EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980 ]
RENATO U. REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BONGABONG, ORIENTAL MINDORO, ERNESTO LIWANAG AND JOSE A. ENRIQUEZ, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, C.J.:
A provision of the present Constitution, both innovative and mandatory, reads: "No elective public officer may change his political party afiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political
party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election."[1] It had been invoked and had been applied in appropriate cases by respondent Commission on Elections.[2] As could be expected, the losing party
thereafter filed certiorari proceedings in this Court. In one case, Amante v. Commission on Elections,[3] there was a reversal of the order of disqualification. It was not so, however, in two other cases, Gabatan v. Commission
on Elections[4] and Evasco v. Commission on Elections,[5] where there was an affirmance resulting in the order against petitioners remaining unchanged. Fidelity to the authoritative command in the leading case of
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[6] as to the observance by administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers of the cardinal requirements of due process, the most prominent of which are the right to a hearing and the necessity for
substantial evidence in support of its ruling, compelled such a course. That same basic approach was followed in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[7] There, the disqualification of petitioner mayoralty candidate was set aside, this Court not
being satisfied that he was fully heard. The matter was then remanded "to the respondent Commission on Elections so that it could proceed with the proclamation in accordance with the canvassing without prejudice to the ruling thereafter on the question of disqualification
of petitioner Pimentel after a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal requirements of procedural due process."[8]
The ruling in Pimentel points the way to the resolution of this controversy. Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was a candidate for Mayor in Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. According to the petition, when, on January 4, 1980, he filed his certificate of candidacy, he made clear that he was running under the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, not as a political party but as an umbrella organization.[9] It was then alleged that the Nacionalista Party chairman, unknown to petitioner, on January 10, 1980 filed another certificate of nomination designating him as the official Nacionalista Party candidate.[10] It was the latter that was approved by respondent Commission on Elections.[11] Then on January 25, 1980, came a petition from respondent Ernesto Liwanag, a registered voter of Bongabong, for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner.[12] The Commission on Elections failed to act thereon before January 30, 1980 with the result that petitioner, being a duly certified candidate, was voted for the position of Municipal Mayor, and his votes counted in the canvass thereafter held.[13] Respondent Board of Canvassers of Bongabong canvassed the election returns and thereafter issued a certification to the effect that petitioner obtained 44 more votes than his opponent, respondent Jose A. Enriquez.[14] That ought to have settled matters, with a proclamation of petitioner being the next step, leaving respondent Enriquez having the choice to file an election protest, but respondent Commission on February 7, 1980 issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner to become a candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy.[15] A motion for reconsideration having proved fruitless as no action was taken, this petition was filed with this Court on the assumption that its denial was a foregone conclusion.[16] On the very day this petition was filed, this Court issued this resolution: "After deliberating on the petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to comment thereon (not to file a motion to dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice hereof."[17] There was on February 25, 1980, an urgent ex-parte motion of petitioner with the plea that respondents Commission and Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong "desist and refrain from proclaiming respondent Enriquez" as duly elected mayor.[18] Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion filed by counsel for petitioners dated February 23, 1980, this Court on February 28, 1980 amended its resolution granting "the prayer of the petitioners" and issuing "a Temporary Restraining Order, effective as of [such] date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court."[19] When this Court was informed by the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers that before receipt of the restraining order, respondent Enriquez was proclaimed as Mayor-elect, it modified the resolution on March 17, 1980 "by setting aside the proclamation of Jose A. Enriquez as Mayor-elect of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, to leave no doubt as to the scope of such restraining order specifically enjoining said respondent Jose A. Enriquez 'from assuming the office of the municipal mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, if already proclaimed.'"[20]
It was not so much the recital of the facts as they transpired, but rather their legal significance, that was stressed in the brief four-page comment of private respondents submitted on March 12, 1980. Thereafter, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza[21] filed a manifestation stating that as the aforesaid comment of private respondents had "amply discussed the issues raised," he was adopting it. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision. What immediately calls attention in such comment is that respondents limited themselves, although in a rather offhand manner, to asserting that petitioner was a KBL member and that he ran as a Nacionalista Party candidate. There was no denial therein, though, that there was no hearing. The comment even went so far as to assert that in a case like the present, "due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing."[22] That assertion flatly contradicts what was held in Pimentel.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioner is entitled to the same remedy.
