The decision sought to be reconsidered by respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. upheld the validity of a strike conducted by the Shell Oil Workers' Union and thus reversed an appealed decision from respondent Court of Industrial Relations.^[1]  It was arrived at unanimously, although there was a concurring opinion by Justice Antonio Barredo, with whom Justices J.B.L. Reyes and Querube Makalintal were in agreement.  At that time, Justice Fred Ruiz Castro was on official leave and therefore could not take part.  He has now expressed his conformity with the opinion of the Court as rendered.  Justice Claudio Teehankee, however, would join the two other Justices in support of the concurring opinion of Justice Barredo.  Former Justice Dizon, who concurred in the result, had since then been retired.  After a careful study of the extensive motion for reconsideration, this Court, in accordance with the two opinions, is once again unanimous in sustaining the validity of the strike. 

The concurrence by Justice Barredo was prompted by his differing with the majority of the Court as to the existence of facts in the record which would indicate a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, thus resulting in the strike by petitioner Union.  Nonetheless, he was likewise for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations for, as he pointed out:  "All these, however, do not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner's strike should necessarily be held to be illegal.  It is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give but secondary importance to strict technicalities, whether of substantive or remedial law, and to constantly bear in mind the human values involved which are beyond pecuniary estimation.  As a general rule, labor's most potent and effective weapon is the strike, and it is but natural that when things appear to be dimming on the negotiation tables, labor should almost instinctively take a striking posture.  In other words, the determination of the legality or illegality of a strike, particularly in this enlightened era of progressive thinking on labor-management relations is something that cannot be achieved by mere straight-jacketed legalistic argumentation and rationalization; the process is broader and deeper than that, for to do justice in deciding such an issue, it is imperative that utmost consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of each case, with a view to having the most comprehensive understanding of the motivations of the parties, in the light of human needs, on the part of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and economical conduct of business and industry, on the part of management.  In this particular case, for instance, I cannot agree that respondent has violated its collective bargaining agreement with petitioner, but, on the other hand, I am not ready to conclude that for this reason, the strike here in question was consequently illegal.  I hold that the two strike votes taken by the members of the petitioning union were both premised on the sincere and honest belief that there was a legal breach of the said agreement."^[2] 

Such an approach was reflected in this portion of the opinion of the Court:  "As a matter of fact, this Court has gone even further.  It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer.  It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike.  So it was clearly stated by the present Chief Justice while still an Associate Justice of this Court:  'As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein.'"^[3] 

In the light of the above, it is apparent why, notwithstanding the vigorous plea made in the motion for consideration, there would be no legal justification for touching a different conclusion from that arrived at in out decision of May 31, 1971. 

1. More specifically, it is urged on this Court by respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. that the failure to abide by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement should not be considered an unfair labor practice.  lt is much too late in the day for such a contention to be advanced.  Such a view runs counter to decisions of this Court that go back to 1967.  The ruling was first announced by this Court through Justice Castro in Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations.^[4] It was subsequently followed in Security Bank Employees Union vs. Security Bank and Trust Company;^[5] Manila Hotel Company vs. Pines Hotel Employees Association^[6] and Alhambra Industries, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations.^[7]  There is no merit either for the argument advanced in the motion for reconsideration that the decision in this case would justify violence and thus negate the rule of law.  A more careful reading of what was set forth in our decision should suffice to demonstrate that such misgivings are unjustified.  As was set forth therein:  "Respondent Court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of the violence that attended it.  What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union's economic demands may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice.  That the law recognizes as a right.  There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an objective.  For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful ways.  A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale.  Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts.  To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective.  A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy.  It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed."^[8] 

2. There must have been, on the part of respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., a realization that the unanimity displayed by this Court in reaching its conclusion would, from the realistic standpoint, preclude undue optimism.  Thus, there was an alternative prayer.  Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. seeks to have the twelve officers of the Union denied reinstatement and he given a money award instead, the employee status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Antonio Labrador and Sesinando Romero be terminated for committing serious acts of violence, and the reinstatement of the seventeen security guards be without backpay.  While obviously, in the light of the legal doctrines announced, the reinstatement of the twelve officers of the Union who were dismissed merely because they were such, as well as that of the security guards, was a logical and legal consequence of the decision reached, there appears to be merit in its plea that the employee status of the five above-named individuals be terminated.  A reappraisal of the evidence would indicate that Nestor Samson did beat driver Arsenio Alejo with such force as to cause him to fall down with his eyes "popping out." As for Jose Rey and Romeo Rosales, they were among those who attacked Marcos Prieto, the Company's Iloilo Installation Manager, resulting in the latter's hospitalization for thirty-two days.  The violence exerted by Sesinando Romero and Antonio Labrador, by design and in concert, upon the two helpless victims, Arturo Mallari, the lorry driver, and his helper, Avelino Ruiz, were likewise of such magnitude as to entail the loss of employee status. 

WHEREFORE , with the modification of our decision of May 31, 1971 in that by this Resolution the employee status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Sesinando Romero and Antonio Labrador is likewise deemed terminated as in the cases of Ricardo Pagsibigan, Daniel Barraquel, Gregorio Bacsa, Conrado Peña, and Ernesto Crisostomo, the same is reiterated all respects, and the motion for reconsideration of respondent Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. is denied. 

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L.., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur. 

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion. 

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^[1] L-28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276.  

^[2] Ibid, p. 299. 

^[3] Ibid, pp. 288-289. 

^[4] L-20303, Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226. 

^[5] L-28536, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503. 

^[6] L-24314, Sept. 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 96. 

^[7] L-25984, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 550. 

^[8] Ibid, p. 292. 

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