SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 641, November 19, 1982 ]
FRANCISCO RADOMES, COMPLAINANT, VS. FERNANDO FABRIGARAS, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The case was thereafter referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for report and recommendation.[4] After such investigation duly conducted, such report embodying the recommendation was submitted on November 10, 1982. It summarizes its finding thus: "1. Petitioner has nothing to show, by way of documentary proof, that there was such marriage between respondent and Felicidad Jumagdao; 2. What he knew of such marriage was what he merely heard, hence, hearsay; 3. He has also no document to prove that Severino, Urbano, Betilda, and Yolanda, all surnamed Fabrigaras, are respondent's children by Felicidad Jumagdao, having learned of this only through rumors; 4. Inspite of his search of the records of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer and the local parish priest, he has failed to locate the documents in support of his claim of marriage between respondent and Felicidad Jumagdao; 5. Municipal Treasurer Babon (who also was the local civil registrar), vouched that the Book of Marriages of the municipality for 1942 is complete. It was brought to the hearing and examined; 6. Petitioner saw for himself that the Book of Marriages of the parish priest of Wright is intact; and that it has no record of such marriage; 7. Exhibit 1 (Fr. Emilio Bernardo's certificate) attests that no such record of marriage exists."[5]
The recommendation is that respondent be exonerated.
The Court agrees with such recommendation. There is relevance to this excerpt from the opinion of Justice Malcolm in Santiago v. Calvo:[6] "The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled clients, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their spleen on attorneys."[7] The doctrine set forth in Edwards v. McCoy,[8] a 1912 decision, Justice Moreland being the ponente, bears repeating: "A verdict or decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked, and a body which affirms such a decision does not exercise either deliberative discretion or authority."[9] It is worthwhile to note that in the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[10] such a principle was paraphrased by Justice Laurel in this wise: "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attacked."[11]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Fernando Fabrigaras is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., no part.
[1] Answer, 4.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro and Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan.
[5] Report and Recommendation, 5-6.
[6] 48 Phil. 919 (1926).
[7] Ibid, 923.
[8] 22 Phil. 598.
[9] Ibid, 601.
[10] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[11] Ibid, 642.