Appeal from the order dated April 5, 1957, of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija  in Special Proceedings No. 972,  which  reads as follows:

"This  is  a  motion for   partial  partition   and  distribution. The parties having agreed that only the  heirs Dominica  Medina. and Gorgonio  Medina  be given an advance payment of P1,000.00 from the cash  deposit,  and they, as well as the other heirs twenty-five cavans of palay each for their subsistence, to be included in the final distribution of the residue of the estate, the administrator is hereby ordered to advance to  Dominica Medina and Gorgonio Medina the amount of P1,000.00,  each,  from the cash  deposit of the estate, and twenty-five cavans each  to all  the five heirs for their subsistence, pending  the liquidation  of the said estate, provided that the same shall be collated in  the final distribution of shares among the heirs";

  and from the  order of  April 29, 1957, denying for  lack of merit  appellant's motion for reconsideration.

  The records disclose that the following proceedings were had in the lower court:

  On March 10,  1956,  Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition, seeking his appointment as  administrator of the property of his wife, Veronica Medina, who died intestate. On April 2, 1956, Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina, as heirs of the  deceased (she being their full-blood sister), filed an opposition,  praying  that Gorgonio  Medina,  or a neutral third party, or Felicisimo Gatmaitan and Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as administrator or administrators of the estate.  In an  order  dated July 18,  1956, the court appointed Felicisimo Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate with  a bond in the amount of  P2,000.00 and  Gorgonio Medina  as co-administrator without compensation and bond.

  On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed an amended  inventory  of the estate left by  the deceased consisting of an undivided half of the conjugal  partnership properties  and  amounting  all in  all to P31,336.60.  An opposition  to the admission of said inventory was registered by the oppositors on  the ground that  the same did not represent the true and faithful list of the properties left by the deceased,  and,  particularly, that a  parcel of twenty-two (22) hectares of land, more or less, was left but.   In view  of the  opposition,  the hearing  and  consideration  of the amended inventory was, in  an order dated April 29,  1957, postponed  until further  assignment.

  On April 2, 1957, the heirs of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Partial Partition  and Distribution", stating that the  estate had no debts and the heirs were all  of legal  age; that some of  them  were necessitous and in  need of cash; and praying that the share  corresponding to each  of the heirs  in the palay produce for the  agricultural year 1956-1957, as well as the cash deposit in the different banks, be ordered partially distributed among the heirs pending the final  distribution of the estate.  The  court heard counsel for administrator Gatmaitan and  for  the heirs or oppositors,  but without receiving any evidence whatsoever, promulgated on April 5, 1957  the order subject-matter  of the instant  appeal. On April 26, 1957,  the administrator, Gatmaitan, filed a motion for reconsideration, calling attention  to the  fact that, contrary to what the order states, "he has not agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner contained  in the order", and urging that "the sums ordered  to he partially distributed  are not warranted by the circumstances obtaining" in  the  case and  that, moreover, "the manner  of distribution will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirs themselves". As previously indicated, this motion  was  denied by  Judge  Agustin  P. Montesa  for lack of merit.

  Gatmaitan filed  notice  of appeal  from the foregoing orders.  On May 17, 1957,  appellant filed the record on appeal and notified counsel for the oppositors  of  the date he would move for the approval  thereof by  the court.  The order of Judge Felix Makasiar,  dated July 15,  1957, approving the record  on appeal presented by appellant, states that counsel  for the  oppositors  had failed to file written opposition  thereto as  required in the order  of the court dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the length of time that had already elapsed.   In his  brief, appellant only made one assignment of error, and it reads thus:

"The lower  court gravely abused  its discretion in directing a partial distribution of  the intestate estate of the  deceased Veronica Medina in favor  of appellees, under its order of April 5,  1957, without requiring the distributees to file the proper bonds pursuant to the  provisions of Rule  91, Section 1 of the  Revised Rules  of Court."

  This appeal was originally taken to the Court of Appeals, but, since there is  no  serious  issue  of fact involved  in the case, the same  was certified  to  us pursuant to the appellate  court's resolution of August 28,  1958.

