Pending resolution by this Court in this special civil action are:  (1) the Second Motion for Reconside­ration filed by respondents Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacien­da Calatagan and Alfonso Zobel with leave of this Court, (2) the same respondents' Supplemental Second Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) peti­tioner Miguel Tolentino's Motion to Order Respondent Judge to Respect and Comply with the Decision of this Court in this case dated June 30, 1967.

Before proceeding to discuss the issues raised at this stage by the parties involved in this case, this Court deems it prudent, in order that it will be better understood why this consensus of opinion was arrived at, to refer back to the jurisprudence squarely applicable to, and in fact, the background of, the case, source of this special civil action.

In cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R of the Court of Appeals entitled Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Miguel Tolentino, Sr., et al., the said court, in resolving the issue of whether or not possession in or good faith by virtue of a torrens title acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment the said title is adjudged null and void by a proper court, ruled that such an issue should be re­solved in the affirmative.  The said Court of Appeals, pur­suant to this ruling, then made the pronouncement that, corollarily, a possessor whose possession has been found to be one in good faith by virtue of such torrens title acquired in good faith, is, therefore, entitled to reim­bursement by the owner of the parcels of land, the govern­ment of the Philippines in that instance, for the necessa­ry and useful expenses made thereon, with the right of re­tention until such reimbursement is made.  This resolution of the Court of Appeals, which modified the decision pre­viously rendered by it on October 31, 1961, was promulgated on August 20, 1962, (in the said cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R) and was elevated on appeal by certiorari to this Court, which appeal was docketed as cases G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 and L-20355-56.  This Court, on April 30, 1965, affirmed in toto the said resolution of the Court of Appeals.

However, prior to the promulgation of the above-men­tioned resolution of the Court of Appeals on August 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Batangas, then pre­sided over by the Honorable Damaso S. Tengco, promulgated its decision in Civil Case No. 373, source of this special civil action, on June 2, 1962.  In its said decision, the court a quo, on the question of compensatory damages claim­ed by plaintiff-intervenor therein, Miguel Tolentino, Sr., merely relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforementioned cases CA-G.R.Nos. 24186-87-R which was promulgated on October 31, 1961, and which was then not yet modified by the said resolution of August 20, 1962.  Consequently, the defendants Dizons therein were consi­dered by the court a quo as liable for the fruits of Lot 360, Psd 40891, which the said plaintiff-intervenor could have received from March 11, 1954 (Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950, pp. 258-259).

The decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No.373 was appealed directly to this Court where it was docketed as G.R.No. L-20950.  Speaking through Mr. Justice Jesus G. Barrera, we there held that:

"However, as we have ruled in this case of Dizon, et al., vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary ex­penses made on the land, which must properly be extablished and determined.

"It also follows that as such possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property.

xx                  xx                     xx                     xx

"WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.  No costs.

"SO ORDERED."

After our decision in the said case G.R. No. L-20950, May 31, 1965, had become final and executory, the court a quo on December 27, 1965, issued a writ of execution commanding the Sheriff of Rizal to, among others, cause the defendants, private respondents herein, to jointly and severally pay plaintiff-intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., petitioner herein, compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 (which con­sists of 29.8634 hectares) from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said lot.  This writ of execution, obviously, was based on the impres­sion of the court a quo that since paragraph (c) of its judgment in the said Civil Case No. 373 ordered all the defendants to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., such compensatory damages, and since the decision of this Court in the said case G.R. No. L-20950 appears to have absolved only the Dizons from the payment of such compensatory damages, then the other set of de­fendants therein, i.e., Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel, private respondents herein, remain solidarily liable to pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., the compensatory damages awarded to him by the court a quo in its said decision.

Upon motion of co-defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel, the court a quo, on January 18, 1966, temporarily suspended the enforcement of the said writ of execution.  On February 2, 1966, His Ho­nor, the respondent Judge, issued an order quashing the writ of execution of December 27, 1965, on the ground that nowhere in the decision of the court a quo of June 2, 1962, nor in the decision of this Court in case G.R.No.L-20950, is there any pronouncement that defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel have been found to be possessors in bad faith and, therefore, liable for the payment of damages to Miguel Tolentino, Sr.  The court a quo further based its order quashing the said writ of exe­cution obviously on the ground of estoppel, i.e., that, pre­cisely, on May 31, 1965, plaintiff and intervenor Miguel To­lentino, Sr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration in case SC­-G.R.L-20950 wherein he insisted that all the defendants be declared possessors in bad faith and liable for compensatory damages.  This Motion for Reconsideration, however, was de­nied by this Court.

Plaintiff-intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., then came up to this Court in this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus for the issuance of an order for the respond­ent Judge to execute the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 against herein private respondents and to annul the orders of the court a quo suspending the enforce­ment of the writ of execution of December 27, 1965 (order of January 18, 1966); quashing the same writ of execution (order of February 2, 1966); denying the motion of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines and Intervenor Tolentino for the issuance of another writ of execution of paragraph (a) of the decision in the said Civil Case. 373 (order of February 8, 1966); and denying the motion for reconsideration of these orders of February 2 and 8, 1966 (order of April 13, 1966).  On June 30, 1967, this Court rendered a decision in this case annul­ling the said orders of respondent Judge of January 18, Feb­ruary 2 and 8, and April 13, 1966.  A Motion for Partial Reconsideration under date of August 3, 1967, was filed by counsel for the respondents, Attys. Jalandoni and Jamir.  This motion was denied by our resolution of September 13, 1967.  On September 19, 1967, a Second Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondents through the same counsel.  A supple­mental Second Motion for Reconsideration under date of Sep­tember 22, 1967, was also filed for the same respondents, this time by Atty. Rafael Recto.  A Second Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration under date of October 12, 1968, was likewise filed by the said respondents.  Since then, many pleadings, motions, memoranda, etc., have been filed before this Court with respect to the incident of the said Second Motion for Reconsideration of the private respondents.  We are now called upon to resolve the issues raised by all these pleadings, motions and memoranda.

After a careful and painstaking study of all the said pleadings, motions, memoranda and other pertinent papers, as well as the record of this case, with respect to the is­sues which this Court is now called upon to resolve, it is our considered opinion that the decision of this Court pro­mulgated on June 30, 1967, should be reconsidered and set aside, not only on the grounds of law and justice but also on the ground of equity.  This is because we can find no justifica­tion for an award of compensatory damages in favor of peti­tioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., much less make the private res­pondents herein liable for such damages.  As the lessee of the government, his cause of action was necessarily against his lessor due to the failure of the latter to place him in peaceful possession of the property leased to him.  By analogy, when a lessee rents a building which turns out, however, to be oc­cupied by another person, and the former cannot obtain pos­session, his (the lessee's) cause of action is against the lessor for breach of contract in that the latter violated the obligation of delivering to him the peaceful possession of the leased premises.  The lessee has no cause of action against the possessor because he has no relation, contractual or ex­ delicto, with the latter.

A study of the Record on Appeal in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo case G.R. No. L-20950 of this Court, shows that there is nothing therein to support a construction or interpretation of the judgment of the lower court in the sense that it makes the private respondents in this special civil action liable for the compensatory damages awarded to peti­tioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.  In point, there is nothing in the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the decision of the lower court in the said Civil Case No. 373 which could form the basis for an award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against the private respondents in this special civil action.  Pursuant to these findings, it inextricably becomes our considered opinion that to construe the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 otherwise would mean the rendition of a verdict or judgment with absolutely nothing to support it, and in fact would constitute a plain and open contradiction of the conceded and admitted facts of the case.  Such a ver­dict or decision, therefore, would be void (Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. 598, 601).

Furthermore, a minute scrutiny of the same Record on Ap­peal in case SC-G.R.No.L-20950 reveals the fact that the amend ed complaint of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines in that case is made up, by way of summary, of the following allega­tions:

(a)   The first cause of action (pp. 2-5, Record on Ap­peal) alleges, in brief, the irregular registration of close to 2,500 hectares of public land by defendant Alfonso Zobel;

(b)   The second cause of action (pp. 5-6, Record on Appeal) alleges the fraudulent and malicious sale and/or lease of the lots in this public land to other persons, including the defendants Dizons;

(c)   The third cause of action (pp. 7-10, Record on Ap­peal) alleges the filing with, and approval by, the Depart­ment of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the fishpond application of, among others, herein petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. Paragraph 19 of the same amended complaint of the Republic of the Philippines under this cause of ac­tion (p. 10 of the said Record on Appeal) alleges damages of approximately P500,000.00 in the form of uncollected rentals from the permittees and awardees of the applicants to the said fishponds.  This allegation of damages in the form of uncollected rentals, clearly, cannot be construed as applicable to petitioner Tolentino's claim for damages or to the award of compensatory damages in his favor since his claim is for unrealized earnings and profits for prawns, crabs and milkfish (pp. 24-25, Record on Appeal);

(d)   The fourth cause of action (pp. 10-11, Record on Appeal) alleges the right of the plaintiff and/or its per­mittees or lessees to the use, enjoyment and possession of the lots, subject matter of Civil Case No. 373 of the lower court.

Clearly, the amended complaint of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo cannot be construed or interpreted in such a manner as to constitute a basis for an award of compensatory damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., since the damages claimed therein are alleged to be uncollected rentals from the permittees and awardees, or lessees, of the lots, subject matter thereof.

