Appeal by defendant Roberto Ner y Feliciano from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting him of the crime of murder, with which he is charged, and sentencing him to life imprisonment, with the corresponding accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jose de Leon, in the sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

It is not disputed that, while he was in his apartment at No. 2036-C Anacleto Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, on May 17, 1964, at about 10:00 p.m., Jose de Leon was shot and sustained several wounds in different parts of the body, as a consequence of which, he died soon thereafter, before reaching the North General Hospital, to which he was brought immediately after the occurrence.  According to Dr. Angelo Singian, Assistant Chief Medical Examiner of the Manila Police Department, the cause of death was profuse hemorrhage due to 9 "through and through" gunshot wounds, five (5) produced by a .38 or .45 caliber firearm and four (4) by a .32 caliber firearm.  Indeed, .45 and .32 caliber slugs and shells were found at the scene of the shooting.  Later, the corresponding information for murder was filed against Roberto Ner y Felicia o, who allegedly killed Jose de Leon "conspiring and confederating With two (2) others, whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown," although the complaint filed with the office of the City Fiscal of Manila named Valentino Villanueva and Jose Lopena as the persons who had thus assisted Ner in the commission of the crime.  After due trial, under a plea of not guilty, the lower court convicted and sentenced Ner as above stated.  Thereupon, Ner moved for a new trial, upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied.  Hence, this appeal.

The case hinges on whether or not appellant has been sufficiently identified as the killer or one of the killers of Jose de Leon.  In this connection, the main witnesses for the prosecution were Estanislao de Leon, Leonardo Bolea, Rddolfo Rosales and Artemio Tiong.

The first is a lieutenant in the Manila Police Department, and will, accordingly, be referred to by his aforementioned rank.  The lieutenant was, at the time of the occurrence, in his house at No. 2063 Anacleto St., about 30 meters away from that of Jose de Leon, who was his nephew and will hereafter be referred to as "Boy", his nickname.  Upon hearing the report of gun fire, the lieutenant ran to the latter's house, at the ground floor of which he learned that the shooting had taken place in Boy's apartment, at the third floor.  At the door of said apartment, he found Boy on the floor, lying on his right side, bleeding profusely, with his feet at the door and the head inside the room, wearing no other garment than a "short" trunk.  Lifting Boy's head, the lieutenant inquired about the identity of his assailant, to which Boy answered, in a "low voice":  "Bobby" "Pirate".  These are the nicknames of appellant herein.  As the lieutenant asked "who Bobby" and "who Pirate" was, Boy looked at him (lieutenant), but did not answer.  Forthwith, the lieutenant ran down and asked several persons, whom he found at the ground floor, to get a vehicle so that Boy could be taken to a hospital.  Then the lieutenant and four (4) other persons, who followed him to Boy's apartment, brought Boy down and placed him in a jeep, at the door of the building, whereupon the lieutenant bade those helping him to take Boy "to the hospital," which they did.  Meanwhile, the lieutenant posted himself at the door of the apartment, outside the same, "so that nobody could touch anything."

According to Leonardo Bolea, he thrice saw appellant Ner, accompanied by Jose Lopena and Valentino Villanueva, in the evening of May 17, 1964, cruising aboard a red-colored jeep along Anacleto St., where he was.  In fact, when the jeep passed in front of Bolea, for the first time - after he had bought cigarettes from a store nearby - Lopena greeted him.  When the jeep passed for the third time, Bolea was seated in front of the house of one Aling Asiang, about 15 meters away from the building in which Boy's apartment was.  Ner was then behind the "wheel", with Villanueva seated beside him, and Lopena in the back seat.  The jeep made a U-turn and then parked in front of said apartment, facing Camarines Street.  Lopena alighted from the jeep and talked with someone seated on a bench, whereas Ner, followed by Villanueva, entered said building.  Soon there was a volley of shots in Boy's apartment, after which Ner emerged hurriedly from the building, holding a firearm, which he threw into the back of the jeep.  He blew its horn twice, and, forthwith starting the motor, drove off alone.  Then Angelina Viray, Boy's common-law-wife, rushed out of the apartment shouting several times "Binaril si Boy ni Pirate; binaril si Boy" (Boy was shot by Pirate; Boy has been shot).  Thereafter, the lieutenant came running towards the apartment.