  The  lower court, we believe, erred  in  rendering the order appealed from. A partial distribution^[1] of the  decedent's  estate pending the final termination of the testate or  intestate proceedings should as much  as possible be discouraged by the  courts and,  unless  in  extreme cases, such form of advances  of inheritance should not be countenanced.  The reason  for this strict  rule is obvious courts should guard with utmost  zeal  and jealousy the estate  of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be  adequately protected and  all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance.

  Why the appealed order is unwarranted is  evident on three counts. Firstly, to our mind, the partial distribution was prematurely ordered by  the lower court.   It appears that at the time the questioned order was rendered, the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the administrator-appellant was not yet  even accepted, and it was still under consideration by the  court, in view of an opposition to the admission thereof by some of the heirs.  Moreover,  it seems that notices for  the presentation of claims by  possible creditors of the estate had not yet been published, so that the period for  the presentation of claims had not as yet elapsed.  Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a sufficient basis  upon which  to order a partial distribution of  the  properties, having  in mind the adverse effects that it might have on the rights of the creditors and the heirs  alike.^[2] As pointed out by the appellant,  there are indications that  the fruits and cash  amounts  ordered to be partially  distributed  would be in excess of the distributees' full  inheritance from the estate.  The inventory, as  filed,  showed a total sum  of P31,336.60 that actually represents  the  conjugal  partnership assets, half of which  belongs  to the surviving spouse. Said  inventory  does  not embody any Seductions  for such expenses  as funeral  charges, inheritance  taxes,  expenses for administration or  an estimate  of  probable  debts  of the estate.  It  is worthwhile to state  in  this connection that besides the appellant, as the  surviving spouse  of the decedent, there are  about  eight others, all claiming  to  be lawful heirs and seeking  respective shares in the estate, five of whom  are alleged full-blood brothers and sisters and three half-blood brothers^[3] of  the  deceased  Medina. It should be noted that the appellees, being  brothers and sisters of the deceased, are not entitled to allowances for support, such as the court is authorized to provide, under Section  3 of Rule   84  of the  Rules of  Court,  for the widow and the children^[4] of the deceased during the  settlement  of estate proceedings,  to be  deducted  from  the respective shares  of the participants.

  Second, and more important,  no  bond was  fixed  by the court as a condition precedent to the partial distribution ordered by it,  a bond which, because of the reasons already  adduced,  becomes all the more imperative.

  Rule 91, Section  1 of the Rules  of Court,  specifically provides  as follows:

"When  the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the  allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the  application of the  executor  or administrator, or of a  person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the  residue  of the  estate  to  the persons  entitled  to  the same, naming  them and  the proportions, or  parts,  to  which  each  is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares  from the executor or administrator,  or any other  person having the same in his possession. *  *  *

  No distribution shall be  allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has  been made or provided  for, unless the distributees or any  of  them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned  for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs." (Italics supplied)

  Appellees contend that  the order of partial distribution having been issued pursuant to an agreement of the  parties, the same  could not now be assailed  by the appellant. While the wording  of the appealed order  seem to indicate that  it  was  rendered  with  the conformity  of  the heirs, there  is reason  to believe that  it  was  just a  mistaken impression on the part of the court.  Soon after the order was rendered, the  administrator-appellant filed  a  motion for reconsideration, among other things,  calling the attention  of the court that  he never agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner ordained in the appealed  order.   Although  said  motion  was  denied  for lack of merit, the court did not  deny categorically appellant's  imputation, which  could have easily been  averred to by  it; nor did the appellees at any time prior  to  this appeal controvert the aforesaid allegation of the  administrator.  There  is  plausibility  in  appellant's  statement that the agreement  referred to in the  order was  actually one  between the appellees among themselves.

  It should  be  noted, furthermore, that the bond required b£ the Rules is not solely for the protection of the heirs tjfien appearing, but also  for the benefit of creditors  and subsequent claimants who have not agreed  to the advances.

