the barangay captain that the complainant Reyes and respondent Caruncho now reside in the same street and within the same barangay in Pasig - at MRR Road, Barangay No. 6, Pasig, Metro Manila since July, 1981.

 

"I do not agree that the principle of estoppel should be raised against such certification in order to thwart the utilitarian value of the decree. The parties themselves desire peace. The State is duty bound to preserve and maintain peace. The Judiciary should do no less."

I share the views expressed by Justices de Castro and Guerrero above-quoted. Additionally, I must say that even if the light felony involving. Caruncho, et al. is not covered by P.D. No. 1508, Judge Espiritu did not commit a grave abuse of discretion for: True it is that in criminal cases society is the ultimate aggrieved party for which reason the People of the Philippines is designated as the plaintiff. True it is also that except as provided in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code a pardon by the private offended party does not extinguish criminal liability. And true it is further that the dropping of criminal cases by the execution of affidavits of desistance by complainants is not looked with favor. These are Hornbook doctrines. But what is actually done in our criminal justice system? First, there is plea bargaining between the prosecution and the defense. For instance, murder is charged but in exchange for a plea of guilty the charge is reduced to homicide and the accused is allowed to claim a number of mitigating circumstances. It is not uncommon for estafa, libel, physical injuries and even homicide cases-to be dismissed because the complainant has lost interest or alleged that the complaint was filed as a result of a misunderstanding. A number of examples can be given and they can fill a book.

In the instant case, Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu has presented an affidavit of desistance. In the light of contemporary practice the question which is raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not he acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. I submit that there was no grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the petition should be dismissed.

As a footnote, it should be mentioned that Salvador F. Reyes transferred his residence from Fairview Park in Quezon City to Barangay Caniogan in Pasig where Caruncho also lives. On March 22, 1982, the two executed a verified amicable settlement before Barangay Captain Ruperto Concepcion. Commenting on this factual development the Solicitor General says: "The present case, we submit, falls within the spirit and purposes of P.D. 1508, particularly to promote the speedy administration of justice without judicial recourse and, thus, help re­lieve the courts of docket congestion (WHEREASES of the decree)." To be sure this applies only to Mayor Caruncho but not to the other private respondents.

After I had written the foregoing, some "developments" took place and I feel that I must make the following statements but as mine alone only:

Justice de Castro has returned from his extended sick leave. Since his dissenting opinion was more extensive than mine, I asked him if he wanted to write the "main" opinion but he demurred. Instead he signi­fied his concurrence to my opinion.

Justice Melencio-Berrera's separate opinion which is actually a second revision of her first separate opinion bewails the length of time it has taken to dispose of the case. She appears to attribute the blame mostly on the Chief Justice, a posture which I do not share. A reading of the third version of her separate opinion will readily reveal some of the causes for the delay which I believe cannot be blamed on the Chief Justice:

Because some of the justices "flipped" it was necessary to re-agenda the case a number of times for further discussion. The Court after all is a deliberative body where opinions can and do change after debates which can sometimes be heated. Moreover, in between the different dates when the case was placed on the agenda the composition of the Court was changing. Justices Barredo and Vasquez, retired; Justice de Castro went on prolonged sick leave after his accident; Justices Teehankee and Gutierrez, Jr. went to Cairo to attend a conference and even Justice Melencio-Herrera went abroad.

At any rate, I fail to see any compelling reason for deliberate haste in the disposition of the case. There would be reason enough to urge expeditious action on the petition if the Court had been consistently disposed to grant it but, alas, that is not so. The final action is to dismiss the petition.

WHEREFORE, for lack of necessary votes to grant the petition the same is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Guerrero, Makasiar and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs, and, in addition, submits a separate opinion (1) to make clear that at no time had there been submitted to his office a ponencia of Justice Melencio-Herrera with seven other Justices concurring and (2) to express, in the broadest general terms, his perception of what for him is the evolving trend of more humanism in the administration of criminal justice, with its resulting benefits.

Teehankee, J., concurs with the separate opinion of Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera. Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, and Gutierez, Jr., JJ., see separate opinion.

Plana and Relova, JJ., vote to grant the petition. Please see separate opinion.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs but adding some views through a separate opinion.