The testimony of Rodolfo Rosales was, substantially, to the same effect.  He was at Anacleto Street, near said apartment, at the time of the occurrence and shortly before.  In fact, Bolea passed in front of him on his (Bolea's) way to the place of Aling Asiang.  When the aforementioned jeep passed for the third time, with Ner, Lopena and Villanueva on board the vehicle, they parked it in front of the building above mentioned.  Then Ner and Villanueva entered the same, but, no sooner had they done so than gunshots were fired.  Forthwith, Ner ran out of the building and sped away.  Then Angelina Viray emerged therefrom saying "Tulungan ninyo ako.  Binaril si Boy; binaril si boy x x x Pirate" (Help me.  Boy has been shot; Boy has been shot x x x Pirate").  Immediately thereafter, the lieutenant went up the building and entered Boy's apartment.  Rosales followed the lieutenant to the third floor of the building and saw the body of Boy on the floor, in a pool of blood.  The lieutenant held Boy's head and asked him who had shot him.  Boy opened his eyes and, with a trembling voice, replied:  "Pirate" or "Bobby Pirate".  The lieutenant further inquired:  "What Bobby?  What Pirate?" Rosales heard no answer.  He was, also, one of those who brought Boy to the North General Hospital, but Boy died before reaching the same.

Artemio Tiong declared that, in response to a call, received by him as mobile patrolman, he reached Boy's apartment at about 10:09 p.m., but he (Boy) was then already gone.  Tiong, however, asked Angelina Viray what had happened, and she said that Boy lived with her in the apartment, she being his wife; that between 9:50 and 10:00 o'clock that evening, Pirate Bobby Ner had visited them; that Boy and Ner talked in the living room, after which, Ner left; that, when Boy and Angelina retired to their bed-room, soon thereafter, somebody knocked at the door; that as Boy opened the same, there was a hail of gunshots; that rushing out of the bed-room, she saw Boy sprawled on the floor, mortally wounded; and that his assailant was Bobby Ner alias Pirate.

The main witness for the defense was Rolando Raymundo, an 18-year old tricycle operator, who would have us believe that, at the time of the occurrence, he was with his tricycle, parked beside the house of one Mrs. Aguilar, across the street from Boy's apartment.  Then two (2) men came in an army jeep and went up the apartment.  Soon, several shots rang out in succession, whereupon said men rushed out of the apartment, boarded the jeep and sped away.  None of them was, however, appellant Ner, whom the witness knows.  Nei­ther did he see either the lieutenant or Leonardo Bolea or Rodolfo Rosales, at the scene of the occurrence.

The defense introduced, also, the testimony of Ernesto Pascual and Eduardo Benito, who affirmed that on May 17, 1964, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Bolea and Rosales were in a pool-room at Rizal Avenue, from which they proceeded to the scene of the occurrence after being informed that the same had taken place.

Likewise, testifying for the defense, Teodoro Villanueva, father of Valentino Villanueva, stated that Angelina Viray had never mentioned the name of Boy's assailant and that the first person who entered Boy's apartment, after the occurrence, was one Corporal Herrera, not Lt. de Leon, who did not reach the apartment until 12 minutes after the shooting.

Appellant Ner did not take the witness stand.  He now maintains that His Honor, the trial Judge, Hon. Federico Alikpala, had erred in giving credence to the witnesses for the prosecution; in taking into account the testimony of Patrolman Tiong, relative to the statements made to him by Angelina Viray, notwithstanding the fact that she had not been placed on the witness stand; in drawing an unfavorable infer­ence from his (appellant's) failure to testify on his behalf; in not hold­ing that the evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt; and in deny­ing his motion for a new trial.

Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to disturb the findings of fact made by Judge Alikpala.  Indeed, the lieutenant had no reason to implicate appellant herein, if Boy had not really named him (appellant) as his assailant.  Instead of impelling him to commit perjury, the fact that Boy was his nephew was an added inducement for the lieutenant to adhere to the truth, as, otherwise, he would not only contribute to the conviction of an innocent person, but, also, assist the guilty party in evading punishment.  The veracity of the lieutenant's testimony is, moreover, bolstered up by the testimony of Rosales, who heard the lieutenant inquire about the identity of the assailant, as well as the answer given by Boy.