With respect to the complaint-in-intervention of peti­tioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., (pp. 15-32 of the same Record on Appeal), the following constitute his allegations:

(a)   In paragraph 1 (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal), he adopts allegations Nos. 1 to 22 of the complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines;

(b)   Paragraphs 2 to 7 (pp. 16-20, Record on Appeal) complain of the alleged acts of usurpation made by defend­ant Alfonso Zobel, et al.;

(c)   Paragraphs 8 to 15 (pp. 20-24, Record on Appeal) allege the fraudulent sale of several lots of Psd 40891 to the Dizons, et al.; the dismissal by the Secretary of Agri­culture and Natural Resources of the protests by the lessees and vendees of Ayala y Cia., and/or the Hacienda Calatagan against the orders of the Director of Fisheries for them to vacate the said fishponds; and the alleged right of plaintiff-intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., to the posses­sion of Lot 360 of Psd 40891 from the date of the filing of the latter's application on March 11, 1954;

(d)   Paragraph 16 (pp. 24-25, Record on Appeal) which is entitled "DAMAGES" merely alleges that he (Tolentino) had

"x x x suffered and will further suffer in­calculable damages in the form of earnings and profits in the amount of P3,000.00 for 'sugpo', P3,000.00 for 'alimango' and P1,000.00 for 'ba­ngos' for each of the two (2) harvests a year of the 29.2638 hectares of the public fishponds, Lot 360 of Psd-40891 since March 11, 1954; as well as P100,000.00 moral, punitive and exemplary damages, he having unlawfully been deprived of his right to possess and enjoy the said fishpond."

(e) Paragraphs 17 to 22 merely allege technicalities of failure to appeal by the defendants Dizons, from the orders of the Director of Fisheries for them to vacate the public fishponds; arguments dwelling on res judicata; and his (plaintiff-intervenor Tolentino's) alleged right to the enjoyment or possession of the lot he applied for as a basis for his additional prayer for the issuance by the court a quo of a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants from committing acts of dispossession and usurpation against him.

Clearly, therefore, there is no allegation for damages made by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., in his complaint-­in-intervention in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo against the private respondents in this case.  His allega­tion that he suffered damages in the form of unrealized earnings and profits as quoted above does not satisfy the requirement of allegation of ultimate facts constituting the act or omission of the respondents in this case in violation of his legal rights and for which, consequently, the latter should then be ordered to pay him compensatory damages.  In brief, while it is true that he alleged that he suffered damages, yet he did not allege who caused him to suffer these damages; who is responsible therefor; and why precisely or additionally the respondents in this case should be liable therefor.  Implicitly and necessarily, at the most, his allegation of having suffered the said damages must be construed as directed against whoever was in posses­sion of the said fishpond-lots at the time he should have started to possess the same.  And there is no dispute over the fact that only the Dizons were in possession of these fishpond lots at that time or on March 11, 1954, when petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., filed his fishpond lease application with the Bureau of Fisheries.

It should be remembered that every complaint must state at least the ultimate facts upon which a party relies for his cause of action.  Hence, since there is no allegation of ulti­mate facts by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., in his com­plaint-in-intervention against the respondents in this case regarding what act or omission by the latter caused him dam­ages, how can there be, in effect, an award of damages against the private respondents in the case, source of this special civil action?  It must also be remembered that every ordinary civil suit must be based on the presence of a cause of action.  And a cause of action, to exist, must have the following ele­ments:

1.      Legal right of the plaintiff;

2.      Correlative obligation of the defendant; and

3.      Act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.  (I Moran, Comments on the rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 91.)

As stated above, there is no allegation in the said peti­tioner's complaint-in-intervention that the private respond­ents in this case committed an act or omission in violation of his legal rights.  In his third cause of action (p. 24, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950), he merely alleged damages due to the "defendants' stubborn refusal to vacate the portion of the public land x x x", Lot 360 of Psd 40891.  This allegation, even if construed to satisfy the third element of a cause of action, can apply only to the Dizons who were the owners and possessors when petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., applied for a lease of that lot on March 11, 1954.  However, the same allegation clearly cannot be construed or considered to constitute an ultimate statement of any act or omission on the part of the private respondents in this case (Ayala y Cia., et al.) in violation of Tolentino's alleged right of possession.  For, conceding an instance of fol­lowing events to their natural conclusion, i.e., granting that the Dizons immediately turned over the possession of Lot 360 to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., when the latter filed his fishpond lease application on March 11, 1954, and acknow­ledged the title of the government over that same lot, could petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., validly sue the respondents in this case, Ayala y Cia., et al., for damages?  Obviously not.  In fact, neither could he have sued the Dizons also, for he then would not have any cause of action against both the respondents in this case and the Dizons.

Granting, however, the foregoing pronouncements to be not indubitable, still the fact remains that this Court should not base its impressions on a merely casual reading of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373.  As we have stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippines Veterans Board, et al., 106 Phil. 125, 131, to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety.  Hence, in order to arrive at a just and equitable solution to the issues presented to this Court by this special civil action, we must read the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 as a whole.  If, in the said decision of the lower court, there is a finding of fact or conclusion of law that the private respondents herein, who were co-defendants along with the Dizons therein, were included in the liability for compensatory damages to herein petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., then we may say that our decision in this special civil action should stand.  But if, as may be found after the said thorough and painstaking study of the issues and background of this case, the said decision of the lower court (particu­larly pp. 218-219, and 257-259, Record on Appeal, G. R. No. L-20950, quoted verbatim hereafter) considered only the Di­zons as liable to Tolentino for damages, then the necessa­ry implication would be that the private respondents in this special civil action were not in reality included in the liability for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolenti­no, Sr.  Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

This Court has promulgated many cases, viz., Velez vs. Martinez, et al 63 Phil., 231; De Ralla vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil 491; Morelos vs. Go Chin Ling, et al., 105 Phil 814; and Villoneset al. vs. Nable et al., 85 Phil., 43, wherein it was held judgment must no be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part.  Hence, it behooves this Court now to be not overly technical and refuse to read the decision of the lower court as a whole or confine itself to the fallo thereof only.  Rather, the decision of the court below should be taken as a whole and considered in its en­tirety to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof (De Ralla vs. Director of Lands supra).  Neither is this Court inclined to confine itself to a reading of the said fallo literally.  On the contrary, the judgment portion of a decision should be interpreted and construed in harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof (Morelosvs. Go Chin Ling, supra).  As stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al supra, to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion there­of should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety.  Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.  Applying these principles to this case, therefore the pertinent portion of the decision in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo which states:

"Corollary to the present case, Civil Cases Nos. 135 and 136 of this Court were ventilated between the same parties as test cases over fish­ponds, with similar and identical nature to those now disputed and the Court of Appeals sustaining the findings of this Court ruled on October 31, 1961 that the defendants' subdivision titles are null and void and that the fishponds in question which have been in the possession of the Dizons belonged to the public domain and outside Trans­fer Certificate of Title No. 722, and that the Dizons were liable for damages suffered by de­fendants Tolentino" (p. 218, Record on Appeal, G.R.No.L-20950) (Underscoring supplied)

xx                  xx                     xx                     xx

"To the mind of the Court, insofar as this Lot 360 is concerned, the Dizons began posses­sing in bad faith from the time that they became aware of a defect in their title or mode of ac­quisition (Art. 526 of the Civil Code, Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil. 644).  This was on March 11, 1954, when the Director of Fishe­ries dismissed their protest to the fishpond applica­tion of the Tolentinos on the ground that the fishpond was outside the boundaries of Hacienda de Calatagan and a part of the territorial sea.  As such posses­sor, they are liable for the fruits received as well as those which the lawful possessors would have re­ceived pursuant to Article 54 of the Civil Code.  From the time this complaint has been filed up to the present, it has been admitted that the defendants Dizons are in possession of the portion of the sea denominated as Lot 360 of Psd 40891.  Evidence shows that the fruits that could be received were P1,000.00 per hectare of milkfish or bangos, and P2,000.00 per hectare for shrimps, crabs and other fishes.  Intervenor Tolentino should therefore be awarded damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare from March 11, 1954 until he is placed in lawful possession of the fishpond in Lot 360." (Ibid., pp. 258-259) (Underscoring supplied.)

should control the deliberations of this Court in this case.  In other words, it is clear from the above-quoted portions of the decision of the court a quo that only the Dizons, and not herein private respondents as well, were intended by the court a quo to be liable for compensatory damages to peti­tioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., for the reason, as stated by the same court a quo, that the former were admittedly the only ones in possession of the portions of the sea denomi­nated as Lot 360 of Psd 40891, and not herein private res­pondents also, at the time when petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., filed his fishpond lease application with the Bureau of Fisheries on March 11, 1954.

Additionally, article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or ap­plication of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This mandate of law, obviously, cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.

"x x x The judgment must be read in its en­tirety, and it must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part, if possible, and to effectuate the obvious intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law." (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864.)

"Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a reasonable intendment to do justice and avoid wrong.  When a judgment is susceptible of two in­terpretations, that will be adopted which renders it the more reasonable, effective, and conclusive, and which makes the judgment harmonize with the facts and law of the case and be such as ought to have been rendered x x x." (49 C.J.S., pp. 865-866.)

"When language of decree is susceptible of two constructions, from one of which it follows that the law has been correctly applied to facts and from other that law has been incorrectly, applied, that construction should be adopted which correct­ly applies the law." (Footnote of 49 C.J.S., p. 866.)

"x x x Necessary legal implications are in­cluded although not expressed in terms, but the adjudication does not extend beyond what the lan­guage used fairly warrants.  The legal effect, ra­ther than the language used, governs.  In cases of ambiguity or doubt, the entire record may be examined and considered.  Judgments are to have a reasonable intendment.  Where a judgment is sus­ceptible of two interpretations, that one will be adopted which renders it more reasonable, effec­tive and conclusive, and which makes the judgment harmonize with the facts and law of the case and be such as ought to have been rendered.  x x x" (34 C.J. 502.)

"As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written instruments.  The determinative factor is the intention of the court, as gathered from all parts of the judg­ment itself.  In applying this rule, effect must be given to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in a judgment, as well as to that which is expressed in the most appropriate lan­guage.  Such construction should be given to a judgment as will give force and effect to every word of it, if possible, and make it as a whole consistent, effective and reasonable.  Sometimes, it is declared that the interpretation of a judg­ment must be characterized by justice and fairness.  If a judgment is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would render it legal and the other il­legal, the court will adopt the former.

