The defendant, convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, had been cashier and bookkeeper of the branch of Warner, Barnes & Co. in that city.   He alone kept the books and had  custody of the cash.  Such money as came in during his occasional absence from the office was delivered to the  temporary manager, who appears to have usually left it upon the desk of  the defendant  who took possession of it  upon his return.

In  June, 1905, when  the semi-annual  statement of the books was  made up, it  was discovered that  there was a shortage of over 10,000  pesos, which afterwards proved to amount to P11,006.13 and  which had been covered up by false  entries in the books.  This amount was the total of twenty-one checks, all drawn by the defendant and entered by him on a slip which he carried, although not appearing in the books of the firm, in which,  on the contrary, their amount was covered by various false entries.  Besides this memorandum  on a slip of paper, he also kept  a  private daily  statement of the cash, in which allowance was made for the aggregate of these checks as money paid out, so that when  asked by his superior for the amount in bank, he could at once correctly  state it.  It is admitted that all these  entries and papers were in his handwriting, except that the checks were signed by the manager.

The defense rests upon the claim that the various entries were made by  the manager's direction and that the money realized from  the checks had gone to him, and not to the defendant who had no knowledge that the checks  had in fact been cashed.   There is absolutely nothing in this case to sustain this claim, other than the testimony of  the defendant,  which is inconsistent with the  length of time, about four months, through which the entries ran, as well as with his private memoranda.  The pretence that he did not know that the checks had been cashed,  conflicts with the memoranda, as well as  with the declarations of the  messengers, who cashed them at the bank.

On  two occasions, in  the presence of the manager, the chief of police, and at least one other person, the defendant admitted the defalcation and he  later signed a confession of his guilt.  He now claims, that he did so under a misunderstanding of its meaning and actuated by fear and by the hope of immunity.   It appears that he at first refused any  admission, which he was finally induced to make by the  expectation of not being prosecuted.  The  chief of police testified  that the manager had said that if the defendant would not sign that paper he would be taken to the calaboose.  The  manager  himself,  while  denying any threat, violence, or intimidation, admitted that he promised Alameda that if the money was  repaid  he would not prosecute him.

"Alameda said to me 'How do I know if I refund the money and sign the paper you would not prosecute me?' I told him he could take the paper or my word, as he liked. I gave him my word."

We think  that the words of the manager, under the circumstances of  the case and in the presence of the chief of police, amounted to a menace, as well  as a promise of leniency, so as to render the confession inadmissible.

There is by no  means a concord of authority in English and  American cases as  to what constitutes a promise or threat, rendering inadmissible the testimony of a detained person induced  thereby.  In the Philippine Islands the matter is regulated  by  section  4 of Act No, 619, which, although occurring in a law of special  application to the Constabulary, is yet so general in its terms and scope as, in the  opinion of this court, to apply to all cases of voluntary confession,  (U. S. vs. De la Cruz, 5 Phil. Rep., 24.)

This confession was properly admitted under general proof that  it was voluntary,  the defendant's specific evidence to the contrary being offered only at a later stage of the trial.   The defense  could have protected itself by  a request for a preliminary examination and proof as. to the character of the confession at the time when it was offered, or if such examination had been refused by the judge or had been for any reason omitted, then by a motion to strike out the confession, following the testimony of the defense. No such motion having been made, the trial judge did not feel himself at liberty to reject it.

In reviewing and retrying  the case we do not meet the same obstacle, but give the defendant  the benefit of his objection and  exception, and we discard  the confession. Nevertheless, for the  reasons first  stated, there remains other abundant proof of the defendant's guilt.

The judgment  of the lower court is modified in respect to subsidiary imprisonment, and the defendant is sentenced to presidio correccional for a period of two years and  nine months, the payment of the  costs of both instances,  and the  indemnification of P11,006.13 to Warner, Barnes  & Co., with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, limited to the amount of the indemnification and the third part of the principal penalty,  not including the costs.   So ordered.

Arellano,  C.J.  Torres, Johnson, and Willard,  JJ. concur.