Neither had Rosales and Bolea any possible motive to falsely incriminate appellant herein.  On the contrary, the records show that Rosales and Bolea were old acquaintances of and in friendly terms with appellant Ner and Valentino Villanueva, as well as Jose Lopena, both of whom were, likewise, implicated by said witnesses for the prosecution.  And this they must have done from the very beginning, for - as stated in appellant's motion for reconsideration - Villanueva and Lopena were included in the charge filed by the police in the office of the City Fiscal of Manila, because of which they took to hiding soon thereafter.

The defense makes capital of the fact that, according to Dr. Singian, Boy may have lived "one to two minutes" after being shot, during which period of time "it might be possible but less probable" for him to speak.  Appellant deduces therefrom that Boy could not have told the lieutenant, when the latter reached the former's apartment, that his assailant was "Bobby", "Pirate", because the lieutenant's residence was about 30 meters away from Boy's apartment and said two minutes must have elapsed before the lieutenant had covered the distance.  This conclusion is, however, debatable.  Be­sides, Dr. Singian spoke merely in terms of possibilities and probabilities.  He did not say that Boy could not have lived longer than or spoken after two (2) minutes.  He even confessed that one "could not be certain," or positive about it.  Indeed, Boy did live several minutes after the lieutenant had reached him.  In fact, the lieutenant even asked several persons to take Boy to the North General Hospital, in view of which, said persons went up the apartment of Boy, took him down the building in which his apartment was, placed him in a jeep parked at Anacleto street and brought him to said hospital, although he died on the way thereto.  By this time, from 5 to 10 minutes, at least, must have elapsed since he was shot.  Hence, Boy may have really told the lieutenant that the assailant was "Bobby" "Pirate".

Appellant assails the veracity of Rosales, upon the ground that there are several contradictions between his testimony in court and that given by him at the preliminary investigation, in the office of the City Fiscal and between his testimony in chief and the answers given by him on cross-examination.  The alleged contradictions refer to whether the jeep used by appellant Ner came from Camarines street or Tayabas street, before it parked in front of the house in which Boy had his apartment; whether the jeep had three (3) or four (4) passengers; whether the passengers who entered said house were two (2) or three (3); the period of time that elapsed from such entry to the shooting; the caliber and color of the gun carried by appellant, when he emerged from said house, immediately after the occurrence; whether he started the motor of the jeep before blowing its horn, or the latter was first; and the precise words uttered by Angelina Viray when she came out of the building.

These are, however, minor details which do not affect the testimony of Rosales on appellant's presence in Boy's apartment, at the time of the occurrence, on which he has not incurred in any contradiction and was corroborated by Bolea, the lieutenant and Tiong.  Furthermore, as regards the events immediately preceding the occurrence, it is well to remember that Rosales had not anticipated the same.  Accordingly, his attention was not focussed on appellant's jeep and its occupants, so that it was only natural for him (Rosales) to have no more than a general idea about it, and to be uncertain about minute details.  In fact, minor inconsistencies of a witness tend to reinforce, rather than weaken, his testimony, for they indicate that it was spontaneous and unrehearsed.^[1]

Again, when Rosales testified in the City Fiscal's office, Valentino Villanueva, his father Teodoro Villanueva, Jose Lopena and the latter's lawyer were seated beside him (Rosales).  Valentino Villanueva was so close to Rosales that the former used to nudge the latter's feet in the course of his testimony.  There were then no other persons in said office, except the investigating fiscal and Boy's father, who was some distance away.  Considering that Valentino Villanueva and Jose Lopena, aside from appellant Ner, who was then at large, had been implicated by Rosales, we accept, as satisfactory, his explanation to the effect that the inaccurate details mentioned by him on that occasion were due to his extremely nervous condition at that time.

It is next contended that Rosales had contradicted the lieutenant, because the latter testified that he was alone in Boy's room when he (lieutenant) inquired about the assailant's identity and Boy-answered "Bobby" "Pirate", whereas Rosales affirmed that he saw and heard Boy give his ante mortem statement, and because the lieutenant claimed not to have met Angelina Viray as the former proceeded to Boy's apartment, although Rosales declared otherwise.  Are find no contradiction between these testimonies, for the lieutenant was inside Boy's apartment and Rosales was outside the same when the ante mortem statement was made.  So, too, when the lieutenant proceeded to said apartment, he was in such a hurry that he did not pay attention to the people on the way thereto.