"The judgment may be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly, at least where there is uncertainty and ambiguity.  In the latter case, it is proper to consider the pleadings, and verdicts or findings, in light of the ap­plicable statutes.  If a finding is inconsistent with the judgment proper or decretal part of the decree, the latter must control.  The issues in­volved in the action are also important factors in determining what was intended by the judgment." (30A Am. Jur., pp. 212-213.) (Underscoring sup­plied.)

The foregoing pronouncements find support in the case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes et al., 63 Phil., 87, 91-92, where­in this Court allowed a judgment that had become final and executory to be "clarified" by supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted and which, when supplied, in ef­fect changed the literal import of the original phraseolo­gy, thus:

"x x x it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint, the promissory note reproduced therein and made a part thereof, the prayer and the conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision of the respondent judge, that the obligation contracted by the petitioners is joint and several and that the parties as well as the  trial Judge so understood it.  Under the juridical rule that the judgment should be in accordance with the allegations, the evidence and the con­clusions of fact and of law, the dispositive part of the judgment under consideration should have ordered that the debt be paid severally, and in omitting the word or adverb 'severally' inadver­tently, said judgment became ambiguous.  This am­biguity may be clarified at any time after the decision is rendered and even after it had become final (34 Corpus Juris, 235, 236.) The respondent judge did not, therefore, exceed his juris­diction in clarifying the dispositive part of the judgment by supplying the omission".  (Underscoring supplied).

This is so because, in the first place, if an already final judgment can still be amended to supply an omission committed through oversight, this simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an already final decision, the fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with the body of such final decision.  This is precisely what happened in the above-cited case.

In the second place, granting that an amendment may be limited to the supplying only of an omission, then it may be correctly argued that a perusal of the fallo of the lower court's decision, in relation to the body there­of, shows, by simple logic, that the letters "se" were in­advertently omitted from the word "the" in paragraph (c) of the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373.  Such omission, therefore, may be supplied to conform with the spirit of the decision as contained in the body thereof.  In other words, paragraph (c) should have read "ordering all these defendants x x ", hence, a clear case of omission.  This is the only logical conclusion applicable to this is­sue in this case because the succeeding paragraph (d) of the fallo of the lower court's decision which restrains and enjoins the exercise of further acts of ownership and pos­session again uses the phrase "all the defendants".  Since, even prior to the time of the filing of Civil Case No.373 before the lower court, only the Dizons were the registered owners and possessors of Lot 360, Psd 40891, cause of the award of damages by the court a quo, this paragraph (d) of the judgment in the said Civil Case No. 373 could then apply only to the Dizons.  Likewise, therefore, it is ob­vious that in this paragraph (d), of the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373, the word "these" was the one intended to be used by the lower court, and not the word "the"; hence, a case of omission again of the letters "se" from the word "the" in that paragraph (d).  This observation is conclusively supported by the fact that the last paragraph (e) of the said decision of the lower court which orders the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs of the suit does not contain the word "all" anymore.  Hence, this paragraph (e) was clearly intended by the lower court to apply also to the private respondents in this case, as well as the Dizons, since all the defendants lost their case before the court a quo.  In fine, the word "all", therefore, was clearly meant by the lower court to apply only to the several defendants Dizons as specifically identified in the second paragraph (b) of the fallo of its decision, Of course, it could also be that the word "said" should have been placed between the words "the" and "defendants" in the said paragraph (c), but was inadvertently omitted by the trial Judge or his typist.  This is especially so considering the fact that paragraph (a) of the judgment of the court a quo ends with a period as shall be shown and discussed hereafter.

In the third place, if an already final decision can still be amended by means of supplying an omission, there is no reason why we cannot take the reverse proposition as also true, i.e., that words which were not really intended by the body of the decision to appear in the fallo thereof should also be stricken off or, at the very least, interpreted in a manner so as not to refer to what was, in the first place, not intended by the lower court.  As the said case of Locsin et al. vs. Paredes, et al. supra, states, ambiguity is not merely confined to a literal one, but may arise where the dispositive portion of the judgment under consideration is not in accordance with the allegations and the evi­dence of the parties, and the conclusions of fact and of law of the lower court.

In the fourth place, if an amendment may be allowed after a decision has already become final, such amendment may consist either in the supplying of an omission (as in the said case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., supra); the striking out of a superfluity (the word "all") in the fallo thereof; or the interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body of the decision which gives it life.  But the body of the lower court's decision does not say anything about the private respondents in this case being liable for damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.  The spring cannot rise higher than the source.

The decision in case G.R.No. L-26112 pronounced that the judgment in Civil Case No. 373 (G.R.No.L-20950) has been affirmed except only as regards subdivision (c) there­of which should be modified so as to read, in effect, as follows:

"(c) Ordering the defendants, except the Dizons, to jointly and severally pay x x x and except also insofar as the Dizons have pursuant to the decision, as amended -- the right of retention therein stated." (p. 5, Decision, G.R.No. L-26112).

After a mature deliberation upon that pronouncement of this Court as contained in the said decision in this case, we now do not agree with the observation that the decision in G.R. No. L-20950 is confined to these two (2) modifica­tions only.  Paragraph (b) of the said judgment of the court a quo which orders the defendants Dizon to vacate Lot 360 in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., is also necessarily modified so as to make them vacate the said Lot 360 only from the moment they are reimbursed the necessary and useful expenses they incurred thereon. Paragraph (d) which restrains and enjoins "all the de­fendants from further acts of ownership and possession over Lot 360", etc., is also necessarily modified in the sense that the Dizons, who are the present posses­sors of the said Lot 360, cannot be restrained or en­joined from exercising acts of possession thereon until their right of retention is terminated by, again, their being reimbursed their said necessary and useful expenses.  These observations only go to show that, really, this Court cannot just fold its arms and react in a merely passive manner by confining itself in this present case to consi­dering paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 as standing alone.  A contrario, it should read such dispositive por­tion as a whole.  In fact, the whole decision itself, in­cluding the opinion portion thereof, should be read in order to arrive at the true meaning of any of its parts.  And in so doing, especially as revealed by the body of the decision in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo (particularly the previously quoted potions appearing in pp. 218-219 and n. 258, et seq., of the Record on Ap­peal in case G.R.No.L-20950) the wording of the same decision was clearly for only the Dizons to pay damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.  In brief, to say that the decision in case SC-G.R.No. L-20950 modifies only paragraph (c) of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 would be inconsistent with the obvious effects of the former decision upon paragraphs (b) and (d) of the latter decision.  This is because, unques­tionably, the Dizons can neither be made to vacate nor be restrained from exercising acts of possession over the lots in question in Civil Case No. 373 of the lower court until they are reimbursed their expenses thereon.

Going now to the dispositive portion of the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 as reproduced in pp. 259-260 the Record on Appeal in Case SC-G.R. No. L-20950, it should be noted that paragraph (a) thereof ends with a period, whereas paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) respectively end with a semi-colon.  This fact is being brought out here to stress the fact that an examination of the said Record on Appeal shows that the said parag­raph (a) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas really ends with a period, and not with a semi-colon as the decision in this case of June 30, 1967, erroneously reproduces there­in, thus:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"(a)  Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit '24') of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Ba­tangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calata­gan over the areas outside its private land co­vered by TCT No, 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are here­by reverted to public dominion.

"(b)  Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amoranda Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of intervenor Miguel Tolentino;

"(c)  Ordering all the defendants to joint­ly and severally pay Intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;

"(d)  Restraining and enjoining all the de­fendants from further acts of ownership and pos­session over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd­40891; and

"(e)  Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.

"IT IS SO ORDERED."

Hence, paragraph (a) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court, which paragraph declares as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No.T-9550 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Batangas "and other subdivision titles issued in favor of respondents Ayala y Cia., and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, x x x" was obviously intended by the lower court to be a ruling entirely distinct and separate from the succeeding parag­raphs of the same dispositive portion of the said deci­sion.  This can only be so since the said paragraph (a) refers exclusively to the private respondents in this case, while the succeeding paragraph (b), which is an order to vacate, refers only to, and in fact specifi­cally names and enumerates, the defendants Dizons, namely, Antonino, Lucia, Adelaida, Consolacion, Artemio, Ruben, Amoranda and Zenaida, all surnamed Dizon.  This paragraph (b), obviously, does not refer to Ayala y Cia., Alfonso Zobel and/or Hacienda de Calatagan, private res­pondents herein, for the simple reason that they are not in possession of Lot 360, Psd-40891, as stated therein.  Consequently, paragraph (c), the issue in this special civil action, of the same dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court which orders "all the de­fendants to jointly and severally pay compensatory dam­ages x x x" to Miguel Tolentino, Sr., which paragraph is necessarily connected to the preceding paragraph (b) since the latter ends with a semi-colon, can only refer to the defendants Dizon.

To reiterate, it should be noted that the damages awarded in this paragraph (c) of the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 are compensatory.  Hence, these damages refer only to, at the earliest, when Tolentino al­legedly suffered them or when his cause of action accrued on March 11, 1954, when he filed his fishpond lease ap­plication with the Bureau of Fisheries.  But at that time, only the Dizons were the possessors and registered owners of Lot 360, Psd-40891, subject matter of petitioner Mi­guel Tolentino, Sr.'s complaint-in-intervention.  Hence, such order to pay damages could only have been meant against the Dizons.

Moreover, to award damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against herein private respond­ents would violate the cardinal rule that a judgment must conform to and be supported by both the pleadings and the proofs, and should be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings were framed and the case was tried (secundum allegata et probata).

