The crucial question in this application for a writ of habeas corpus  filed by Alfredo Ventura y Ylarde arose from his continued confinement dating from May 27, 1968 after the filing of an information against him for double homicide with physical injuries with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.^[1] Though admittedly he was subsequently convicted in a decision rendered on April 2, 1970, an appeal was duly perfected to the Court of Appeals.^[2]  The grievance set forth in his petition is that the pendency of such appeal all these years amounts to a denial of his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of the case against him, as his appeal could not be decided because the whereabouts of the stenographer, Mr. Jaime T. Cortez, who took down the stenographic notes of the proceedings, could not, until now, be located.^[3]  Further on this point, he alleged that a resolution of the Court of Appeals ordering the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses, who had previously testified, with such stenographer Cortez taking down the notes, and directing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pangasinan to give a new stenographer thirty (30) days within which to submit the transcript of stenographic notes after such retaking, had not reached the stage of compliance.^[4]  It is petitioner's submission: "The continuous detention of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the fact that he has perfected his appeal since April 12, 1970 is in wanton violation of his constitutional right as provided for under the Old and New Constitution, Sec. 16, Art. IV of the New Constitution, [being] reproduced hereunder for convenience and ready reference: 'All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."^[5] His plea is that his release from detention be ordered by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.^[6]

The application was filed on July 28, 1977. On August 3, 1977, there was a resolution from this Court reading as follows: "The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ, not later than Tuesday, August 9, 1977. The hearing of this case is hereby [set] for Wednesday, August 10, 1977 at 10:30 a.m."^[7]  In view of an urgent motion for two days extension of time to file a return, it was not until August 11 that it was submitted. The then Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza^[8]  narrated the steps taken by the Court of Appeals from September 1, 1971 up to July 28, 1977 when counsel for petitioner filed a motion to hold in abeyance the retaking of proceedings by such tribunal until this petition was resolved and alleged as a special defense that there was no denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. He referred to the test set forth in Acevedo v. Sarmiento,^[9] stating that such a right "means one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays."

It was not until the following Friday, August 12, 1977, that the hearing took place. On the same day, this resolution was issued by this Court: "When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attys. Herenio Martinez and Angela Valenzuela appeared and argued for the petitioner while Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan appeared and argued for the respondents. Thereafter the Court Resolved to require the petitioner to file an amended petition within ten (10) days from today."^[10]  An amended petition was duly filed on September 27, 1977. It did not by any means lend added strength to the petition with the commendable admission that in at least four orders, dating from June 28, 1974 to March 18, 1976, the Court of Appeals had taken the necessary steps, including an order for the arrest of the missing stenographer.^[11]  There was an insistence on the plea, however, that the circumstances disclosed the denial of the right to the speedy disposition of his case.^[12]

It was not unexpected, therefore, that in the return of respondents, filed on November 9, 1977, it was stressed that the alleged denial of petitioner's right to the speedy disposition of his case was devoid of "basis in law or in fact, * * *."^[13]  After noting that respondents could in no way be held liable "for the failure of stenographer Cortez to submit" his transcription,^[14]  it stated: "Neither has the Court of Appeals been remiss in its duty to speedily dispose of the appeal; on the contrary, as adverted to in paragraph 6 of the petition, it issued a series of orders and resolutions for the purpose of completing the stenographic notes, and thus, promptly disposing of the case," citing fourteen resolutions of the Court of Appeals from September 1, 1971 to July 28, 1977 to expedite the disposition of the appeal and the order of arrest of such stenographer as well as his transfer to the PC Stockade at Camp Crame.^[15]  The special defense that he was confined by virtue of a valid order or judgment was reiterated as he had been admittedly convicted of double homicide with serious physical injuries.^[16]  It was likewise set forth that he could have obtained his provisional liberty by posting the required bail fixed by the Court of Appeals.^[17]

The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. His release cannot be ordered.

