Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 54295 thereof dismissing the appeal taken by Chua Keng Klan from a decision of the Municipal Court of Manila in the present detainer case.

The same was, on December 12, 1962, commenced by Roman Ozaeta, as executor of the estate of the late Carlos Palanca y Tanguinlay, in Special Proceedings No. 12126 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.  The estate included a lot of about 801.20 square meters, with the improvements thereon, located at No. 1089 Aguilar St., Manila, which had been leased to Chua Keng Kian, since the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, at a monthly rental of 200, on a month-to-month basis.

Prior to the institution of said case, or on March 3, 1962, defendant had received a letter from Ozaeta stating that the lease of the premises was thereby terminated as of April 30, 1962, because the heirs of the deceased intended to construct an apartment house on the lot aforementioned, and urging the defendant to vacate the same, on or before the date last mentioned.  The defendant having refused to do so, despite repeated demands, said case was filed on the date adverted to above.

Defendant's answer in the Municipal Court averred that the alleged intent to construct an apartment house was merely a ruse to impose upon him a higher rate of rental.  He, moreover, set up a counter claim for P22,500, said to represent one-half of the cost of improvements he claimed to have introduced on the lot in question, with the alleged authority of its deceased owner, Carlos Palanca.  In due course, the Municipal Court rendered judgment, on May 28, 1963, sentencing the defendant to vacate the property in litigation; to pay to plaintiff the sum of P1,600, as rentals for the period from May to December, 1962, and P600 a month from January, 1963, up to such time as the defendant shall have vacated said property, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation thereof, in addi­tion to attorney's fees in the sum of P300 and the costs.

The defendant seasonably appealed to the Court of First Ins­tance of Manila, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 54295, and he filed an answer, dated June 28, 1963, reproducing, in effect, the one submitted in the Municipal Court.  Plaintiff moved, on July 2, 1963, to dismiss defendant's counterclaim, and, on August 16, 1963, to be allowed to withdraw the deposits made by the de­fendant.  The latter was denied on August 24, 1963 and the former on August 29 of the same year.

Over a year later, or on October 20, 1964, the Court of First Instance motu propio dismissed defendant's appeal, for "lack of interest to prosecute the same".  A motion for reconsideration of the order to this effect having been denied, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which, after appropriate proceedings, rendered the decision appealed from, setting aside the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance and remanding the case thereto for trial on the merits.  Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, to which we gave due course.

Prior thereto, or while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the project of partition among the heirs of the deceased Carlos Palanca had been approved by the probate court, in view of which said heirs substituted Roman Ozaeta as plaintiff in this case.

Plaintiffs herein raise two questions, namely: (1) whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside said order of dismissal.

As regards the first question, it is urged that since the defendant's appeal from said order of dismissal raised a question purely of law, namely, whether he had unduly failed to prosecute the appeal, the same was within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, so that the decision of the Court of Appeals must be deemed null and void ab initio.  We deem it, however, un­necessary to pass upon this question because, whether we deal with the proceedings before Us as one for review on certiorari of said decision of the Court of Appeals, or as a direct appeal from the or­der of dismissal of the Court of First Instance, the result is' the same.

Indeed, it is not disputed that the question whether or not a case should be dismissed for "failure to prosecute" is mainly ad­dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  As a consequence, the action taken by said court should not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it appears affirmatively that the former had abused its aforementioned discretion.  In other words, the trial court must be presumed to have acted correctly, unless and until the contrary is satisfactorily established.^[1]  In the case at bar, the Court of Ap­peals adopted, in effect, the opposite procedure, for it assumed that "in all probability, the court" - of first instance - "could not have heard the case immediately even if there was a motion to set it for hearing, because of the pendency of other urgent or similar matters" and that "this is the reason why the clerk of court did not x x x include this case in the calendar," during the period it had not been included therein.

Then again, the Court of Appeals acted upon the false premise that the decision of a municipal court against the defendant in illegal detainer cases is vacated on appeal taken by said defendant.  As ear­ly as January 23, 1948, such premise had been explicitly rejected by this Court, in Torres vs. Ocampo^[2], in which it held that:

" x x x judgment rendered by an inferior court in forci­ble entry or illegal detainer is not vacated by the appeal until after the rendition of judgment by the Court of First Instance; but it continues in force and may be executed upon failure on the part of the appellant to put up the supersedeas bond and monthly deposits required by law, during 'the pendency of the appeal."

Over twelve (12) years later, this was reiterated in Acierto vs. Laperal^[1], in the following language:

"The only issue posed in this petition is whether the appeal taken by plaintiffs from the decision of the Municipal Court of Manila to the court of first instance had the effect of vacating said decision as is the case in ordinary actions as provided for in Section 9, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court.

"While in an ordinary action a perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the judgment of the justice of the peace or of the municipal court, and the action when duly entered in the court of first instance shall stand de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure in that court as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there com­menced (Sec. 9, Rule 40), this rule only applies to ordinary actions, and not to cases of ejectment which are governed by Sec. 8, Rule 72.  This rule sets out a particular procedure that may be deemed to be an exception to the provisions of Sec. 9, Rule 40 x x x"

Indeed, the appeal taken by the defendant in a forcible entry or illegal detainer case from a decision rendered against him does not bar its execution during the pendency of the appeal.  To stay execution he must file a bond - which would be unnecessary if the decision had been vacated, for there would then be nothing to execute, and, hence, nothing to stay - and must deposit the amount due to the plaintiff "as found by the judgment" appealed from.  As a consequence, the appealed judgment is thereby enforced or enforce­able one way or the other - either by ordinary execution or by de­posit of said amount, coupled with a bond to stay said execution.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the period from June 28, 1963, when defendant filed his answer, to October 20, 1964, when the order of dismissal was issued, or over one (1) year and three (3) months, during which defendant had not asked the case to be set for hearing in the Court of First Instance, is not long enough to warrant dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute.  This is contrary to the position taken by this Court in Chuan vs. De la Fuente^[2], Villanueva vs. Secretary of Public Works^[3], and Insurance Co. of North America vs. Republic1, in which we upheld orders of dismissal based upon inaction for a similar length of time.

One other factor must be taken into account.  This unlawful detainer case is a special civil action which, by its nature, is meant to be summary in character.  Besides, it is a matter of common knowledge that there is a considerable number of cases of this kind pending before our courts; that appeals therefrom have only too often been resorted to for purposes of delay; and that such cases and the appeals therein taken contribute materially to the clogging of court dockets and, hence, to the delay in the disposition of other cases deserving of more attention.  In short, considerations of public policy warrant that greater diligence be demanded from defendants-appellants in forcible entry and detainer cases to expe­dite the disposal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant Chua Keng Kian.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurring and dissenting in separate opinion.


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