On January 30, 1961, the respondents Dy Pac & Company, Inc. and Alfonso Santos Soriano were adjudged guilty of unfair labor practice by the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and were consequently ordered to pay certain workers, all members of the petitioner Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Union, backwages from the date of their unjust dismissal to the date of the finality of the CIR's decision, without, however, the benefit of reinstatement.  Both the Company and the Union moved for reconsideration of this decision, but their motions were denied.  On appeal by the res­pondent Company, this Court, in Dy Pac & Company vs. CIR and Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Union, L-18460,^[1] affirmed the CIR decision in its entirety.

Upon this Court's decision becoming final and executory on December 1, 1962, the Union moved in the CIR for computation of the backwages awarded to its members.  The motion was granted.  On January 30, 1963, the chief examiner of the CIR turned in his assessment of backwages based principally on the time records and payrolls pertaining to the affected workers for the period from August 25 to November 3, 1956 -- the only records then extant and available for the purpose.  According to the chief examiner's report, the backwages covering the period from January 20, 1957 (the date when the workers ceased in their employment) to December 1, 1962 (date of the finality of the decision of this Court) amounted to a total of P65,122.59 corresponding to 17 of the 19 workers listed as complainants in exhibit I, page of the original records.  Two workers, Floro Asada and Percival Echaluce, were not included in the computation due to the ab­sence of their names in the time records and payrolls made available by the Company.

The parties filed their oppositions to the report.  On November 9, 1966, after evaluating the evidence adduced and hearing the arguments of the oppositors, the CIR, through Judge Joaquin Salvador, issued an order approving the chief examiner's report on the whole, and ordering the inclusion of Percival Echaluce among the workers entitled to backwages.  Floro Asada remained excluded, however, due allegedly to the absence of a sufficient basis for his inclusion.  Both the Company and the Union took exception to this ruling, and moved for modification thereof.

On January 28, 1967, after hearing duly had, the CIR en banc passed a resolution, concurred in by three of its judges, with the two others not taking part, modifying the order of Nov­ember 9, 1966.  The award was thereby drastically reduced to only six months of backwages, the first three months corresponding to the time when the old carro of the Company was operating without the workers involved in this case, and the next three corresponding to an arbitrary period during which the same workers would have, "in all probability," found some other employment following the complete stoppage of the operations of the old carro.  The resolution of the CIR en banc also contained an order for the inclusion of Floro Asada upon a finding that, the latter was em­ployed at the old carro during the time involved in this case but happened to be on sick leave when the pertinent time records and payrolls were prepared.  The name of Percival Echaluce was, however, caused to be excluded due to its non-appearance in the same time records and payrolls.

The Union has come to this Court on a special civil action of certiorari questioning the authority of the CIR en banc to render its resolution of January 28, 1967.

The two issues posed for resolution we shall discuss in seriatim.

1. The dispositive portion of the original decision of Jan­uary 30, 1961, rendered by the CIR through Judge Jose Bautista, reads:

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CON­SIDERATIONS, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay immediately the backwages of the complainant workers, from the date of the stoppage of work in the old carro up to the time when this decision shall become final and executory, without reinstatement."

Subsequently, the CIR en banc, through a resolution also penned by Judge Bautista, denied the motions for reconsideration filed by both the Union and the Company.  This resolution, dated March 23, 1961, stated:

"Respondents moved for new trial and the reconsideration of the decision of this Court dated January 30, 1961; while complainant, in its motion for reconsideration, prayed that said decision be modified in the sense that the company should also be ordered to reinstate the workers in addition to the payment of their back wages.

"After a careful examination of the evidence of the parties, together with the reasons given in the motions for reconsideration, we find respon­dents' reasons for new trial and reconsideration of the decision of this Court of January 30, 1961 with­out merit.  Complainant's motion for reconsidera­tion also cannot be entertained because there is no operation in the old carro.  The operation of the old carro depends upon a filer who could make the bunch of crates function smoothly.  When Alfonso Santos Soriano abandoned the work, the work was stopped.  Then his son, Alfredo Santos Soriano took over, but he had to quit because he was not a competent filer.  To reinstate the workers concerned when there is no work to be done would be injustice to the com­pany, because management would be forced to give salaries to the workers even if they have nothing to do.  It should be noted that the punishment which this Court imposes upon any erring party is remedial and not punitive in character.

"WHEREFORE, all motions for reconsideration should be, as they are hereby, DENIED."

On appeal to this Court by the Company, we decided the case (L-18460, supra) with the following dispositive statement:  "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant."