1. For all its broad, latitudinarian, even, scope, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus  application is consi-derably narrowed, where the detention complained of may be traced to judicial action. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ does not lie."^[18] There is, though, this exception. As set forth in Gumabon v. Director of Prisons: "Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention."^[19] That doctrine goes back to Conde v. Rivera,^[20]  decided in 1924, a case involving the right to speedy trial the denial of which, according to Justice Malcolm, would entitle a person "restrained of his liberty [to sue out] a writ of 'habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.'"^[21] The latest case in point is Flores v. People.^[22]

2. There is plausibility in the view submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General that the constitutional right to the speedy disposition of one's case,^[23]  a new provision in the Constitution, can be viewed in the same light as the traditional right to a speedy trial. In the pleadings filed by it, reference was made to the standard set forth in Acevedo v. Sarmiento^[24] as to its signifying "one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays."^[25] The Acevedo opinion traced its origin to the same case of Conde v. Rivera, where Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with what was ordained by the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays."^[26]  Even a cursory reading of the steps taken by the Court of Appeals to assure that petitioner's appeal could be resolved in accordance with the evidence submitted before the lower court would indicate that all the necessary steps had been taken to assure that a definitive judgment could be reached. Admittedly, there is delay, but it is not that kind of a delay that could be considered either capricious or oppressive. Again, there is an element of vexation that must be suffered by petitioner, but certainly it does not amount to that degree of annoyance, provocation, or distress that would justify a nullification of the appropriate and regular steps that must be taken to assure that while the innocent should go unpunished, those found guilty must expiate for their offenses. Clearly then, there is no justification for the granting of petitioner's plea for liberty.

3. In the course of the hearing of this application, reference was made to the aforecited case of Flores v. People where this Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by Francisco Flores and nullified an order of the Court of Appeals^[27]  denying a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a failure to comply with the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial. It is not applicable. It could be distinguished. In that case, petitioner Flores was accused of robbery on December 31, 1951 and was found guilty on November 25, 1955. An appeal was taken in December of that year. There was at first a resolution on February 10, 1958 by the Court of Appeals, remanding the records of the case to the lower court for the rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the appeal. Thereafter, on August 5, 1959, another resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals granting petitioner's motion to set aside the decision. The case was therefore returned to the lower court. There the matter appeared to have rested. No further progress in the proceeding was discernible. Accordingly, on May 10, 1965, there was a motion in the Court of Appeals for the dismissal of the case. It was based on the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. When the Court of Appeals failed to grant such motion to dismiss, the matter was taken to this Tribunal. Our decision granting the petition for certiorari is based on the following consideration: "Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us - considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again."^[28] There is a decisive difference therefore. In Flores, to all intents and purposes, after the resolution of the Court of Appeals setting aside the decision, no trial was held. The information, it must be remembered, was filed as far back as December 31, 1951. When the dismissal of the case was sought in a motion of May 10, 1965, a period of fourteen years had elapsed. In this application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is the pendency of appeal from a decision, which on its face carries a presumption of validity, after a trial duly held, that is made the basis for petitioner's plea for liberty. There is thus a crucial difference. It is our ruling that at this stage, considering further all the circumstances previously set forth, there is in law no transgression of the asserted constitutional right to the speedy disposition of a criminal case.

4. At any rate, the return of the Office of the Solicitor General to the amended petition pointed out that while such appeal is pending, petitioner could secure his liberty by posting the required bail. If petitioner is of the view that the amount fixed should be reduced, there is no obstacle to his presenting a motion to that effect to the Court of Appeals which could act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, this petition for habeas corpus is dismissed.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

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^[1] Petition, par. 2, Annex B.

^[2] Ibid, par. 4; C.A. G.R. No. 11116-CA.

^[3] Ibid, pars. 5 and 6(a).

^[4] Ibid, par. 6.

^[5] Ibid, par. 7.

^[6] Ibid, par. 9.

^[7] Resolution dated August 3, 1977.

^[8] He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan.

^[9] L-28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247.

^[10] Resolution dated August 12, 1977.

^[11] Amended Petition, par. 6.

^[12] Ibid, pars. 7 and 8.

^[13] Return of respondents to amended petition, par. 3.

^[14] Ibid, par. 7(8).

^[15] Ibid, par. 7(c).

^[16] Ibid, Special and Affirmative Defenses, pars. B to F.

^[17] Ibid, Special and Affirmative Defenses, par. F.

^[18] Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, Section 4.

^[19] L-30026, January 30, 1931, 37 SCRA 420.

^[20] 45 Phil. 650.

^[21] Ibid, 652. Cf. Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949); Chavez v. Court of Appeals, L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663; Celeste v. People, L-24135, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 391; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420.

^[22] L-25769, December 10, 1974, 61 SCRA 331.

^[23] According to Article IV, Section 16 of the present Constitution: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."

^[24] L-28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247.

^[25] Ibid, 249.

^[26] 45 Phil. 650, 651.

^[27] CA G.R. No. 16641-R, People v. Flores.

^[28] 61 SCRA 331, 336-337.

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