EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 52463, September 04, 1980 ]
JESUS L. VILLEGAS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LORENZO G. TEVES AND THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, C.J.:
A novel provision in the present Constitution is that empowering the Commission on Elections to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and
city officials."[1] Thus, its competence is greater than that formerly found in the 1935 Constitution which is limited to the "enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections."[2] Where before it was the
Electoral Tribunal and the judiciary that inquired into and passed upon election contests affecting legislative members and provincial and city officials, respectively, a distinction being made between those involving legislative members and provincial and city officials, now it
is the Commission on Elections that does so. Its authority to decide pre-proclamation controversies is still one of its functions.[3] The question in this case arose from the fact that during the pendency of such a proceeding before respondent
Commission, an election protest was filed by petitioner against private respondent Lorenzo G. Teves, who was duly proclaimed provincial governor of Negros Oriental by the Board of Canvassers, having obtained 160,592 votes as against 65,204 votes of petitioner.[4] It is undoubted that the law affords a remedy to one who has lost in an election, if in the conduct thereof, there has been a violation of the Election Code. The specific question is whether under the particular circumstances of this controversy, it should
be through a protest and not through a pre-proclamation suit.
Our answer is that it should be the former. Accordingly, this certiorari and prohibition proceeding aimed at compelling respondent Commission to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental to suspend the canvass of votes for governor and to consider the certificate of candidacy of respondent Teves cancelled is dismissed. It is quite evident that at this stage, no useful purpose would be served.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. There was filed with respondent Commission on February 1, 1980 by petitioner, an Urgent Petition to Suspend the Canvass of Votes and the Proclamation and Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Teves.[5] On February 2, 1980, a resolution in the above petition was promulgated by respondent Commission stating that inasmuch as "specific violations of the Election Code on prohibited acts, such as illegal election propaganda, massive vote buying, terrorism, etc.; considering that the grounds alleged are proper grounds for an election protest or criminal action, [it resolved] to deny the aforementioned petition."[6] It was not until February 5, 1980 that petitioner elevated the matter to this Court. As noted earlier, as far back as February 2, 1980, the Provincial Board of Canvassers had proclaimed respondent Teves as the provincial governor-elect of Negros Oriental with the majority of over 95,000 votes. At the time, therefore, that the urgent petition was filed with this Court, there had already been a proclamation. It is regrettable that counsel, in his petition, did not so inform this Tribunal. Upon being required to comment, respondent Teves pointed out that he had on March 1, 1980 taken his oath of office, duly assumed the position and thereafter exercised the functions of governor of Negros Oriental.[7] In addition, the comment pointed out that there was pending an election protest before respondent Commission with petitioner Jesus L. Villegas and the other candidates of his party for the positions of vice governor as well as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,[8] contesting his election and that of his party-mates. A copy of the protest was likewise included which indicated that it was filed with respondent Commission on February 9, 1980 and that the grounds alleged in the pre-proclamation controversy were the same grounds on which the protest was based.[9] Moreover, respondent Teves had filed on March 4, 1980 his answer with a counterclaim.[10] It is thus clear that the election protest is still pending with the respondent Commission. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,[11] in his comment likewise sought its dismissal. As was therein pointed out: "Considering, however, that respondent Lorenzo G. Teves had already been proclaimed as the winner in the gubernatorial elections in Negros Oriental, that he had already taken his oath and that he had already assumed the office of the governor of said province, the instant petition has become moot and academic; 3. Furthermore, as correctly observed or ruled by the COMELEC, in its resolution of February 2, 1980 * * * the grounds relied upon by petitioner in PP No. 63 which are the same grounds alleged by him in this instant petition are proper grounds for an election protest or criminal action."[12]
Both comments were considered as answers and the case submitted for decision. As set forth at the outset, the petition cannot prosper.