---

CONCURS and submits this SEPARATE OPINION

FERNANDO, C.J.:

I yield my concurrence to the plurality opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, written - and this is not typical of him - in a rather light vein. It is understandable why. As emphasized by him, this case "is a good example of the saying 'much ado about nothing.' " I am not prepared though to go along with him in his characterization of the reaction that could arise from the well-known exhaustive and comprehensive treatment that retired Justice Barredo and Professors McDougal and Feliciano usually accord any subject on which they write. I must likewise qualify my concurrence to his observation that "justice Melencio-Herrera in fact already had a ponencia to which nine (9) other Justices concurred." I must state for the record that at no time had I even been shown an opinion by her to which nine other Justices concurred. The ponencia submitted by her on September 30, 1982 to the Office of the Chief Justice, was concurred in by six other Justices.^[1] There were even then already five dissenters.^[2] Two justices did not take part.^[3]   Her ponencia was thus one vote shy of the indispensable eight votes necessary for a Supreme Court decision. In letter to me accom­panying such opinion, she stated: "The case is now ready for [my] action."^[4]

Attached to her letter is the handwritten note of Justice de Castro, reading as follows: "I have circulated copies of my dissent. However, I have not signed yet, intending to do so after I have known the reaction to my dissent. If the majority 'dissents' against it, I may go along, or just sign as the lone dissenter if no one agrees with me. Thanks, (Signed) Pacifico de Castro P.S. In the meantime, the draft decision may be circulated, not to lose time. Same."^[5]

It was during the session of the Court on March 25, 1982 that Justice Melencio-Herrera was asked to prepare the "draft decision" referred to by Justice de Castro in his letter. Apparently, she was able to get the conformity of nine other members of the Court to-such a draft. Thus she could assert in the above letter that on September 20, 1982, there were enough votes for her to write, not a mere draft, but a decision of the Court. It can be deduced from the tenor thereof that in the space of ten days, the efforts of Justice de Castro to persuade other members to his-way of thinking, bore fruit. Thus on September 30, when she submitted her ponencia, there were only six Justices who concurred with her, with five dissenters there was though the possibility that the eight decisive vote could still be forthcoming.

It is true I could have voted with her, thus making her ponencia the decision of the Court. She could have been under the impression that I would do so. Of course, had I done so, there would not be any need for the seven separate opinions, excluding mine, and the plurality opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos. I am the first to admit that her ponencia is not lacking in merit. The "inarticulate major premise "to borrow from Holmes, is, in the terminology of Professor Packer, the crime control model in the criminal process.^[6]   Its primary concern is on efficiency, the stress on a high rate of apprehension end conviction conformably to "the dominant role [of society] in repressing crime."^[7]

On the other hand, as may be inferred from my opinions these past sixteen years, I am quite partial to the due process model, to adopt anew Professor Packer's terminology. The concern is for "the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of limitation of power."^[8]   Thus the stress on the presumption of innocence and the insistence upon the state's duty to insure that an accused could rely effectively on his constitutional rights. I have desisted from applying with unmitigated rigor the full force of our penal law. If, therefore, a lower court judge, in the exercise of his sound judgment, could decide that a prosecution be dismissed and there was nothing arbitrary or whimsical in his order, I would find it extremely difficult to reverse him on the ground that there was a grave abuse of discretion. For me, then, the opinions of Justices Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, labeled dissents to her ponencia, were more persuasive. They manifest, to my mind, fealty to such an approach. Hence, my inability to concur with her.

As my vote, would thus be indecisive, I waited for later developments. They were not long in coming. On November 18, 1982, there was a pleading from respondents attaching a certification by the Barrio Captain of Caniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila to the effect that as far back as March 22, 1982, Salvador F. Reyes, the complainant, and respondent Caruncho, Jr., both residing in his barangay, appeared before him to manifest that they had amicably settled their differences regarding the incident of June 16, 1981, the subject of a criminal case then pending with the Municipar Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Comment was required from petitioner. When filed on January 27, 1983, it simply stated that there was no objection to the motion for leave to file such certification. Thereafter, on February 4, 1983, respondents, relying on the Katarungang Pambarangay  law, Presidential Decree No. 1508, and stating that there was an amicable settlement, sought the dismissal of the petition for being moot and academic. Once again, comment was required from petitioner. In such Comment, submitted on February 28, 1983, the Solicitor General interposed no objection.

