On January 10, 1964 the spouses Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso P. Perez interposed the present petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction from the order of January 4, 1964 of the respondent Judge Gregorio T. Lantin of the Court of First Instance of Ma­nila, which order denied a motion for reconsideration of a previous order rejecting a motion to quash the writ of execution herein controverted.

A chronology of the essential antecedent events is necessary for a clear understanding of the case at bar.

On February 25, 1959 the respondent Ricardo P. Her­moso commenced civil case 39407 in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge) against the petitioner Damaso P. Perez and one Gre­gorio Subong, for the recovery of the principal sum of P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather ma­terials used in the shoe manufacturing business of the said petitioner. Because at the hearing neither the de­fendants nor their counsel appeared despite due notice to the latter, Hermoso was permitted to present his evi­dence ex parte. On April 11, 1960 judgment was rendered ordering Perez and Subong to pay Hermoso jointly and severally the sum of P17,309.44 with interest, attorney's fees and costs.

On June 21, 1960 Perez and Subong appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their appeal because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Then on Feb­ruary 4, 1961 the defendants elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of merit.

After the case was remanded to the court of origin, Hermoso moved for execution of judgment, which was granted on July 1, 1961, and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on August 15, 1961. Meantime, on July 11, 1961, Perez and Subong filed a petition for relief from judgment, alleging excusable negligence. This petition was denied by the respondent Judge on August 3, 1961. From the order of denial, Perez and Subong on August 21, 1961 served notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

On August 23, 1961 the respondent Sheriff of Manila le­vied upon 3,573 shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso P. Perez with the Republic Bank. On August 30, 1961 Perez interposed an urgent motion to stay execu­tion, alleging that the levy on said shares was highly excessive and unjust, considering that said shares have a to­tal value of more than P357,300 while the judgment debt was only P17,309.44. On September 2, 1961 the Sheriff served and published the first notice of sale scheduling the auc­tion sale of said shares for September 8, 1961. However, by order of September 7, 1961, the respondent Judge suspended the sale on execution pending resolution of the abovemen­tioned urgent motion to stay execution.

On September 29, 1961 the respondent Judge promul­gated two orders: the first denied the appeal of Perez and Subong from the abovementioned order of August 3, 1961 re­jecting their petition for relief from judgment, and the second denied Perez' urgent motion to stay execution.

Consequently, an October 4, 1961 the respondent She­riff served a second notice of sale resetting the auction for October 10, 1961. This was cancelled by the Court of Appeals which issued on October 9, 1961 a writ of prelimi­nary injunction, pending hearing of Perez' petition for mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA?G.R. 29962-R) filed on October 5, 1961 against the respondents Judge and Sheriff, in which petition Perez al­leged that (1) the levy upon his 3,573 shares of stock was manifestly and patently unjust, and (2) the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his statutory right to appeal.

On November 15, 1962 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy at the same time that it upheld the denial of his motion to appeal.

The case was remanded for the second time to the court of origin on January 14, 1963. Subsequently, on January 18, 1963, the Sheriff published the third notice of sale, this time for only 210 shares of stocks, setting the public sale for January 24, 1963.

Two days before the scheduled sale on execution, or on January 22, 1963, a new twist was added to the already pro­tracted litigation when the petitioner Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, the wife of Damaso P. Perez, filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for injunction with ex parte writ of preliminary injunction against Hermoso, the Republic Bank and the Sheriff of Manila (civil case 7532), wherein she contended that the levied shares are conjugal assets which are not answerable for the judgment debt of Damaso Perez, an obligation contracted not for the benefit or interest of their conjugal partnership. On the following day, January 23, 1963, Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granted the ex parte writ of preli­minary injunction, enjoining once more the respondent Sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. However, on Oc­tober 4, 1963, Judge Mencias lifted the writ, in obeisance to the doctrine enunciated in Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960) to the effect that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions. Incidentally, the abovementioned civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon motion of the complainant herself.

A month before the aforementioned writ was lifted, or on September 3, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to recall or lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging the same rea­sons she advanced in civil case 7532 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which are the self-same grounds upon which the herein petitioners anchor the peti­tion at bar -- the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of the obligation of Damaso Perez. Neither Mrs. Perez nor her counsel attended the sche­duled hearings. On October 19, 1963 the respondent Judge promulgated an order denying the motion on the ground that "Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez is not a part in this case and that this [the motion to lift execution] is not the remedy prescribed by the Rules of Court in its Section 15 of Rule 39 for the protection of her right".

The writ of preliminary injunction having been lifted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the urgent mo­tion to lift the writ of execution having been denied by the court a quo, the respondent Sheriff on October 18, 1963 caused the publication for the fourth time of a notice of sale set­ting the execution sale of 220 shares of stock for October 29, 1963.

On October 23, 1963 Mrs. Perez filed with the respondent Sheriff a third-party claim over the aforesaid 220 shares of stock, but the latter was determined to proceed with the sche­duled auction sale as he was protected by an indemnity bond filed by the respondent Hermoso. On October 25, 1963 Mrs. Perez, assisted by her husband, commended civil case 55292, denominated an action to vindicate third-party claim with pe­tition for preliminary injunction, in Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Federico Alik­pala. As a consequence of the new action, the projected exe­cution sale was suspended for the fourth time. On November 8, 1963 Judge Alikpala denied the preliminary injunction prayed for in the aforesaid civil case 55292, on the grounds that (1) he has no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction; and (2) the remedy of plaintiff (Mrs. Perez) is to lodge the third-party claim filed by her with the court which issued the execution, "as it has the inherent control of its minis­terial officers and to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice."

