SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-36637, July 14, 1978 ]
GENEROSO MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE AND ADMINISTRATRIX DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ AND DOLORES MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
SANTOS, J.:
Relevant antecedent facts follow. On May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner,[1] filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. A notice was issued on December 3, 1964 setting the date of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly published, posted and served but nobody appeared nor filed an answer or opposition within the period allowed for that purpose. Consequently, the registration court entered on July 6, 1965, an order of general default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte.[2]
From the evidence presented by applicant Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, it was proven that he and his wife, Diega de Leon; were the owners of the parcels of land subject of the application but the same were sold by them, during the pendency of the case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, herein private respondents, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights. The instrument embodying such sale was presented as Exhibit I. On the basis of such evidence, the registration court rendered a decision on July 21, 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon. On the same day, a copy of said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza.[3]
On November 5, 1965, after the decision had become final, the applicant-vendor, Generoso Mendoza, filed a motion for the issuance of the decree. On May 16, 1967, Decree No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the land of vendees Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and ordering the registration of the same in their names, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza.[4]
On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that the decision dated July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto dated May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 be cancelled, on the ground that the vendees, the registered owners, had failed to pay the purchase price of the lands.[5]
The registration court considered said urgent petition for reconsideration as a petition for review of the decree and issued an order dated September 3, 1968 setting aside its decision, its order for the issuance of the decree, and the decree of registration, on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties to the application for registration. Moreover, said court ordered the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 0-3787 and directed the registration of the lands in the names of spouses, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon, subject to the rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, stated in the deed of sale.[6]
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza moved to reconsider the order, but their motion was denied on October 17, 1968. On December 19, 1968, said spouses appealed from the order dated September 3, 1968. On March 11, 1969, Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and on April 10, 1969, the registration court dismissed the appeal.[7]
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 43250-R. The Court of Appeals on January 5, 1970, ordered the registration court to give due course to the appeal. The registration court approved the Record on Appeal and forwarded the same to the Court of Appeals together with all the evidence adduced during the trial.[8]
Acting on said appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46581-R, the Court of Appeals rendered on February 27, 1973, the decision, subject matter of the present petition for review. It set aside the order of the land registration court of September 3, 1968 which set aside its decision of July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto. It also denied applicant Mendoza's petition for reconsideration dated April 15 (filed April 16), 1968, which was considered as a petition for review of the decree.
Hence, this Petition for Review which alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred --
"1. . . . IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HIMSELF CAUSED THE REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE NAME OF THE APPELLANTS.
"2. . . . IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO FORMAL AMENDMENT OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE APPLICANT, THE REGISTRATION COURT COULD LEGALLY ORDER THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF VENDEES BECAUSE THE APPLICANT HIMSELF PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR ADJUDICATION; AND THAT THE APPLICATION COULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE ALREADY ADVANCED BY SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE SAID APPLICANT.
"3. . . . IN HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT BASED ON FRAUD PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLEE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT."[9]
The foregoing assigned errors question the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ordering the registration of the landholdings subject matter of the application for registration in the names of herein private respondents who are the purchasers of the landholdings, nothwithstanding that they were not parties in the original registration proceedings before the lower court.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' holding that he himself caused the registration of the land in question in the name of the vendees, the herein private respondents. But whether or not the petitioner did in fact cause the registration of the land in favor of private respondents is a question of fact which cannot properly be raised in the present petition for review inasmuch as Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that in an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court, only questions of law may be raised.[10] Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner caused the registration of the land in favor of the private respondents cannot now be raised in this Appeal much less disturbed by this Court.
However, by petitioner's insistence that he could not be deemed to have caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents as he never testified in court having sold the same to said private respondents,[11] he, in effect, invokes the exception to the above-stated rule of conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, namely: that the Court of Appeals' finding is grounded entirely on surmises or conjectures and has no basis in the evidence on record.[12] Consequently, We are tasked with the examination of the records of the case to determine the veracity of petitioner's claim that he never testified in court as having sold the property to the herein private respondents. And it must here be emphasized that should the records confirm such claim of the petitioner, the Court of Appeals' holding that he caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents would have no basis in the evidence and should, thus, be reversed.
A careful study and consideration of the records of the case, however, belie petitioner's claim that he did not testify relative to the aforementioned deed of sale. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on the application for registration held on July 6, 1965 all too clearly show that petitioner and his wife testified before the deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold the property sought to be registered to the private respondents. Thus, the records show that petitioner testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"Atty. VALENTIN:
Q. You said that you are the owners of these two parcels of land subject matter of this litigation, after you have caused the filing of this application, was there any transaction that took place with respect to the same?
A. Yes sir, we have sold these two parcels of land to Daniel Gole Cruz and his wife Dolores Mendoza.
Q. Showing to you this document which is an original carbon copy of a deed of sale written in Tagalog and executed and ratified on October 15, 1964, would you kindly tell this Honorable Court which is Exhibit I, will you tell this Honorable Court if you know this Exhibit I? (sic)
A. Yes, sir, that is the carbon copy of the deed of sale I have just Mentioned."[13] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, applicant-petitioner's wife, Diega de Leon, testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"ATTY. VALENTIN:
Q. Do you know the two parcels of land subject matter of this registration proceedings?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these properties?
A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and his wife, Dolores Mendoza are in actual possession of the same.
Q. Why are Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza co-possessing with you these two parcels of land?
A. Because on October 15, 1964, we sold this property to them with one of the conditions that until my husband and myself or anyone of us die, we wil live with them."[14] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the private respondent Daniel Gole Cruz to confirm the aforesaid sale of the subject property. Thus, Cruz testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"ATTY. VALENTIN:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. DO you know the property covered by this registration proceedings?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know the same?