As of that date then, the petition had, to all intents and purposes, become moot and academic. There was no longer any petitioner. That could be the explanation why Justice Melencio-Herrera, in her separate opinion, did not take kindly to the Comment of Solicitor General Mendoza in effect agreeing to the petition being dismissed.

March 1983, on the whole, was a period devoted to the discussion of two significant habeas corpus petitions, Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile^[9] and Morales v. Ponce Enrile.^[10]   The former was not decided until April 20, 1983 and the latter on the 26th of the same month. There were, of course, other important cases discussed and decided during that time. From May 2 to 18, I was abroad to honor an invitation to pay a second visit to the French Cour de Cassation, during which trip I was able likewise to confer with jurists from the United Kingdom, the President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, and the President of the International Court of justice. It was not then until the latter part of June, June 23, 1983 to be exact, that the Court voted anew on this petition. From October 1982 to June 23, 1983, the Court en banc acted on 3,230 items in the agenda, with 130 new petitions, 19 of which were applications for habeas corpus and held 38 hearings, 21 of which dealt with habeas corpus petitions. The Court, either through extended opinions or minute resolutions, decided 2,702 cases. The priority to be accorded a petition that has become moot and academic is hardly discernible. So I did assume. Considering the views of my brethren, as expressed in their opinions, except for Justices Teehankee and Melencio-Herrera, such an assumption cannot, with reason, be stigmatized as purely conjectural.

In the voting on June 23, 1983, a day before Justice Melencio-Herrera's official trip abroad, only Justices Teehankee, Escolin, and Relova voted with her to grant the petition. Seven members of the Court, Justices Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Vasquez, Gutierrez, Jr., and I voted to dismiss the petition. Justices Makasiar and Aquino did not take part, and Justice Plana was absent. On June 27, 1983, in her absence, her separate opinion was received in the Office of the Chief Justice. On September 27, 1983, the Court voted for the last time. Justice Plana was at that time present. His vote was to grant the petition. Justice Vasquez had by then retired.

On July 1, 1983, Justice De Castro was the victim of an accident and had to be on sick leave until November of 1983. Thus, it fell to Justice Abad Santos to be the spokesman of the members of the Court voting for the dismissal of the petition. Living up to his well-deserved reputation of being "fast on the draw," he circulated his opinion on October 7, 1983. On December 16, 1983, a Friday, he submitted the original version of his "decision" with an addendum. On Monday, December 19, I suggested that perhaps such addendum should be incorporated in the Resolution. The result is this Resolution submit­ted on January 9, with Justices De Castro and Gutierrez, Jr., concurring but submitting separate opinions, and with Justice Concepcion Jr., concurring in the dismissal only as to respondent Caruncho, likewise filing his own opinion. So did Justices Plana, Escolin, and Relova, all of whom voted to grant the petition. Thus only Justice Teehankee concurred in the separate opinion of Justice MeIencio-Herrera.

The explanation, it occurs to me, considering that from her standpoint the discussion of the legal issues appears to be quite adequate, is that in her separate opinion, there is a reference to the Justices who changed their stand. After the voting on September 27, 1983, there was added in her separate opinion an expression of concern for what she saw as a delay in the final disposition of the case.

Justices Concepcion Jr., De Castro, and Gutierrez, Jr., in their separate opinions stress that in a collegiate court modification or even reversal of opinion is to be expected as the deliberations are likely to produce a clash of ideas. The conclusion finally arrived at then may differ from that originally entertained. Justice Escolin, who was with her as to the petition being granted, was of a different mind when it came to a Justice "adopting" an opinion different from that originally entertained by him. Thus: "That the final votation turned out the way it did is but a simple case of some justices changing their minds, after thorough and assiduous deliberation, for what they believed should be the correct disposition of the issue involved." Justice Relova who likewise voted to grant the petition had this to say: "There were differences of opinion which is not unusual in a collegiate court and because the issue has to be weighed and reweighed carefully, initial opinions at times changed."

