Respondent Araceli Torrechante filed on July 21, 1964 a complaint for libel against petitioner Raquel Doce be­fore the Municipal Court of Real, Quezon Province.  At­tached to the complaint were the affidavits of respondent and her witness, one Dionisio Destojo.  According to res­pondent, also annexed to the complaint was a photostatic copy of the letter^[1] sent by petitioner to her which was the basis of the complaint.

The complaint was amended on August 4, 1964, with the further allegation that Torrechante suffered moral damages on account of the libelous letter sent by peti­tioner.  On August 12, 1964, Judge Cabungcal, the Munici­pal Judge at Real, was allowed by the Court of First Ins­tance to inhibit himself from the case.  Accordingly, Judge Juntereal of the Municipality of Infanta, Quezon, was de­signated to hear the case at the Municipality of Real in place of Judge Cabungcal.

On October 28, 1964, Judge Juntereal issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner.  The officer's return shows that this was served on petitioner on December 16, 1964.^[2] She was not detained however, because of the bail bond admit­tedly prepared and filed by her even as early as July 24, 1964 yet.^[3]

On April 23, 1965, the case was called for the se­cond stage of the preliminary investigation.  Petitioner appeared without counsel and she asked for postponement which was granted.  On December 4, 1965, petitioner filed a manifestation requesting that the preliminary investigation which had been reset to December 11, 1965 be con­ducted in Lucena City where she resides instead of at the Municipality of Real.

Petitioner apparently failed to show up at Real on December 11, 1965 for the municipal court subsequently issued an order, dated January 13, 1966, stating that pe­titioner's manifestation was an implied waiver of her right to the preliminary investigation and ruling "x x x that there is a prima-facie case against the accused."^[4] The case was then forwarded to the Court of First Instance.

On February 21, 1966, the provincial fiscal filed the information for libel against petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Quezon sitting at Lucena City.  Petitioner was then able to secure postponements of the first two dates set for the arraignment, which was 'final­ly reset on June 21, 1966.  On this latter date, without being arraigned, petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that there had neither been a preliminary examina­tion nor investigation in the case.

The court a quo denied the motion, by its order da­ted June 22, 1966, ruling that it had jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and "x x x that a preliminary investigation had been previously conducted in accordance with established procedure.^[5] When her motion for reconsideration failed, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

It is petitioner's principal submission that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to try her for the offense Charged because: (1) the warrant of arrest was defectively issued, and (2) there was no preliminary investigation.

There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued.  Section 87 of the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act 3828^[6] requires that the Municipal Judge issuing the same, personally examine under oath the witnesses, and by searching questions and answers which are to be reduced to writing.  Here, instead of searching questions and answers, we have only the affidavits of respondent and her one witness.  Moreover, said affidavits were sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest.

However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner cons­titutes a waiver of the irregularity attending her arrest.^[7] Besides, by her other personal appearances before the municipal court and the court a quo, petitioner vo­luntarily submitted herself to the court's Jurisdiction.  Hence, the absence of preliminary examination becomes moot already, the court having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and could therefore proceed with the preliminary investigation proper.

Now, it was petitioner's fault that no full dress preliminary investigation proper as contemplated in Rule 112, Section 10, of the Rules of Court was conducted.  She was aware that it had been set on December 11, 1965, but apparently, petitioner failed to show up in court.  She must have assumed that her request-manifestation of Decem­ber 4, 1965 would be granted.  Following the ordinary course of Judicial procedure, it must be presumed that the criminal case was called for preliminary investiga­tion on December 11, 1965. Since petitioner did not show up, the court considered this as waiver on her part.  There was nothing more left for the court to do but forward the records of the case to the Court of First Instance upon finding the existence of prima facie case against the ac­cused.

Since petitioner had already been afforded the oppor­tunity for preliminary investigation proper and consider­ing further that the municipal judge, herself had already found a prima facie, case for libel,^[8] there was no more need for the provincial  fiscal to conduct his own prelimi­nary investigation under Section 14 of Rule 112.  Anyway, petitioner's rights could still be amply protected in the forthcoming trial of the cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition, for lack of merit, is hereby dismissed.  Costs against petitioner Raquel Doce.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Acting Chief Justice, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

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^[1] This is alleged to form part of the records below.

^[2] See back of Annex "D", Rollo, p. 25.

^[3] Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 92-93.

^[4] Annex "G" of Petition, Rollo, p. 28.

^[5] Annex "J" of Petition, Rollo: p. 36.

^[6] Took effect on June 22, 1963.

^[7] U.S. v. Grant, 18 Phil. 122; Carrington v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134.

^[8] Note 4, supra