EN BANC
[ G.R. NO. L-24661, February 28, 1974 ]
BENJAMIN RABUCO, VENANCIO G. GUIRNALDA, LEODEGARIO ALOBA, ELEUTERIO IBANES, ROGELIO ARAGONES, ASENCIO ABANCO, BENEDICTO BAUTISTA, MAXIMO AQUINO, PAULINA DALUMIAS, NENITA RAMOS, GUILLERMO VARIAS, EMELDA ARELLANO, PEDRO BILBAO, ERNESTO BONBALES, ROSITA OCA BAUTISTA, TERESITA
ESTEBAN, JOSE BENJAMIN, LORENZO BELVEDER, LEODEGARIO TUMLOS, PATRICIO MALATE, ANSELMO CORTEJOS, ANACLETA ADUCA, SALOME BARCELONA, ENRICO CELSO, IRENE CAMBA, MARIA COLLADO, RUFINO CANTIL, ANANIAS CANILLO, MAXIMO DE CASTRO, CEFERINO SALAZAR, PATRIA ANAYA, FELISA VELASCO, IGNACIO
SARASPI, FLAVIO DINAGUIT, REMEDIOS BAROMETRO, PEDRO GEBANIA, RUBEN GEGABALEN, EMETERIO EDANO, LUCIANO ARAGONES, ADRIANO ESTRELLADO, BONIFACIO EVARISTO, ISIDORO EDORIA, TIMOTEO ECARUAN, BIENVENIDO COLLADO, CENON DAJUYA, RAFAELA FERNANDEZ, ALFONSO FAUSTINO, AVELINO GARCIA, RICARDO
GUIRNALDA, FRANCISCO HENERAL, CARMEN KIONESALA, FELICIANO LUMACTOD, DOLORES VILLACAMPA, LNARCISO LIM, EUFEMIO LEGASPI, MATILDE MABAQUIAO, EULOGIO VINA, MACARIO ANTONIO, JERENIAS DE LA CRUZ, MARTIN MANGABAN, SIMEON MANGABA T., CARIDAD MER MILLA, FELIX MAHINAY, NAPOLEON MARZAN,
ISAIAS MANALASTAS, JOSEFA CORVERA, JOSE APRUEDO, ARSENIO REYES, EUGENIA A. ONO, CORNELIO OPOLENCIA, SEDECIAS PASCUA, ABUNDIO PAGUNTALAN, ESPERANZA DE QUIROS, CRESENCIO SALEM, MOISES FERNANDEZ, FORTUNATO GONZALES, SOCORRO R. VALEN, RODOLFO COLLADO, VENERIO CELSO, GREGORIO DE LA
CRUZ, CELSO ALCERA, NICOLAS ARAGONES, JOSEFINA MANANSALA, ADELAIDA CALASIN, JOSE AGUSTIN, TOMAS JOSEPH, MANUEL DADOR, SERGIO LIPATON, ERNESTO SUMAYDING, MARCELINO DIOSO, MIGUEL ALCERA, CRISANTA ENAMER, JUAN VIADO, HILARION CHIOCO, EUROPIA CABAHUG, VICTORIA DUERO, CONSORCIO ENOC,
MAMERTO GAMONIDO, BONIFACIO SABADO, MARIA INTROLIZO, HENRY ENOLBA, REYNALDO LIM, FORTUNATO LIPON, ERNESTO MALLOS, FLORENTINA PATRICIO, MAMERTO PALAPALA, RAMON DE PERALTA, JOSE PORRAS, APOLINARIO YAP, JUAN ROQUE, FELIX ROQUE, GLICERIA SALAZAR, MIGUELA SABIO, AGAPITO SAYAS,
PAULINO SARROZA, PACIFICO JUANICO, LIBERADO TULAWAN, LIGAYA LAUS, ERNESTO VERZOSA, LEOPOLDO BERNALES, JAIME VISTA, ISAIAS AMURAO, BENITA M. BARENG, AND BRIGIDA SANCHEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS SUBSTITUTED BY HON. RAMON BAGATSING AS CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON.
LADISLAO J. TOLENTINO, CITY ENGINEER OF MANILA, THEIR AGENTS, EMPLOYEES, ASISTANTS AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEM; HON. BENJAMIN GOZON, ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REFORM AUTHORITY SUBSTITUTED BY HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORMS AND HIS AGENTS,
EMPLOYEES, ASSISTANTS AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER HIS ORDERS, RESPONDENTS.[1]
[NO. L-24915. FEBRUARY 28, 1974]
BENJAMIN RABUCO, ET AL., (THE SAME CO-PETITIONERS IN L-24661), PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS SUBSTITUTED BY HON. RAMON BAGATSING AS CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, ET AL. (THE SAME CO-RESPONDENTS IN L-24661), RESPONDENTS.