It would be less than gracious on my part if I do not express my appreciation for these kind words of Justice Gutierrez, Jr. in his separate opinion: "Regarding Justice Melencio-Herrera's concern about delays in the resolution of cases, there is no member of this Court who does not share an equal concern. From the moment I joined this Court, I have seen the Chief Justice continuously appeal to all of us to give appropriate priority to death penalty and life imprison­ment cases, to see how all labor cases may be expedited, to look for older cases that may have become moot so they can be dismissed in minute resolutions, and to otherwise press for early resolution of pending cases and, at the same time, unfailingly congratulate his Court whenever statistics on decided cases show that a little back patting is warranted."^[11]

He was equally cognizant of the role invariably played by Justice Teehankee, - not that he is the only one - in the at times tedious-process of arriving at decisions. Thus: "However, as expressed every now and then by Senior Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, our concern for expedited action should not result in cut­ting short deliberations on any petition until the views of all the Justices desiring to document have been fully heard. The Supreme Court is a collegiate court and full and free deliberations are the index of collegiality."^[12]   The Court has been benefited. It has thereby been more confident that decisions reached with greater care and foresight can stand the test of scrutiny. Whatever delay is thus Incurred is compensated by the feeling of a task performed in a most judicious manner. There is this added benefit. In the process, a-member may be strengthened in the validity of his conclusion or may be persuaded by the opposing view.

This is as good an opportunity as any for me to acknowledge that my brethren have-been most cooperative in the collective effort of the Court to terminate cases with promptness and dispatch, but after due deliberation. So it has been since my assumption of office on July 2, 1979. In 1979, the Court decided 2,411 cases, 2,487 in 1980, 2,934 in 1981, 3,616 in 1982, and 3,522 in 1983. Previously, only at one time had the number of decisions been above 2,500. That was in 1976 when there were 2,784 cases decided.

I could very well understand the feeling that prompted my esteemed colleague to lay bare her deep disappointment of this turn of events. Her ponencia, fashioned with commendable craftsmanship failed to carry the day. Perhaps I should have voted with her when six other members of the Court had signed it. Then that would have been a decision of the Court. If I could, I would have done so. Her motivation was of the purest. Crime, if committed, must be penalized. The wrongdoer must feel the full force of the criminal law. For me, however, while agreeing on general principle, it would suffice if the offended party would be satisfied with exacting the civil liability. I could not look with disfavor then on an affidavit of desistance, especially so, where, as in this case, the matter could be handled by a barangay tribunal. If the alleged offender is a public official, there could be in addition, the imposition of an administrative sanction.

My reading of some recent writings on criminology reveals that originally it was the offended party that must exact retribution for the wrongdoing until the State intervened. In Common Law parlance, the King's Peace must be maintained. Thus, as in the United Kingdom, a prosecution is in the name of the reigning, Rex or, if the monarch be a female, Regina. Here it is the People of the Philippines. My perception is that there is a trend towards adopting anew the practice followed in the early times. Leave it to the offended party. He enjoys a greater discretion to decide whether or not he would prosecute. This is so especially where the offense imputed is of a light character or a misdemeanor. I must leave it at that. This opinion, at it is, is lengthy enough. I must bide the time until the proper occasion presents itself, if ever, for a fuller treatment.

May I reiterate the lingering feeling of regret at my inability to affix my signature to her ponencia and thus avoid all this - and here I use a favorite word of Justice Abad Santos - "brouhaha."

---

^[1] Justices Teehankee, Aquino, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.

^[2] Justices Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Vasquez.

^[3] Justices Barredo and Makasiar.

^[4] Letter, 1.

^[5] Handwritten note of Justice de Castro to Justice Melencio-Herrera dated August 6, 1982.

^[6] Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 154 (1968).

^[7] Ibid, 162.

^[8] Ibid, 165.

^[9] G.R. No. 61388, 121 SCRA 472.

^[10] G.R. No. 61016, 121 SCRA 538.

^[11]   Separate opinion of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., 3. Like Justice Melencio-Herrera, Justice Gutierrez, Jr. was also an outstanding former student. So that Justice Efren Plana would not feel ignored, may I add that he likewise belongs to that category.

^[12] Ibid.

tags