What has been said concerning Rosales applies equally to the contradictions allegedly found in Bolea's testimony.  Emphasis is placed by appellant upon Bolea's failure to relate to the relatives of Boy, at any of the three (3) or four (4) days he (Boy) was lying in estate, what he (Bolea) had witnessed in the evening of the occurrence.  This has been sufficiently explained by Bolea.  Boy's assassination was not an ordinary passion crime.  He had been killed in gangland or goon fashion.  All of his supposed assailants were then at large.  Worse still, Valentino Villanueva, one of those he believed to have participated in the commission of the offense, was living in the same building in which Boy had his apartment.  In short, Bolea's silence was dictated by prudence and the instinct of self-preservation.

The defense insists that the testimony of Patrolman Tiong concerning his conversation with Angelina Viray should be disregarded as hearsay, for Angelina did not take the witness stand.  Said conversa­tion took place in Boy's apartment, on May 17, 1964, between 10:09 and 10:30 p.m., or immediately after the occurrence, and referred to the circumstances surrounding the same.  At that time, Angelina had not, as yet, fully recovered from the effects of the as­sassination of her common-law husband, practically, if not actually, before her own eyes.  In fact, she was not only crying; she had, also, been repeatedly saying, almost hysterically, that Boy had been shot by "Pirate".  Tiong's testimony about the statements then made by her, before she could deliberate on the events that had transpired a few minutes before, was properly admitted under Sec. 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which:

"x x x Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately  prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the RES GESTAE.  x x x"

Indeed, it has been held:

"x x x that declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or occurrence in litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction itself.^[2]

It is true that, in saying that Boy had been shot by Pirate, Angelina did not explain to Patrolman Tiong whether or not she had seen the latter in the act of firing, although she said so in an affidavit made by her in the City Fiscal's office.  Her story to Patrolman Tiong indicated, however, that she had seen appellant and Boy talking in the living room of his apartment, shortly before the shooting, and that, accordingly, she had personal knowledge of appellant's presence at the scene of the occurrence.

The fact that Angelina's statement to Tiong was part of her narration, prompted by his questions about the details of the occurrence, does not detract from the spontaneity of her statement.  All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration^[3] before he had time to think and make up a story^[4], or to concoct or contrive a falsehood^[5], or to fabricate an account^[6], and without any undue influence in obtaining it^[7], aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances.^[8]

Thus, in People v. Ruzol^[9], we said:

"The circumstance that as soon as Eladio and his uncle reached the Philippine Constabulary barracks, he promptly told the authorities, without doubt or hesitation, that it was Manuel Torres and Lorenzo Ruzol that killed his father, is convincing proof that he recognized the accused when he saw them.  The discovery of the crime by the witness, his pursuit of the accused, and the fact that immediately thereafter, as soon as he arrived at the barracks, he positively pointed to the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, without any sufficient intervening time for him to fabricate his account, is convincing proof of the correctness of his identification.  All the events occurred in rapid succession, and the pointing out of the accused as the perpetrators may be said to be parts of the res gestae."

Similarly, the following statements have been held to be part of the res gestae:  the statement of a child made within an hour of an alleged assault^[10]; the testimony of a police officer as to what a victim told him not more than 30 minutes after the commission of an alleged crime^[11]; the statements of defendant's employees made about 30 minutes after an accident^[12]; and the declaration of a victim some 5 to 10 minutes after an incident^[13].

Little need be said about the evidence for the defense.  Teodoro Villanueva's assertion that Angelina had not mentioned appellant's nickname, immediately after the occurrence, cannot affect the result of the case.  To begin with, his son, Valentino Villanueva, was one of those implicated by the evidence for the prosecution.  Being naturally interested in the latter's failure, the testimony of Teodoro does not have much weight.  Said interest is made even more manifest by the fact that it was Teodoro Villanueva who asked Ernesto Pascual and Eduardo Benito to testify for appellant herein.  At any rate, said testimony cannot prevail over the positive evidence for the prosecution concerning the presence of appellant in Boy's apartment, corroborated by Boy's ante mortem declaration and the testimony of Patrolman Tiong regarding the statement of Angelina Viray immediately after the occurrence.