[NO. L-24916. FEBRUARY 28, 1974]
BENJAMIN RABUCO, ET AL. (THE SAME CO-PETITIONERS IN L-24661), PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS SUBSTITUTED BY HON. RAMON BAGATSING AS CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, ET AL. (THE SAME CO-RESPONDENTS IN L-24661), RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.
D E C I S I O N
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of
the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property.
The origin and background of the cases at bar which deal with the decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 enacted on June 17, 1961, as raised by respondent mayor of Manila in resisting petitioners' pleas that respondent mayor not only lacks the authority to demolish their houses or eject them as tenants and bona fide occupants of a parcel of land in San Andres, Malate[2] but is also expressly prohibited from doing so by section 2 of the Act, may be summarized from the Court of Appeals'[3] certification of resolution of May 31, 1965 as follows:
Case L-24916 involves petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals[4] from the decision of the Manila court of first instance dismissing their petition for injunction and mandamus to enjoin the demolition of their houses and their ejectment from the public lots in question and to direct respondent administrator of the Land Authority (now the Secretary of Agrarian Reform) to implement the provisions of Republic Act 3120 of the subdivision and sale on installment basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants and bona fide occupants thereof, and instead ordering their ejectment.
Case L-24915 involves petitioners' independent petition for injunction filed directly with the Court of Appeals on January 29, 1965[5] to forestall the demolition overnight of their houses pursuant to the order of demolition set for January 30, 1965 at 8 a.m. issued by respondents city officials pending the elevation of their appeal. The appellate court gave due course thereto and issued the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for.
The two cases were ordered "consolidated into one" since they were "unavoidably interlaced. "The appellate court, finding that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was "dominant and inextricable issue in the appeal" over which it had no jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly "sidetracked" the issue, thereafter certified the said cases to this Court, as follows:
The Court gave due course thereto and on August 17, 1965 issued upon a P1,000. bond the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for enjoining respondents "from demolishing and/or continuing to demolish the houses of herein petitioners situated in Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, or from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of their present possession."
The records of two cases certified by the appellate court, L-24915 and L-24916, were eventually forwarded to this Court which per its resolution of August 24, 1965 ordered that they be docketed and be considered together with case L-24661.
In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials "from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners' possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as safeguarded them under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965.
The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as correctly perceived by the appellate court is the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof[6] and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's certification resolution, supra.
The incidental issue seized upon by the trial court as a main issue for "sidetracking" the decisive issue of constitutionality, to wit, that petitioners' houses as they stood at the time of its judgment in 1965 "were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constituted public nuisances" whose removal could be ordered "even if petitioners were already the owners of the land on which their respective houses are erected" has become moot with the burning down of the petitioners' houses in the fire of April 19, 1970.
If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation as contended by respondents city officials, then the trial court's refusal to enjoin ejectment and demolition of petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise, petitioners' right under the Act to continued possession and occupation of the premises and to the lifting and dismissal of the order of demolition issued against them must be enforced and the trial court's judgment must be set aside.
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be striken down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.[7]
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The case of Salas vs. Jarencio[8] wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act 4118 whereby Congress in identical terms as in Republic Act 3120 likewise converted another city lot (Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, of the cadastral survey of Manila also in Malate) which was reserved as communal property into disposable land of the State for resale in small lots by the Land Tenure Administration to the bona fide occupants is controlling in the case at bar.
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use"[9] and stressed that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation."[10]
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not "intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: x x x x The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2) Article III of the Constitution,[11] but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property."[12]
Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 must fail as the City was not deprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition with its private or corporate funds either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of their houses.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court (in Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside, and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued on August 17, 1965 is hereby made permanent. The respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform as successor agency of the Land Tenure Administration may now proceed with the due implementation of Republic Act 3120 in accordance with its terms and provisions. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., see concurring opinion.
Fernandez, J., took no part.
[1] Substitution of respondents was made as per the Court's resolution of July 26, 1973 granting petitioners' motion for such substitution.
[2] Lot 21-B, Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila with an area of 10,198, square meters described as located in the San Andres Playground. The Act also makes the same disposition of another lot known as Lot 82 of Block 573, with which petitioners are not involved.
[3] Third Division then composed of Castro, Capistrano & Villamor, JJ.
[4] Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 35453.
[5] Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 35269.