The CIR en banc, in now constricting the coverage of the backwages due to the workers from 5 years and 10 month plus to only 6 months, relied heavily on the argument that since the work at the old carro had been permanently stopped after March 2, 1958 due to the non-availability of a qualified filer, the workers involved could not have been reinstated to their former jobs.  The CIR en banc thus concluded that whatever backwages these workers were entitled to should not extend beyond the time when, had they been reinstated, they would have nevertheless ceased working due to the legitimate shutting up of the carro.

This Court will not dwell on the validity of the legal proposition that "backwages should not extend beyond the date of closure of business where such closure was due to legitimate business reasons and not merely to an attempt to defeat the order for reinstatement."^[2] Without determining whether or not this precept applies to the peculiar circumstances of the present case, it is our considered view that the CIR en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it delimited, as it did, the workers' right to the recovery of backwages as originally adjudicated in its decision of January 30, 1961.  The latter decision explicitly ruled that backwages were to span a period commencing "from the date of the stoppage of work in the old carro up to the time when this decision shall become final and executory." The pretension that this was modified by resolution of the CIR en banc cannot stand scrutiny because the same resolution merely rejected the parties' motions for reconsideration and did not afford any kind of modified relief from the operation and effects of the judgment of January 30, 1961.  It should be remembered that while the body of a decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity regarding which way the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.^[3]

The award by the CIR of backwages from the time the old carro ceased operations up to the time its decision, as affirmed by this Court, became final and executory, is now the law of the case and is beyond the reach of review by the CIR or by this Court.

By "law of the case" is meant that "whatever is once in revocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case" so long as the "facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.  And once the decision becomes final, it is binding on all inferior courts and, hence, beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.^[4]

What we said in Galvez vs. Philippine Long Distance Com­pany^[5] is apropos:

"The equitable considerations that led the lower court to take the action complained of can­not offset the demands of public policy and public interest -- which are also responsive to the tenets of equity -- requiring that all issues passed upon in decisions or final orders that have become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and definitely closed, for, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught the main role of courts of justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the main­tenance of peace and order, by setting justiciable controversies with finality."

2. The ClR en banc, in its resolution subject of the pre­sent action, ordered the name of Percival Echaluce stricken from the list of workers entitled to backwages, while at the same it ordered the restoration of the name of Floro Asada in the list.  The CIR en banc, unfortunately, did not state its reasons for ousting Echaluce.  We can only infer that it based its ruling upon the fact that Echaluce's name does not appear in the only payrolls and time records available.  The ultimate question we thus confront is whether or not evidence exists regarding Echaluce's employment with the Company during the time the latter committed acts constituting unfair labor practice, independently of those payrolls and time records.

This Court need not venture far for the answer.  The order of November 9, 1966 penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador who conducted a hearing on the examiner's report, found with respect to Echaluce that "the evidence is clear that he was working in the company when the old 'carro' ceased operation ... the reason why his name does not appear in the payrolls is the fact that he was then absent when they were signed." The Company appears not to have overcome this evidence, having relied solely on the strength of the extant payrolls and time records.

At all events, that Percival Echaluce and Floro Asada were among the complainants in L-18460, is not controverted by the Company.  They must, therefore, perforce be considered as included within the coverage and intendment of the dispositive portion of the decision of this Court in L-18460.

The essential question that confronts the CIR is merely one of computation of the backwages of these two complainants, there being no record or payroll to indicate the exact amount of the wages they were receiving at the time that the old carro stopped operations.  We can, however, with a certain degree of fairness, rely on the solution stated by Judge Salvador in his order dated November 9, 1966, which solution is apparently acceptable to both the Company and the Union, there being no indica­tion in the record to the contrary.  This mode of computation is expressed in the said order as follows:  "His backwages should be based on the average of what his co-members received as shown in the payrolls."

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of the CIR en banc of January 28, 1967 is hereby modified so that, first, the compu­tation of backwages shall cover the period from the date of the stoppage of work at the old carro up to December 1, 1962, the date the decision in the original case became final and executo­ry, and, second, Percival Echaluce and Floro Asada are enti­tled to backwages which shall be based on the average of what their co-workers received as shown in the pertinent payrolls.  Because the workers herein involved may have found other em­ployment or other means of livelihood after they were dismissed, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during the period covered by the award of backwages should be deducted from the total liability of the Company.  To this end the CIR is hereby directed to admit pertinent evidence that may be adduced by the Company.

No pronouncement as to cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.

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^[1] August 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 892 (per Concepcion, J.).

^[2] Durable Shoe Factory vs. CIR, et al., L-7783, May 31, 1956.

^[3] Manalang vs. Vidal Tuason de Rickards, L-11986, July 31, 1953.

^[4] Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, L-15548, October ?????, 1962, 6 SCRA 286; People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1041.

^[5] L-16370, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 418, 423.

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