Dwelling now on the issue of the alleged bad faith of herein private respondents, granting, arguendo, that the latter were the ones who caused error by using the magnetic survey method resulting in the inclusion of Lot 360 of Psd-40891 of the Batangas Cadastre in their cer­tificate of title (due to their causing the preparation of a composite plan which led to the issuance of TCT No. 20), still they should not be made liable for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.  In the first place, to follow such a theory would lead to absurd consequences.  This because in such a case, the surveyor and even the manufacturer of the magnetic-method surveying equipment himself, would, if such a contention is to be upheld, be also liable for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino.  By analogy, where a pedestrian is injured in an automo­bile accident, to follow such a theory would lead to the absurd conclusion that the manufacturer of the automobile should also be liable for damages in favor of that pedes­trian because by manufacturing such automobile, this act provided the occasion for the accident to happen.  Clearly, this would lead to an unbroken chain of liability going back to the very first material used in the manufacture of that automobile, i.e., the steel manufacturer or, even further, the iron ore liner.  In the second place, it s a fact that magnetic surveys can lead to error like, for example, where the survey should actually result in a curve, what appears is a straight line.  The private res­pondents in this case, therefore, are not guilty of bad faith.  Besides, and in any event, bad faith is a cause of action based on tort which, as applied to the case, source of this special civil action, has already pres­cribed, particularly with respect to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.  This is because the alleged fraudulent survey facilitated by the said composite plan was per­formed during the year 1949 (Decision, Record on Appeal, G.R.No. L-20950, p. 169), and therefore, an action based on such a tortious act, if tenable, would have prescribed in 1953 or four (4) years thereafter (Art. 1146, Civil Code).

As previously stated above, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas on this issue of damages in Civil Case No. 373, source of this special action, relied entirely on the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R Nos. 24186-87-R, October 31, 1961, awarding damages in fa­vor of Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against the Dizons.  The said decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was promulgated on June 2, 1962.  This date was prior to the date of the resolution of the Court of Appeals of Au­gust 20, 1962, modifying its above-mentioned decision of October 31, 1961, in the said cases CA-G.R.Nos. 24186-87-R.  In that resolution and as previously expounded upon above, plaintiffs-appellants Antonio Dizon, et al., were even­tually absolved from liability for damages, in favor of Mi­guel Tolentino, Sr., who is also the petitioner in this case, and the former were given the right of retention of the properties, subject matter of those cases, until they are reimbursed the useful and necessary expenses they made thereon.  The said resolution of the Court of Appeals of August 20, 1962, was affirmed in toto by this Court in G.R.Nos.L-20300-01 and 20355-56.  It is there­fore the opinion of this Court now that were it not for this circumstance of fate regarding dates, i.e. that the said resolution in cases CA-G.R.Nos. 24186-87-R was promulgated subsequent to the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373, there would surely be no dispute about this matter since the lower court would then not have relied for its ruling on this issue of damages upon the original decision of the Court of Appeals in those cases as cited above.  In brief, the court a quo would not have made any award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. in Civil Case No. 373 if its decision had been promulgated after the issuance by the Court of Ap­peals of its said modifying resolution as affirmed later or by this Court in cases G.R. Nos.L-20300-01 and L-20355-56.

The damages now being sought to be, in effect, awarded to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., being compensatory, such damages must be only against those responsible there­for when his cause of action accrued, that is, the Dizons.  However, the latter were absolved by us from such liability our decision in case G.R. No. L-20950.

In point, it should be borne in mind that a case may be filed only when there is a cause of action present or upon the accrual of a cause of action.  There is no dis­pute that the cause of action of petitioner Miguel Tolen­tino, Sr., arose at the earliest, from the time that he flied his fishpond lease application for Lot 360 of Psd-40891 in 1954, a time when only the Dizons were in pos­session and were the registered owners thereof.  Aside from the fact that the cause of action of petitioner Miguel To­lentino, Sr., as stated previously above, was against his lessor (the Government) for the latter's inability to com­ply with its obligation to place him in possession of what was leased to him, a ruling which, in effect, would make the private respondents herein liable for damages to the petitioner would be tantamount to this Court's giving sanction to the allowing of a case to be filed and decided fa­vorably by a lower court, although the cause of action there had not yet accrued or where none exists.  Therefore, had the said petitioner filed a case in the nature of the one he did file in Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo against the private respondents herein at the time when the latter were still the registered owners and possessors, his com­plaint would, at the very least, have been premature since his fishpond lease application had not yet been filed by him with the government at that time.  In other words, there absolutely is no reason for awarding compensatory damages against a prior possessor and registered owner (the res­pondents in this case), even assuming that the latter were in bad faith, in favor of a person who did not have a cause of action against him.  The filing of a fishpond lease ap­plication by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. was a condition sine qua non for his cause of action to accrue or come about.  Hence, damages in his favor, if any, can be assessed only against those who deprived him of his right of possession of the said Lot 360 of Psd-40891 at the time he filed the said fishpond lease application on May 11, 1954, provided, of course, that the latter are found in bad faith.  Thus, even if the predecessor of the present possessors were in bad faith, they cannot be held liable in favor of a person who did not have a cause of action against him.  This is an elementary rule of civil procedure.

With respect to the equitable aspect of this case, the injustice of, in effect, an award of damages against the respondents in this special civil action is very obvious.  As stated above, neither the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 nor the decision of this Court in G.R. No.L-20950 has made any finding as to the amount of the necessary and useful expenses that will have to be reimbursed to the present possessors, the Dizons.  The decision in the said case G.R. No. L-20950, in fact, stated that those expenses have yet to be properly established and determined.  Neither did it say who is to make such reimbursement.  Hence, so long as reimbursement is not made to them, they (the Dizons) will retain their right of possession.  On the other hand, the private respond­ents in this special civil action will continue to be lia­ble for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. for about P90,000.00 a year.  Aside from such obvious injus­tice and inequity, how much then will the private respond­ents in this case be made to pay perpetually to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.? How much should the clerk of the lower court state in each writ of execution that he is called upon to issue as should be paid by the private res­pondents in this special civil action to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., when the basis for the compensatory dam­ages is deprivation of possession, and such deprivation of possession cannot be terminated, that is, possession cannot be given to Tolentino until the Dizons are reim­bursed their expenses?  And such expenses have yet to be established and determined as stated by us in the said Case G.R.No.L-20950.  And after the five-year prescriptive period for a judgment to be enforced by an ordinary motion for execution, may this amount of practically P90,000.00 a year be still considered enforceable a matter of course or without need of a new court action pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court?  These uncertainties which readily reflect the obvious injustice of the effects of our decision in this case is borne out by the Writ of Execution itself as issued by the lower court, which states to the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal that:

"x x x, you cause the said defendants to jointly and severally pay Miguel Tolentino com­pensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 (which consists of 29.8634 hectares) from March 11, 1954 until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area; to collect the lawful fees x x x."

Clearly, therefore, the damages which are required to be specific in amount, i.e., "x x x, and the amount actually due thereon if it be for money" (Sec. 8, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court), are incapable of accurate estimation so as to put an end to all the incidents of Civil Case No.373 of the lower court, in fact, petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., need not or can hardly be expected to obtain possession of the said lot at all since he will be paid P90,000.00 a year without any sweat or effort on his part.  This is a similar situation to that contemplated in a positive potestative conditional obligation which is void under the civil law. e.g., Tolentino will enter into possession when he wants to, and only from that time will the respondents in this case cease to be liable in the payment of about P90,000.00 to him annually.

If this Court, therefore, would not reconsider its decision in this case, the result would be clearly unjust and will lead to the iniquitous consequence of, in effect, ordering the respondents to pay alimony to petitioner Mi­guel Tolentino, Sr.  In brief, the respondents would then have to pay P3,000.00 per hectare a year of Lot 360, Psd­-40891, or about P90,000.00 annually to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. so long as the latter desists from entering into possession of the said lot.  In return, the former get nothing from the said petitioner as cause or consideration for such desistance, but, on the contrary, have to continue paying him this alimony; a clear case of adding insult to Injury.

Coming now to the contention of one of the counsel for petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. during the oral argument last August 11, 1970, that the decision of this court in this case of June 30, 1967, is already final and executory based on the fact that herein private respondents filed their motion for partial reconsideration on the day of the 15-day period before the judgment in this case to become final, and that, therefore, the second motion for reconsideration which was filed the next day after the receipt of the resolution of denial of June 13, 1967 by said counsel, was filed out of time or one day late, suffice it to say that the decision of this Court in the case of Mara, Inc. vs. the Honorable  Court of Appeals and Ace Lumber Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-26584, July 31, 1969 (28 SCRA 1075), squarely refutes this conten­tion on all its four corners. We there held that a party who files a motion to reconsider on the last day of the pe­riod allotted by the Rules of Court may still validly take further steps to protect his interest the day after receiv­ing the notice of denial of such motion.  Petitioner Tolenti­no insists, nonetheless, that what should be applied here is Sec. 1 of Rule 52, which provides that "[a] second motion for reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been pending," and not Sec. 3 of Rule 41, which was applied in Lloren, etc. vs. Veyra, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-13929, March 28, 1962 (4 SCRA 637), and, later, in Mara.  A similar argument was raised in Mara, and we there said that nothing but confusion would be gained by not applying a uniform rule.  At any rate, to accord merit to petitioner Tolentino's contention would render nugatory - whenever the first motion for reconsideration is filed on the last day of the 15-day period - the above-quoted provision of Sec. 1, Rule 52.  Moreover, even if it may be considered that the decision in this case of June 30, 1967, has already become final pursuant to the said contention of petitioner's coun­sel, still, there is nothing to prevent this Court from ap­plying the doctrine in the aforesaid case of Locsin vs. Pareredes, supra, to the effect that even if the decision of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 is already final, this Court may still clarify the ambiguity contained in the judgment of the lower court in its decision.  By such clarification, there is no partial modification of the said judgment, but rather, and at the most, a mere interpretation thereof for purposes of clarifying an ambiguity.