[6] Section 1 of the Act thus provides: "Section 1. Lot 62 of Block 573 and Lot 21-B of Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, all situated in the District of Malate, City of Manila, which are reserved as communal property are hereby converted into disposable or alienable lands of the State, to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure Administration shall subdivide the property into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred and twenty square meters in area, fix the price of each lot and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no down payment shall be required to tenants or bona fide occupants who cannot afford to pay such down payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase more than one lot: Provided, further, That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he shall be given a lease from month to month until such time that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, further, That in the event of lease, the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per annum of the assessed valuation of the property leased: Provided, finally, That in fixing the price of each lot, the cost of subdivision and survey shall not be included."
[7] Prov. of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968). Cf. Nawasa cases where the municipality's waterworks system was held patrimonial property of the municipality that established it, of which it cannot be deprived except by the exercise of eminent domain with the payment of full compensation as held in Mun. of Paete vs. Nawasa, 33 SCRA 122 (May 29, 1970) and cases cited; Mun. of Compostela, Cebu vs. Nawasa, 18 SCRA 988 (1966); and City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144 (1959).
[8] 46 SCRA 734 (1972), per Esguerra, J.
[9] Idem, at page 747, emphasis added.
[10] Idem, at page 750.
[11] Reproduced in Art. IV, section 2 of the 1973 Constitution.
[12] 46 SCRA at pages 751-752, emphasis added.
The origin and background of the cases at bar which deal with the decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 enacted on June 17, 1961, as raised by respondent mayor of Manila in resisting petitioners' pleas that respondent mayor not only lacks the authority to demolish their houses or eject them as tenants and bona fide occupants of a parcel of land in San Andres, Malate[2] but is also expressly prohibited from doing so by section 2 of the Act, may be summarized from the Court of Appeals'[3] certification of resolution of May 31, 1965 as follows:
Case L-24916 involves petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals[4] from the decision of the Manila court of first instance dismissing their petition for injunction and mandamus to enjoin the demolition of their houses and their ejectment from the public lots in question and to direct respondent administrator of the Land Authority (now the Secretary of Agrarian Reform) to implement the provisions of Republic Act 3120 of the subdivision and sale on installment basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants and bona fide occupants thereof, and instead ordering their ejectment.
Case L-24915 involves petitioners' independent petition for injunction filed directly with the Court of Appeals on January 29, 1965[5] to forestall the demolition overnight of their houses pursuant to the order of demolition set for January 30, 1965 at 8 a.m. issued by respondents city officials pending the elevation of their appeal. The appellate court gave due course thereto and issued the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for.
The two cases were ordered "consolidated into one" since they were "unavoidably interlaced. "The appellate court, finding that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was "dominant and inextricable issue in the appeal" over which it had no jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly "sidetracked" the issue, thereafter certified the said cases to this Court, as follows:
"The validity of Republic Act 3120 which was seasonably posed in issue in the court below was sidetracked by the trial court, thus:Case L-24661 for the continuation and maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court of Appeals for preservation of the status quo was filed by petitioners directly with this Court on June 21, 1965, pending transmittal of the records of Cases L-24915 and L-24916 to this Court as certified by the Court of Appeals which declared itself without jurisdiction over the principal and decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120.
'The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 need not be passed upon as the principal question in issue is whether the houses of the petitioners are public nuisances, which the court resolved in the affirmative. As a matter of fact even if the petitioners were already the owners of the land on which their respected houses are erected, the respondent city officials could cause the removal thereof as they were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constitutes public nuisance.'
"It is significant to note, however, that what is sought by the respondent City Mayor and City Engineer of Manila is not only the demolition of the petitioners' houses in the premises in controversy, but their ejectment as well. Moreover, Republic Act 3120 does intend not only the dismissal of the ejectment proceedings against the petitioners from the land in controversy upon their motion, but as well that any demolition order issued against them shall also have to be dismissed. The law says:
'Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against any tenants or bona fide occupant shall be instituted and any proceedings against any such tenant or bona fide occupant shall be dismissed upon motion of the defendant. Provided, That any demolition order directed against any tenant or bona fide occupant thereof, shall be dismissed.' (Sec. 2, R.A. 3120)
"Indeed, the petitioners-appellants, who contended in the court below that it was not necessary to decide on the validity or constitutionality of the law, now asseverate that 'Republic Act No. 3120 expressly prohibits ejectment and demolition of petitioners' home.' The petitioners' argument in their appeal to this Court runs as follows:
'1. Petitioners-appellants are entitled to the remedies of injunction and mandamus, being vested with lawful possession over Lot 21-B, Block 610, granted by law, Republic ACt No. 3120."The defense of the respondent Mayor and City Engineer of Manila to arguments 2 and 3 is the invalidity of the said Republic Act 3120 for being in violation of the Constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation. So that even if argument 2 interposed by the petitioners-appellants should be rejected, still they may claim a right, by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of Republic Act 3120, to continued possession and occupation of the premises and the lifting of the order of demolition issued against them. The constitutionality of the said Republic Act 3120, therefore, becomes the dominant and inextricable issue of the appeal."