  As to the  argument that the order in question is merely interlocutory and therefore  not appealable, we find  that the objection was not seasonably  interposed by the appellees.   In Salazar vs. Salazar, G. R.  No. L-5823, April 29, 1953,  it was held,  and  we quote:

"The motion to dismiss filed by appellee during the pendency of this appeal on the ground that the order  appealed from is not appealable because it is merely interlocutory, cannot be entertained. While an order denying or granting alimony pendente lite is interlocutory and consequently non-appealable * * * ,  however,  if appeal is taken  therefrom, and no timely objection is  interposed thereto, the objection is deemed waived.  Thus, when the objection is founded on the ground that the judgment  appealed from is interlocutory, but the appellee, before making such  objection, has allowed the record on appeal  to be approved and printed, and has allowed the appellant to print his brief, such objection is too  late and is deemed waived (Slade-Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil., 223, 225; Luengo & Martinez vs. Herrero, 17 Phil., 29; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1952 ed., p. 987)."

  Lastly, appellees urge that this appeal was prematurely taken  in that  appellant has not as  yet formally objected to the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged order of the court, dated  May  16,  1957,  which appellees  have quoted in their brief, as  follows:

"Atty.  Cesar Francisco, counsel for  the administrator, is hereby given one week from today within which to file his manifestation as to whether the administrator  is willing to withdraw his appeal from the order dated  April  5,  1957,  provided  Atty. V.  M.  Ruiz files a bond in the amount of  P2,000.00 and the value of 25 cavanes of palay  granted to each  of the, two heirs Dominica Medina and Gorgonio  Medina in the aforesaid order of the Court to guarantee the refund of the said amount and the value of the palay should the same  be found, to be in excess of what is due to the said two heirs upon the  final  distribution of the  estates";

  and upon which, they  (appellees)  filed the following manifestation dated May 23, 1957:

"Considering  that up to the  present, the Court  has not as yet ruled upon counsel's opposition  or objection to the administrator's appeal, nor have the  administrator or that of his counsel rejected the heir's offer of a bond to answer for whatever excess they might receive as advance inheritance, the  undersigned counsel for the heirs above-named respectfully prays the Court, to hold in abeyance whatever action it shall take towards the approval or non-approval of  the Record on Appeal, until such  time as it shall have  ruled upon their opposition  or until the administrator shall have rejected formally  the offer of  a bond aforesaid.  Counsel shall then in time file his corresponding opposition  to the Record on Appeal."

    The tenor of the order of May 16, 1957, as well as the fact that neither said order nor the "constancia" of appellees are included in the Record on  Appeal, indicates that the belated  offer to file a bond amounted to  no more than an attempt of appellees to settle the particular issue between  the  parties that was  rejected  by the appellant. That the record on appeal  was approved much later, on July 15, 1957, and yet  without the written opposition * * * required in  the order of this Court dated  June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the  length of time that has already elapsed (R. A. p.  23), and the absence of proof that the bond offered  was  ever filed and approved by the Court, fortify  that conclusion.  Anyway, since the purpose of the bond required by Section 1, paragraph 2, of Rule  91 is to protect not only the appellant but  also the creditors and subsequent  claimants  to the  estate,  in  order that they may not  be  prejudiced by the  partial  distribution, the amount of  the bond  could not  be  fixed without  hearing such interested parties, and there is no showing that they were consulted.  Hence, the bond offered could not affect the  merits of this appeal, although the Court below is not  precluded  from approving  a new bond.

    Wherefore, the  order of  partial  distribution appealed from is hereby set aside, without prejudice  to the issue of another order after strict compliance with  the Rules of Court.   The  records are ordered remanded  to the  lower court for  further proceedings.   Costs against appellees.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ.,  concur.


  

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^[1] Should not be confused with an order for alimony pendente lite.

^[2]  See Escuin vs. Escuin, 11 Phil. 332.

  ^[3] These last mentioned heirs were not  included in the order of partial distribution.

  ^[4] The enumeration has been held to be exclusive (see Babao  vs. Villavicencio, 44 Phil., 921).