1. While disqualification based on what is popularly known as turncoatism is a novel feature of the Constitution, it cannot escape attention that even under previous election statutes, there were provisions on ineligibility to hold an elective office. It cannot be accurately said, therefore, that there has been a violent break with the past. In the first Election Code[23] that took effect on January 9, 1907, there was a specific section on disqualifications.[24] In the chapter on the election law in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, again there was a limitation on the number of times an official may be reelected,[25] and on ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds and contractors for public works of the municipality being elected as well as appointed to a municipal office.[26] In a statute revising and compiling the chapter on election law of the Revised Administrative Code,[27] the third reelection of provincial governor and municipal president, now municipal mayor, was prohibited.[28] Another section in the same act provided that a person "delinquent in the payment of taxes cannot assume office to which he has been elected without first paying said taxes."[29] The Election Code enacted during the Commonwealth[30] reiterated the ban on a third consecutive reelection to the offices of provincial governor and mayor.[31] There were likewise provisions on disqualification on account of excessive election expenditures as well as disloyalty to the government.[32] After the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines, a new Election Code was passed.[33] There were provisions therein declaring a final decision of a competent court finding a candidate guilty of having spent in his election campaign more than the total emoluments attached to the office for one year, or having solicited or received any contribution or of spending more than that allowed by law, or having violated the restrictions on electioneering and the prohibitions regarding transportation, food and drinks as grounds for disqualification.[34] Disloyalty to the government likewise sufficed to cause ineligibility.[35] A year before martial law, the Election Code of 1971 was approved.[36] There was a reiteration of the disqualifications based on the above acts.[37] While this Court had occasion to rule on the question of eligibility to elective municipal positions in United States v. Neri Abejuela[38] and United States v. Madamba,[39] it was not until Topacio v. Paredes,[40] a 1912 decision, that there was an exhaustive and scholarly disquisition on the subject. There have been since then many more cases on disqualification.[41]
2. It is quite obvious, therefore, that from the standpoint of the juridical concept of disqualification, there is no departure from what has been and continues to be. There has been no break with the past, much less a sharp one. This is not to ignore the fact that a constitution as the expression of the people's highest ideals cannot be severed from the texture of the times. In the last Constitutional Convention, it has been willed by the framers and ratified by the people that the virus of turncoatism should be remedied. Hence, the adoption of this novel provision. This Court has given it force and effect. So it should be, as the constitution is the supreme law. Such being the case, it cannot be said that there is a disregard of the equally cardinal concept of an elector being a "particle of popular sovereignty"[42] because the candidate he voted for happens to be thereafter declared disqualified. The right of suffrage remains undefiled, but the candidate who is the beneficiary of its exercise is by law deemed ineligible. It has always been so as attested to by the previous decisions cited. In thus according respect to the fundamental law, the popular will has not been ignored. For that is precisely to abide by and not to defy what the constitution commands, the highest expression of its sovereign power. The duty of this Court is to enforce, not to nullify, what it decrees. That is all that we do in this case.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections of February 7, 1980 petitioner Renato U, Reyes disqualified from becoming a candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the proclamation of respondent Board of Canvassers declaring Jose A. Enriquez as Mayor-elect of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, are hereby nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The writ of mandamus is granted and respondent Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, is commanded to proclaim, in accordance with the canvass already terminated, petitioner Renato U. Reyes as Mayor-elect. Thereafter, the case is referred to the respondent Commission on Elections so that it could proceed to pass on the question of the disqualification of petitioner Renato U. Reyes after a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal requirements of procedural due process. No costs.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, and Antonio, JJ., are on official leave.
[1] Article XII, C, Section 10 of the Constitution.
[2] The other respondents in this petition for certiorari and mandamus are: The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, Ernesto Liwanag and Jose A. Enriquez.
[3] G.R. No. 52375, January 25, 1980.
[4] G.R. No. 52381, January 26, 1980, Teehankee, J., dissented.
[5] G.R. No. 52401, January 28, 1980, Teehankee, J., dissented.
