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[TOMAS A. BORJA v. DIOSCORO DE LEON](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c3ffb?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-20245, Sep 30, 1963 ]

TOMAS A. BORJA v. DIOSCORO DE LEON +

DECISION

118 Phil. 1050

[ G.R. No. L-20245, September 30, 1963 ]

TOMAS A. BORJA, PETITIONER VS. DIOSCORO DE LEON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Tomas A. Borja and Dioscoro de Leon were the official candidates for the office of mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in the  elections held  on November 10,  1959.  Upon  the conclusion of the canvass on November 18, 1959, the municipal  board of  canvassers proclaimed  De Leon  as  the duly elected mayor of Gapan with p. plurality of 96 votes over Borja, De Leon having been credited with 4,873 votes and Borja with 4,777.

On November 23, 1959, Borja filed a protest before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in which he averred that the election in Precincts Nos. 1,16, 22-A, 28, 28-A, 32, 32-A, 33, 33-A, 34, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 36-D was tainted with  frauds and irregularities and  should be invalidated.

By way of counterprotest, De Leon in turn contested the election in Precincts Nos, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 4- A,  5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A, 8,10,10-A, 10-B, 11,12,14,17,18, 19,19-A, 19-B, 20, 21,  21-A, 21-B, 21-C, 22, 23,  23-A, 23-B, 24, 24-A 25, 26-A and 27.

After trial on the  merits,  the court a quo declared De Leon the duly elected mayor  with a plurality of 35 votes, whereupon Borja filed a motion for reconsideration.   He alleged that the court erroneously credited Borja with 119 votes only in Precinct No. 22-A, which is less by 31 votes than the total number actually counted in his favor in open court during the hearing on January 22, 1960.

Acting on the motion, the court a quo ordered the  reopening of the ballot box for Precinct No. 22-A and the recounting  of the  ballots cast  for protestant as a result of which it was established  that protestant received 146 votes.  In view of this recounting, the court a quo amended its  decision by declaring De Leon the elected mayor of Gapan with a plurality of 8 votes.

Both protestant and protestee appealed from the original decision, as well as from the amended one, to the Court of Appeals where, however, the appeal of protestee was dismissed in view of his failure to file his  brief.  He was likewise barred from filing his brief as appellee for the same reason.  Thereupon, on  May 30, 1962, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment likewise declaring Dioscoro de Leon as the duly elected mayor of  Gapan with  a plurality of 37 votes.

Protestant filed a motion  for reconsideration  contending that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it passed upon  on  more than 300 ballots  which protestant did not touch in  his appeal, nor the  protestee, as the latter's appeal was dismissed for failure to file his brief even if he was unable to file  his brief as appellee  after his  appeal  was  dismissed.  Protestant emphasized  that the  appellate jurisdiction  of  the Court of Appeals  was merely restricted to those ballots which protestant touched or discussed in his  appeal, and if  this is done  and the aforesaid 300  ballots are  disregarded the result  would show that protestant  has a  plurality of 10 votes over  protestee. Required to submit his  comment on the motion, protestee  submitted,  even belatedly, an opposition   thereto, invoking our ruling in Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil., 852.  The argument of protestant to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.  Hence, the present petition for review.

The  main theme  of protestant is  that  the Court of Appeals erred in passing upon and in  rendering judgment anew on 363 ballots  despite the fact  that the   same were not the subject of his appeal nor were they touched  upon or discussed in his brief even if they were not  also taken up  by  protestee in his brief because his appeal was dismissed and was unable to file any brief as appellee. And this contention is predicated upon the fact that  this Court in some cases has  ruled in connection with protests on appeal that it is  the duty of protestant, or  his  counsel, in the discussion of the errors imputed to the trial court in the revision of ballots  in the different precincts, to point out the error or errors into which said court is said to have  fallen, and that if he  fails to do so or  no such assignment is made,  the court may refuse to consider or examine such ballots because there is no attempt  to show where the error  of  the trial court  had been committed. And with regard to the appellee, this Court has also stated that it is likewise the duty of  the appellee to point out in his brief any error against himself into which the court is supposed  to have  fallen, as  otherwise  the court may refuse to consider it.[1]

It is true that this  Court has  stated in some cases that in appeals in  election protests  it is  necessary  that the party  appealing should make an   assignment of error in which he should point out the error or errors imputed to the trial court in  the revision of ballots in different precincts in view of the numerous number of ballots   involved in a protest  and that if such assignment is not made or the error is not pointed out, the appellate court  may refuse to examine or consider the same in the appeal, but that ruling was laid down merely as a guide for  a party or his counsel in an election case in view of the numerous ballots involved because otherwise the court may not know what particular ballot an appeal refers to.  But that ruling  cannot  be so interpreted as to deprive an appellate court of the  right  given to it by  law to examine  any ballot  even motu proprio if that is necessary  to arrive at a  correct decision (Section 175, Revised Election Code). It is for this  reason that  an appeal  in an  election case is likened to an appeal in a criminal case where  the case is deemed tried de novo (Section 178,  Revised  Election Code). The philosophy behind this ruling is that the real purpose  of an  election case is to  ascertain what is the true will of the people or who is the one duly elected and this can only be achieved by throwing wide open the appeal before the  court.

Thus, in Cababasada vs. Valmoria,[2] where the consideration of some ballots by the appellate court was objected to on the  ground  that  the appellant has not  made  any express  assignment  of  errors in  his  brief with regard thereto,  and the objection was overruled  on the ground that the  ballots were within the appellate jurisdiction of the court, we said: "When it appears that the trial  court has  illegally rejected ballots that had been legally cast in favor of a  candidate, the appellate court must correct the error, even without an express assignment of error made in the brief.  An appellate  court may affirm an appealed decision on grounds different from those stated  in  the decision of the trial court.  According to Section 178 of the Revised Election Code, appeals in election  contests  shall proceed as  in criminal cases,  and in a  criminal case  the appellate  court  may consider errors of the trial court  not expressly  pointed out in an  assignment of error, so as to render substantial justice." Our ruling in the case mentioned  by protestant should be interpreted  in  this  light because an  election case involves public interest.

"There are weighty reasons that support the application of  such theory in election  cases.  One  is  the cardinal principle  that an election   case involves public interest and,  hence,  it imposes upon the court the imperative duty to ascertain by  all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. That is why the law gives  to the court  the  power, in the interest of justice, to  order motu  proprio that the ballot boxes  and other election documents  be produced before it so that they may be examined and recounted regardless of whether the party raises  any issue in  its pleading concerning the validity of the ballots (Section 175, Revised Election Code). On the other hand, it has been  postulated as  a fundamental principle underlying  the trial  of  election cases that technicalities or procedural barriers should not be  allowed to stand if the  same would tend to defeat  rather than promote the  interest of justice.  Rather,  it is enjoined that the Election Law  should be  liberally  construed to the end   that the  will of the  people may not be defeated (Ibasco  vs.  Ilao, et al., 110 Phil., 553.)

Having reached this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to consider the other assignments of errors in appellant's brief.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.   No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador,  Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalirital, JJ., concur.

 


[1] U.S. vs. Noriega  and Tobias, 31 Phil.,  310; Lucero vs. De Guzman, supra; Mendoza vs. Mendiola, 53 Phil., 267.

[2]  83 Phil., 112.

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