'2. Civil Case No. 56092 has not been barred by any prior judgment, as wrongly claimed by respondents-appellees.
'3. Ejectment and demolition against petitioners-appellants is unlawful and clearly prohibited by Republic Act No. 3120.'
The Court gave due course thereto and on August 17, 1965 issued upon a P1,000. bond the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for enjoining respondents "from demolishing and/or continuing to demolish the houses of herein petitioners situated in Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, or from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of their present possession."
The records of two cases certified by the appellate court, L-24915 and L-24916, were eventually forwarded to this Court which per its resolution of August 24, 1965 ordered that they be docketed and be considered together with case L-24661.
In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials "from performing any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners' possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as safeguarded them under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965.
The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as correctly perceived by the appellate court is the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof[6] and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's certification resolution, supra.
The incidental issue seized upon by the trial court as a main issue for "sidetracking" the decisive issue of constitutionality, to wit, that petitioners' houses as they stood at the time of its judgment in 1965 "were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constituted public nuisances" whose removal could be ordered "even if petitioners were already the owners of the land on which their respective houses are erected" has become moot with the burning down of the petitioners' houses in the fire of April 19, 1970.
If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation as contended by respondents city officials, then the trial court's refusal to enjoin ejectment and demolition of petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise, petitioners' right under the Act to continued possession and occupation of the premises and to the lifting and dismissal of the order of demolition issued against them must be enforced and the trial court's judgment must be set aside.
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be striken down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.[7]
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The case of Salas vs. Jarencio[8] wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act 4118 whereby Congress in identical terms as in Republic Act 3120 likewise converted another city lot (Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, of the cadastral survey of Manila also in Malate) which was reserved as communal property into disposable land of the State for resale in small lots by the Land Tenure Administration to the bona fide occupants is controlling in the case at bar.
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use"[9] and stressed that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation."[10]
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not "intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: x x x x The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2) Article III of the Constitution,[11] but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property."[12]
Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 must fail as the City was not deprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition with its private or corporate funds either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of their houses.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court (in Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside, and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued on August 17, 1965 is hereby made permanent. The respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform as successor agency of the Land Tenure Administration may now proceed with the due implementation of Republic Act 3120 in accordance with its terms and provisions. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., see concurring opinion.
Fernandez, J., took no part.
[1] Substitution of respondents was made as per the Court's resolution of July 26, 1973 granting petitioners' motion for such substitution.
[2] Lot 21-B, Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila with an area of 10,198, square meters described as located in the San Andres Playground. The Act also makes the same disposition of another lot known as Lot 82 of Block 573, with which petitioners are not involved.
[3] Third Division then composed of Castro, Capistrano & Villamor, JJ.
[4] Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 35453.
[5] Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 35269.
[6] Section 1 of the Act thus provides: "Section 1. Lot 62 of Block 573 and Lot 21-B of Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, all situated in the District of Malate, City of Manila, which are reserved as communal property are hereby converted into disposable or alienable lands of the State, to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure Administration shall subdivide the property into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred and twenty square meters in area, fix the price of each lot and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no down payment shall be required to tenants or bona fide occupants who cannot afford to pay such down payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase more than one lot: Provided, further, That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he shall be given a lease from month to month until such time that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, further, That in the event of lease, the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per annum of the assessed valuation of the property leased: Provided, finally, That in fixing the price of each lot, the cost of subdivision and survey shall not be included."
[7] Prov. of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968). Cf. Nawasa cases where the municipality's waterworks system was held patrimonial property of the municipality that established it, of which it cannot be deprived except by the exercise of eminent domain with the payment of full compensation as held in Mun. of Paete vs. Nawasa, 33 SCRA 122 (May 29, 1970) and cases cited; Mun. of Compostela, Cebu vs. Nawasa, 18 SCRA 988 (1966); and City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144 (1959).
[8] 46 SCRA 734 (1972), per Esguerra, J.
[9] Idem, at page 747, emphasis added.
[10] Idem, at page 750.
[11] Reproduced in Art. IV, section 2 of the 1973 Constitution.
[12] 46 SCRA at pages 751-752, emphasis added.