[6] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[7] G.R. No. 52428, February 21, 1980.
[8] Resolution, February 21, 1980.
[9] Petition, Factual Background, par. 2.
[10] Ibid., par. 3.
[11] Ibid., par. 4.
[12] Ibid., par. 5.
[13] Ibid., par. 6.
[14] Ibid., par. 7.
[15] Ibid., par. 9.
[16] Ibid., par. 10.
[17] Resolution, February 19, 1980.
[18] Urgent Ex-Parte Motion.
[19] Resolution, February 28, 1980.
[20] Resolution, March 17, 1980.
[21] He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz.
[22] Comment, 4.
[23] Act No. 1582.
[24] According to its Section 14, delinquency in the payment of taxes, deprivation of the right to vote as part of the penalty for an offense committed, violation of the oath of allegiance to the United States, taking up arms against it, contributions to subversive organizations, the giving of aid and comfort to such groups, and insanity were the grounds for disqualification. Cf. Sec. 6 of Act No. 1709 and Sec. 1 of Act No. 1726. The amendatory acts all of which became effective the same year are Act No. 1709, Sec. 6; Act No. 1726, Sec. 1 and Act No. 1768, Sec. 1.
[25] Cf. Section 403. It was thereafter amended by Sec. 2 of Act 3030 (1926).
[26] Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code (1917). Cf. Pamil v. Teleron, L-34854, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 413.
[27] Act No. 3387 (1927).
[28] Ibid., Sec. 403.
[29] Ibid., Sec. 407.
[30] Commonwealth Act No. 357 (1938).
[31] Ibid., Sec. 21.
[32] Ibid., Secs. 24 and 25.
[33] Republic Act 180 (1947).
[34] Ibid., Sec. 29.
[35] Ibid., Sec. 30.
[36] Republic Act No. 6388.
[37] Cf. Sections 25 and 27.
[38] 12 Phil. 30 (1908).
[39] 18 Phil. 501 (1911).
[40] 23 Phil. 238.
[41] Cf. Guzman v. Provincial Board, 48 Phil. 211 (1925); Cecilio v. Belmonte, 51 Phil. 540 (1928); Yra v. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380 (1928); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Caesar v. Garrido, 53 Phil. 97 (1929); Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934); De los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 892 (1935); Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil. 778 (1948); Llamoso v. Ferrer, 84 Phil. 490 (1949); Castañeda v. Yap, 91 Phil. 819 (1952); Gamalinda v. Yap, 93 Phil. 310 (1953); Vilar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil. 659 (1955); Luison v. Garcia, 103 Phil. 453 (1958); Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 111 Phil. 733 (1961); Miralles v. Gariando, 111 Phil. 1091 (1961).
[42] Cf. Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).
The ruling in Pimentel points the way to the resolution of this controversy. Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was a candidate for Mayor in Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. According to the petition, when, on January 4, 1980, he filed his certificate of candidacy, he made clear that he was running under the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, not as a political party but as an umbrella organization.[9] It was then alleged that the Nacionalista Party chairman, unknown to petitioner, on January 10, 1980 filed another certificate of nomination designating him as the official Nacionalista Party candidate.[10] It was the latter that was approved by respondent Commission on Elections.[11] Then on January 25, 1980, came a petition from respondent Ernesto Liwanag, a registered voter of Bongabong, for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner.[12] The Commission on Elections failed to act thereon before January 30, 1980 with the result that petitioner, being a duly certified candidate, was voted for the position of Municipal Mayor, and his votes counted in the canvass thereafter held.[13] Respondent Board of Canvassers of Bongabong canvassed the election returns and thereafter issued a certification to the effect that petitioner obtained 44 more votes than his opponent, respondent Jose A. Enriquez.[14] That ought to have settled matters, with a proclamation of petitioner being the next step, leaving respondent Enriquez having the choice to file an election protest, but respondent Commission on February 7, 1980 issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner to become a candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy.[15] A motion for reconsideration having proved fruitless as no action was taken, this petition was filed with this Court on the assumption that its denial was a foregone conclusion.[16] On the very day this petition was filed, this Court issued this resolution: "After deliberating on the petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to comment thereon (not to file a motion to dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice hereof."[17] There was on February 25, 1980, an urgent ex-parte motion of petitioner with the plea that respondents Commission and Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong "desist and refrain from proclaiming respondent Enriquez" as duly elected mayor.[18] Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion filed by counsel for petitioners dated February 23, 1980, this Court on February 28, 1980 amended its resolution granting "the prayer of the petitioners" and issuing "a Temporary Restraining Order, effective as of [such] date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court."[19] When this Court was informed by the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers that before receipt of the restraining order, respondent Enriquez was proclaimed as Mayor-elect, it modified the resolution on March 17, 1980 "by setting aside the proclamation of Jose A. Enriquez as Mayor-elect of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, to leave no doubt as to the scope of such restraining order specifically enjoining said respondent Jose A. Enriquez 'from assuming the office of the municipal mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, if already proclaimed.'"[20]