Accordingly, justice and equity now compel this Court to depart in this case from the general rule that for pur­poses of execution, only the dispositive portion of a de­cision should be referred to.  This course of action is not only justified by precedents but, in fact, is ordained by the Constitution itself which requires a decision to be in writing and to state the findings of fact and conclusions of law as bases for the judgment. Needless to say, a lower court may commit errors in its findings of fact and/or con­clusions of law, but that does not affect the validity of its decision once it becomes final.  However, a judgment or fallo without any basis at all in fact and in law or in the opinion portion of the decision from which it draws its breath and life can only be considered as null and void.  Emphatically, such a judgment can never be elevated to the dignity of a judicial act.  The final and true decision that should be considered, therefore, is the decision of this Court in G.R.No. L-20950.

In fact, even the decision of this Court in the said case G.R.No. L-20950 states, as its dispositive portion, the words:

"WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.  No costs.

"SO ORDERED."

It should be noted, therefore, that the above-quoted dispositive portion of the said decision in case G.R.No. L-20950 itself, has seen fit to implement a practice where­by the actual judgment of a court is also to be found in the opinion portion, and not in the fallo thereof always.  And since it is the decision of this Court in Case G.R. No. L-20950 which should be considered as the more authorita­tive and final one regarding the rights and liabilities of the parties to Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo, re­ference should therefore be made to the contents of the said decision of this Court in said case G.R.No.L-20950 in order to determine the decisive question as to how the judgment of the court a duo was modified.  To this end, and for convenience, the following portions of the said deci­sion in case G.R. No. L-20950 are pertinent:

"We have gone over the evidence presented in this case and found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.  It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the fore­shores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company to third persons.  There is also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a certifi­cate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a 'composite plan' wherein the aforesaid fore­shore areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan.  Defendants-appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor.  This, however, was justified by claiming that it could have been caused by the system magnetic survey used in the preparation of the ori­ginal titles, and anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, according to defendants) is with­in the allowable margin given to magnetic survey.

"But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct, the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by per­mits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshores, beach, or of the navigable water itself.  And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or con­fer title on the registrant.  (See G.R.No.L-8654, Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona, et al., April 28, 1956; also G.R. No. L-20300-01 & L-20355-56, Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., April 30, 1965.) In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No.T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia. and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be por­tions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public domi­nion.

"However, as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc. et al.,(Said purchasers who relied on the efficacy of their certificate of title, cannot be considered pos­sessors in bad faith until after the legality of their said titles has been finally determined.),  there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made in the land which must properly be established and determined.  It also follows that as such possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other par­ties on account of their possession of the property.

"In view of the foregoing, the revocation of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued by the lower court, and the suspension of the delivery of possession of the properties to plaintiff and intervenor Tolentino, were in order.

"WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.  No costs.

"SO ORDERED."

The above-quoted portion of the said decision in case G.R.No.L-20950 clearly shows that what was really in issue with respect to the question of the compensatory damages awarded by the court a quo to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., was the question of whether or not the Dizons were liable therefor.  It necessarily follows, therefore, that it was never in the mind nor in the contemplation of this Court that the private respondents in this case were also considered by the court a quo as liable for the compensa­tory damages in question to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., for the simple reason that it was only the Dizons, as previously stated above, who were in possession and were the registered owners of Lot 360, Psd-40891 of the Batangas Cadastre, at the time petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. filed his fishpond lease application on March 11, 1954, the date when his cause of action accrued.  This is even conceding the proposition that petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. ac­quired the right to possess the same lot on that date and not at the time of the approval of the said application on February 10, 1959.  And since the Torrens Titles of the Di­zons served to shield them against any stigma of bad faith, the same legal rule must obtain as respects any imputation of bad faith against the private respondents herein.  In other words, there is no reason why the reliance of the Dizons upon the indefeasibility of their Torrens Titles should vary in its effect from the reliance of Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel, or, for that matter, of any other person upon theirs.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respondents, motions for reconsideration as stated in the first part of this resolution are hereby granted, and the motion of peti­tioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. mentioned also thereat is denied.  The decision of this Court heretofore rendered in this case G.R.No. L-26112 is hereby set aside and the pe­tition for certiorari and mandamus in this case is dismissed without costs.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., filed a separate dissent and concurs with the dissenting opinion of J. Teehankee.
Reyes, J., concurs in the dissent of C.J. Concepcion, and J. Teehankee.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
Teehankee, J., files a dissent and concurs with the dissent of C.J. Concepcion.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

BARREDO, J.:

I concur.  On the whole, I agree with the main opinion, but I would like to explain my reasons for doing so.  Incidentally, I believe it is not amiss for me to state first why I have taken part in this case notwithstanding my having been co-signer of the basic petition herein, as Solicitor General then.

The fact that as Solicitor General, I co-signed with petitioner Tolentino the petition in this case made me hesitate at first to take part and vote in the disposition of the present incidents.  On second thought, however, (a) realizing that this is one of the matters that have been purposely deferred to await the completion of the membership of the Court, and (b) discerning from the manifestation of counsel for said petitioner of January 30, 1969, shortly after Mr. Just­ice Teehankee and the writer joined this Court, which submits "for the convenience of the Court, especially of those new members who have not participated in any of the incidents relative to the matter under consideration (naturally, including me) a brief history of this case," that there would be no objection on their part to my participation herein, much less, has petitioner asked for my inhibition, and (c) above all, it being evident that even when the writer co-signed the peti­tion herein, it could not have been his intention to own and support any allegation or theory of petitioner Tolentino favorable exclusively to said petitioner's private interest, since it would be officious and illegal for any Solicitor General to represent and take common cause with any party on points in which such party's interests are separate and distinct from those of the Re­public, hence the writer's signature under the petition was for and on behalf exclusively of the Republic, I have opted to act with the Court here.

It should be clear to anyone that the joinder of the Republic and Tolentino as co-petitioners in this case did not necessarily put them in the same shoes; the personali­ty of the Republic in this case is rooted in its being plaintiff and prevailing party in G. R. No. L-20950 while that of Tolentino is in his being intervenor and, as such, also a prevailing party therein; as to the separability of their respective interests in this case, it is possible that Tolentino cannot succeed if the Republic fails, but the Republic can succeed even if Tolentino does not; so, it is obvious, there are matters in which Tolentino may be interested but wherein the Republic is not and cannot be interested, but this does not mean they cannot file a com­mon pleading alleging their respective separate interests, which is exactly what was done in this case.  In other words, the common petition did not make the Solicitor Ge­neral the counsel of Tolentino as to matters in which his interest is separable from that of the Republic, which is exactly the case with respect to the damages claimed by Tolentino in the pending incidents.  It cannot be said, therefore, that as to these incidents, the writer is act­ing in a case in which he has been counsel, within the contemplation of Section 1 of Rule 137.  Furthermore, it is recalled that the legal staff of the Solicitor Gene­ral's Office firmly recommended against the office tak­ing part in this case and it was only on the insistence of petitioner Tolentino to allege in the petition certain matters affecting the Republic that helped prevail upon me to co-sign the petition.  As far as the Solicitor Gene­ral's Office was concerned, it would have gone along with the order of Judge de los Angeles that the writ of execu­tion is unnecessary until after any of the present title holders have refused to surrender their titles for cancel­lation or the Register of Deeds has refused to cancel the corresponding titles.  Be that as it may, at the present stage of the proceedings, all matters affecting the Re­public in this case have already been resolved, the judgment in this case ordering Judge de los Angeles to issue the writ of execution for the cancellation of the annul­led titles being now final and executory because respon­dents have not asked for reconsideration in respect there­to, and there being nothing before the Court in the pre­sent incidents that could directly or indirectly affect either favorably or adversely any interest of the Repub­lic, it is believed that there can be neither legal, ethical nor moral grounds for me to refrain from acting and voting as a member of the Court here.

Coming now to the incidents submitted for the Court's resolution, I take it that the problem commonly posed by them has its root in the following basic antecedent facts:

In Civil Case No. 373 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, entitled Republic of the Philippines versus Ayala y Cia, et als., with Miguel Tolentino as plaintiff-intervenor, which was an action to annul the titles of the defendants over certain lands in Calatagan, Batangas claimed to be portions of the territorial waters of the public domain and to recover possession thereof, with da­mages, the said court of first instance rendered judgment over the pen of Judge Damaso S. Tengco on June 2, 1962 as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"(a)  Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit '24' ) of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion.

"(b)  Ordering Defendants Anto­nio Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino;

"(c)  Ordering all the defend­ants to jointly and severally pay Intervenor Miguel Tolentino com­pensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;

"(d)  Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd­-40891;

"(e)  Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.

"IT IS SO ORDERED."

In the appeal taken to this Court from said decision by the losing parties docketed as G. R. No. L-20950, the following judgment was rendered on May 31, 1965:

"WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.  No costs."

After this judgment became final and the case was re­manded to the trial court, upon motion of petitioner Tolen­tino, the said court, respondent Judge Jaime de los Angeles, presiding, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and pursuant thereto, bank deposits and real properties of re­spondents Alfonso Zobel and Ayala y Cia and the Hacienda Calatagan were garnished and levied upon.  Whereupon, said respondents filed a motion to quash the said writ of exe­cution, which motion the court promptly acted upon by or­dering the temporary suspension of the writ.  Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this order.  In their opposi­tion to this motion, said respondents raised as a main is­sue that neither the judgment of the trial court nor that of this Court, both hereinabove quoted, adjudged them liable for the damages claimed by petitioner Tolentino and even assuming that the trial court's decision had made them so liable, they were later absolved together with the Dizons by the modificatory decision of this Court.  On the other hand, petitioner Tolentino contended that (1) "the decision of the Supreme Court is perfectly clear and needs no extraneous interpretation; and (2) that any doubt that may arise at the extent and purport of the modification made by the Supreme Court of the lower court's decision may be resolved by a perusal of the body of the Supreme Court's decision and of the decision of the lower court." (Par. 14, pp. 6-7, Petition in this Case).

