Respondent-appellee Francisco Cokeng seeks reconsideration of this Court's decision in the above entitled case, ordering the revocation of his certificate of naturalization (17 Sup. Ct. Rep. Annot., p. 853).  Bases of the decision were that in the original application for naturalization, said respondent failed to state all his former places of residence; and lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct, rendering the naturalization one that was illegally obtained (Com. Act No. 473, sec. 18).

With regard to the first ground, this Court's main decision found that appellee, in addition to his given address at 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, had also resided at 28 12th Street, corner Broad­way, Quezon City, but had not revealed it in the amended application for his naturalization that was the one published as required by law.

That the appellee Cokeng had resided in the house in Cuezon City is indubitable, as it appears manifested by him in several public documents executed between 1951 and 1954, as detailed in our decision.  Some of these were even sworn to by him (Exh. A and Exh. SSS, for example).  His explanations, that in some of said documents the residence in Quezon City was set down by mistake, or that it was an address and not a residence, or that he had purchased it for his parents, were examined and found unconvincing and not acceptable.

In his motions for reconsideration, the appellee stresses that in law a person can only have one legal domicile, and that appellee, in good faith, only made it appear in his application for naturalization that his residence was 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, because it was there that he stayed most of the time.  These arguments are unmeritorious.  It is noteworthy that section 7 of the Naturalization Law expressly requires the applicant to state his "present and past places of residence", and the words used in the statute clearly show that the term used ("residence") was not employed in the sense of "legal domicile", precisely because a person can only have one domicile.  Considering the purpose of the requirement, which is to enable the public and the investigating agencies of the government to gather all formation available as to the conduct of an applicant, and thus determine whether his behavior at all times has been irreproachable as required by law, and hence, whether the prospective admission to citizenship should be objected to or not, it becomes obvious that by places of residence, section 7 of the Naturalization Law refers to the places of actual physical residence,^[1] whether temporary or permanent.

In Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964, this court said --

"Petitioner argues, however, that his residence in Manila was only temporary so that his legal residence or domicile remained to be Legazpi City.  Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law speaks of 'present and former places of residence' without specifying actual or legal residence.  Its purpose, as stated, is to give the public and the investigating agencies of the government an opportunity to gather information and to express objection relative to the petition.  Precisely, for this reason, it is important that petitioner's actual, physical residence be likewise set forth and published, since information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding."

We reiterated these views in O Ku Phuan vs. Republic, 1967C, PHILD 570, 573,^[2] where it was ruled that:

"The only former place of residence mentioned in the petition for naturalization was 1040 O'Donnell, Sta. Cruz, Manila.  The record shows, however, that petitioner had resided in Davao from 1936 to 1946, at No. 788 Juan Luna, Tondo, Manila, from 1946 to 1948 and in the 2nd Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City, from 1948 to 1949.  It is well settled that this failure to mention petitioner's former residences affects the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case.

"Indeed, such omission tends to defeat the purpose of the publication, required by law, of notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization.  It deprives the Government of the opportunity to make a thorough and effective investigation of petitioner's background, prior to the hearing of his petition.  Moreover, people, residing in the neighborhood, of the former places of residence not mentioned in the petition may thus be led to believe that petitioner is another person.  They may, accordingly refrain from conveying to the Government pieces of information relevant, if not vital, to the petition for naturalization.  For this reason, the fact that, petitioner mentioned, in his testimony, said former places of residence, does not and can not -- contrary to the import of the order appealed from -- cure the effect of the failure to specify them in his aforementioned petition.

Upon the other hand, the decisions in Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768, and Chausintek vs. Republic, 88 Phil. 717, discuss residence for purposes of venue for the filing of the petition for naturalization and are, therefore, inapplicable to the present issue.

Likewise obvious it is that the good faith of the applicant in omitting one or more of his "present and past places of residence" in his application, becomes and is irrelevant for the purposes of the law.  Whether the omission be in good or bad faith, the fact is that full inquiry as to the irreproachability of applicant's behavior is thereby, preyed, and the law's intent frustrated.  Hence, this Court in a long line of decisions has invariably held that such omission is fatal to the application for naturalization (Lim Tan vs. Republic April 30, 1966; Ong Ping Seng vs. Republic, L-19575, February 26, 1965 and numerous decisions cited therein; Tan vs. Republic, L-22077, February 18, 1967; O Ku Phuan vs. Republic, L-23406, August 31, 1967, 1967C PHILD, 570 and cases cited).

It is apparent from the preceding considerations that the act of appellee Cokeng in not disclosing his residence in Quezon City, having deprived the State of opportunity to fully inquire into the applicant's conduct, rendered the decree of naturalization improvident and improper, being contrary to the requirements and policy of the law.  While the decree had become final, the State is not thereby deprived of corrective action through denaturalization proceedings for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate.  For under section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, "a competent judge may cancel the natura­lization certificate issued and its registration in the civil registry whenever it is shown that ---- said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally".  These terms were reproduced from the American law that allowed cancellation of naturalizations "fraudulently or illegally procured", and it has been the consistent interpretation of the Federal and Supreme Courts of the United States that the term "illegally procured" is not limited to irregularity, but also denoted a determination by the Court contrary to law of the matter submitted to it.  (U. S. vs. Nopoulos, 225 Fed. 556; U. S. vs. Plaistrow, 189 Fed. 1010; Grahl vs. U. S., 261 Fed. 437; U. S. vs. Koopmans, 290 Fed. 545; U. S. vs. Khaw, 1 Fed, 2d 1006; U. S. vs. Ness, 62 L. Ed., 321; U. S. vs. Ginsberg, 61 D.Ed. 853).

