APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the present  action for revival of judgment.  On July 2, 1947, herein plaintiff bank obtained judgment   the defendant and others, for sum of money.  As the other defendants had died and the five-year period for the enforcement of the deficiency judgment by mere motion had elapsed, the plaintiff instituted this action on June 27, 1957 to revive the judgment. During the pendency of the case, defendant died and was substituted by his legal representative, who filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that under the Rules, plaintiff should file its claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased pending in the Eizal Court of First Instance. Plaintiff opposed, contending that the judgment, having ceased to be executory, demandable and operative, had been reduced to a mere right of action; that the present action to revive is not one for recovery of money; and that it was for this reason that a contingent claim had been filed by it against defendant's estate. The court sustained the motion to dismiss; hence this appeal. Held:  A  deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing of claims. It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil action remaining unsatisfied after 5 years from its date of entry, is reduced to the condition of a mere right of action (Cia. General de Tabacos etc. vs. Martinez, et al., 29 Phil, 515), but this does not argue against the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is pending1. "Were the present proceedings allowed to continue, they could end with nothing more than a judgment reviving the one subject matter  of the action.  Thus revived, said judgment could not be enforced except through the  probate court, because the judgment debtor died before execution could  be actually levied upon any of his properties.

Order affirmed.  Dizon, J., ponente.