[ G.R. No. 2485, August 17, 1905 ]
ANTONIA DE LA CRUZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SANTIAGO GARCIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
MAPA, J.:
On the 16th of November following, the defendant presented a bill of exceptions which, notwithstanding the objection of the plaintiff, was duly allowed on the 6th of February, 1905.
The plaintiff asks in her motion that said bill of exceptions be dismissed on the ground that the defendant did not except to the judgment at the time of its rendition or at the time he received notice thereof, nor as soon as possible thereafter, but three months from the date of the decision, after the court had overruled his motion for a new trial.
This court has laid down the rule applicable in similar cases.
In the case of Sparrevohn vs. Fisher[1] (2 Off. Gaz., 2) the Court of First Instance entered judgment against the defendant on the 15th of July, 1902; on the 23d of the same month the defendant moved for a new trial and after his motion had been overruled he presented a bill of exceptions on the 28th of the same month. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of the bill of exceptions on the ground that the exception to the judgment had not been presented in due time, and this court upon deciding the question thus raised, held:
"Inasmuch as the defendant moved for a new trial ten days after the rendition of judgment, and this motion being overruled, three days thereafter he filed his bill of exceptions, we hold that the exceptions were taken in due time."
The same decision was made in the case of Vicente Gomez vs. Jacinta Hipolito et al.[1] (2 Off. Gaz., 33.) In that case judgment was entered upon the 1st day of May, 1903, and notice thereof was given to the plaintiff on the 21st of the same month. The plaintiff excepted thereto on the 23d of May and moved for a new trial, which motion was denied on the 23d day of July, and only on the 28th day of that month did he file his bill of exceptions; the majority of this court, however, held that the bill had been properly allowed and certified to by the court below, over the objection of the defendants who contended that the said bill of exceptions had been presented after the time provided by law had expired and that it should therefore be dismissed.
The case of Eulogio Garcia vs. Ambler and Sweeney[2] may also be cited. That was a petition for mandamus to compel the judge to certify a bill of exceptions presented by Garcia in a certain action between him and J. W. Marker for damages. The judgment in that case was entered on the 1st day of May, 1903, against the said Garcia. He excepted thereto on the 7th of May and at the same time moved for a new trial, which motion was denied on the 27th of June. He then presented his bill of exceptions on the 3d day of July following. This court held that the exception to the judgment and the bill of exceptions were presented in due time and that it was the duty of the court below to allow and certify the said bill of exceptions. (2 Off. Gaz., 547.)
It will be noticed from the decisions above cited that this court has given legal efficacy to the motion for a new trial, holding that the same is equivalent to an exception when the defeated party makes such a motion immediately after being notified of the judgment of the court, or within a reasonable time thereafter, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case; so that in the first case above cited, all that the defeated party did was to move for a new trial and present his bill of exceptions three days after he had made such motion. There was no actual exception. The appellant did not use this technical expression. He did not fail to state, however, in a certain and unequivocal manner that he was not satisfied with the judgment of the court when he moved for a new trial. His motion was in its very nature a formal protest against the justice and legality of the judgment, and an exception which is an objection to the judgment excepted to is in reality nothing more than a mere protest.
In these two cases cited, the bills of exception were presented almost two months after the exception to the judgment had been filed, but only a few days after the appellant was notified of the denial of his motion. If no motion for a new trial had been made, the bills of exception would have probably been presented out of time, but a lapse of two months after the exception had been taken, speaking generally, and without taking into consideration the special circumstances of each particular case, would exceed the time prescribed by law for the presentation of such bills of exception. It is well known that bills of exception should be presented within ten days after the defeated party has notified the court of his intention to present his bill of exceptions and that such notice must be given at the time of the rendition of the final judgment or as soon thereafter as possible, in accordance with the provisions of section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It has been laid down as a rule by this court that a motion for a new trial presented immediately after the receipt of notice of judgment or within a reasonable time, according to the circumstances of each particular case, and provided the same is based upon errors of law alleged to have been committed by the trial court or on the insufficiency of the evidence, is equivalent to an exception to the judgment and has the effect of suspending the time prescribed by law within which notice should be given to the court by the appellant of his intention to present a bill of exceptions, until such motion for a new trial has been passed upon by the court.
It follows, therefore, from this ruling of the court, that when a motion for a new trial is overruled, if the defeated party should, as soon as possible after receiving notice of the order overruling the same, notify the court of his intention of presenting a bill of exceptions, he shall have the right to present such bill of exceptions within ten days thereafter. This court has also held that this period of ten days may be extended by an order of the court or by stipulation of the parties. (Vicente Gomez vs. Jacinta Hipolito, above cited.)
It is essential that the motion for a new trial be presented immediately after notice of the judgment, or within a reasonable time thereafter, in order that it produce the legal effects above referred to. We take it to be equivalent to an exception, provided it be presented exactly within that time. If presented after that time it has not and can not have the effect of perfecting the appeal to this court, in the same manner that an exception presented out of time would not have such effect. In such a case it can not be considered otherwise except as a remedy which has for its object to have the Court of First Instance set aside its judgment and give the parties a new trial in accordance with the provisions of section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this connection we held in the case of Eustaquia Salcedo vs. Amanda de Marcaida,[1] decided the 13th of March, 1905, that a motion for a new trial is entirely different from and independent of an exception, for the reason that the motion in that case was presented two months after notice of the judgment, within which time the defeated party failed to except to the judgment or to perform any other act indicating its intention to bring the case to the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar the defeated party was in no way negligent in the preparation and perfection of its appeal, for on the same day in which he was notified of the judgment of the court he moved for a new trial and three days after his motion had been overruled he excepted to the order of the court overruling such motion and also excepted to the final judgment in the case, presenting there-after his bill of exceptions without any objection on the part of the appellee.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Carson, and Willard, JJ. concur.
[1] 2 Phil. Rep., 676.
[1] 2 Phil. Rep., 732.
[2] Page 81, supra.
[1] Page 267, supra.