"No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied with; and every certificate of citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the government may challenge it, as provided in section 15, and demand its cancellation, unless issued in accordance with such requirements.  If procured when prescribed qualifications have no existence in fact, it is illegally procured; a manifest mistake by the judge can not supply these nor render their existence non essential." (U.S. vs. Ginsberg, 61 Law Ed. 853, 856)

"Naturalization granted without the filing of a certificate of arrival as required by the statute, the same being a matter of substance, is illegally procured (U. S. vs. Ness, 62 L. Ed. 8

21)

"No alien has the right to naturalization unless he has complied with the statutory requirements.  If a certificate of naturalization has been procured when the statutory qualification did not exist in fact, it may be cancelled.  Proof of fraud in obtaining a certificate is necessary to justify cancellation, illegality alone all subject a certificate to successful attack." (U. S. vs. Beda, 118 Fed. 2d 458, 459, cit. U. S. Sup. Court decisions) (Emphasis supplied)

"The statute requires certain conditions to exist to entitle a person to naturalization, and no person and no bureau, and no court, can waive these conditions; therefore the government can not be estopped by anything shown in the record in this case." (U. S. vs. Nopoulos, 225 Fed. 656, cit. author.)

It can be readily seen that the lack of fraudulent intent or trickery in obtaining naturalization is no obstacle to the cancellation of a naturalization certificate originally issued in violation of law.  It may be added that appellee's contention that his true residence was No. 428 Sto. Cristo, Manila, is not free from doubt, considering the evidence that these premises were under lease to Go Tian Hoo (doing business under the name of Francis Trading) from April 1951 to December 1958 (tsn. p. 31, Sept. 28,1961; Exhs. V-I and V-II) while the petition for naturalization was filed in 1955.

The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the respondent has not established adequate grounds for altering the conclusions made in the main decision (17 Supreme Court Reports Annotated, p. 857) to, the effect that his failure to disclose all his places of residence justified the revocation of his naturalization.

With regard to the second ground for revocation, to wit, that respondent Cokeng had committed underdeclarations of his income, thereby evincing lack of that irreproachable conduct which the law requires of applicants for citizenship, respondent stresses that the first group of Bureau of Internal Revenue examiners had found that Cokeng overpaid his income taxes for 1952, 1953 and 1954; the second group of examiners that had gone over Cokeng's case found overpayments only for 1952 and 1954, but certified to this taxpayer's being deficient in his income declarations for the years 1953, 1955, 1956 and 1957; and still a third group of examiners in turn confirmed Cokeng's overpayments for 1952 and 1954, but .reported that for the years 1953, 1955, 1956 and 1957, there was neither deficiency nor overpayment.  To cap this confusing situation, respondent has submitted (See Annexes to his Motion of November 14, 1966) a report of Supervising Revenue Examiner Restituto D. Atienza, (who had originally investigated Cokeng's tax case, and assessed him for additional taxes) wherein said examiner declared, as of October 1963 that respondent had overpaid his income taxes for the years 1951, 1952 and 1954; and recommended that he be assessed for deficiency income taxes for 1958 and 1959, but without penalty, because "there is no direct evidence of fraud."

The records further disclose a memorandum dated May 8, 1967 of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Misael P. Vera, reporting to the Solicitor General,^[3] that other revenue examiners had verified anew respondent's tax cases, and that -

"The examiners found no evidence in the records to the show that the deficiency tax arose from undeclared income that would indicate bad faith on the part of the taxpayers, thus substantiating the conclusion and recommendation of the late Examiner Atienza as adverted to above.  On the other hand, the examiners found instances showing good faith on the part of the taxpayer.  He voluntarily filed, his amended returns for 1952 up to 1955, inclusive, declaring an additional income consisting of dividends from San Miguel Brewery Corporation.  This additional income has not been discovered by the team of Examiners Timoteo C. Andrade and Felix S. Lopez whose examination covered the years 1948 up to 1954, inclusive.  Moreover, the amended returns were filed even before the start of the second reinvestigation, which was then not expected.  The taxpayer also voluntarily filed a Supplementary Inventory, on February 14, 1956, as Administrator of the estate of his deceased father thereby increasing the estate and inheritance taxes.  These acts of taxpayer, the examiners pointed out, demonstrate not only good faith but civic-mindedness long before the denaturalization case was stated sometime in 1960."

These conclusions the Commissioner confirmed and adopted, saying -

"It appearing that the examiners' findings are based on a thorough appraisal and evaluation of the records of Mr. Cokeng's tax cases, this Office finds it unnecessary to add to or detract from the said comments, which are therefore, hereby confirmed and adopted as our official answer to the questions posed in your query."

In view of these developments, we are left with no alternative but to conclude that, despite the suspicious variations in the results of the different examinations of respondent's tax cases, the second charge of underdeclarations of his income has not been clearly established, and therefore, his denaturalization ca not be predicated upon said charge.

It appearing, however, that Cokeng's naturalization was illegally obtained, because the Court granting it improperly disregarded the applicant's failure to disclose one, of his places of residence, contrary to the requirements of section 7 of the Naturalization Law, the denaturalization decreed in the original decision of this Court must be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

Concepcion, C.J, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Castro, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the opinion of J. Castro.
Angeles, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

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^[1] Lo vs. Republic, L-15919, May 19, 1961; Qua vs. Republic, L-1934, October 27, 1964.

^[2] Citing copious precedents.

^[3] Annex A, to his comment filed on May 19, 1967.

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