It is, likewise, clear that the negative testimony of Rolando Raymundo to the effect that none of the two (2) men who alighted from the jeep and entered the building at No. 2036 Anacleto street, was appellant Ner, and that he (Raymundo) had not seen the lieutenant, Leonardo Bolea and Rodolfo Rosales in that place, cannot blunt the positive testimony to the contrary of these witnesses for the prosecution.  The inherent weakness of Raymundo's testimony becomes evident when we bear in mind that he denied having seen at the place of the occurrence, not only Bolea and Rosales, but, also, the lieutenant, despite the fact that the latter's presence in Boy's apartment had been admitted by defense witness Teodoro Villanueva.  Then, again, if Raymundo merely failed to notice the lieutenant when the latter entered said building, then it is not unlikely - assuming that his (Raymundo's) tricycle was really parked in front of said build­ing - that he had incurred in a similar oversight as regards the entry of Ner in the same building and the presence of Bolea and Rosales in the vicinity thereof.  Indeed, such presence is incontestable, not only as regards the lieutenant, but, also, insofar as Rosales is concerned, he being one of those who brought Boy to the North General Hospital.

This fact, in turn, discredits the testimony of Ernesto Pascual and Eduardo Benito, who would have us believe that Rosales and Bolea were in a pool-room at Rizal Avenue, when Boy was shot, and that said witnesses for the prosecution did not leave said place until later, when someone came and brought news about the occurrence.  Indeed, considering that the messenger of this news was someone who, apparently had walked from the scene of the occurrence, after inquiring about the identity of the victim, and that it took less than 9 minutes to remove the latter from his apartment, Rosales could not have reached the same on time to bring Boy to the hospital - as he did - had Pascual and Benito told the truth.

Upon a careful review of the record, we are fully satisfied that Judge Alikpala has not overlooked or misunderstood any fact or circumstance of weight and importance in deciding this case, in view of which we can not disturb his findings of fact based upon a reliance on the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, and the view that that of the witnesses for the defense is unworthy of credence.

About a week after the promulgation of the decision appealed from, appellant filed a motion for new trial based upon allegedly newly discovered evidence, namely, the testimony of Angelina Viray, Valentino Villanueva and Jose Lopena, whose affidavits were attached to said motion.  Appellant maintains that the lower court has erred in denying said motion.

It is alleged therein that the defense could not have availed, prior thereto, of the testimonies of Valentino Villanueva and Jose Lopena because they had been in hiding up to June 14, 1965, or after the conclusion of the trial on April 2, 1965.  The record shows, however, that, as early as December 16, 1964, or even before the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, Villanueva and Lopena had executed a joint affidavit, in Manila, before appellant's counsel.  Hence, the testimony of said witnesses is not newly discovered evidence.

Neither is that of Angelina Viray.  Indeed, the decision appealed from was promulgated on October 4, 1965.  Thereupon, a news item about it appeared in the issue of the Manila Daily Bulle­tin, of October 5, 1965, reading:

"YOUNG HOOD METED OUT A LIFE TERM

"A youthful police character Roberto Ner y Feliciano, was convicted for murder yesterday and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of First Instance.

"Judge Federico Alikpala convicted Ner for the slaying of Jose de Leon nephew of a police officer, last May 17, 1964.  De Leon was shot and killed in his house.

"The defense headed by Candelario R. Domingo, indicated it would ask for a new trial on the basis of new­ly found evidence.  It intended to present a certain Angelina Viray, who was said in the verdict to be the common-law wife of De Leon and was also the lone eye­witness to the slaying."

It is thus manifest that the testimony of Angelina Viray was available to the defense even before October 4, 1965, for, otherwise, appellant's counsel could not have announced then the intention to file a motion for new trial based upon her testimony, which, in fact, he filed soon thereafter.  This explains why she did not appear before the court, despite the subpoena issued to her, as witness for the prosecution, when the trial began on September 10, 1964, and notwithstanding an affidavit subscribed and sworn to by her, before an assistant fiscal of Manila, on June 17, 1964 - or before the filing of the information against appellant herein - confirming the story given by her to Patrolman Tiong in the evening of May 17, 1964.  Another subpoena issued to her for the resumption of the trial on September 29, 1965, could not be served, because she was "no longer residing at given address." The prosecution stated to the Court that it (the prosecution) had "tried to locate her" and had "not been successful" in this endeavor.

