Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered against petitioner by the Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental and imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of slight physical injuries.

The background facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom to go to the principal's office. While the teacher was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room. She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the following injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence:

 

"1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.

 

"2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.

 

"The above lessions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days." (Pages 26-27, Record.)

Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent Judge erred in convicting her of the crime of slight physical injuries. She maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her classmate and for denying that she did so. She contends she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in this pose by the Solicitor General, who recommends her acquittal, coupled with the observation that although "petitioner is not criminally liable for her conduct, she may still be held accountable for her conduct administratively."

We agree with the Solicitor General.

In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the teacher exercises substitute parental authority over the students. (Article 349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article 352, "The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student." And pursuant to this provision, Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual enjoins:

 

"The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature, reducing scholarship rating for bad conduct, holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and expressions tending to destroy the pupil's self-respect, and the permanent confiscation of personal effects of pupils are forbidden."

In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions, no teacher may impose corporal punishment upon any student in any case. But We are not concerned in this appeal with the possible administrative liability of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to pass on her civil liability other than what could be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that should be the outcome hereof. The sole question for Our resolution in this appeal relates exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the alleged crime of slight physical injuries as defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in the courts below.

In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer, in the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and 1/4 cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be disciplined. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine.

Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary measures that may be employed by teachers under Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative authorities.

After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary eight (8) votes necessary for conviction has not been obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner-accused is entitled to acquittal.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her being dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting ex-delicto.

Castro, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., concurs. The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise authority over the pupil in loco parentis  depends on her ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if the punishment is moderate, not prompted by bad motive, and is of such nature that the parent of the child might expect the child would receive if she did wrong.

Aquino, J., concurs. The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment, should be disciplined administratively. In People vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and Enage, JJ., concurring, held that teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal punishment, was not criminally liable because he had no criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, 1 K.B. 160. (Justice Torres dissented.)

Fernando, J., dissents in a brief opinion.

Teehankee, J., concurs with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma and adds brief remarks in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Muñoz Palma, J., dissents for reason stated in a separate opinion.

Santos, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar.

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DISSENTING OPINION

FERNANDO, J.:

I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that should permeate the law but also in accordance with the tendency much more manifest of late in international law to accord greater and greater protection to the welfare of the young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the doctrine parens patriae  calls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to assure that teachers and educators should refrain from the infliction of corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of the past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering the nature and extent of the physical injuries sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma, the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its persuasiveness. The leading case of People v. Cagoco,^[1]  where the accused approached the victim from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on the back part of his head causing him to fall backwards, his head striking the asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later comes to mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there was alevosia, although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so great a wrong as that inflicted.^[2]

Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the accused.

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^[1] 58 Phil. 524.

^[2] Article 13, par. 3.

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