A. Because we have been living in said place since I got married and besides, on October 15, 1964, the said two parcels of land were sold to us by the herein applicant and his wife.
Q. Showing to you this Exhibit I, would you identify and tell this Honorable Court if you know the same?
A. Yes sir, Exhibit I is the carbon original of the deed of sale executed in our favor."[15] (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, even the registration court itself did not believe applicant-petitioner's claim that he did not previously cause the registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents. For, while it granted applicant-petitioner's petition for review of the decree and ordered the re-registration of the land in his name, the Court, nevertheless, expressly declared in the very same order that:
"Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case. At the hearing, he himself produced evidence that on October 15, 1964 he and his wife sold the land in favor of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza for the amount of P6,000.00 payable in installments (Exh. 1). x x x"[16] (Emphasis supplied).
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the respondent Court of Appeals did not incur any error when it held that applicant-petitioner himself caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents.
Petitioner, however, insists in his second assignment of error, that the registration court could not legally order the registration of the land in the names of the vendees-respondents, who were neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration case below. Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title, thus -
"SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. The interested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. x x x" (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land, subject matter of an application for registration, to be "dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during the interval of time between the filing of the application and the issuance of the decree of title, and to have the instruments embodying such disposition or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the "interested party" for the court to either "order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.[17] The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.
As heretofore stated, the instrument embodying the sale of the subject property by the petitioner to the private respondents was duly presented to the registration court for consideration. That the purpose was to have the land registered in the names of private respondents subject to the usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife is explicit in the following facts and circumstances. Firstly, it was the petitioner himself, the applicant in the registration proceedings, who presented the deed of sale (Exh. I) to the court and testified before the same that he did sell the land to the private respondents. This was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have the land registered in his name--as an order of general default had been issued and the hearing on the application for registration had been conducted EX-PARTE. Secondly, as if to fully convince the court of the fact of sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega de Leon, and private respondent, Daniel Gole Cruz, to confirm the said sale of the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the petitioner even filed the motion for the issuance of the decree of confirmation of title after having received the decision of the court ordering the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees-respondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary rights--thereby signifying his full assent to the same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the consideration of the deed of sale in relation with the application for registration. But the law does not require that the motion accompanying the presentation of the instrument be in writing. And the above-enumerated acts of the applicant-petitioner and the circumstances surrounding the same accept of no interpretation than that the applicant-petitioner did in fact move the court to order the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees-respondents, subject only to the stipulated usufructuary rights of the petitioner and his wife. There was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first requirement of the law.
Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the parties, the relevant fact to be considered is that an order of general default had been issued prior to the presentation of the deed of sale by the applicant-petitioner, since nobody filed an opposition to the application for registration. Thus, the only person who should have been entitled to a notice from the court was the applicant-petitioner himself, as the only party with a legal standing in the proceedings. In view thereof, no legal objection to the court's jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents may be interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement of prior notice to the parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law, respondent Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents.
The petitioner, finally, contends--in a desperate effort to justify the validity of the appealed order of September 3, 1968--that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that he was not the victim of fraud perpetrated by the vendees, private respondents, herein, who allegedly failed to pay the purchase price of the landholdings.
This is also without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides as follows--
"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. x x x Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree:
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the only ground upon which a decree of registration may be set aside is fraud in obtaining the same. In the instant case, applicant-petitioner cannot complain of fraud in obtaining the decree of registration for as heretofore stated, it was solely upon his testimony and proof that the lots were ordered registered in the names of the vendees-respondents and it was also upon his motion that the decree of registration was issued by the lower court. What the applicant-petitioner actually invokes in this case is not fraud in obtaining the decree of registration but the alleged failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase price of the landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent Court of Appeals:
"(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a review. And the registration court has no jurisdiction to decide the contentious issue of whether or not the deed of sale, Exh. "1", should be rescinded for the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price. The issue on the breach of contract has to be litigated in the ordinary court."[18]
In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit any error in setting aside the order of the lower court dated September 3, 1968, and thus allowing the registration of the lots in the names of the vendees, herein private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 27, 1973 is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.
Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, and Guerrero[*], JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Aquino, J., see dissenting opinion.
[**] Third Division; Fernandez, J., ponente; Concepcion Jr. and Gancayco, JJ., concurring.
[1] Substituted by his wife and administratrix Diega de Leon Vda. de Mendoza.
[2] Record on Appeal, pp. 1-9.
[3] Id., pp. 9-11.
[4] Id., pp. 11-14.
[5] Id., pp. 14-31.
[6] Id., pp. 37-40.
[7] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 4, (Rollo, p. 19).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Id., p. 8, (Rollo, p. 23).
[10] The rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding upon the Supreme Court has been followed in a long line of cases, notably: Goduco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17647, June 16, 1975, 14 SCRA 282; Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., G.R. No. L-22533, February 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289; Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-22793, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 54; Chan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737.
[11] See: Petitioner's Reply Brief, pp. 4-5.
[12] See: Napolis vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-28865, February 28, 1972, 43 SCRA 301.
[13] T.S.N., Generoso Mendoza, hearing of July 6, 1965, pp. 6-7.
[14] Id., Diega de Leon, pp. 11-12.
[15] Id., Daniel Gole Cruz, pp. 16-17.
[16] Order of September 3, 1968 (Record on Appeal, pp. 37-38).
[17] See: Government of the Philippines v. Abad and Molino, G.R. No. L-8317, May 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 725; Director of Lands v. Abiera, et. al., G.R. No. L-11834, July 26, 1960, 108 Phil. 943.
[18] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 7, (Rollo, p. 22).
[*] In lieu of Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. who took no part.