Resolving the issues thus raised by the parties, on February 2, 1966, the trial court issued the order now under review, the pertinent portions of which read thus:

"From the above-contentions of the parties, it is thus obvious that their present controversy merely hinges on the interpretation of the decision of the lower court.

"Principally, the parties disagree on whether or not the dispositive por­tion of the lower court's decision re­quiring all tie defendants to pay the intervenor compensatory damages had been only modified or revoked in toto.  It is the contention of the plaintiff that a perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court will clearly disclose that only the defendants Dizons were absolved from the payment of compensa­tory damages although aside from said defendants Dizons, the decision of the lower court has also ordered Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfon­so Zobel to jointly and severally pay intervenor compensatory damages.  Plain­tiff concludes therefore, that follow­ing the decision of the Supreme Court, the Ayala y Cia, Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel must now pay in­tervenor Miguel Tolentino the compen­satory damages awarded to him by the lower court.

"However, it is the considered opi­nion of this Court that the interpreta­tion of the Supreme Court's decision cannot be made by a mere mathematical process of subtraction but rather by understanding its rulings which will control in the interpretation of the decision.  For instance, it cannot be disputed that the decision by the Su­preme Court lays from only three prin­cipal things, namely:  (1) areas found to be portions of the foreshores, beach, or of the navigable river itself are not capable of registration and their inclusion in the certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant (2) purchasers who relied on the efficacy of their certifi­cate of title, cannot be considered possessors in bad faith until the le­gality of their said titles had been finally determined; (3) possessors in good faith cannot be held liable for damages suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property.

"As regards the first ruling, the parties properly understood its appli­cation to the case at bar.  However, as regards the second and third rulings there is a difference of opinion bet­ween the parties.  Plaintiffs are of the belief that defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel has been found to be possessors in bad faith and therefore liable in the pay­ment of damages.

"This Court cannot share with this belief of the plaintiff and intervenor.  Nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court is there such a pronouncement.  On the contrary, it will be remembered that after the promulgation of the said deci­sion on May 31, 1965 plaintiff and intervenor filed a motion for reconsidera­tion wherein they insisted that all, the defendants be declared possessors in bad faith and liable for compensatory damages.  They tried to prove by lengthy reference to the findings of the low­er court that Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel are posses­sors in bad faith.  However, said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Su­preme Court.  Moreover, the Supreme Court, in citing the case of Dizons vs. Rodriguez, et al., in its decision of May 31, 1965, reiterated the principle that holders of certificate of title are considered pos­sessors in good faith until after the le­gality of their certificate of title had been finally determined.  Indeed, to hold Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel possessors in bad faith and liable for compensatory damages from March 1954 would run counter against the very principles laid down in the repeat­edly mentioned decision of the Supreme Court.  This is so because these defend­ants would be paying for the produce of the properties which according to the Supreme Court, their co-defendants Dizons had a perfect right to hold and enjoy, they being possessors in good faith and for value.

"WHEREFORE, the writ of execution dated December 27, 1965 is hereby re­voked and the notice of garnishment dated January 3, 1966 is ordered lifted."

In the decision of this Court of June 30, 1967, it was held:

"The basic facts are not disputed.  Respondents seek to justify the orders complained of upon the ground that the dispositive part of our decision in Case G. R. No. L-20950 is rather vague and requires a clarification, because:

'x x x Since defendants Dizons were held not liable for the alleged damages, it follows that the joint and several character of the ob­ligation imposed by this Ho­norable Court was extinguished, because the other defend­ants herein will no longer be able to claim from defendants Dizons the share which cor­responds to the latter (2nd par. Art. 1217, Civil Code.)'

"This contention is absolutely de­void of merit.  To begin with, Art. 1217 of our Civil Code, cited by respondents, refers to the effect of payment by one of the solidary debt­ors.  No such payment having been made in the case at bar, said Article is clearly inapplicable thereto.  The only provision which respondents might have had in mind (on the assumption that their reference to Art. 1217 was due merely to a misprint) is Art. 1215 of said code, reading:

'x x x Novation, com­pensation, confusion or re­mission of the debt, made by any of the solidary cre­ditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall ex­tinguish the obligation, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.

'The creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who col­lects the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation corresponding to them.'

"Neither is this Article in point.  The aforementioned decision of this Court cannot be regarded as remitting a solidary obligation of the Dizons, because, as possessors in good faith, they were and are entitled by law to retain the property in question, un­til the indemnity due to them is paid.  In other words, they were never under obligation to pay damages to Tolentino, either jointly or solidarily, and, hence, there was no solidary obliga­tion on their part that could have been remitted.  The decision of the Court of First Instance holding all of the defendants herein jointly and solidarily liable for the payment of said damages, did not create a solid­ary obligation.  It was no more than an attempt to declare the existence of said obligation, which attempt - not the solidary obligation - was frustra­ted by our decision establishing that such obligation did not and does not exist.

"In this connection, it should be noted that the dispositive part of the decision of the lower court, which was the object of the appeal in G. R. No. L-20950, provided:

'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

'(a)  Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit '24') of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion;

'(b)  Ordering defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon, and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate lot 360 in fa­vor of Intervenor Miguel To­lentino;

'(c)  Ordering all the de­fendants to jointly and seve­rally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino-compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;

'(d)  Restraining and enjoin­ing the defendants from further ownership and possession over lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891; and

'(e)  Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.' (CFI-Decision, Civil Case No. 373, June 2, 1962; De­fendants' Record on Appeal, pp. 259-260).

"This decision was affirmed by us, except as regards subdivision (c) thereof, which should be deemed modified so as to read, in effect, as follows:

'(c)  Ordering all the de­fendants, except the Dizons, to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area;'

and, except also, insofar as the Dizons have, - pursuant to the decision, as amended - the right of retention there­in stated.

"It may not be amiss to add that it is the ministerial duty of respondent Judge to order the issuance of the writ of execution of the aforementioned deci­sion, as modified by this Court, even if said respondent entertained the doubts pointed out in the orders complained of."

Respondents' motion for reconsideration of this deci­sion was denied, hence, the three motions now for resolu­tion.

Upon a review of all relevant matters and after ma­ture deliberation, I agree with the majority of the Court in that the basic position of respondents in their second motion for reconsideration and supplemental second motion for reconsideration is well taken and that taking all per­tinent circumstances into account and giving due regard to all considerations, both legal and equitable, the decision of this Court of May 31, 1965 in G.R. No. L-20950 may not be construed or understood as holding respondents Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel liable for the damages claimed by petitioner Miguel Tolentino.

To begin with, it cannot be reasonably maintained that to determine the import and extent of the said judg­ment, only its dispositive part and that of Judge Tengco' of June 2, 1962, both above-quoted, may be taken into ac­count.  Neither can it be successfully contended that law and jurisprudence rule out entirely the consideration of any portion of the bodies thereof.  With respect, for in­stance, to the judgment of this Court, it is plainly ob­vious that nobody would be able to tell how the decision of the lower court has been modified, if the bare words alone of the dispositive portion thereof saying, "Wherefore, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed", were to be considered.

Nor is the judgment or dispositive portion of Judge Tengco's decision entirely free from ambiguity as to the very matter in dispute in the present case.  For its bet­ter understanding and because We have noted that the same has not been always accurately quoted in the various and voluminous papers in the records, We have carefully exa­mined the original of said decision and We quote the same again as follows:

"WHEREPORE, judgment is hereby rend­ered as follows:

"(a)  Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T­-9550 (or Exhibits '24') of the Re­sister of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion.

"(b)  Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel To­lentino;

"(c)  Ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay Intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hec­tare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful posses­sion of the said area;

"(d)  Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891; and

"(e)  Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs.

"IT IS SO ORDERED."

As can be seen, paragraph (b) clearly refers, because of the mention of their names, to none other but the defen­dants Antonino, Lucia, Artemio, Ruben, Amorando and Zenai­da, all surnamed Dizon, and Adelaida Dizon Reyes and Conso­lacion Dizon Degollacion.  Paragraphs (c) and (d), on the other hand, do not make reference to any defendant by name but merely says "all the defendants".  Examined by itself alone, the said phrase "all the defendants" would admitted­ly mean all those named as defendants in the complaint, which would necessarily include Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zo­bel.  Considering, however, that it is indisputable that Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel could not have been commit­ting any longer any acts of ownership or possession over any of the lots enumerated, namely Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891, at the time of the filing of the com­plaint, much less when the judgment was rendered, inasmuch as they had already sold the same when this suit was began, and the only ones exclusively exercising such rights then were the Dizons, one is left wondering if Judge Tengco could have had in mind in paragraph (d) to enjoin also the defendants Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel who could not have been committing the acts he was ordering to be enjoined.

The argument, therefore, that the phrase "all the de­fendants" used in paragraph (c) necessarily includes the defendants Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel is untenable.  Such contention would make the same phrase "all the defendants" employed in paragraphs (c) and (d) signify differently for each of said paragraphs.  That would be absurd.  On the other hand, there would be consistency and uniformity in the use of said phrase, if it were to be understood as re­ferring in both paragraphs only to the defendants Dizons.  Indeed, it is more likely that His Honor inadvertently omitted the word "said" between the words "the" and "de­fendants" in the paragraphs in question, or perhaps, His Honor must have meant to say "all these defendants."

Besides, in paragraph (e), His Honor makes reference only to "the defendants" and not to "all of the defendants".  And yet, this is precisely the paragraph that does contem­plate all the defendants, the Dizons, Ayala y Cia and Al­fonso Zobel, for the simple reason that since all of them have lost, Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel, by virtue of pa­ragraph (a) and the Dizons by virtue of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), all of them are naturally liable for the costs.  It is apparent then that there is looseness in Judge Tengco's language that creates room for uncertainty as to the exact import of the judgment, if read by itself without re­gard to the considerations discussed by His Honor.  In fact, unless all the paragraphs of said judgment are construed together, having in view the corresponding pronouncements in the body of the decision, they would even appear to be lacking in consistency.