It was not so much the recital of the facts as they transpired, but rather their legal significance, that was stressed in the brief four-page comment of private respondents submitted on March 12, 1980. Thereafter, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza[21] filed a manifestation stating that as the aforesaid comment of private respondents had "amply discussed the issues raised," he was adopting it. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision. What immediately calls attention in such comment is that respondents limited themselves, although in a rather offhand manner, to asserting that petitioner was a KBL member and that he ran as a Nacionalista Party candidate. There was no denial therein, though, that there was no hearing. The comment even went so far as to assert that in a case like the present, "due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing."[22] That assertion flatly contradicts what was held in Pimentel.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioner is entitled to the same remedy.
1. While disqualification based on what is popularly known as turncoatism is a novel feature of the Constitution, it cannot escape attention that even under previous election statutes, there were provisions on ineligibility to hold an elective office. It cannot be accurately said, therefore, that there has been a violent break with the past. In the first Election Code[23] that took effect on January 9, 1907, there was a specific section on disqualifications.[24] In the chapter on the election law in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, again there was a limitation on the number of times an official may be reelected,[25] and on ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds and contractors for public works of the municipality being elected as well as appointed to a municipal office.[26] In a statute revising and compiling the chapter on election law of the Revised Administrative Code,[27] the third reelection of provincial governor and municipal president, now municipal mayor, was prohibited.[28] Another section in the same act provided that a person "delinquent in the payment of taxes cannot assume office to which he has been elected without first paying said taxes."[29] The Election Code enacted during the Commonwealth[30] reiterated the ban on a third consecutive reelection to the offices of provincial governor and mayor.[31] There were likewise provisions on disqualification on account of excessive election expenditures as well as disloyalty to the government.[32] After the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines, a new Election Code was passed.[33] There were provisions therein declaring a final decision of a competent court finding a candidate guilty of having spent in his election campaign more than the total emoluments attached to the office for one year, or having solicited or received any contribution or of spending more than that allowed by law, or having violated the restrictions on electioneering and the prohibitions regarding transportation, food and drinks as grounds for disqualification.[34] Disloyalty to the government likewise sufficed to cause ineligibility.[35] A year before martial law, the Election Code of 1971 was approved.[36] There was a reiteration of the disqualifications based on the above acts.[37] While this Court had occasion to rule on the question of eligibility to elective municipal positions in United States v. Neri Abejuela[38] and United States v. Madamba,[39] it was not until Topacio v. Paredes,[40] a 1912 decision, that there was an exhaustive and scholarly disquisition on the subject. There have been since then many more cases on disqualification.[41]
2. It is quite obvious, therefore, that from the standpoint of the juridical concept of disqualification, there is no departure from what has been and continues to be. There has been no break with the past, much less a sharp one. This is not to ignore the fact that a constitution as the expression of the people's highest ideals cannot be severed from the texture of the times. In the last Constitutional Convention, it has been willed by the framers and ratified by the people that the virus of turncoatism should be remedied. Hence, the adoption of this novel provision. This Court has given it force and effect. So it should be, as the constitution is the supreme law. Such being the case, it cannot be said that there is a disregard of the equally cardinal concept of an elector being a "particle of popular sovereignty"[42] because the candidate he voted for happens to be thereafter declared disqualified. The right of suffrage remains undefiled, but the candidate who is the beneficiary of its exercise is by law deemed ineligible. It has always been so as attested to by the previous decisions cited. In thus according respect to the fundamental law, the popular will has not been ignored. For that is precisely to abide by and not to defy what the constitution commands, the highest expression of its sovereign power. The duty of this Court is to enforce, not to nullify, what it decrees. That is all that we do in this case.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections of February 7, 1980 petitioner Renato U, Reyes disqualified from becoming a candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the proclamation of respondent Board of Canvassers declaring Jose A. Enriquez as Mayor-elect of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, are hereby nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The writ of mandamus is granted and respondent Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, is commanded to proclaim, in accordance with the canvass already terminated, petitioner Renato U. Reyes as Mayor-elect. Thereafter, the case is referred to the respondent Commission on Elections so that it could proceed to pass on the question of the disqualification of petitioner Renato U. Reyes after a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the cardinal requirements of procedural due process. No costs.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, and Antonio, JJ., are on official leave.