At any rate, in her affidavit attached to the motion for new trial, Angelina declared - contrary to her aforementioned affidavit of June 17, 1964 - that she did not see the person who shot Boy and that, immediately after the occurrence, she did not mention appel­lant's nickname as that of Boy's assassin.  In their joint affidavit appended to the same motion, Valentino Villanueva and Jose Lopena, in turn, stated that Lopena "was never at Anacleto Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, during the evening of May 17, 1964" and that "Valentino Villanueva was already sleeping in the bedroom of their apartment during said time" -- "about 10 o'clock" in the evening -- "and date." Thus, this alleged newly discovered evidence is merely impeaching, cumu­lative or corroborative of that already introduced by the defense, for which reason Judge Alikpala did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant's motion for new trial.^[14]

Inasmuch as Boy was shot suddenly and unexpectedly, as he opened the door of his apartment, in response to the knocking thereat, soon after the visit paid to him by appellant herein, when he (Boy) was almost naked, for he was about to go to bed, it is evident that appellant had acted with treachery, he having employed means and ways, in the commission of the crime, tending directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that Boy may put up, and which Boy had no opportunity to make.^[15] The crime committed was, therefore, murder, which was attended, also, by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling of the offended party.  Moreover, nighttime was manifestly sought, to be sure that Boy was not only in the house, but, also, about to go to bed.  In fact, to avoid any possible miscalculation, appellant even pretended to pay Boy a social visit and to part from the apartment in seeming friendly spirit, only to knock at the door thereof soon thereafter for the kill.^[16] The measures thus taken by appellant, coupled with the fact that he drove three times past the building in which the apartment was, together with two (2) men, before entering said building, armed with a firearm, establish beyond doubt that he had planned the commission of the offense and had, accordingly, acted with evident premeditation.^[17] In view of this circumstance and the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the maximum penalty prescribed for murder, or death, should be meted out to appellant herein, although, for lack of the number of votes necessary therefor, the penalty imposed by the lower court is in order.

WHEREFORE, modified as to the indemnity, which is increased from P6,000 to P12,000,^[18] the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against appellant Roberto Ner y Feliciano.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., dissents.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., did not take part.

---

^[1] People v. Gracia, L-21419, Sept. 29, 1966; People v. Limbo, 49 Phil. 94; U.S. v. Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil. 187.

^[2] Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Buck, 19 NE 453, 458.

^[3] People v. Cuevas, L-5844-45, May 30, 1955; Air France v. Carrascoso, et al., L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966.

^[4] People v. Avila, L-4640, March 23, 1953; 92 Phil. 805.

^[5] People v. Alban, et al., L-15203, March 29, 1961.

^[6] People v. Ruzol, L-8699, Dec. 26, 1956.

^[7] People v. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 371.

^[8]

5 People v. Nartea, 74 Phil. 8; People v. Cuevas, L-5844-45, May 30, 1955; People v. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162; People v. Portento, 48 Phil. 971; U.S. v. Macuti, 26 Phil. 170.

^[9] L-8699, Dec. 26, 1956.

^[10] Wheeler v. U.S. (1954), 211 Fed. 2d. 19.

^[11] State v. Finley (1959), 338 P. 2d. 790.

^[12] Peterson v. General Geophysical Co. (1947), 185 P. 2d. 56.

^[13] People v. Costa (1953), 252 P. 2d. 1.

^[14] People v. Tan, 88 Phil. 609; People v. Ventura, L-16946, July 31, 1962; People v. Evaristo, L-14520, Feb. 26, 1965; Bernabe v. Court of Appeals, L-18278, March 30, 1967; Colcol v. Philippine Banking Corp., L-23117, Nov. 17, 1967; People v. Gutierrez, L-25372, Nov. 29, 1968.

^[15] U. S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, 548; People v. Pengzon, 44 Phil. 224; People v. Alban, L-15203, March 29, 1961; People v. Simon, L-18035, Feb. 28, 1964; People v. Sagario, L-18659, June 29, 1965.

^[16] People v. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515, 536; People v. Sagario, supra.

^[17] U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530; U.S. v. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457; People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295; People v. Sagario, supra; People v. Curiano, L-15256-57, Oct. 31, 1963; People v. Estrada, L-26103, Jan. 17, 1968.

^[18] People v. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968; People v. Gutierrez, L-25372, Nov. 29, 1968.

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