G.R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

Petitioner therein prays for judgment:

1)  Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Phil­ippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any disburse­ment from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and

2)  declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.

The main facts are not disputed.  On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1.     R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, pro­posing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Phil­ippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be appor­tioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be accord­ing to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

2.     R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3.     R.B.H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Arti­cle VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to author­ize senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional conven­tion, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elec­tions which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967.  At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents.  Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Associa­tion --- hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA --- were allowed to argue as amici curiae.  Said counsel for the PHIL­CONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise, prayed that the de­cision in this case be deferred until after a substantially iden­tical case --- brought by said organization before the Commis­sion on Elections,^[1] which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court --- had been submitted thereto for final determina­tion, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both cases.  In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G.R. No. L-28224 for review by certiorari of the resolution of the Commission on Elections^[2] dismissing the petition therein.  The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.

Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter.  He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class suit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.  Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one.  In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General ex­pressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issues raised in said case.

The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.  Despite his aforemen­tioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no jurisdic­tion over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.^[3] Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground:  a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the re­lief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render inoperational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law x x x does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."

J u r i s d i c t i o n

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,^[4] this Court speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Consti­tutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of power between the several departments and among the integral or constitutional constituent units thereof."

It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,^[5] this Court, characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law.  The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,^[6] Avelino vs. Cuenco,^[7] Tañada vs. Cuenco,^[8] and Macias vs. Commis­sion on Elections.^[9] In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest num­ber of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional and act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as nearly as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province.  Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.^[10] It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sov­ereignty in a republican state, such as ours^[11] to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.  Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.^[12] Hence, when exer­cising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.  When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their author­ity from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function,^[13] for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.  Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a govern­ment of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution.  Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Con­stitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,^[14] the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,^[15] despite the eminently political character of the treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Con­gress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,^[16] the latter should be deemed modified accordingly.  The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.

The Merits

Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amend­ed, reads:

"The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose.  Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."

Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a conven­tion called by Congress for that purpose.  In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is neces­sary.  And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the 'Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the peo­ple for their ratification."

In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately.  This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:

1.    The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congress­men;

2.    Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives - propose amendments or call a convention therefore - but may not avail of both - that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention - at the same time;

3.    The election, in which proposals for amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments - such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and

4.    The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be sub­mitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions - which, allegedly, do not exist - as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments.

Legality of Congress and

Legal Status of the Congressmen

The first objection is based upon Section 5, Arti­cle VI, of the Constitution, which provides:

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be ac­cording to the number of their respective inhab­itants, but each province shall have at least one Member.  The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the re­turn of every enumeration, and not otherwise.  Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elect­ed by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts.  Each representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory."

It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Con­gress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, conse­quently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.

It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960.  It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,^[17] purporting to make said apportionment.  This Act was, however, declared uncon­stitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines.^[18]

Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid ap­portionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers.  The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory.  The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers.

It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law.  The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:

"x x x Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts.  x x x."

The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal.  On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative dis­tricts existing at the time of the expiration of said period.

It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935.  This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.^[19] The as­sumption is, however, unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made.  Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.

What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the legislative de­partment, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bica­meral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.

Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.

Then again, since the report of the Director of the Cen­sus on the last enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961.  There can be no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers.  Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holders of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.

Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period, without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and we are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion.  Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment.  In fact, neither our political law, in general, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it maybe, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.

Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provisions of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960.  Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress - with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they exist­ed at the time of said elections - remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned.

Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,^[20] the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but, also their main function.  This provision indicates that, despite the vio­lation of such mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution.  In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.

Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void.  In fact, the main reason for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public - as distinguished from the officer in question - is concerned.^[21] Indeed, otherwise, those deal­ing with officers and employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the position they hold, before dealing with them, or be­fore recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority vest­ed in their respective offices, positions or employments.^[22] One can imagine the great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer can­not be assailed collaterally.^[23] It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings.  Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.^[24]  And the reasons are obvious:  (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the compe­tence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is con­cerned.

It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not third parties.  This pretense is untenable.  It is inconsistent with Tayko vs. Ca­pistrano.^[25] In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement.  This Court held that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally.  It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned.  Tayko was one of the parties in the aforemen­tioned suit.  Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, fin­ished hearing the case, much less rendered a decision therein.  No rights had vested in favor of any of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge.  Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled.  Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested and Re­public Act No. 4913, are complete.  Congress has nothing else to do in connection therewith.

The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the ob­jection under consideration is untenable.

Alternatives Available

to Congress

Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purposed, but it cannot do both, at the same time.  This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, weak one, in the absence of other circumstances - and none has been brought to our attention - supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae.  In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.^[26]

It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provisions on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general.  In other words, the subject-matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.  Moreover, the amendments proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional con­vention called in R.B.H. No. 2.  Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other.  In other words, they were not passed at the same time.