[1] Article XII, C, Section 10 of the Constitution.
[2] The other respondents in this petition for certiorari and mandamus are: The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, Ernesto Liwanag and Jose A. Enriquez.
[3] G.R. No. 52375, January 25, 1980.
[4] G.R. No. 52381, January 26, 1980, Teehankee, J., dissented.
[5] G.R. No. 52401, January 28, 1980, Teehankee, J., dissented.
[6] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[7] G.R. No. 52428, February 21, 1980.
[8] Resolution, February 21, 1980.
[9] Petition, Factual Background, par. 2.
[10] Ibid., par. 3.
[11] Ibid., par. 4.
[12] Ibid., par. 5.
[13] Ibid., par. 6.
[14] Ibid., par. 7.
[15] Ibid., par. 9.
[16] Ibid., par. 10.
[17] Resolution, February 19, 1980.
[18] Urgent Ex-Parte Motion.
[19] Resolution, February 28, 1980.
[20] Resolution, March 17, 1980.
[21] He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz.
[22] Comment, 4.
[23] Act No. 1582.
[24] According to its Section 14, delinquency in the payment of taxes, deprivation of the right to vote as part of the penalty for an offense committed, violation of the oath of allegiance to the United States, taking up arms against it, contributions to subversive organizations, the giving of aid and comfort to such groups, and insanity were the grounds for disqualification. Cf. Sec. 6 of Act No. 1709 and Sec. 1 of Act No. 1726. The amendatory acts all of which became effective the same year are Act No. 1709, Sec. 6; Act No. 1726, Sec. 1 and Act No. 1768, Sec. 1.
[25] Cf. Section 403. It was thereafter amended by Sec. 2 of Act 3030 (1926).
[26] Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code (1917). Cf. Pamil v. Teleron, L-34854, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 413.
[27] Act No. 3387 (1927).
[28] Ibid., Sec. 403.
[29] Ibid., Sec. 407.
[30] Commonwealth Act No. 357 (1938).
[31] Ibid., Sec. 21.
[32] Ibid., Secs. 24 and 25.
[33] Republic Act 180 (1947).
[34] Ibid., Sec. 29.
[35] Ibid., Sec. 30.
[36] Republic Act No. 6388.
[37] Cf. Sections 25 and 27.
[38] 12 Phil. 30 (1908).
[39] 18 Phil. 501 (1911).
[40] 23 Phil. 238.
[41] Cf. Guzman v. Provincial Board, 48 Phil. 211 (1925); Cecilio v. Belmonte, 51 Phil. 540 (1928); Yra v. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380 (1928); Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Caesar v. Garrido, 53 Phil. 97 (1929); Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934); De los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 892 (1935); Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil. 778 (1948); Llamoso v. Ferrer, 84 Phil. 490 (1949); Castañeda v. Yap, 91 Phil. 819 (1952); Gamalinda v. Yap, 93 Phil. 310 (1953); Vilar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil. 659 (1955); Luison v. Garcia, 103 Phil. 453 (1958); Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 111 Phil. 733 (1961); Miralles v. Gariando, 111 Phil. 1091 (1961).
[42] Cf. Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).