Moreover, the punctuations used by His Honor are seem­ingly significant.  It is to be noted that paragraph (a) ends with a period, whereas the other paragraphs end with semi-colons.  His Honor appears to have separated in the judgment the matter of title from those of possession and the exercise of the rights of ownership.  Thus, paragraph (a) is concerned exclusively with the question of title and pa­ragraphs (b), (c) and (d) all refer to possession and the commission of the acts of ownership only.  This is tanta­mount to the segregation of the judgment against all the de­fendants, including Ayala and Zobel, in so far as the nul­lity of their respective titles is concerned in paragraph (a) from the judgment against the Dizons only in regard to the possession of and acts of ownership over the disputed lands in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d).

At best, therefore, if somehow it can be argued that the words used in the judgment are in themselves clear and definite, there is no doubt that they suffer from latent am­biguity literally.  While ordinarily, the phrases "the defen­dants" and "all the defendants" are unequivocal and have a readily comprehensible uniform import, yet when examined in the light of the actual facts contemplated in the other por­tions of the respective paragraphs wherein they are used in this judgment, they cannot possibly convey, as already ex­plained, the same meaning or connotation in all of the said paragraphs.

Accordingly, to be able to do justice and equity to all concerned, there is imperative need to depart in this case from the usual rule confining resort only to the dispo­sitive parts of the decisions concerned.  This is justified by precedents^[1] and even petitioner does not entirely exclude this possibility.^[2] More, as will be explained anon, the provision of the Constitution of the Philippines regard­ing the form of judgments constitutes the conclusion and findings of facts and law of the court as integral parts of the judgment, so that the judgment must be in accordance therewith,^[3] hence it can be said that there is constitu­tional warrant to examine the other parts of a decision when­ever it is necessary to determine the meaning of its dispo­sitive part.

Be that as it may, in the case at bar, it is more important to consider the full length and breadth of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L - 20950 than of the appealed decision of the trial court.  After all, it is the more authoritative and final one.  Since the said judgment modified that of the trial court, the decisive question is, how was said judgment modified?

To answer this question, the following portions of the decision are pertinent:

"We have gone over the evidence pre­sented in this case and found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.  It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company to third persons.  There is also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a certifi­cate of title (TCT No. 722) and pre­pared a 'composite plan' wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan.  De­fendants-appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor.  This, how­ever, was justified by claiming that it could have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the original titles, and anyway, the excess in area (526 hectares, according to defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey.

"But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is cor­rect, the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the fore­shores, beach, or of the navigable water itself.  And, it is an elemen­tary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant.  (See G. R. No. L-8654, Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona, et al., April 28, 1956; also G.R. No. L-20300-01 & L-20355-56, Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., April 30, 1965.) In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Di­zons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia, and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said proper­ties to the public dominion.

"However, as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., (Said purchasers who relied on the efficacy of their certificate of title, cannot be considered possessors in bad faith until after the legality of their said titles has been finally determined.) there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land, which must properly be established and determined.  It also follows that as such possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons can­not also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the pro­perty.

"In view of the foregoing, the revo­cation of the writ of preliminary man­datory injunction previously issued by the lower court, and the suspension of the delivery of possession of the pro­perties to plaintiff and intervenor To­lentino, were in order.

"WHEREFORE, thus modified, the deci­sion of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.  No costs.

"SO ORDERED."

As can be seen, the lower court's resolution of the question of nullity of the titles of all the defendants was affirmed in toto.  With respect to the matters of pos­session and damages, however, again, it must be said that the above-quoted portions of the decision, by themselves alone, are rather ambiguous.  It is said therein that "there being no showing that the Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land." Nothing, however, appears on the face thereof as regards the consequences of the finding of good faith on the part of the Dizons upon the joint and solidary liability of the Ayala y Cia and Alfonzo Zobel with the Dizons, which, it is now alleged, the lower court found and declared in its judgment.  Likewise, as petition­er himself points out, it is not stated who is supposed to make the required reimbursement to the Dizons.  Indeed, un­less closely studied and properly understood, the decision of this Court would appear to be vague and even incomplete.  The truth, however, is that the said decision did set the guide post for the complete comprehension of the modifica­tion it has made of the decision of the trial court, ir­respective of what meaning might be derived from the lat­ter.  This Court's decision definitely says, "as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, et al."^[4] the Dizons are possessors in good faith, they have the right of retention until reimbursed and they need not pay any damages.  Indeed, these points:  (1) who are possessors in good faith in situations like those at bar, and (2) who is supposed to reimburse possessors in good faith like the Dizons, were squarely passed upon in that decision in the Rodriguez case.  These were the holdings of this Court there:

"On the matter of possession of plain­tiffs-appellants, the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be upheld.  There is no showing that plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith and for value.  As such title-holders, they have reason to rely on the indefeasible character of their certificates.

"On the issue of good faith of the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reasoned out:

'The concept of possessors in good faith given in Article 526 of the Civil Code and when said possession loses this character under Art. 528, needs to be reconciled with the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.  Such re­conciliation can only be achieved by holding that the possessor with a Torrens Title is not aware of any flaw in his Title which in­validates it until his Torrens Title is declared null and void by final judgment of the Courts.

'Even if the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title were not thus recon­ciled, the result would be the same, considering the third paragraph of Art. 526 which provides that:

" ART. 526.  x x x

"' Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.'"

'The legal question whe­ther plaintiffs-appellants' possession in good faith, un­der their Torrens Titles ac­quired in good faith, does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment their Titles are declared null and void by the Courts, is a difficult one. Even the mem­bers of this Court were for a long time divided, two to one, on the answer.  It was only after several sessions, where the results of exhaustive re­searches on both sides were thoroughly discussed, that an undivided Court finally found the answer given in the next preceding paragraph.  Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the Sup­reme Court would find that the law is not as We have stated it in the next preceding para­graph and that the plaintiffs?appellant made a mistake in relying thereon, such mis­take on a difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.  Hence, their possession in good faith does not lose this character ex­cept in the case and from the moment their Torrens Titles are declared null and void by the Courts.'

"Under the circumstances of the case specially where the subdivision plan was originally approved by the Director of Lands, we are not ready to conclude that the above reasoning of the Court of Ap­peals on this point is a reversible er­ror.  Needless to state, as such occu­pants in good faith, plaintiffs have the right to the retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the neces­sary expenses made on the lands.

"With respect to the contention of the Republic of the Philippines that the order for the reimbursement by it of such necessary expenses constitutes a judgment against the government in a suit not consented by it, suffice it to say that the Republic, on its own initia­tive, asked and was permitted to inter­vene in the case and thereby submitted itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court.

"In view of the foregoing considera­tions, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all respects, with­out costs."

Thus, it is clear that while the decision in G. R. No. L-20950 does not say so in so many words, the questions posed in the present case were not really left unanswered thereby.  A closer examination of the said decision reveals that the main issue now before Us was actually resolved therein.  It will be noted that in said decision this Court quoted and adopted the reasoning and holding of the Court of Appeals in its decision then under review regarding the reconciliation between the concept of possessors in good faith under the Civil Code, on the one hand, and the doctrine of indefeasibility of a torrens title, on the other.  From such holding of the Court of Appeals, adopted by this Court, the inescapable conclusion is that this Court's finding in G.R. No. L-20950 that the Dizons are posses­sors in good faith, carries with it the lack of bad faith of Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel.  In other words, since their Torrens Titles served to shield the Dizons from any stigma of bad faith, the same legal rule must obtain as respects any imputation of bad faith against Ayala y Cia and Zobel.  There is no reason why the reliance of the Dizons upon the indefeasibility of their Torrens Titles should vary in its effect from the reliance of Ayala y Cia and Zobel, or, for that matter, of any other person upon theirs.  Indeed, the fact that this Court pointedly added to the considerations invoked by the Court of Appeals the observation that the subdivision plan of Ayala y Cia and Zobel was approved by the Bureau of Lands, a circumstance relevant only to the good or bad faith of Ayala y Cia and Zobel but not to that of the Dizons, indicates abundantly that in the mind of this Court there is no disparity between the position of the Dizons and the original title holders, Ayala y Cia and Zobel.  In consequence, on the assumption that Ayala y Cia and Zobel were contemplated by Judge Tengco as included in the phrase "all the defendants" in paragraph (c) of his judgment, I hold that the modifica­tion of the lower court's decision has the effect of absolv­ing not only the Dizons but also the other defendants, Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel, not because of Articles 1217 and 1219 of the Civil Code invoked by said defendants-respondents, but for the reason that justice and equity demand that the reference by this Court to the ruling in Dizon vs. Rodriguez, supra, should apply equally to all the defendants who, by the common circumstanced that they all have Torrens Titles, must be deemed to be similarly situat­ed.  In other words, in view of the reference made by this Court to the doctrine of good faith of holders of Torrens Titles in the Rodriguez case, it is inconceivable that the Dizons, on the one hand, and Ayala y Cia and Zobel, on the other, may be treated differently.

Incidentally, it may be added that that decision also resolved, by such reference to and affirmance of the deci­sion of the Court of Appeals, the question of who is ob­liged to make the required reimbursement to the Dizons.  As a matter of fact, by such reference and affirmance, that decision also pointed out for what and to whom herein re­spondent might be held liable, and, definitely, it is not for damages, but for reimbursement of necessary expenses, and not to petitioner, but to the Dizons.