On the face of the urgent petition before respondent Commission on Elections, which was dismissed in the assailed resolution of February 2, 1980, the grounds in the pre-proclamation controversy are that respondent Teves committed acts violative of certain sections of the 1978 Election Code,[13] specifically referred to as giving money or other material inducements to influence, induce, or corrupt the voters; committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; attaching or displaying billboards on tricycles or other motor vehicles in announcing or advertising his candidacy, during the prohibited period of campaigning, and on election day; showing or displaying publicly advertisement or propaganda in favor of his candidacy by means of cinematography; giving free of charge, directly or indirectly, transportation, food, or drinks or things of value during a public meeting in favor of several candidates not only during the three hours before and after such meetings, but also on the day preceding the election and on the day of the election; engaging in massive vote buying; using public funds under any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, for an election campaign; using government equipment and vehicle for any election campaign or for partisan political activity; availing himself of any scheme to discover the contents of the ballot of a voter who has just voted; transferring the location of a voting center without proper authority; violating the integrity of official ballots by adding false ones to the genuine ones, and altering results in electoral precincts counting of votes; altering certified list of voters to confuse voters or for the purpose of discouraging voters from casting his vote resulting in the disenfranchisement of 20% of the entire voting population of the province and registering new and qualified voters on election day and allowing them to vote; allowing or inducing flying voters to vote more than once in the same election; using of ballots other than the one given by the election committee to alter results of counting votes; distributing sample ballots inside voting centers; and holding in some precincts, elections a day prior to January 30, 1980.[14]
As noted in the comment of respondent Teves, those are the very same grounds in the election protest filed with respondent Commission on February 9, 1980. It becomes quite apparent then as to why this petition should be dismissed. No harm whatsoever could be caused petitioner Villegas. The opportunity for him to prove such a wholesale allegation of massive fraud and violations of the Election Code is still there. The election protest which he himself had filed with respondent Commission three days after this urgent petition for certiorari and prohibition was submitted to this Tribunal is an even more appropriate vehicle for that purpose. Nor should it be lost sight of that the election protest was not even made ex abundanti cautela. It appears to be a deliberate choice on his part to rely on such a proceeding. If, therefore, dismissal of his petition becomes unavoidable, he should be aware on whose shoulder the responsibility falls. Then, too, it would be a time consuming effort if the pre-proclamation controversy at this stage would have to be sent back to the Commission on Elections for a full-dress hearing. That is essential in the task of adjudication, being one of the cardinal requirements of procedural due process. The election protest, however, would serve just as well, if not better. Moreover, it would be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, granting as it did the additional competence to respondent Commission to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials."[15]
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Fernandez and Abad Santos, JJ., on official leave.
[1] So it is provided in Article XII, C, Sec. 2, par. 2 of the Constitution.
[2] Article X, Sec. 2 of the 1935 Constitution reads as follows: "The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law."
[3] According to Sec. 175 of the 1978 Election Code: "The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 hereof."
[4] Comment of private respondent Lorenzo G. Teves, par. 3, Annex 1.
[5] Petition, par. II and Annex A.
[6] Ibid., par. IV and Annex B.
[7] Comment of private respondent Teves, par. 3.
[8] Ibid., par. 2.
[9] Ibid., Annex 2.
[10] Ibid., Annex 3.
[11] He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Zoilo A. Andin.
[12] Comment of the Solicitor General, 2.
[13] The sections referred to are: Section 39(a) and (c); Section 44; Section 178(e), (j-3), (h-h), (p-p), (w-w), (ddd), (ggg) and (iii) and Section 186-(3) sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (e) and (f).
[14] Cf. Petition, Annex A.
[15] Article XII, C, Sec. 2, par. 2 of the Constitution.
Our answer is that it should be the former. Accordingly, this certiorari and prohibition proceeding aimed at compelling respondent Commission to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental to suspend the canvass of votes for governor and to consider the certificate of candidacy of respondent Teves cancelled is dismissed. It is quite evident that at this stage, no useful purpose would be served.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. There was filed with respondent Commission on February 1, 1980 by petitioner, an Urgent Petition to Suspend the Canvass of Votes and the Proclamation and Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Teves.[5] On February 2, 1980, a resolution in the above petition was promulgated by respondent Commission stating that inasmuch as "specific violations of the Election Code on prohibited acts, such as illegal election propaganda, massive vote buying, terrorism, etc.; considering that the grounds alleged are proper grounds for an election protest or criminal action, [it resolved] to deny the aforementioned petition."[6] It was not until February 5, 1980 that petitioner elevated the matter to this Court. As noted earlier, as far back as February 2, 1980, the Provincial Board of Canvassers had proclaimed respondent Teves as the provincial governor-elect of Negros Oriental with the majority of over 95,000 votes. At the time, therefore, that the urgent petition was filed with this Court, there had already been a proclamation. It is regrettable that counsel, in his petition, did not so inform this Tribunal. Upon being required to comment, respondent Teves pointed out that he had on March 1, 1980 taken his oath of office, duly assumed the position and thereafter exercised the functions of governor of Negros Oriental.[7] In addition, the comment pointed out that there was pending an election protest before respondent Commission with petitioner Jesus L. Villegas and the other candidates of his party for the positions of vice governor as well as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,[8] contesting his election and that of his party-mates. A copy of the protest was likewise included which indicated that it was filed with respondent Commission on February 9, 1980 and that the grounds alleged in the pre-proclamation controversy were the same grounds on which the protest was based.[9] Moreover, respondent Teves had filed on March 4, 1980 his answer with a counterclaim.[10] It is thus clear that the election protest is still pending with the respondent Commission. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,[11] in his comment likewise sought its dismissal. As was therein pointed out: "Considering, however, that respondent Lorenzo G. Teves had already been proclaimed as the winner in the gubernatorial elections in Negros Oriental, that he had already taken his oath and that he had already assumed the office of the governor of said province, the instant petition has become moot and academic; 3. Furthermore, as correctly observed or ruled by the COMELEC, in its resolution of February 2, 1980 * * * the grounds relied upon by petitioner in PP No. 63 which are the same grounds alleged by him in this instant petition are proper grounds for an election protest or criminal action."[12]
Both comments were considered as answers and the case submitted for decision. As set forth at the outset, the petition cannot prosper.