In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof, anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different sessions or different days of the same congressional session.  And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.

Counsel ask:  Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held?  The force of this argument must be conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it.  One seeming purpose thereof is to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.  Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.

On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.

May Constitutional Amendments

Be Submitted for Ratification

in a General Election?

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

"x x x The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose.  Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."

There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general election.  The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratifi­cation in special elections merely shows that Congress deem­ed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining.  It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials.  And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities in­volved in general elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen.  But, then, these con­siderations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebi­scite simultaneously with the election of public officers.  They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the above-quoted provision of the Constitu­tion.  Such authority becomes even more patent when we con­sider:  (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitu­tion, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "elec­tion," but "plebiscite."

Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election.  Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers.  They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.

This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for.  It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted.  The ideal conditions are, however, one thing.  The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amend­ment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing.  Much as the writer and those who concur in this opin­ion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Con­stitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.

The majority view - although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitu­tional - as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.

Would the submission now of the

contested amendments to the

people violate the spirit of

the Constitution?

It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question.  Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:

(1)   that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;"

(2)   that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"

(3)   that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for exami­nation by the qualified electors during election day;"

(4)   that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"

(5)   that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution;" and

(6)   that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.

We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendments sought to be made.

These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to them for ratifica­tion, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment.  Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:

"Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination of the election.  At least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance append­ed thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examina­tion by the qualified electors during election day.  Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the Sec­retary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place."

The provision concerning woman's suffrage in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:

"Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted there­in continually until after the termination of the plebiscite.  At least ten copies of the said Arti­cle V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place avail­able for examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite.  Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the In­terior, shall also be kept in each polling place."

Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, re­ferring to the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:

"The said amendments shall be publish­ed in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election.  A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and pro­vincial government office building and in every polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the election.  At least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day.  When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept therein."

As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:

"The said amendment shall be publish­ed in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election.  A printed copy there­of shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election.  At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the quali­fied electors during election day.  When prac­ticable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place."

The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor.  The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place.  Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, ac­cordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign.  Such debates or polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the ini­tiative of a few civic organizations and some militant mem­bers of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon.  A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently.  Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.

Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a consti­tutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fair­ly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is under R.B.H. No. 1 the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R.B.H. No. 3 the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.  We who constitute the minority believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R.B.H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines.  It is not improbable, how­ever, that they are not interested in the details of the ap­portionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend, in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof.  Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of the contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the bal­lots they will use.

It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R.B.H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic.  But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty.  From our viewpoint, the provi­sions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R.B.H. No. 3 permits Con­gressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom a Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same.

The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the funda­mental law is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each departments is supreme within its own sphere.  The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere.  We do not believe it has been satisfac­torily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913.  Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof.  But, then, no law is perfect.  No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement.  Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid.  Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismissed, and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pro­nouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of Jurisdiction.
Sanchez, J., renders a separate opinion.
Reyes, Dizon, and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result reached in the separate opinion of Justice Sanchez.
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur in the separate opinion of Justice Sanchez.

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^[1] Urging the latter to refrain from implementing Republic Act No. 4913 and from submitting to a plebiscite in the general elections to be held on November 14, 1967, the Constitutional amendments proposed in the aforementioned R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.

^[2] Dated October 30, 1967.

^[3] 78 Phil., 1.

^[4] 63 Phil., 139, 157.

^[5] Supra.

^[6] 81 Phil., 818.

^[7] L-2851, March 4 and 14, 1949.

^[8] L-10520, February 28, 1957.

^[9] L-18684, September 14, 1961.

^[10] Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[11] Section 1, Art. II, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[12] Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines.

^[13] Of amending the Constitution.

^[14] And, inferentially, to lower courts.

^[15] Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII, of the Constitution.

^[16] Supra.

^[17] Approved, June 17, 1961.

^[18] Macias vs. Commission on Elections, supra.

^[19] Under the original Constitution providing for a unicameral legislative body, whose members were chosen for a term of three (3) years (Section 1, Art. VI, of the Original Constitution).

^[20] Section 1, Article IX, of the Constitution.

^[21] Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, 37 Phil., p. 192; Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil., 126; Codilla vs. Martinez, L-14569, November 23, 1960.  See, also, State vs. Carrol, 38 Conn., 449; Wilcox vs. Smith 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass., 445; 23 Am. Rep., 323.

^[22] Torres vs. Ribo, 81 Phil., 50.

^[23] Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, supra.

^[24] People vs. Rogelio Gabitanan, 43 O.G., 3211.

^[25] 53 Phil., 866.

^[26] 50 Am. Jur., Sec. 282, pp. 267-268, citing Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, 284 Mich 677, 280 NW 79, citing RCL; Robson v. Cantwell, 143 SC 104, 141 SE 180, citing RCL; Geiger v. Kobilka, 26 Wash 171, 66 P 423, 90 Am St. Rep. 733 and many others.

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