The aforesaid civil case 55292 was dismissed on March 20, 1964, upon agreement of the parties after the institution of the petition at bar.

On the same day (November 8, 1963), Damaso Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsi­deration" of the order of October 19, 1963 which denied his wife's motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. In this latest motion, Perez adopted his wife's previous mo­tion, and at the same time offered in lieu of the levied stocks his alleged cash dividends in the Republic Bank in the sum of P19,985. In the same motion he asked for the suspension of the fifth scheduled auction sale set for No­vember 11, 1963, which was granted ex parte.

On January 4, 1964, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge.

After the respondent Sheriff had scheduled (for the sixth time) the execution sale of the levied 240 shares of stock, the herein petitioners on January 10, 1965 interposed the present petition, which was given due course on January 15, 1964; the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued upon petitioners posting a bond of P10,000.

The movants-petitioners main contention is that the res­pondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recall the controverted writ of execution despite their avowal that the levied 240 shares of stock belong to their conjugal partnership and as such cannot be made to answer for a judgment debt which is a personal obligation only of Damaso Perez.

After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the respondent Judge acted correctly in refusing to quash the writ in dispute.

It is conceded that courts have jurisdiction to enter­tain motions to quash their writs of execution because every court has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.^[1] However, the exercise of this power is well circumscribed. Thus, the proper court may quash the writ only in certain situations, as when it appears that (a) it has been improvidently issued, or (b) it is defective in substance, or (c) it has been issued against the wrong party, or (d) the judgment debt has been paid, or (e) the writ has been issued without authority, or (f) there has been a change in the si­tuation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, or (g) the controversy has never been submitted to the judg­ment of the court, and therefore no judgment at all has ever been rendered thereon.^[2] In the instant controversy, not one of these accepted grounds exists.

Significantly, the spouses have not questioned the in­trinsic validity or regularity of the writ of execution. They have alleged none of the circumstances earlier enumerated or other similar grounds which may warrant the quashal of the writ in dispute.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execu­tion, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the pro­jected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the le­vied stocks should be established as a basis for the subse­quent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the pro­tracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt.

Considering the antecedent facts, particularly CA-G.R. 29962-R, even the remedy indicated above must fail, as Da­maso Perez is now estopped from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets. All along he has nurtured the impression that the said shares are his exclusive property, which representation was enhanced by the fact that the same are registered in his name alone.

It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez practically asserted exclusive ownership of the levied shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety of the levy with respect to its excessive coverage, he never raised the question of the conjugal nature of the levied shares. Having represented himself before the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals as the exclusive owner of the shares in dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets, an assertion that he should have ad­vanced with expected alacrity when he first questioned the legality of the levy.

Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although she was not a party in CA-G.R. 29962-R, the judgment therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her husband. Moreover, she cannot feign utter ignorance of the affairs of her husband as to justify her delay in questioning the legal­ity of the levy on the ground aforestated in civil case 7532, which case was commenced only on January 22,1963, 17 months after the original levy was made on August 23, 1961.

Even granting that the court a quo could properly take cognizance of the said motion to quash the writ of execution, the movants-petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the levied shares are conjugal assets and that the judg­ment debt is a personal obligation only of Damaso Perez.

Anent their claim that the shares in question are con­jugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of evi­dence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that "All property of the mar­riage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de, Ilano,^[3] it was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conju­gal property." In the recent case of Maramba vs. Lozano, et al.,^[4] this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code re­fers to property acquired during the marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired. . . the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband alone is an indication that the shares be­long exclusively to said spouse.

Conceding, however, that the shares in question are conju­gal assets, they must still prove that their ganancial partner­ship is not liable for the payment of the aforesaid judgment debt. This, they were unable to do. Their contention that the judgment debt is a personal obligation of only one of them is devoid of evidentiary foundation. It is, to say the least, a futile attempt to rebut the presumption that the husband, as head of the family and administrator of the conjugal partner­ship, contracts obligations for the benefit of his family or the partnership.^[5] The aforesaid obligation was contracted in the purchase of leather used in the shoe manufacturing bu­siness of the petitioner husband. Said business is an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, in the pursuit of which Damaso Perez had the right to embark the partnership.^[6] It is well-set­tled that the debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his exclu­sive and private debts.^[7]

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted li­tigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or with­drawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on official leave.

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^[1] Dimayuga vs. Raymundo, 76 Phil., 143.

^[2] Moran, comments On The Rules of Court, Vol. 2, p. 258, and the cited therein.

^[3] 63 Phil., 629, 639.

^[4] L-21533 June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474.

^[5] See J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, 1964 ed., Vol. I, p. 186; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1960 ed., Vol. I, pp. 402-403; Francis­co, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Bk. I, pp. 522?523.

^[6] Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger and Galinger, 56 Phil. 326.

^[7] Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336.