On the face of the urgent petition before respondent Commission on Elections, which was dismissed in the assailed resolution of February 2, 1980, the grounds in the pre-proclamation controversy are that respondent Teves committed acts violative of certain sections of the 1978 Election Code,[13] specifically referred to as giving money or other material inducements to influence, induce, or corrupt the voters; committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; attaching or displaying billboards on tricycles or other motor vehicles in announcing or advertising his candidacy, during the prohibited period of campaigning, and on election day; showing or displaying publicly advertisement or propaganda in favor of his candidacy by means of cinematography; giving free of charge, directly or indirectly, transportation, food, or drinks or things of value during a public meeting in favor of several candidates not only during the three hours before and after such meetings, but also on the day preceding the election and on the day of the election; engaging in massive vote buying; using public funds under any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, for an election campaign; using government equipment and vehicle for any election campaign or for partisan political activity; availing himself of any scheme to discover the contents of the ballot of a voter who has just voted; transferring the location of a voting center without proper authority; violating the integrity of official ballots by adding false ones to the genuine ones, and altering results in electoral precincts counting of votes; altering certified list of voters to confuse voters or for the purpose of discouraging voters from casting his vote resulting in the disenfranchisement of 20% of the entire voting population of the province and registering new and qualified voters on election day and allowing them to vote; allowing or inducing flying voters to vote more than once in the same election; using of ballots other than the one given by the election committee to alter results of counting votes; distributing sample ballots inside voting centers; and holding in some precincts, elections a day prior to January 30, 1980.[14]
As noted in the comment of respondent Teves, those are the very same grounds in the election protest filed with respondent Commission on February 9, 1980. It becomes quite apparent then as to why this petition should be dismissed. No harm whatsoever could be caused petitioner Villegas. The opportunity for him to prove such a wholesale allegation of massive fraud and violations of the Election Code is still there. The election protest which he himself had filed with respondent Commission three days after this urgent petition for certiorari and prohibition was submitted to this Tribunal is an even more appropriate vehicle for that purpose. Nor should it be lost sight of that the election protest was not even made ex abundanti cautela. It appears to be a deliberate choice on his part to rely on such a proceeding. If, therefore, dismissal of his petition becomes unavoidable, he should be aware on whose shoulder the responsibility falls. Then, too, it would be a time consuming effort if the pre-proclamation controversy at this stage would have to be sent back to the Commission on Elections for a full-dress hearing. That is essential in the task of adjudication, being one of the cardinal requirements of procedural due process. The election protest, however, would serve just as well, if not better. Moreover, it would be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, granting as it did the additional competence to respondent Commission to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials."[15]
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Fernandez and Abad Santos, JJ., on official leave.
[1] So it is provided in Article XII, C, Sec. 2, par. 2 of the Constitution.
[2] Article X, Sec. 2 of the 1935 Constitution reads as follows: "The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law."
[3] According to Sec. 175 of the 1978 Election Code: "The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 hereof."
[4] Comment of private respondent Lorenzo G. Teves, par. 3, Annex 1.
[5] Petition, par. II and Annex A.
[6] Ibid., par. IV and Annex B.
[7] Comment of private respondent Teves, par. 3.
[8] Ibid., par. 2.
[9] Ibid., Annex 2.
[10] Ibid., Annex 3.
[11] He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Zoilo A. Andin.
[12] Comment of the Solicitor General, 2.
[13] The sections referred to are: Section 39(a) and (c); Section 44; Section 178(e), (j-3), (h-h), (p-p), (w-w), (ddd), (ggg) and (iii) and Section 186-(3) sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (e) and (f).
[14] Cf. Petition, Annex A.
[15] Article XII, C, Sec. 2, par. 2 of the Constitution.