To be sure, it is not clear to me how respondents Ayala y Cia and Zobel can be considered to have been ad­judged by Judge Tengco as liable for damages to petitioner Tolentino when there is not one word in the body of the decision regarding any privity between petitioner and said respondents, not to speak of any finding of fact or conclu­sion of law therein in reference thereto.  His Honor held that petitioner Tolentino is entitled to the fruits re­ceived by the Dizons during the period of their possession subsequent to the filing of Tolentino's application for leas, citing in this respect Petargue vs. Zorilla, 92 Phil. 5,^[5] but there is complete silence as to the part in said liability, whether joint or several, or, merely joint, of the other defendants.  As earlier indicated, the Constitu­tion and the Rules of Court require courts of record to state in their decisions "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which (they are) based" (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution; Section 1, Rule 36).  The apparent purpose of these provisions is precisely to insure that judg­ments have definite bases in fact and in law, so much so that without such conclusions and findings, a decision be­comes, if not invalid, at least, subject to return to the lower court so that the judge may make the necessary find­ings and conclusions.  In a case, therefore, as the one before Us, wherein there are several defendants and the find­ings of fact and conclusions of law made in the decision refer only to some but not to all of the defendants, a judg­ment therein saying, in the dispositive part, that it is against the defendants, without particularizing any of them, or even if it were expressly against "all" the defendants, is to be deemed a judgment exclusively against the defend­ants as to whom there are findings and conclusions in the body of the decision and, surely, not against all of them.  This, I submit, is the view most consistent with the intent and spirit of the Constitutional mandate, the purpose of which is to avoid arbitrary and unintelligent decisions.  The judge may err in his findings and conclusions, that would not affect the validity of his decision; but a judg­ment without any stated bases in fact and law, in violation of the Constitutional injunction, should never be accorded the status of an enforceable judicial act.

The view I have thus taken of the main question before Us - that is, what exactly is the judgment to be executed by respondent judge - makes it unnecessary for Us to determine what exactly is the intent of Judge Tengco's decision in so far as the liability of the respondents Ayala y Cia and Zo­bel is concerned.  As already explained, I believe that this resolution should be based mainly on the judgment of this Court in G. R. No. L-20950 and the doctrine in Rodriguez it has adopted by express reference, including, of course, what both of these two decisions necessarily imply, without at­tempting in any way to alter or modify the latter, since ad­mittedly such endeavour is not legally permissible.  The cause for the heated and extended debate and sharp differ­ences of opinion during our repeated deliberations on the present motions, regarding the true import and exact sense of the decision of Judge Tengco is thus avoided.  In this way, the Court is also relieved from having to pass on any matter of substantive law, particularly, the point as to whether or not these respondents can be held liable for damages to petitioner on the theory that the acquisition by them of their titles which incorporated the lands in question was a tor­tious act even as to said petitioner, inspite of the fact that at the time petitioner came into the picture by filing his application for lease, respondents had already conveyed the said lands to the Dizons, as well as the fact that peti­tioner knew, when he so applied for lease rights, that respondents had already existing titles over said property and that, therefore, controversy regarding the validity of said titles was inevitable, since petitioner's application was premised, on the other hand, on the assumption that the lands in question are public lands.  Parenthetically, in this connection and as additional argument against the me­rits of petitioner's claim, I seriously doubt the propriety, at least, in equity, of awarding damages to one who, for all practical purposes, has wittingly acquired something that is controversial.  In any event, delving into such matters at this stage would amount to somehow reopening the main case, which cannot be legally done anymore.

After this opinion was prepared, Mr. Chief Just­ice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Teehankee submitted their separate dissenting opinions.  It is but fitting that proper respects be paid to said opinions, formidable as they are and displaying once more as they do the industry and sagacity of their authors.

The most important point to be noticed in both dis­senting opinions is that the same seem to give more impor­tance to what is submitted in them to be the correct in­terpretation or construction of the dispositive portion of the decision or of the judgment of Judge Tengco than to the proper understanding of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-20950.  That the meaning attributed by the distinguished dissenters to the judgment of Judge Tengco may have rational basis cannot be denied.  The arguments advanced in both dissenting opinions on this point amply demonstrate this.  I reiterate, however, that such discus­sion is not decisive of this case.  In fact, whatever dis­cussion there is in this opinion of the true import of the Tengco judgment, the same is not intended to be the ratio decidendi hereof.  The only purpose of such, discussion is to emphasize that the language of the judgment of Judge Tengco is not as happy and as unequivocal as it should have been, and that there being possible debate as to its exact import, it is justifiable to resort to a construc­tion thereof in the light of the other portions of the whole decision.  Stated differently, I hold that it is not imperative, in deciding the present incidents, to indulge in any effort to determine the precise terms of the Tengco decision, considering that the modificatory decision of this Court can itself be adequately understood, independ­ently of what His Honor might have intended to mean, and since, after all, the latter is the one controlling, the dissection of the Tengco judgment is of very little rele­vance.

As already stated, I hold that because of the re­liance by Mr. Justice Barrera in G. R. No. L-20950, on the doctrine in his own decision in Dizon vs. Rodriguez, supra, regarding the effect of the issuance of a Torrens title upon the question of the good or bad faith as pos­sessor and/or owner of the land described therein of the person to whom it is issued, there can be no way of apply­ing to respondents Ayala and Zobel who were also Torrens title holders like the Dizons, a different yardstick from that applied to the latter.  Accordingly, it is but rea­sonable, if not inevitable, to conclude that upon the authority of the decision of Mr. Justice Barrera in Rod­riguez, the position of Ayala and Zobel in their briefs in G. R. No. L-20950 on this point had been upheld.  Of course, it can be said that there is no explicit state­ment to this effect in this Court's decision, but can it not be equally said that such eloquent silence only pa­ralleled by Judge Tengco's not making any express and un­ambiguous holding as to the supposed liability of the re­spondents Ayala and Zobel in his decision?  In other words, if it is fair to conclude that merely because Judge Tengco made findings of fact from which the illegality of the inclusion of the areas of the sea herein in question within the Ayala title or titles might be deduced, it was no longer necessary for him to make any express holding that such inclusion was made by said respondents in bad faith or that they had thereby committed a tortious act for which they should be liable to petitioner Tolentino, irrespective of whether they had acted in good faith or in bad faith, it should also be logical and reasonable to hold that by merely referring to the ruling in Dizon vs. Rodriguez, supra, to the effect that bad faith can be im­puted to the holder of a Torrens title only from the time of the judicial declaration of the nullity of such title, this Court had virtually considered the respondents Ayala and Zobel as not having been in bad faith until  their titles were annulled, which was when the decision of this Court was promulgated and after the Dizons were already the ones holding said titles.  More specifically, if Judge Tengco's reference to "all the defendants" in the dispositive part of his decision can be understood as in­cluding the respondents Ayala and Zobel only because there are findings of fact which would justify such a conclusion, notwithstanding that he has made no express holding as to their liability, much less the nature thereof, why would it be untenable to consider this Court's judgment which says "thus modified" as inclusive of the absolution of the said respondents from any possible liability under the lower court's judgment, since, as above demonstrated, there is ample legal basis for such absolvitory holding? In any event, it is to be noted that nowhere in the dis­senting opinions is the position of the majority on this point regarding the import and effect of the ruling in Rodriguez discussed, much less refuted.

The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dis­sents has not escaped my attention.  Neither am I over­looking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dan­gerous and inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration of a fi­nal and executory judgment.  I want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing doc­trines enjoining any such modifications.  The public poli­cy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order.  I am not advocating any departure from them.  Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is.  All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by this opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view, is the true and correct meaning and im­plications of the decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.

True, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Teehankee, the respondents Ayala and Zobel did raise the issue of what is the import of Judge Tengco's decision in their brief in G. R. No. L-20950, but it is entirely a different mat­ter to say that Mr. Justice Barrera's decision overruled the contention of respondents in respect thereto.  Pre­cisely, that is the issue in this case, and for the rea­sons set forth above, it is my considered view that, on the contrary, they were upheld, at least impliedly, hence the point of res adjudicata would seem to have no invulne­rable basis here.

In conclusion, I hold that respondent Judge acted in accordance with law and sound discretion in issuing the order complained of.  Herein respondent judge's rul­ing which, in effect, held that respondents Ayala y Cia and Alfonso Zobel have not been adjudged by this Court liable for damages allegedly suffered by petitioner is correct, hence, the latter has no right to an execution in the sense prayed for by him.  I vote to grant respondents' motion for reconsideration and to deny petitioner Tolentino's motion.

---

^[1] Villones vs. Nable, et al., 85 Phil. 43; Siari Valley Estates, Inc. vs. Lucasan, et al., 102 Phil. 390; De Ralla vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil., 491.

^[2] Par. 14, pp. 6-7, Petition in this case quoted earlier.

^[3] Sec. 12, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines; Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 510-511.

^[4] G. R. Nos. L-20300-01 & L-20455-56, supra.  These cases in­volve exactly similar circumstances as the present case, except that the Dizons were the ones who initiated the judicial action to confirm their possession of the lands therein in question.

^[5] It is not true that the ruling in the case of Petargue vs. Zorilla, supra, is to the effect that an applicant for lease of a public land is entitled to juridical posses­sion thereof from the date he files his application and that, therefore, he may recover damages from the one in actual possession of the land applied for until such possession is surrendered to him.  He do not be­lieve that such is the sense of that decision.  Indeed, such interpretation of the ruling in that case does not appear sound and is pregnant with fearful possibilities of opportunism and graft.  It is essentially inequitable.  More accurately, what this Court held was this:

"1.  PUBLIC LANDS; JURISDICTION OF COURT THEREON; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DE­TAINER. - Courts have jurisdiction to entertain an action of forcible entry instituted by a bona fide ap­plicant of public land, who is in oc­cupation and peaceful possession thereof and who has introduced im­provements, against one who deprives him of the possession thereof before award and pending investigation of the application."

Surely, this ruling does not imply that if an applicant is not in possession, he is entitled to damages from the time he files his application up to the date he act­ually secures possession of the land applied for.

tags